


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A HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE
WAR BETWEEN THE STATES

VOLUME II

BETHEL TO SHARPSBURG

BETHEL TO SHARPSBURG

BY

DANIEL HARVEY HILL


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VOLUME II

RALEIGH

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CHAPTER XI

YORKTOWN AND WILLIAMSBURG

The Virginia Peninsula, to which the eastern seat of war was transferred in the spring of 1862, is a long, narrow tongue of land enclosed between the York River on the north and the James River on the south. Its eastern front is washed by the Chesapeake Bay. The James River is navigable to Richmond, but at this time was unavailable to McClellan on account of the *Merrimac* and the batteries at Mulberry Point. The York River is easily navigable as far as West Point, and through its tributary, the Pamunkey, with more difficulty, as far as the White House. This river, too, was closed to Federal boats by the Confederate guns at Yorktown and at Gloucester Point, across the river. Until these could be reduced, West Point, which McClellan designed to use as a field base, was inaccessible. He, therefore, could advance only by forcing his way overland up the Peninsula by direct frontal assaults, unless McDowell's corps could take Gloucester in reverse from Fredericksburg.

The entire section was unfavorable for army habitation or movement. The lower peninsula, flat, ill-drained, malarial, sickly, was indented with streams of small flow, but extensive, swampy banks. At high tide in the rivers, these streams were deepened to impassability and the swamps flooded. The upper Peninsula, more densely wooded, is bisected by the sluggish swamp-bordered Chickahominy River, flowing parallel to the two tidal rivers. The roads, instead of being as General McClellan thought, "passable at all seasons of the year," had to be laboriously corduroyed before they were passable at all for artillery

and heavy army trains. The spring rains and continuous army traffic soon changed them into trails of mud.

Borne by the headquarters steamer *Commodore*, General McClellan reached Fortress Monroe on April 2, 1862.¹ This grim old fort, mounting 223 heavy guns and garrisoned by 14,904 men,² was in the department of General John E. Wool. As General McClellan naturally desired to control operations at his own base, General Wool agreed to waive all technicalities³ and the command was transferred to McClellan, with permission to draw a division of troops from the fort as soon as he needed it.⁴

On the morning after McClellan arrived he received the first of three disappointments that he says seriously marred his approaching campaign. First, he learned that the navy could not fulfill his expectations of combining with the army in assaulting the batteries of Yorktown and Gloucester Point.⁵

The second disappointment came in a midnight telegram countermanding the order which gave him control of Wool's forces. He was, therefore, no longer in command of his own base. The third will be mentioned presently.

¹ "I reached Fort Monroe on the afternoon of the 2d, still under the delusion that I should have an active army of 146,000 and the full control of my base of operations, and that I should receive efficient support from the navy." *McClellan's Own Story*, 254.

² *Official Records*, 14, 54.

³ *Ibid.*, 25, 39.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 18, 25.

⁵ General McClellan in his report says: "Flag Officer Goldsborough, then in command of the United States squadron in Hampton Roads, regarded it (and no doubt justly) as his highest and most imperative duty to watch and neutralize the *Merrimac*, and . . . he did not feel able to attack the water batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester. All this was contrary to what had previously been stated to me, and naturally affected my plans." *Ibid.*, 9, 8. On the other hand, the assistant secretary of the navy, and also Admiral Goldsborough, testify before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, that the naval authorities were not consulted about any plans to capture those batteries, that wooden vessels could not have bombarded the works with any success, and that the navy complied with every request of General McClellan. Fox states directly: "I am not aware that he ever required that we should attack Yorktown or that it was ever expected that we should do so." *Ibid.*, 630-34.

Without waiting for all his troops to arrive, General McClellan on the morning of April 4 set his Second Corps, under General Heintzelman, and his Fourth Corps, under General Keyes, in motion over the execrable roads of the Peninsula. Heintzelman advanced on the road leading by Big Bethel for Yorktown. Keyes took the James River road to obtain position between Yorktown and Williamsburg. McClellan clearly states his plans in his official report: "I had hoped by rapid movements to drive before me or capture the enemy on the Peninsula, open the James River, and press on to Richmond before he could be materially reinforced from other portions of his territory. . . . I designed, should the works at Yorktown and Williamsburg offer a serious resistance, to land the First Corps,¹ reinforced, if necessary, on the left bank of the York or on the Severn, to move it on Gloucester and West Point in order to take in reverse whatever force the enemy might have on the Peninsula, and compel him to abandon his position."²

General McClellan's hopes of driving the enemy before him and of capturing Yorktown on the ninth³ were rudely jarred on April 5; for, when Heintzelman's columns came abreast of Yorktown on that morning, they were stopped by an artillery fire from the works that McClellan deemed too strong to assault. Keyes's corps on the left was also brought to a halt about six miles below Yorktown by a hot fire at Lee's Mill on the Warwick River. "No part of this line as far as discovered," he reported to McClellan, "can be taken by assault without an enormous waste of life."⁴ McClellan did not know until his army ran under

¹ The First Corps was McDowell's, which was unexpectedly taken from him on April 4. In view of his plans, as just outlined, it is easy to see how in his vexation he wrote to his wife that the order of withdrawal was "the most infamous thing that history has recorded."

² *Official Records*, 14, 8.

³ Letter to his wife, April 3. *McClellan's Own Story*, 307.

⁴ Keyes to McClellan.

its guns either the "nature or extent of this position along the Warwick River,"¹ nor that the river flowed parallel to his front.

The works that thus unexpectedly jostled awry General McClellan's plan "to press on to Richmond before the Confederates could be reinforced," were constructed by General J. B. Magruder, who on May 21, 1861, had been assigned to the command of the Peninsula. General Magruder, a former major of artillery in the United States army, was perhaps the most picturesque general officer of the Confederacy. Fond of display, punctilious in ceremonial, apt in the ruses of war,² belligerent by temperament, he was withal a competent commander and an engineer of skill.

Shortly after Magruder assumed command the First Regiment of North Carolina Volunteers, under Colonel D. H. Hill, reported to him at Yorktown. Colonel Hill was put in immediate command of the post of Yorktown, and his military training was at once of service in laying out and strengthening the fortifications in that sector. About July 1, the Fifteenth North Carolina Regiment, under Colonel Robert M. McKinney, joined the garrison. The soldiers of these two regiments, quartered on the line of the old Revolutionary works, were along with all of Magruder's troops, called to incessant labor in ditching and intrenching during the summer. This severe duty, which often continued for a good part of the night, was lightened only by the bewildering marches up and down the Peninsula that Magruder frequently made to impress the Federals with a show of force.³

¹ McClellan's Report.

² A young officer irreverently wrote of his chief: "General Magruder takes more delight in kicking up a clatter to fool the enemy than any man you ever saw."

³ Magruder reports in regard to this service: "I had to defend a peninsula 90 miles in length and some 10 miles in width, enclosed between two navigable rivers, terminated by fortresses impregnable as long as the enemy commanded the waters. My force was less than 3,000 men." *Official Records*, 9, 38.

The constant exposure in the pestilential marshes of that section brought about an excessive amount of sickness among Magruder's overtaxed little body.¹ The First Regiment, as already narrated, constituted largely the Confederate force in the battle of Bethel on June 10, 1861. In September Colonel Hill was appointed a brigadier-general, and, at the request of Governor Clark, was assigned to command the defenses of North Carolina. On his promotion Lieutenant-Colonel Charles C. Lee was elected colonel.² The regiment remained in the neighborhood of Yorktown until it was mustered out of service in November. With the exception of a brief excursion to North Carolina after the fall of New Bern, the Fifteenth Regiment remained with Magruder until Yorktown was evacuated.

Faced as he was continuously by a large Federal force at Fortress Monroe—first under Butler and then under Wool³—Magruder began three defensive lines across the Peninsula with water batteries on their flanks. The first of these, constructed after months of toil and extending from Ship Point on the York to Mulberry Island on the James, he was forced by lack of numbers to abandon on the approach of McClellan's army. The second, which was now arresting the progress of the Federals, was pitched behind the

¹ Lieutenant Kearny of the Fifteenth Regiment writes: "During the early part of September there was less than ten per cent of the regiment able to perform camp duty. The loss by death and disability during the months preceding winter was greater than from battle during any one year afterwards, being over fifteen per cent." Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 737.

² At this election Major James H. Lane was selected as lieutenant-colonel, and Robert F. Hoke was promoted from a lieutenantancy to the majoralty. The regiment at the close of its six months of service was reorganized as the Eleventh North Carolina. Shortly after these elections Lane was chosen colonel of the Twenty-eighth North Carolina and Hoke lieutenant-colonel of the Thirty-third North Carolina, and when the First Regiment was mustered out Lee was elected colonel of the Thirty-seventh North Carolina.

³ General Butler reports 6,750 on June 26, 1861 (*Official Records*, 2, 666); General Wool reports 10,900 on November 26, 1861 (*Ibid.*, 4, 629-31); and 11,692 present for duty; 13,013 present and absent in December, 1861. *Ibid.*, 632.

sluggish swamp and forest-bordered Warwick River. This river, rising near Yorktown and flowing athwart the Peninsula, had been so dammed as to flood the adjoining country as far as Lee's Mill, where Keyes's corps was now anxiously reconnoitering. The roads across the river were on these dams, which were defended by abatis, rifle-trenches, and batteries.¹ The line having the batteries at Mulberry Point for its right flank terminated in the village of Yorktown on its left. The town was fortified by continuous earthworks, water batteries, and rifle pits. The entire line was unfinished and the Confederates continued to strengthen weak points during the siege.

In order that his scant force² might fortify undisturbed and that the nature of his works might not be disclosed, Magruder always kept a field force pressed close to Fortress Monroe, and as at Bethel, hit hard at any excursions from the Federal base. So well had he succeeded in holding the Federals under cover of their guns that General McClellan, on setting out from Wool's headquarters, was utterly uninformed as to the position or strength of the Confederate lines.

From the time at which he began to receive daily reports of the coming of the much heralded Grand Army of the Potomac, Magruder was torn with anxiety lest his stretched-out lines should be tossed aside before

¹ Colonel H. C. Cabell, chief of Magruder's artillery, gives this description of the topography and intrenchments: "Three roads led up from the Peninsula and crossed the line of our defenses. The first on our right was the Warwick road, that crossed at Lee's Mill; the second crossed at Wynn's Mill, and the third was commanded by the redoubts (Nos. 4 and 5) near Yorktown. The crossing at Lee's Mill was naturally strong, and fortifications had been erected there and at Wynn's Mill. Below Lee's Mill the Warwick River, affected by the tides and invested by swamps on each side, formed a tolerable protection; but the marshes could easily be made passable and the river bridged. Between Lee's and Wynn's Mills an unbroken forest extended on the right bank of the stream to a distance of about 3 miles. Two additional dams were constructed—the one (Dam No. 1) nearest to Wynn's Mill and the other Dam No. 2. A dam called the "upper dam" was constructed in the stream above Wynn's Mill." *Official Records*, 12, 412.

² In the summer of 1861, Magruder reports his strength at 3,000 (*Ibid.*, 9, 38); on August 24, 1861, at 6,000 (*Ibid.*, 4, 635); on October 8, 1861, at 9,500.

Lee, who was watching the development of McClellan's movement,¹ could send aid.² Notwithstanding his disparity in numbers, he resolved to make a "glorious fight," and in an order to his soldiers directs that "each man shall take care to aim well, fire low, and bring his man."³ Magruder's solicitude is readily understood. When McClellan's army of 58,000⁴ men was halted on April 5, by Confederate artillery fire, only 11,500 men⁵ were present to support that fire. Moreover, of this number Magruder says: "I was compelled to place at Gloucester Point, Yorktown, and Mulberry Island fixed garrisons amounting to 6,000 men, my whole force being 11,000; so that it will be seen that the balance of the line, embracing a length of 13 miles, was defended by 5,000 men,"⁶ and these short of ammunition.⁷

With this number in the trenches at the time of McClellan's approach, Magruder, of course, expected to be brushed aside. As he watched through the rain of April 5 the advance of McClellan's pickets, he wrote to General Lee, "I have made my arrangements to fight with my small force, but without the slightest hope

¹ "The movement against you may be a feint, and the real attack may be on Norfolk." Lee to Magruder, March 29.

² Thinking that McClellan knew the Confederate strength as well as he knew the Federal, Magruder writes on March 24, 1862: "We shall make a glorious fight doubtless, but it will avail us nothing if the enemy carry our works. Should he advance now, he would carry all the strong points and reinforcements would be too late." *Official Records*, 14, 393.

³ *Ibid.*, 410.

⁴ McClellan's Report, *Ibid.*, 12, 7.

⁵ Magruder to Randolph, *Ibid.*, 14, 436. In the field returns nearest this date—February, 1862 (*Ibid.*, 9, 49)—Magruder reported an aggregate present of 15,900 men. This number, however, included the garrison of 1,561 men in Gloucester Point across the York River, and not available for duty on the Warwick. Moreover, after this report the threatening attitude of Burnside in North Carolina led to the sending of 5,000 of Magruder's men to that state.(a) These regiments had not all returned at McClellan's advent. The Fifteenth North Carolina Regiment, for example, did not come back until April 15, 1862.(b)

a *Ibid.*, 9, 66.

b Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 737.

⁶ *Official Records*, 12, 405.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 14, 438, 439, 442.

of success.”¹ Much, however, to Magruder’s satisfaction, his thinly manned lines were not assaulted after the initial cannonade on April 5. “Every preparation,” he reports to the War Office, “was made in anticipation of an attack by the enemy; the men slept in the trenches and under arms, but to my utter surprise he permitted day after day to elapse without an assault.”² “No one but McClellan,” comments General Joseph E. Johnston, “could have hesitated to attack.”³

While the Federal commander stood dubious, Magruder “awaited without danger and received without hurry the reinforcements he needed”;⁴ for as soon as it became clear that McClellan’s objective was Richmond and not Norfolk, Johnston’s army was ordered to the Peninsula. Johnston took over the command on April 17, and as his senior officers reported their arrivals, he assigned Magruder to his right wing, Longstreet to the center, D. H. Hill to his left, including his old command at Yorktown, and G. W. Smith to the reserve.⁵ These dispositions were not completed until April 18, thirteen days after McClellan’s arrival in front of the Warwick. These thirteen days, secured by Magruder’s “inimitable clatter,” were of inestimable value to the Confederates. They gave Magruder time to strengthen his weak spots, permitted Johnston to get his men on the firing line with unhurried breath, and enabled Jackson to whet his sword for his encircling pursuers in the Valley of Virginia.

General McClellan’s failure to push over his weak foe surprised his own government as much as it did the Confederate commanders. President Lincoln wrote to him on April 9, “The country will not fail to note, is now noting, that the present hesitation to move

¹ *Official Records*, 14, 422.

² *Ibid.*, 12, 406.

³ *Ibid.*, 14, 456.

⁴ Trobriand, *Four Years with the Army of the Potomac*, 176.

⁵ *Ibid.*

upon an entrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.”¹ Still, even if McClellan had been more pugnacious than he was, it is not difficult to understand why he was reluctant to storm breastworks. He had been impressed from the day on which he encountered this unexpected line across the Peninsula by the reports of Keyes and of Barnard, his own chief engineer, as to the forbidding nature of these defenses.² He was misled by the swollen estimates of the Pinkerton Agency as to the number of Southerners behind these ramparts.³ When McClellan himself rode the length of those forest-hidden batteries on April 6 and 7, he saw a foe in every bush, and declared that “instant assault would have been simple folly.”⁴

He had built up the Army of the Potomac with the avowed purpose of “crushing the rebels in one campaign.” In a letter to Secretary Stanton on April 7, he reiterates this cherished belief: “I feel fully impressed with the conviction that here is to be fought the great battle that is to decide the existing contest.”⁵ He was, therefore, unwilling to sacrifice a man needlessly until that war-ending battle was staged. With this thought in mind, McClellan resolved, in spite of the President’s adjuration, “it is indispensable to you that

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 15.

² Keyes sent McClellan a copy of his letter to Senator Harris on April 7, in which he declared: “The line in front of us is, therefore, one of the strongest ever opposed to an invading force in any country. *Ibid.*, 13. Barnard reports: “They are far more extensive than may be supposed from the mention of them I make, and every kind of obstruction which the country offered, such as abatis, marsh, inundation, etc., was skillfully used. The line is certainly one of the most extensive known in modern times.” *Ibid.*, 318.

³ Under the enchantment of this agency, not yet discredited, he wrote Secretary Stanton on April 7: “My force is possibly less than that of the enemy, while they have all the advantage of position.” *Ibid.*, 12, 11. Allen Pinkerton, at the head of this agency, made the following estimates of the Confederate strength: for March 29, 25,000; for May 3, 100,000 to 120,000, a number which he states to be “rather under than over the mark”; for June 26, 180,000. *Ibid.*, 267-69.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

you strike a blow,"¹ to batter down the Confederate works with heavy guns before he ordered a final assault.²

This desire to husband his men was intensified when, on the very day that his troops came under fire, he suffered his third disappointment. This was the detachment of McDowell's First Corps from his command and its retention near Washington. This action, which General Franklin of that command calls the "first great crime of the war,"³ was based on the allegation that McClellan had disobeyed the President's order to leave 55,000 men to protect the capital. Thus further reduced in numbers, the harassed commander felt all the more impelled to conserve his men for the pitched battle that he was expecting to make decisive.

That "series of fatalities which were to be the almost daily experience of the Army of the Potomac" had set in. "Surprised that he could not surprise the place in the first instance, overawed by the appearance of the Warwick and its supposed defenses, estimating the enemy's numbers far beyond the fact, and delayed or delaying in the attempt upon Gloucester—McClellan settled down to the scientific siege of Yorktown."⁴ The decision to resort to siege operations bottled up the Federal army for a month in the noisome swamps of the Warwick "where disease lurked in every

¹ *Official Records*, 14, 79.

² *Ibid.*, 74, 84.

³ General Franklin's comments are interesting. He says: "General McClellan's plan of turning Yorktown by the movement of McDowell's corps on the north bank of the York River was utterly destroyed. The Army of the Potomac was forced to stay a whole month on the Peninsula uselessly, to make the expensive and abortive siege of Yorktown, to fight the bloody battle of Williamsburg; and the capture of Richmond, which in all human probability would have been made in the month of May had General McClellan's plan been carried out, was deferred for three years. Thus was consummated the first great crime of the war. . . . I do not know whether the perpetrators of this crime were punished for it in this life, but the ghastly account of bloodshed in Virginia for the next three years shows that the innocent country was punished in a way that will be remembered by widows and orphans for a generation." *Annals of the War*, 81.

⁴ Webb, *The Peninsula*, 62.

breeze," and further marred "the harmonious relations that ought to exist between a commander and his government."¹ Had McClellan been permitted to strike with the overwhelming numbers that he had originally planned and as he had designed, the Confederates, with their small and imperfectly armed force, would have been sorely beset to save their capital, even if they had done so.

After his decision to resort to siege methods McClellan subjected his men to such an amount of work as would, says Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher of the Scots Fusilier Guards, "have tested severely the discipline of an European army." Miles of swampy road had to be corduroyed, bridges to be built, swamps to be filled, trees to be felled, in order to bring up the supplies, munitions, and heavy guns required. The difficulties of getting the high caliber guns to the front were almost insuperable.² Early in May lines parallel to the Confederate works were finished, and fourteen batteries and three redoubts, armed with 101 siege

¹ Two sincere writers present these views at this juncture: Ropes is of the opinion that "McClellan showed his lack of knowledge of the world in insisting with such obstinacy on his own scheme, when he ought to have known that the constant, cordial, and unfaltering support of the administration must be a condition essential to his success, no matter what plan he might adopt. This support he willfully forfeited at the outset, and he did so knowing perfectly well that he was doing so." *Story of the Civil War*, I, 271.

Webb says: "That the withholding of McDowell was a shock to McClellan was certain. The news reached him . . . at the very moment when the Warwick was discovered to be a considerable obstruction, and when the necessity of a flanking column was immediately obvious. Right in the emergency that column was withheld from his control, and we affirm that, looking at the matter irrespective of every political bias, either McClellan should have been relieved, or else every possible effort should have been made to keep his force, now actively engaged in the field at the full strength with which alone he proposed to undertake his operations. Whether his own view was correct or incorrect, in that view he was crippled. He proposed a plan with McDowell as a principal actor in it; McDowell withdrawn, the plan was radically interfered with." *The Peninsula*, 58.

² From the siege diary of General Barry we learn: "Oftentimes the heavier guns, in their transposition of 3 miles from the landing to the batteries, would sink in the quicksands to the axle-trees of their traveling carriages. The efforts of the best trained and heaviest of the horses of the artillery reserve were of no avail in their effort to extricate them, and it became necessary to haul this heavy metal by hand, the cannoneers working knee-deep in mud and water." *Official Records*, 12, 348.

guns of various kinds, supplemented by three field batteries in position,¹ were ready to throw the heaviest shot then known on the Confederate lines.² The morning of May 5 was set for these guns to celebrate the completion of an arduous task by a simultaneous fire. "But," writes Morse, "it so happened that another soldier also had at the same time finished his task. General Magruder had delayed the Union army to the latest possible hour, he had saved a whole valuable month; and now quite cheerfully, triumphantly, . . . he slipped away. As it had happened at Manassas, so now again the Federals marched unopposed into deserted intrenchments; and a second time the enemy had so managed it that their retreat seemed rather to cast a slur upon Union strategy than to bring prestige to the Union arms."³

General Johnston, whose two weeks of command in Magruder's trenches had only confirmed him in his previous opinion, never had the slightest intention of awaiting the Federal burst of metal. His first inspection of the Peninsula convinced him that the Confederate position between two navigable rivers was under the circumstances untenable. As soon as he had finished his inspection, he returned to Richmond. In a conference attended by President Davis, Secretary Randolph, Generals Lee, Longstreet, and G. W. Smith, he advocated the withdrawal of Magruder's forces,

¹ Barry's Report, *Official Records*, 12, 348.

² Major Doull of the siege train, after a comparison of his guns with the English and French guns used at the siege of Sebastapol, says: "The guns placed in position before Yorktown exceed, therefore, in weight by 50 per cent any guns that have ever before been placed in siege batteries." *Ibid.*, 356.

General McClellan wrote to President Lincoln on April 23: "Works have been constructed that may almost be called gigantic. . . . I have tonight in battery and ready for action five 100-pounder Parrott guns, ten 4½-inch advance guns, eighteen 20-pounder Parrotts, six Napoleon guns and six 10-pounder Parrotts; this not counting the batteries in front of Smith and on his left—45 guns. I will add to it tomorrow night five 30-pounder Parrotts, six 20-pounder Parrotts, from five to ten 13-inch mortars, and, if it arrives in time, one 200-pounder Parrott." Nicolay and Hay, V, 373.

³ *Abraham Lincoln*, 47.

concentration nearer Richmond of all the Confederate troops from Virginia to Georgia, and a combined offensive movement against McClellan's army. In reply to objections he urged that the signal defeat of McClellan would enable the Confederates to recover with ease any losses incurred. The same views had been individually urged by the two generals longest in service on the Peninsula—Generals Magruder and D. H. Hill.¹ President Davis thus sums up the results of this conference:

After hearing fully the views of the several officers, I decided to resist the enemy on the Peninsula, and, with the aid of the navy, to hold Norfolk, and to keep command of the James River as long as possible. Arrangements were made, with such force as our means permitted, to occupy the country north of Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley, and with the rest of General Johnston's command, to make a Junction with General Magruder to resist the enemy's forces on the Peninsula.²

Johnston, who was reconciled to the decision only because he believed that events on the Peninsula would soon compel the Confederate government to adopt his method,³ returned to the Peninsula to carry out the President's orders. He remained in position until all the forces he could then expect were assembled and until McClellan's men were so tried by hardships and disease that the Federal commander "took from Yorktown a poorer army than he had brought there."⁴ Then without waiting for his troops to be pelted by

¹ On April 4, General Magruder wrote to the secretary of war: "I think our only chance of ultimate success is by uniting Huger's army, mine, and all floating forces at once with General J. E. Johnston's army, and beating McClellan's army of the Potomac." *Official Records*, 14, 422. On April 15, General Hill wrote to the same officer: "Would it not be better to let our railroads in North Carolina be cut, our cities in South Carolina and Georgia be captured, and have the whole Southern army thrown here and crush McClellan? By attempting to hold so many points, we have been beaten in detail, and are losing all that we have been trying to hold." *Ibid.*, 442.

² *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, II, 87.

³ *Johnston's Narrative*, 115.

⁴ Barnard's testimony, Committee on the Conduct of the War, II, (1), 417.

an array of guns, for which his own "old-fashioned ship-guns"¹ were no match, he, much to the chagrin of the Federal artillerists,² retired towards Williamsburg in in front of which Magruder had constructed his third line of defenses. He withdrew from the trenches 53,000 men.³ "General McClellan, by his own morning report of April 30, had in his camps, trenches, and scrambling in haste on board the transports that they had quitted the day before, an aggregate of 112,392 present for duty, the total aggregate present and absent being 130,378."⁴

During the month's siege there was only one infantry attempt to pierce the Confederate works. This was directed against Dam No. 1, a position known to the Federals as the "one-gun battery," and the attack fell on a North Carolina regiment. This point was selected because the works there seemed less strong than at other places. General W. F. Smith, of the Federal Fourth Corps, was directed, on April 16, to form his three brigades—those of Brooks, Davidson, and Hancock—in front of the dam, and to make an attempt "to force the enemy to discontinue his work in strengthening his batteries, to silence his fire, and to gain control of the dam existing at that point."⁵ At three o'clock in the afternoon Companies D and F, supported by Companies E and K of the Third Vermont Regiment, were ordered to cross "the creek and

¹ *Johnston's Narrative*, 118.

² General Barry, chief of McClellan's artillery, says: "It will always be a source of great professional disappointment to me that the enemy, by his premature and hasty abandonment of his defensive line, deprived the artillery of the Army of the Potomac of the opportunity of exhibiting the superior power and efficiency of the unusually heavy metal used in this siege and of reaping the honor and just reward of their unceasing labors day and night for nearly one month." *Official Records*, 12, 348.

³ *Johnston's Narrative*, 117.

⁴ Nicolay and Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, V, 375. The report referred to is found in the Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, II, (1), 323.

⁵ *Official Records*, 12, 363.

if possible gain possession of the enemy's works." ¹ Under cover of a fire from twenty field pieces, ² the four companies waded the intervening water and boldly charged the Confederate defenses.

The rifle-pits at that point were held by the Fifteenth North Carolina Regiment under Colonel Robert M. McKinney. The regiment at the time of the attack was throwing up works for the protection of its camp about 200 yards in rear of its front. The rifle-pits at the water's edge were, consequently, occupied only by its pickets and a few sharpshooters from the Sixteenth Georgia. The Vermont men drove in the pickets and took position behind the Confederate works. As soon as the pickets gave the alarm, the Fifteenth North Carolina seized its stacked arms and rushed in the face of a deliberate fire to recover its pits. In the charge Colonel McKinney was instantly killed. Two companies of the Second Louisiana Regiment, the Seventh and Eighth Georgia, and a portion of the Sixteenth Georgia, at once pushed to the assistance of the North Carolinians, and the intruders were repelled. ³ At a later hour the Fourth, the Fifth, and the Sixth Vermont regiments were, says Colonel Lord, ordered "to carry the enemy's works by storm." General Howell Cobb, the Confederate brigade commander at that point, however, had arrived, and under his direction the new attempt was foiled. The total Federal loss was 165 men. ⁴ The North Carolinians lost 12 killed and 44 wounded. ⁵

Colonel McKinney was a professor in the North Carolina Military Institute at Charlotte when the war opened. He was elected Captain of Company A of the Sixth Regiment, and then Colonel of the Fifteenth. His division commander, General McLaws,

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 375.

² *Ibid.*, 368.

³ Levy's Report, *Ibid.*, 421; Magruder's Report, *Ibid.*, 407.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 367.

⁵ Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 734.

said of him, "In the death of Colonel McKinney the service has lost one who was pure in all his thoughts and just in all his acts; a brave and skillful officer, who in his death as in his life reflected honor on both his native and his adopted state, and illustrated the Christian gentleman." Acting Adjutant, H. A. Dowd, was elected colonel to succeed McKinney.

During their service in the Warwick trenches the North Carolina regiments, in common with all other Confederate troops, were tested by hardships. General Magruder, who rode his front regularly, describes their sufferings:

From April 4 to May 3, this army served almost without relief in the trenches. Many companies of artillery were never relieved during this long period. It rained almost incessantly, the trenches were filled with water; the weather was exceedingly cold; no fires could be allowed; the artillery and infantry of the enemy played upon our men almost continuously day and night; the army had neither sugar, coffee, nor hard bread, but subsisted on flour and salt meat, and that in reduced quantities, and yet no murmurs were heard. Their gallant comrades of the Army of the Potomac (Johnston's), and the Department of Norfolk (Huger's), though not so long a time exposed to these sufferings, shared their hardships and dangers with equal firmness and cheerfulness.¹

General D. H. Hill, who, "as was his custom," says Major Ratchford, "was the last to leave Yorktown,"² bears similar testimony. He says: "Our Revolutionary sires did not suffer more at Valley Forge than did our army at Yorktown and in the retreat from it. Notwithstanding the rain, mud, cold, hunger, watching, and fatigue, I never heard a murmur or witnessed an act of insubordination."³ General E. P. Alexander, whose position as chief of ordnance gave him unusual avenues of observation, declares: "These statements

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 408.

² MS. Memoir.

³ *Ibid.*

are not exaggerated in a single word. The trenches filled with water as fast as they could be opened and could not be drained. Yet the continual firing compelled the men to remain in them. . . . A hand or a head could not be exposed for a moment without receiving a ball from the telescopic target rifles with which many of their sharpshooters were armed and which could be relied on to hit a button at 250 yards.¹ The trenches were so hastily constructed that they hardly afforded room for the line of battle to crouch in. . . . In many places they became offensive beyond description. Fires were strictly forbidden by day and night. . . . The sick list increased by thousands and cases occurred where men actually died in the mud and water of the trenches before they could be taken to the hospitals." Yet in spite of these depressing conditions, "not only were there no murmurs or complaints, but in the midst of all this, the terms of enlistment of a large part of the army expired and they at once reënlisted 'for three years or the war'."²

When the surprised Federals found that Johnston's army had declined to await a one-sided bombardment,³

¹ Cudworth, in his sketch of the First Massachusetts Regiment, thus describes the methods of the Federal sharpshooters: "Creeping out at night on all fours to within 6 or 8 hundred yards of the opposite line, he selected a tree, stone, pit, or chimney behind which to secrete himself. At daylight every part of him must be invisible, and remain so until sundown. At the same time, he must be able to draw a bead upon some angle, embrasure, or other position of importance." 146. Sergeant H. C. Wall, of the Twenty-third North Carolina Regiment, gives a glimpse behind the lines in the Confederate trenches. He says: "As the sharpshooting grew hotter, the pickets could be relieved only at night. The opposing pickets fired at everything in sight. For a space the boys on such duty embraced mother earth more intimately than they had before deemed possible. But they gradually learned that shooting and hitting were by no means synonymous terms." Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 195.

² *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 10, 36.

³ Cudworth, in his *History of the First Massachusetts Regiment*, thus sets forth the scenes incident to this discovery: "During the night the firing was kept up in a furious manner, filling the Union troops with wonder as to what the rebels were intending to do; but about three o'clock in the morning it suddenly ceased. The pickets listened, but could hear nothing; they rose to their feet, trying to peer through the darkness of the early morning, but could see nothing. They crept slowly and continuously forward and met with no opposition. Finally, they reached the hostile breastworks, jumped

they followed the retiring Confederates up the Peninsula. Stoneman's cavalymen, accompanied by four batteries ¹ of flying artillery, were the first to take the road. Hooker's three brigades, followed by Kearny's division, pressed behind Stoneman on the Yorktown road. Smith's division, with the divisions of Casey and Couch in its rear, marched on the road from Lee's Mill to Hooker's left. The divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick, after starting towards Williamsburg, were recalled to take boat for West Point in the Confederate rear. They were to unite with Porter's division of the Third Corps and Franklin's strong division of McDowell's Corps which in answer to McClellan's repeated calls for reinforcements ² had been dispatched to him, in an ascent of the York River to West Point. These four divisions were to fall on the Confederate flank and rear as the other divisions crowded on them in front.³ If they had sailed promptly, the Confederate army would have been severely imperiled. General McClellan did not think an early collision imminent on the Williamsburg road, and remained

into the ditches, scrambled up the ramparts—*the rebels were gone!* . . . It took but a short time to spread the news . . . and then it was astonishing to see how, as by enchantment, the whole spirit and aspect of Camp Winfield Scott changed, and how 90,000 men, released from the hazards of picket duty and sharpshooting, from the drudgery of trenchwork and corduroys, from the silence and restraints of previous wearisome weeks, from the expectation of tomorrow's bombardment, and the dread of the fearful assault to succeed it, from the whole weight and monotony of the prolonged siege—became possessed of and pervaded by the exhilaration of a mighty and triumphant joy." 156.

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 423.

² During all his campaigns, McClellan's importunities for more troops were so insistent that Secretary Stanton, in a moment of exasperation, revealed his estimate of the commander by saying, "If he had a million men, he would swear the enemy had two million, and then sit down in the mud and yell for three." Nicolay and Hay, V, 366. Lincoln is reported to have said that sending troops to General McClellan "was like shifting fleas across a barn floor with a shovel—not half of them ever got there."

³ The next and by far the most important step was to throw Franklin's division, supported promptly and strongly, as rapidly as possible up the York River by boat, to land on its right bank opposite West Point in order to take in reverse whatever works might exist between that point and Yorktown, and to cut off, if possible, the enemy's trains and troops still south of the mouth of the Pamunkey." *McClellan's Own Story*, 320.

at Yorktown to expedite the embarkation of these divisions. General Sumner was directed to control the marching troops until McClellan's arrival.

The entire Army of the Potomac, on which so much care and money had been expended, was now on its feet. The eyes of the Northern people were solicitously turned on its progress to see whether McClellan would justify the President's belief by handling the army finely "once he got him started."¹

The collision which McClellan did not anticipate came, nevertheless, in front of Williamsburg on the first day's march. On account of the rain-softened roads, both armies were creeping laboriously. The infantry of each force was often disturbed in its plodding to lift bodily some wagon or gun from unseen holes. The Confederate army, cumbered with all its trains, reached and passed the fortifications of Williamsburg about four o'clock in the afternoon. Johnston, apprised of the embarkation of the Federal divisions to pass his army, had no intention of occupying those lines.² At that hour, however, Stoneman's cavalry, under General Cooke, and Gibson's battery debouched from the woodlands and began to examine the open ground in front of the Confederate fieldworks."³ Johnston saw that if he would save his trains, he must check this close pursuit. He, therefore, hurried back the brigades of Semmes and Kershaw to hold the Williamsburg defenses until the trains were well out of the way. Manly's North Carolina battery was attached to Kershaw's brigade. "The battery," says Longstreet, "had to go at a run to be sure of cover in the redoubts."⁴ As soon as the Carolinians could get

¹ Nicolay and Hay, V, 172.

² "They thought so little of opposing us there that the greater part of their army had already passed on, when the attack of Stoneman compelled them to return in order to delay our pursuit and cover their rearguard." Trobriand, *Four Years with the Army of the Potomac*, 193.

³ Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 69.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 70.

into battery, they opened fire on Gibson's guns, which, protected by Cooke's cavalry, had gone into play on the skirt of woods opposite the central work.¹ So accurate was the fire from their guns, "worked," as General Semmes declares, "with spirit, intelligence and effect,"² that Gibson reports the "disabling of his battery at nearly every shot."³ McCarthy's Richmond Howitzers somewhat later joined the combat. The two batteries delivered "a cross fire of shell and shrapnel," reports the Federal brigade commander, "that became destructive, killing and wounding many horses, and a number of officers and men."⁴ This activity of the artillery, combined with a steady fire from the infantry and one or two cavalry charges, drove the Federals back into the woods to await the coming of their infantry. Gibson's battery abandoned one gun and three caissons. Of these General McLaws reports: "Captain McCarthy, whose battery arrived a few minutes previous to this, sent forward horses from his pieces, and the guns and caissons of the enemy were brought to the main work. To Captain Manly's battery, however, is due the killing of three horses, attached to the caissons and pieces, and by the rapidity of his fire preventing the enemy from carrying them off."⁵

The Federal infantry, for which Stoneman's cavalry was waiting after its repulse, was floundering forward through the mire with disappointing slowness and apparently without much central guidance. At times different organizations were so jumbled as to hinder progress. In one of these entanglements, the division of Hooker and Smith exchanged roads. Hence, when

¹ "Meanwhile, the Federal cavalry was advancing, Gibson's horse artillery and Manly's Confederate battery were in severe combat." Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 70.

² *Official Records*, 12, 446.

³ *Ibid.*, 431.

⁴ Cooke's Report, *Ibid.*, 428.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 442.

these two leading divisions approached the Confederates, Hooker was on the Hampton road where it was intended for Smith to be, and Smith was on the Yorktown road. When, about four o'clock, Smith came up in rear of the cavalry, General Sumner, the ranking officer, ordered him to form for battle, but "it became so dark that the troops got lost in the woods and had to wait until daylight."¹ Hooker's men marched until eleven o'clock, and then, exhausted, sank to sleep on the road. General Heintzelman thus described the events of May 4: "Our cavalry had been repulsed. One delay after another occurred until it got to be dark. The troops got separated and did nothing that night."²

Longstreet, who was charged with the conduct of affairs in the Confederate rear, was directed to relieve Semmes and Kershaw about dusk, in order that they might rejoin their division, then in advance. He sent the brigades of R. H. Anderson and Pryor to occupy the redoubts.

At dawn Anderson, the senior officer, who was at that hour expecting to continue his march towards Richmond, was notified by Longstreet that the army trains were mud bound from the incessant rains and that it would be necessary to delay the Federals until the wagons were out of danger. Anderson, therefore, manned the central bastioned redoubt known as Fort Magruder, the field redoubts on the right of the fort, and as many on the left as the pelting rain permitted him to see.³ Two redoubts, however, on the extreme left, which covered the approach over Cub

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 457.

² Testimony before Committee on the Conduct of the War, II, (1), 348.

³ These works were the third line of defenses constructed across the Peninsula by Magruder's foresight and energy. It would have aided the Confederates in their retreat if Magruder could have commanded the rear, for he knew, of course, the location of all defenses and the geography of the country. His men, however, had been longest exposed in the trenches, and Johnston, no doubt from humane considerations, delegated the irksomeness of rear-guard duty to Hill and Longstreet.

Run Dam at Saunder's pond, and which McLaws from "a previous knowledge of the ground"¹ had occupied on the fourth, were not manned. These were the redoubts seized in the afternoon by General Hancock, and the scene of the gallant fight of the Fifth North Carolina Regiment. Longstreet's brigades were notified to respond to Anderson's call, if he needed them. The other Confederate divisions continued their march.

Early on May 5, in the gloom of a downpour of rain, the Federals aligned themselves for battle—a battle fought on their part, says General Webb, then assistant chief of artillery in the Army of the Potomac, "without plan, with inadequate numbers, and at a serious sacrifice without compensating results."² There has been so much misapprehension as to the purpose and conduct of the Battle of Williamsburg that the viewpoint of those who fought it seems lost to sight. For instance, General Keyes says: "If Hancock had failed, the enemy would not have retreated." Swinton, after stating that "Hooker's fight was really quite unnecessary," declares that the flank movement of Hancock "decided the issue."³ Schalk says: "At Williamsburg, the Rebels made a stand, and were only forced to relinquish the position in consequence of a flank movement executed by General Hancock."⁴

These statements, as well as others covering different episodes in the battle, imply that Johnston deliberately planned to deliver battle at Williamsburg. Such an implication is far from correct. The very position of his troops precludes such a conception. Of his four divisions present, two—those of Magruder and G. W. Smith—were on the road to Barhamsville when the battle was begun, and were never called back.

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 442.

² Webb, *The Peninsula*, 73.

³ *Army of the Potomac*, 118.

⁴ Schalk, *Principles of Strategy*, 168.

The third—D. H. Hill's—was already following the trains when it was halted to see whether the fourth—that under Longstreet, would need aid in repelling the Federal attack. Johnston was, as already stated, aware that a large force was embarking on the York River to rake his flank. "It was not his policy to allow the remainder of McClellan's army to detain and amuse him while this attempt to intercept him by water was in progress."¹ Moreover he knew that McDowell, with an army almost as large as his own,² had practically an open road to Richmond whenever the Federal government, recovering from its "Washington scare," should direct him to take it. Consequently, he was anxious not to lose a minute on his journey toward Richmond, and fought not from choice, but only to preserve his endangered trains. No incident of the battle determined his continued retreat; circumstances decreed it before he left Yorktown.

Johnston, who on account of a lack of vigor in the Federal attack up to ten o'clock, had at that hour ridden for his van,³ but who later returned as the battle grew, says emphatically: "We fought for no other purpose than to hold the ground long enough to enable our baggage trains to get out of the way of the troops."⁴

Although there were three corps commanders on the field, Hooker, without orders from any of the three, opened the battle on the left, whereas Sumner, the commanding officer, was preparing to operate on the

¹ Hughes, *General Johnston*, 131.

² "He will move with between 35,000 and 40,000 men." Lincoln to McClellan, May 18, 1862.

³ "As McClellan was at Yorktown superintending the water movement, which he regarded as the most important, so Johnston was in the van expediting the march of his army to meet it." Hughes, *General Johnston*, 131.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 124.

right.¹ There was not much vigor in the opening of Hooker's battle. Webber's battery of regulars was ordered to take post at the edge of the woods in front of Fort Magruder, and Bramhall's and Osborn's batteries were directed to range alongside of Webber. When Webber's guns reached the open, a fire too hot for his cannoneers greeted them and they left their pieces. Bramhall reached his position on the right of Webber's deserted guns. Volunteers from Osborn's battery and some men rallied by Captain Webber made their way to his guns, and the two batteries opened a steady fire on the fort and redoubts. Hooker's infantry meantime "lingered at the edge of the woods, firing at long range."² Other than the repulse of a second advance of Confederate skirmishers, there was little action until around ten o'clock—then the contest warmed.

Wilcox's Confederate brigade, which had been countermarched from Williamsburg, had been thrown in on the right of Fort Magruder to develop the strength of the Federals. As Wilcox's skirmishers crossed the open field a little after ten o'clock and penetrated into the woods for some depth, they found Hooker's battle lines. "The woods," reports Wilcox, "were so dense that a colonel could not see his entire regiment when in line of battle."³ As Wilcox became engaged, his right was successively extended by the brigades of A. P. Hill, a regiment and a battalion of

¹ "The fact is that when Hooker began his attack, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes had adopted another plan of action, irrespective of Hooker." *The Peninsula*, 73. "I immediately ordered General Hancock to advance with his brigade and ten pieces of artillery, it being my intention to force their left." Sumner's Report, *Official Records*, 12, 541. Hooker, in justification of his independent action, reports: "Being in pursuit of a retreating army, I deemed it my duty to lose no time in making the disposition of my troops to attack, regardless of their number and position, except to accomplish this result with the least possible sacrifice of life." *Ibid.*, 465. His "regardlessness" led to the sacrifice of 1,575 men in his division. *Ibid.*, 450.

² Stuart's Report, *Ibid.*, 570. Keyes's Report, *Ibid.*, 512.

³ *Ibid.*, 590.

Pryor,¹ and Pickett's brigade—an aggregate Confederate strength on the right of Fort Magruder of thirteen regiments.² There were in Fort Magruder and on its left the three regiments and two battalions of Anderson's brigade. This makes a total Confederate infantry force of sixteen regiments and two battalions engaged in the morning battle. They were opposed until after one o'clock by the twelve regiments of Hooker's division³—in all, according to Heintzelman's report, about 9,000 men.⁴

At twelve o'clock Longstreet was notified that the Confederate trains could not get clear before night. He did not want to remain quiet under the fire of longer range rifles than his own men were using. He, therefore, directed Anderson "to organize columns of attack upon the enemy's position and batteries."⁵ The combined attack drove Hooker's troops farther back into the forests and captured the batteries of Webber and Bramhall, but for the lack of horses only five of these guns could be drawn off. "Indeed," says the Comte de Paris, an active participant on the field, "the repeated efforts of the Confederates succeeded at last in shaking the confidence of Hooker's men, who felt themselves unsupported; they lost the abatis where they had held out so long, and while still fighting, fell back across the woods which they had occupied in the morning." As Hooker's men, some still fighting obstinately, some, says Heintzelman,⁶ in a panic, fell back, the reinforcements for which he had been asking

¹ Pryor was later "joined by Major A. K. McLemore with three companies of the Fourteenth Alabama and 40 men of the Thirty-second Virginia, under Captain Segar, in the aggregate 150 men." Pryor's Report: *Official Records*, 12, 588.

² These were Wilcox, 3 (the Eleventh Alabama was not with him, and two companies from the Tenth Alabama and one from the Ninth were also absent); A. P. Hill, 4; Pickett, 4; Pryor, 2 (Pryor's itemized list shows only 670 men present). *Ibid.*

³ The Seventy-first New York was not present. *Ibid.*, 459.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Longstreet's Report, *Ibid.*, 564.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 453.

began to arrive. Peck came up a little after one o'clock on Hooker's right and threw his five regiments into the fray.¹ Two of Peck's regiments broke, but he called up his other three, and presently General Couch sent him General Devens with two regiments. Soon after General Palmer reported with two regiments and General Keim with three more.²

About an hour after Peck's entrance into the battle, General Kearny arrived and began to relieve the exhausted troops of Hooker, who, as General Webb says, "lost ground until Kearny came to his relief."³ Berry, of Kearny's division, entered the fighting at 2:30 with three regiments,⁴ and Birney about 3:00 with two of his regiments.⁵ As Longstreet felt the stiffening imparted to the Federal lines by the arrival of all these regiments, he moved Colston's brigade of three regiments, the last of his own brigades, into

¹ Colonel Trobriand of Peck's brigade thus pictures the battle at this time: "What a tumult! The whole edge of the woods on fire; the musketry rolling uninterruptedly from one end of the line to the other, the balls striking the trees like hail and bounding among the branches; two batteries firing as fast as possible, the shells tearing the branches of the trees and filling the woods with their explosions; shrapnel bursting in the air like petards—such were the instruments of the diabolical concert." *Four Years with the Army of the Potomac*, 198.

² *Official Records*, 12, 521.

³ Webb, *The Peninsula*, 80. General Heintzelman gives this picture of Hooker's division just before Federal reinforcements came up: "The long march through rain and mud gave but little time for rest. Many straggled or came back with the constant stream of wounded, who had to be helped to the rear. They were not always prompt to rejoin their regiments. The rain, the sight of the wounded, the reinforcements still behind, all conspired to depress everybody." In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Heintzelman adds, in reference to Kearny's arrival, "if he had arrived ten minutes later, I think we should have been defeated, for my troops were exhausted and out of ammunition. . . . The enemy in our front had got pretty close, within a few hundred yards of where I was, and on my left they were in the woods beyond me. . . . I knew if I turned my own horse my troops would give way, and therefore I did not dare do it." II, 1, 353. General McClellan says of Hooker's feelings at this time: "Hooker's losses were severe, and when I next saw him, a day or two afterwards, he was much depressed and thought that he had accomplished nothing, so much so that I felt it necessary to encourage him. It was not until some time afterwards that he came to the conclusion that he had accomplished a brilliant feat of arms." *McClellan's Own Story*, 325.

⁴ *Official Records*, 12, 504.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 503.

action a little after 3:30 and later, in reply to Longstreet's request, D. H. Hill sent him a regiment and a battalion of Early's brigade. Although the battle still swayed backward and forward at places, Longstreet reports that these reinforcements enabled him to hold his new position with comparative ease."¹

The total number of Federal regiments engaged on the Confederate right numbered, as has been stated, twenty-nine; the Confederate regiments, if the three battalions be taken as the equivalent of one regiment, numbered twenty-three.²

In the battle on the right only two North Carolina regiments took part. These were the Thirteenth under Colonel A. M. Scales, and the Fourteenth under Colonel W. P. Roberts—both in Colston's brigade. Their brigade went into action just after Hooker was reinforced by Peck and Kearny, and consequently, while engaged only a comparatively short time, they were under a lively fire. The Thirteenth went in to A. P. Hill's right under steady volleys, but the coolness of Colonel Scales and Lieutenant-Colonel Ruffin stimulated the men to endure the ordeal of first battle with-

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 564.

² Both Federal and Confederate regiments had been so thinned by sickness in their malarial camps and by their "mud march" on May 4, that any exact statement of numbers actually engaged on either side is impossible. An undated Confederate return (*Ibid.*, 14, 479) gives Longstreet's divisional strength at 13,816. Longstreet states that from an estimate made on the field, the total number of Confederates engaged was 9,000. The same return gives Wilcox's brigade at 2,616, Pickett's at 2,460, and Pryor's at 2,310. In their official reports of men engaged, Wilcox states that he had 1,100. Pickett, gives his strength as 1,529, and Pryor, some of whose had been detached, at 670. These divergences occur also in the Federal reports. General Heintzelman reports that Hooker's division numbered about 9,000 (*Ibid.*, 12, 459). The reports of six of Hooker's commanders—the others not reporting numbers—assert that they took 3,945 infantry into action. (a) This would be a regimental average for these six of 657. If Hooker's six other regiments averaged about the same, this would give Hooker's infantry at 7,884. With his artillery this would make about 8,000 men—a thousand fewer than given by Heintzelman. If it be fair to assume that the 17 other regiments had the same average as Hooker's, then there were about 19,169 Federals in the battle on the Confederate center and right. However, General Sumner says, "I suppose there were not more than 10,000 or 12,000 men under fire."

a *Ibid.*, 474, 478, 483, 487.

out faltering. The regiment had 15 men killed and 48 wounded.¹ The Fourteenth came under fire on Hill's left at a later hour, and consequently suffered less. Its loss was six killed and nine wounded.² Longstreet commends both Scales and Roberts for "having discharged their difficult duties with marked skill and fearlessness," and states that "Brigadier-General Colston, though last upon the field, was hotly engaged until night put an end to the struggle."³ The Fourth North Carolina Regiment was sent on the field just before dark, but was not actively engaged.

While the battle was swaying on the right, a passage at arms, not so satisfactory to the Confederates, took place on the Confederate left. About 8 a.m. Sumner was informed by some negroes that a redoubt on the extreme Confederate left was unoccupied.⁴ When this report was confirmed by Captain Stewart of the Engineers, General Hancock was directed "to take the enemy's works on our right and hold them." Hancock, during the uproar of Hooker's battle, crossed Cub Dam Run and marched into the unoccupied redoubt. He then, in the amusing words of the Comte de Paris, "finding no enemy before him fearlessly advanced"⁵ to the second, which was also without defenders. Recognizing the vital importance of the position gained, a position squarely on the Confederate flank, Hancock, who had with him five regiments and ten pieces of artillery,⁶ was minded to make a diversion

¹ There is no return in the official casualty list for these two regiments. These figures are from a list by companies which was furnished to the *Milton* (N. C.) *Chronicle*.

² *Raleigh Standard*.

³ *Official Records*, 12, 567.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 512. "The failure to occupy and hold this redoubt which Hancock seized has been made the subject of criticism by some of the writers on this engagement. If the battle had been intended as a general action, the criticism would be just. . . . But it is not a just criticism for the reason that the engagement was not general." Hughes, *General Johnston*, 131.

⁵ Comte de Paris, II, 22.

⁶ These were the Fifth Wisconsin, Forty-ninth Pennsylvania, Sixth Maine, Seventh Maine, Thirty-third New York, and Cowan's battery (6 pieces) and Wheeler's battery (4 pieces). Hancock's Report.

in favor of the sorely beset Federal left. As soon as he had received the promise of four additional regiments, he threw his skirmishers and artillery in range, and began "seriously to annoy the Confederates by an enfilading fire."¹

"The occupation of these two redoubts on his extreme left," says Lossing, "was the first intimation that Johnston had of their existence, and he at once perceived the importance of the position, for it was on the flank and rear of the Confederate line of defense and seriously menaced its integrity."² To counteract this serious diversion Early's brigade of D. H. Hill's division was, by Longstreet's orders, drawn up on the left of Fort Magruder, and Hill moved his other brigades, except Featherston's, into supporting distance. "Meanwhile," says Longstreet, some of his officers made a reconnoissance in front of his ground and reported a route by which favorable attack could be made upon the Federals at the redoubt under Hancock."³ As a result of this reconnoissance Early sent an officer to report, says Johnston, that a battery, that had been firing on Fort Magruder and the troops near it, was near in his front and asked permission to attack it.⁴ General Hill, who saw that if the continuous rain delayed the trains overnight, it would not do to leave Hancock established in the Confederate works, approved Early's request. "The message," continues General Johnston, "was delivered to General Longstreet in my presence, and he referred it to me. I authorized the attempt, but enjoined

¹ Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, I, 283.

² *The Civil War in America*, II, 382.

³ *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 77.

⁴ *Johnston's Narrative*, 122. General Early says: "Shortly after I had placed my command in position, General Hill came up and I suggested to him the propriety of moving through the woods to attack one of the enemy's batteries which seemed to have a flank fire on our main position." *Autobiography*, 68.

caution in it.”¹ Hill says in his official report: “General Longstreet approved of the movement and directed me to accompany it. Neither Longstreet nor myself knew the precise position of the battery, and both were entirely ignorant of the ground. We, however, agreed on the general plan of getting in rear of the battery by passing through the woods to the left of its supposed position.”²

On leaving Longstreet, Hill, who understood that whatever was to be done must be done quickly so as to comply with Longstreet’s injunction “not to involve the army so as to delay the march after night”³ if the trains were safely on their way, rode forward and reconnoitered the ground as well as the circumstances permitted.⁴ Longstreet in his report dismisses the action with these few words: “General Hill soon reported that it was time to make the attack there, and I ordered him to feel the enemy with caution. He arranged his forces for the attack with excellent judgment, but in the hurry of bringing the troops into action some of the officers failed to take due advantage of the ground and exposed them to a fire which was not absolutely necessary, and the effort to drive the enemy from that part of his position failed. This mishap could have been remedied by an extreme flank movement and complete victory won; but, as I have intimated before, we were not in a condition to increase our responsibilities, and a great delay might have endangered other operations of the army.”⁵

As there were two North Carolina regiments in Early’s brigade, it becomes necessary to follow the action in more detail. The brigade of four regiments was arranged for battle by General Early as follows:

¹ Johnston’s *Narrative*, 122.

² *Official Records*, 12, 603.

³ *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 78.

⁴ *Official Records*, 12, 603.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 565.

the Fifth North Carolina Regiment, Colonel D. K. MacRae, on the right flank; the Twenty-third North Carolina, Colonel John F. Hoke, on the right center; the Thirty-eighth Virginia Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel P. B. Whittle, on the left center; and the Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiment, Colonel W. R. Terry, on the left flank. General Hill's plan of attack is clearly stated in his report. His orders were that the brigade should cross an intervening stream, advance under the cover of the woods, halt at the far edge of the woods for each regiment to establish itself on line, and then unitedly throw the weight of the four against Hancock. He says: "I directed this wing (the Fifth and the Twenty-third North Carolina) to halt as soon as the stream was crossed and undergrowth penetrated, to get the whole brigade in line, and sent my adjutant, Major Ratchford, to General Early to know whether he had got over, the thickness of the undergrowth being such that the troops on the left could not be seen. We had not halted five minutes when I heard shouting and firing immediately in our front, and a voice, which I took to be General Early's, above all the uproar, crying, 'Follow me.' I directed the right wing to move rapidly forward, and went myself in advance of it. . . . I could see nothing of General Early or the Yankees. I soon, however, met an aide galloping up from him, stating that General Early was far over on the right in the open field, chasing the Yankees; that he was wounded and needed reinforcements, and had ordered a regiment in the earthwork to his support." ¹ General Longstreet, in his narrative, says: "General Hill ordered the advance regiment to halt after crossing a streamlet and get under cover of the wood till the brigade could form; but General Early, not waiting for orders or the brigade, rode to the front of the Twenty-fourth Virginia, and with it

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 603.

made the attack. The gallant MacRae, of the Fifth North Carolina, seeing the Twenty-fourth Virginia hotly engaged, dashed forward, *nolens volens*, to its relief. The other regiments, seeing the confusion of movements and of orders, failed to go forward.”¹

Thus at the opening of the struggle the two regiments farthest apart in the brigade were off to the attack before the two center companies, delayed by the entangling undergrowth, were ready to join them. The Twenty-fourth Virginia, with General Early at its head, rushed forward with unsurpassed gallantry as soon as it was clear of the woods. The Fifth North Carolina, on reaching the open and finding the Twenty-fourth Virginia fighting alone, changed front, obliqued to the left, and joining front with the Virginians pressed on with equal daring. General Hill, thinking the surest way to aid the two regiments involved in front was by a flank attack, ordered the Twenty-third North Carolina and the Thirty-eighth Virginia to change front to the left, advance rapidly through the woods, and fall on Hancock’s flank. The density of the woods delayed the manoeuvre, and before these two regiments, which a few weeks later at Seven Pines were so distinguished for tenacious pugnacity, could join their comrades, the brief but disastrous conflict was ended.

Just as the Twenty-fourth Virginia and Fifth North Carolina advanced about 5:10 p.m., General Hancock was preparing to obey his third order² to

¹ *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 78.

² This first order to fall back was brought by Lieutenant Kusserow while his batteries were shelling the redoubts occupied by the Confederates and while the battle on the Confederate right was still raging. The second was delivered by Captain Aiken, and the third by Lieutenant Crane—both the latter about 3:30 p.m. *Official Records*, 12, 546, 548. Sumner, constantly urged by Smith, twice started reinforcements to Hancock, but in each case countermanded the order for fear of disaster in the center. Smith’s Report, *Ibid.*, 527-28.

retire to his original position at the first redoubt.¹ His preparations were hastened by seeing the Confederates forming in unknown strength for attack on his advanced lines. Moreover, he could not afford, if he had felt strong enough to take risks, to give battle in a position from which he had been thrice directed to retire. He therefore ordered his artillery to retire, piece by piece, a manœuvre which Colonel MacRae says was carried on "en echelon with great precision."² At the same time he directed his infantry to fall back to his original position on the crest. The infantry, with the exception of the Fifth Wisconsin and the heavy line of skirmishers from four of the regiments, got back with little hard fighting.³ The Wisconsin men, who were "sorely beset," lost severely.⁴ It was this retirement,⁵ in process when the attack was

¹ Hancock sets forth his situation at this hour. He says: . . . at 4:20 p.m. I addressed a written communication to General Smith, stating that I would wait a reasonable time to get an answer from General Sumner before falling back. I awaited an answer to this communication till 5:10 o'clock p.m. . . . Just at this moment I observed that the enemy were throwing infantry into the redoubts on my front and that my skirmishers were firing on them. . . . The enemy still persisting in their efforts, preparatory to a charge on my artillery, I ordered some shell to be thrown into them, and then directed the artillery to retire rapidly, piece by piece, to my second line. About this time I was informed that a regiment of the enemy had gone into the woods on my left, with a view to flanking me there, and seeing the enemy's infantry break through the woods in front of the right flank of my advanced line, and anticipating a still more serious movement from that direction toward my rear, I ordered the two regiments on the left of the battery to fall back in line of battle to the crest on the left of the redoubt. . . . I directed the Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers to fall back in line of battle, fighting. The colonel had not thought of retiring until he received this order. . . . Previous to this I ordered the Seventh Maine Volunteers on my extreme right to fall back behind its original line . . . and now only waited for that gallant regiment, the Fifth Wisconsin, already sorely pressed by the enemy, to get into position before I advanced to the attack." *Official Records*, 12, 538-40.

² *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 7, 370.

³ The colonel of the Sixth Maine reports that up to the time he reached the second line his men had not fired a gun. *Official Records*, 12, 550.

⁴ This regiment lost 79 men in a few moments. The other four regiments engaged lost together only 16 men. *Ibid.*, 450.

⁵ The regimental reports explain the conditions under which the retirement was executed. Colonel Burnham of the Sixth Maine reports: "When my regiment had fallen back half way to the fort, I halted it, faced it about, and waited for the double purpose of allowing my line of skirmishers to come up with the regiment and the Fifth Wisconsin to come up with us. I again

opened, which led some of the officers of the attacking regiment to think they had put Hancock to flight.¹ By the time Hancock had posted his artillery in its third position and established his line of battle on each side of the redoubt, into which he marched four companies of the Sixth Maine, the two Confederate regiments were in close rifle range. The North Carolinians came abreast of a fence about one hundred yards from the redoubt and from it delivered a steady fire. The Confederates never advanced beyond this fence, for, says MacRae, who, on the wounding of General Early succeeded to the command of the brigade, "there was no such manifest disorder as would justify the storming of the redoubt."² As the Confederate rifles blazed from the fence, Hancock, his regiments all then in place, ordered his entire force to fire and advance. The five regiments, with their rifle fire supplemented by canister from Wheeler's battery,³ forced the two regiments back with severe loss.

Colonel MacRae thus pictures the close of the combat:

Under this fire of grape from the battery and volleys from the infantry, the regiment continued to advance until I found a slight shelter of a low fence within 100 yards of the redoubt. The fire was terrific; my men and officers were falling on every

faced my command about and continued to retire in accordance with the order. . . . The enemy were now close upon us. Seeing us fall back, they fancied that we were in full retreat and their exultation knew no bounds." "After maintaining this position for some time," says Colonel Cobb of the Fifth Wisconsin Regiment, "I received your order to fall back fighting. . . . My men fell back in good order, every man loading as he retreated, wheeling and returning the fire of the enemy with a rapidity and coolness worthy of veterans. In this manner I fell back to the line of battle which had already formed, and with your assistance formed my regiment in the center, a space having been left for that purpose." *Official Records*, 12, 555.

¹ "In a word General Winfield Hancock's five regiments and ten guns have been attacked and driven in by a single Virginia regiment and are now on the point of being routed." Maury, *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 8, 295.

² *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 7, 530.

³ *Official Records*, 12, 532.

side. The Twenty-fourth Virginia, on my left, was suffering in like proportion. . . . I had previously sent my adjutant to General Hill, announcing my loss and the danger of my position and earnestly begging reinforcements; but finding my force too small and the position fatally defective, I did not wait his return, but ordered my command to fall off down the cover of the fence, and immediately after received the order to retreat.¹

The question has been raised why General Hill did not order one or both of his other brigades to the succor of the overwhelmed regiments. The action lasted only 23 minutes.² Even the other two regiments of Early's brigade did not have time, after their direction was changed, to afford relief. Moreover, General Hill had been ordered not to prolong the action "so as to delay the march after night." Even if he had not been under orders, he was too experienced a soldier not to know that Hancock would be reinforced in the capital position that he had secured³ as soon as he was pressed. Indeed, as we now know, Smith, Hancock's division commander, had twice in the early afternoon started reinforcements to his fortunate brigadier,⁴ but was forced to recall them by Sumner's uneasiness about his center. General McClellan reached the field from Yorktown at almost the exact hour of the Confederate advance. His first order was for Smith, "who was chafing like a caged lion, to move as rapidly as possible to Hancock's support with his two remaining brigades and Naglee's."⁵ An order, therefore, from Hill for the engagement of his other

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 611.

² "By the evidence of an officer, who noted the time, the action continued twenty-three minutes from the time of the enemy's appearance until his repulse." Hancock's Report, *Ibid.*, 541.

³ "Could I have arrived at one o'clock, it is very certain that Smith, supported by Couch and afterwards by Casey, would have at once debouched from Hancock's ground and have cut off the retreat of the greater part of the troops engaged against Hooker." McClellan in his *Own Story*, 332.

⁴ *Official Records*, 12, 556.

⁵ *McClellan's Own Story*, 330. These troops ordered by McClellan reached Hancock just at the close of the battle, and were posted to relieve him before night. *Official Records*, 12, 560.

troops at that hour would, on any reasonable presumption on his part, have precipitated a night battle. Such a conflict would not only have "delayed the march" in direct violation of his orders, but would have been contrary to all Confederate plans to get to Eltham's Landing ahead of Franklin.

General McClellan's discomfiture on his left, thinks Longstreet, led him to magnify Hancock's success on his right.¹ He was troubled over the inadequate handling of his men by his three corps commanders,² and naturally found relief in lauding the feat of Hancock, who with 2,547 men³ succeeded in repulsing the desperate advance of two regiments that together numbered fewer than one thousand men.⁴ Hancock's dispositions were soldierly, and he was always a good officer, but his odds on this occasion were overwhelming. Comrades and adversaries united in praise of the assailants. "History," says General Hill, "has no example of a more daring charge." General Hancock, in a burst of enthusiasm for their daring, declared that the two regiments deserved to have the word "Immortal" inscribed on their banners.

¹ *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 80. In answer to the question, "Where was General Hancock engaged and what did he do in that battle?" General Heintzelman replied, "He was engaged on the right and repulsed an attack of the enemy of some two or three regiments, I believe; that is all. We all considered it a very small matter. We thought it really had no influence upon the battle." Committee on the Conduct of the War, II, 1, 354.

² On reaching the battlefield about five o'clock, McClellan says: "I found everything in a state of chaos and depression. Even the privates saw clearly that with force enough in hand to gain a victory, we, the pursuers, were on the defensive and content with repulsing attacks, and that there was no plan of action, no directing head." *McClellan's Own Story*, 328.

³ Hancock's Report, *Official Records*, 12, 543.

⁴ In an official report of Lieutenant-Colonel P. J. Sinclair not found in the official records, but preserved in the *Milton Chronicle*, he states the strength of the Fifth Regiment as follows: Officers, 24; noncommissioned officers, 64; privates, 341. Total 429. The undated return at Yorktown, before sickness and the forced march reduced the strength, gave the regiment only 460. Colonel Maury says: "This exposure and hardship, greater than they had ever borne, was quickly followed by sickness and disease, so that during the three weeks in the Yorktown trenches, the 700 muskets of the Twenty-fourth were reduced to something like 500 men." *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 8, 283. In the light of these facts, it is amusing to read in General Francis A. Walker's *Life of Hancock*, (p. 43) this assertion: "He had defeated and routed a superior force of the enemy, led by two of their ablest captains."

The losses in the Fifth North Carolina, which from lack of cover in the retreat exceeded those of the Twenty-fourth Virginia, were appalling. Out of the 429 men engaged 56 were killed, 115 wounded, and 81 missing, a total of 252.¹ The Light Brigade in its famous charge at Balaklava took 600 men into action and lost only 247. The Twenty-fourth Virginia's loss was 30 killed, 93 wounded, 66 missing, total 190.² The total Federal loss during the entire action was 2,239.³ The total Confederate loss was 1,503.⁴

Among the killed and wounded in the Fifth Regiment were some most promising young officers. Lieutenant-Colonel John C. Badham, a cool and gallant soldier, was killed. Lieutenant Samuel Thomas Snow, while cheering forward his men, was shot dead. Captain Henry Mullins was mortally wounded. Captains Thomas M. Garrett, John W. Lea, Hamilton C. Jones, and Lieutenants Joseph G. Hays, W. S. Boswell, and John P. Clark were all wounded.

¹ Sinclair's Report, already quoted.

² *Official Records*, 12, 569.

³ *Ibid.*, 450.

⁴ This is reached by adding to the list given in the records (*Ibid.*, 12, 569) the loss in the Fifth North Carolina, which is not given in the official return.

CHAPTER XII

THE ADVANCE ON RICHMOND AND THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN

On the morning after the battle at Williamsburg the Confederates again took the rain-sodden road for Richmond.¹ General McClellan, who was held blame-worthy by some of his fellow-officers² for not following hot after Johnston, says that owing to the exhaustion of his soldiers, the inability of the supply trains to keep pace with the army, and the heaviness of the roads, "an immediate pursuit was impossible."³ As a result of this inaction, Franklin's division and Dana's brigade of Sedgwick's division landed at Eltham before their comrades left Williamsburg. This position, hardly more than a mile from the road⁴ on which the Confederate baggage, ordnance, and artillery trains had to pass, had been chosen, it will be recalled, as the landing place of the four divisions of Franklin, Porter, Sedgwick, and Richardson in their ascent of York River. Could these divisions have been concentrated there as speedily as McClellan hoped, Johnston's army would have been gravely endangered. What Webb calls "Peninsula fatality" again destroyed

¹ "The tenacious mud was often knee-deep. Shoes were pulled from our feet by it and lost. Pantaloon became so caked and weighted with mud that many, in sheer desperation and utter inability in their exhaustion to carry an extra ounce, cut off and threw away all below their knees. All that night we had no food, nor the next day." Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 200. Longstreet writes to G. W. Smith on May 8, "If your road can beat this for mud, I don't want to see it. If you see the general (Johnston) say to him that we are as happy as larks over here, till we get 126 wagons (the total number) up to the hub at one time." *Battles and Leaders*, II, 222.

² General Hooker, for example, whose self-confidence was to be shocked at Chancellorsville, told the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "We moved in a manner I never did understand—losing time. . . . So far as the best information we have goes, the enemy had abandoned the idea of defending Richmond. And it was only when they saw the lassitude and inefficiency of our army that they concluded to make a stand there." II, (1), 578.

³ *Official Records*, 12, 23.

⁴ Whiting's Report, *Ibid.*, 630.

the underpinning of a well-conceived plan. Hence, when the Confederates arrived at the line of contemplated flank danger at Eltham, they were doubly favored: McClellan was not hanging on their rear; and only Franklin's division and Dana's brigade of Sedgewick's division were lying at their right elbows. Their confidence would have been increased had they known that Franklin was under orders to hug the river.

General G. W. Smith, in charge of the Confederate advance, of course knew nothing of Franklin's orders. Hence, on finding that Federal skirmishers were approaching the highway, he ordered Whiting's division to drive Franklin's men back to the cover of their gunboats so as "to prevent any interference with the march of the main column."¹ This was done on the morning of May 7 with two brigades, and Johnston's men "passed on unhindered toward Richmond."² Near the close of this action Reilly's North Carolina Battery, supported by Pender's Sixth North Carolina Regiment, was stationed on a bluff overlooking the river, and fired a few shots from the Parrott guns assigned to this battery from the captures at Manassas. The range proved unsatisfactory, and battery and regiment were soon withdrawn. Two of Pender's men were wounded.

Johnston's army, marching on an average of only ten miles a day, reunited its columns at Baltimore Cross Roads on May 9. There the starving soldiers were served with supplies brought over the York River Railroad from Richmond.³ While his army was

¹ Whiting's Report, *Official Records*, 12, 629.

² "Thus the flanking movement, on which General McClellan had apparently counted to win for him a decided advantage, had secured only a comparatively easy advance of his right wing as far as West Point. Ropes, *The Story of the Civil War*, II, 111.

³ While the Confederate soldiers, separated from any supply base, were almost without food, McClellan, using his boats on the York River, got forward rations with little difficulty. The Comte of Paris records that "In one day the wooded banks of Queen's Creek are cleared and rude wharves built where transports came to deposit their cargoes of salt pork, biscuit, rice, and forage." Lossing, *Civil War in American*, II, 26.

resting, Johnston was informed that Norfolk had been abandoned by the Confederates on May 10, and that on May 11, the *Merrimac* had been destroyed by her own commander.¹ The burning of the ironclad opened the James River as well as the York to the Federal boats, and required a change in Johnston's position. He says, "On the 15th the attack upon the battery at Drewry's Bluff by the enemy's gunboats suggested to me the necessity of so placing the army as to be prepared for the enemy's advance up the river or on the south side, as well as from the direction of West Point. We, therefore, crossed the Chickahominy to take a position 6 or 7 miles from Richmond. That ground being unfavorable the present position (in the fortifications around the city) was taken on the 17th."²

The slowness with which General McClellan moved toward Richmond enhanced the growing belief in Washington that he was not a "fighting general."³ On May 20, the Army of the Potomac, having moved

¹ The loss of Norfolk, including the Gosport Naval Yard, was a severe blow to the Confederate government, but the town could not be held after the Peninsula was evacuated. It was intended that the *Merrimac* should ascend the James River and add the weight of her guns to the defense of Richmond. Her draught was too deep and hence she was destroyed.

² *Official Records*, 12, 276.

³ McClellan's daily telegrams to the War Department and his letters to his wife disclose that three convictions governed the conduct of his Peninsula campaign. The first of these, owing to his Pinkerton spectacles, was that everywhere the Confederates far outnumbered him. His three corps commanders, notwithstanding the fact that he did not think highly of them and that the Prince de Joinville classed them as "three old women," (a) seem to have measured the Confederate strength more accurately than their chief. (b) His second conviction was that he could and would end the war by one decisive victory. With this in view, he thought that to make sure of victory in this one crucial test, he should have "all the disposable troops in Eastern Virginia." This conviction goes far in explaining his insatiable call for more troops. The third belief was that if it so willed, the War Department could furnish the troops. The following citations illustrate his frame of mind: May 8, "I expect to fight another and very severe battle before reaching Richmond, and with all the troops the Confederates can bring together, and therefore should have all the reinforcements that can be given me." *Ibid.*, 14, 150. May 10, "I see no other hope for him than to fight this battle, and we must win it." *Ibid.*, 12, 26. May 12, "I think one more battle here will finish the work." *McClellan's Own Story*, 356. May 14, "I must respectfully and earnestly urge upon Your Excellency that the opportunity has come for striking a fatal blow at the enemies of the Constitution, and I beg that you will cause this army to be reinforced without delay by all

only fifty-two miles in sixteen days, reached the Chickahominy. "There," says Irwin, stating the point of view of the War Office, "it lay astride of that sluggish stream, imbedded in its pestilential swamps, for thirty-nine days."¹ The hesitant advance of the Grand Army, from which so much was expected, greatly disturbed President Lincoln. Added to the disappointment arising from McClellan's failure to meet popular expectation² by an immediate crushing of Johnston's small army, came the ubiquitous and disconcerting victories of Stonewall Jackson in the Valley of Virginia.³ The campaign of this commander, who seemed "to have been especially created to become the unknown quantity of the Army of the Potomac,"⁴ is so closely interwoven with events on the Peninsula

the disposable forces of the government. I ask for every man the War Department can send me. . . . The greater our force, the more perfect will be our combinations and the less our loss." *Official Records*, 12, 27. May 18, "The great battle must first be fought by our troops in mass." *Ibid.*, 180. May 20, "We are gradually drawing near the rascals. I think they intend to fight us in front of Richmond; if they do it will be a decisive battle." *McClellan's Own Story*, 394. May 21, "All accounts report their numbers as greatly exceeding our own." *Ibid.*, 349. May 23, "I am here on the eve of one of the great historic battles of the world—one of those crises in a nation's life that occur but seldom." *Ibid.*, 396.

a Hooker's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, II, (3), 577.

b Testimony of Keyes, Sumner, and Heintzelman: Committee on the Conduct of the War.

¹ *Battles and Leaders*, II, 437.

² "As yet the Northern people, intoxicated by their successes in the West and on the coast, had been disappointed of the great battle which was to insure the capture of Richmond. Rumor each day in New York announced its fall, and the unopposed march of the army to within a few miles of the city excited the hopes of the ignorant masses, only too credulous of all that tended to magnify the power and greatness of the Federal Republic." Fletcher, *History of the American War*, I, 453.

³ "This Valley constituted the only route by which a Confederate army could invade Maryland and threaten Washington City in rear. Cool judgment at the head of affairs, after Washington had once been fortified against an attack by open assault, might have laughed at any real danger from such an invasion. . . . But fear, approaching panic, took possession of Washington whenever a Confederate force appeared in the Valley, and every operation would be suspended to concentrate all efforts upon driving it out. This oversensitiveness of the Federals cut its greatest figure in 1862, and was more than once the only salvation of Richmond." Alexander, *Memoirs*, 94.

⁴ Dodge, *Bird's-eye View of our Civil War*, 55.

that it will be necessary to glance at Jackson's triumphant sweep from Swift Run Gap near Staunton to Harpers Ferry.

Jackson had been left to occupy the beautiful Valley with practically no instructions except "to concentrate on any (enemy) that may be exposed,"¹ and thereby relieve the pressure on Fredericksburg, which was to be used as a secondary base against Richmond.² No orders were ever sweeter to Jackson than discretionary orders. His restless genius loved to take counsel only of itself in planning his swift campaigns. In the separated positions of the Federals before him³ he saw "a golden opportunity for striking a blow"⁴ that would divert westward some of the hosts converging on Richmond. With a boldness new in American war and with a power to fascinate his men into undergoing almost incredible hardships on the march and reckless valor on the field, Jackson at once entered on a strategic diversion of which "no finer study can be found in modern war."⁵

Leaving Swift Run Gap by a tortuous route, Jackson united with Edward Johnson's force near Staunton, and on May 8 fell on Schenck and Milroy at McDowell. He defeated these commanders and followed their retreat almost to Franklin. Having cleared his rear by this stroke, he set out on May 19 to grapple with Banks on the Valley pike. Banks, although weakened by the withdrawal of Shield's division to reinforce McDowell, was in a strongly fortified camp at Stras-

¹ Lee to Jackson, *Official Records*, 18, 866.

² *Ibid.*, 859.

³ At this time the Federal forces were scattered as follows: Banks was a little south of Harrisonburg; a part of Milroy's force was near McDowell; Schenck was near Franklin; Fremont was moving south from Romney; Blenker was north of Winchester; Geary and Abercrombie were north of Warrenton. Around Harrisonburg, Banks had about 19,000 men. Fremont's force included about 15,000. The Confederates under Jackson, including Ewell, and Edward Johnson, numbered 19,663. *Ibid.*, 18, 829, 851, 879.

⁴ Jackson to Lee, *Ibid.*, 871.

⁵ Steele, *American Campaigns*, 234.

burg. While Banks and Secretary Stanton, who was personally directing from Washington the Federal campaign in the Valley, still thought Jackson at Harrisonburg, ¹ he swiftly emerged from the Luray Valley road, and crushed Kenly at Front Royal. With Ewell's coöperation, he, in President Lincoln's words, ran a race to Winchester with Banks and beat him back in full retreat across the Potomac. Acting, says Dabney, ² on instructions from Richmond, Jackson next menaced Harpers Ferry and sought to convey the impression that the Confederates designed invading Maryland and even assaulting the capital. ³

The tidings of the defeat and expulsion of Banks from the Valley and Jackson's presence at Harpers Ferry "fell like a thunderbolt on the war council at Washington." ⁴ Secretary Stanton wrote to Governor

¹ "Since they had left Mount Solon and Elk Run Valley on May 19, the troops in four days had made just sixty miles. Such celerity of movement was unfamiliar to both Banks and Stanton, and on the night of the 22d neither the secretary nor the general had the faintest suspicion that the enemy had as yet passed Harrisonburg. There was serenity at Washington. On both sides of the Blue Ridge everything was going well. . . . Banks at Strasburg was in a strong position, and McDowell was about to lend the aid which would enable McClellan to storm the rebel capital. Washington seemed so perfectly secure that the recruiting offices had been closed, and the President and secretary, anticipating the immediate fall of Richmond, left for Fredericksburg the next day. McDowell was to march on the 26th, and the departure of his fine army was to be preceded by a grand review. So on this night of May 22, the President and his people were without fear of what the morrow might bring forth. The end of the rebellion seemed near at hand. Washington was full of the anticipated triumph. The crowds passed to and fro on the broad avenues, exchanging congratulations on the success of the Northern arms and the approaching downfall of the slaveholders. The theaters were filled with delighted audiences, who hailed every scoffing allusion to the 'Southern Chivalry' with enthusiasm, and gaiety and confidence reigned supreme. Little dreamed the lighthearted multitude that in the silent woods of the Luray Valley a Confederate army lay asleep beneath the stars." Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, I, 314-15.

² *Life of Jackson*, 386.

³ Ropes (II, 126), in quoting Dabney as to these instructions, asserts that "there are apparently no dispatches or letters bearing on this point in the War Records." Yet on May 16, General Lee writes to Jackson: "Whatever movement you make against Banks do it speedily, and if successful drive him back toward the Potomac and create the impression, as far as practicable that you design threatening that line." *Official Records*, 18, 893.

⁴ Swinton, *Army of the Potomac*, 126. General Gordon, who commanded Bank's rear-guard, says: "The effect of our retreat upon the country was startling. . . . Governor Andrew at Boston penned the last words of a

Andrew, "There is no doubt the enemy in great force is marching on Washington." "In the cities of the North," writes Henderson, "the panic was indescribable. As the people came out of church the newsboys were crying, 'Defeat of General Banks! Washington in danger!'"¹ In response to the alarm from Washington, the governors of thirteen states called for more troops.

This unwarranted panic produced an even greater diversion of troops from Richmond² than General Lee had in mind when he directed the movement.³ It kept the weight of about 30,000 muskets and thirteen batteries—that is, the divisions of King, Ord, and Shields of McDowell's army—from being thrown against the Confederates in the great battles around their capital; for as soon as President Lincoln heard of Bank's defeat, he declared that "if McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be entirely helpless,"⁴ and rescinded the order for McDowell to join McClellan. General McDowell was then instructed to put 20,000 men in motion to assist Fremont in the capture of Jackson in the Valley.⁵ President Lincoln was so wrought over the situation that in addition

proclamation, calling on Massachusetts to rise once more for the rescue and defense of the capital. . . . In other states the excitement was scarcely less intense than in Massachusetts." *Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain*, 256.

¹ *Stonewall Jackson*, I, 344.

² The English military historians, Wood and Edmonds, say: "History affords few instances of a small force producing such great results as followed from Jackson's Valley campaign. Both he and Lee detected the weak spot in the Federal armor—the anxiety of the Cabinet for the safety of their capital. The Confederate generals played on the fears of the Washington politicians, and by so doing paralyzed the plan of campaign of the Federal commander. It is hardly too much to say that the fate of Richmond was decided, not on the banks of the Chickahominy, but by the waters of the Shenandoah." *The Civil War in the United States*, 92.

³ *Official Records*, 18, 878, 891, 893.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 12, 32.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 18, 219. General Meade, in a letter to his wife, measures this movement as follows: "You see how completely Jackson succeeded in carrying out these [directions], by paralyzing McDowell's force of 40,000 men, through the stupidity of the authorities at Washington becoming alarmed and sending McDowell on a wild-geese chase after a wily foe, who never intended to be caught in a trap." *Life and Letters of General Meade*, I, 276.

to sending McDowell on a bootless quest of Jackson's long-distance marchers, he disturbed General McClellan with this tart telegram: "I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come to the defense of Washington."¹

In vain Generals McClellan and McDowell pointed out the futility of this effort "to trap" Jackson, and remonstrated as far as soldiers dared against this diversion from their main objective, the capture of Richmond.² The President and Secretary Stanton took charge of the campaign and tried to direct it by wire from Washington.³ As predicted by McDowell, Jackson eluded Fremont and Shields at Strasburg, and not only escaped with all his captured stores, but turned on his pursuers for two more victories at Cross Keys and Port Republic. By his adroit handling of his little army, Jackson "induced us," says General Upton, "to scatter more than 60,000 men from three departments."⁴ The conclusion seems inevitable that had McDowell's well-appointed corps of nearly 40,000 men been allowed to swell McClellan's army to 140,000

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 32.

² McDowell writes the President: "It will take a week or ten days for the force to get to the Valley by the route which will give it food and forage, and by that time the enemy will have retired. I shall gain nothing for you there and lose much for you here. It is, therefore, not only on personal grounds that I have a heavy heart in the matter, but that I feel it throws us all back, and from Richmond north we shall have all our large masses paralyzed and shall have to repeat what we have just accomplished." *Ibid.*, 18, 220. McClellan dispatched as follows: "I am confident that Washington is in no danger. . . . The real issue is in the battle about to be fought in front of Richmond." *Ibid.*, 12, 35.

³ "Mr. Lincoln, at Washington, was exerting himself to the utmost, sending a dozen dispatches a day to Banks, Fremont, McDowell, McClellan—all admirable . . . but nothing seemed to avail." Nicolay and Hay, V, 403. "But Stanton was directing this campaign; it was he that was pitted against Lee and Jackson in the game of strategy. He would listen to no advice nor protests from McDowell and McClellan, and by his obstinacy and ignorance of the science of war he probably set back the fall of Richmond and the Confederacy just three years." Steele, *American Campaigns*, 228.

⁴ *Military Policy of the United States*, 306.

or 150,000 troops, only a miracle could have saved the Confederate capital.¹

Only one regiment from North Carolina took part in the rapid evolutions of Jackson's "foot-cavalry." This was the Twenty-first North Carolina, a large regiment of twelve companies under Colonel W. W. Kirkland. This regiment, which had been present, but not closely engaged at First Manassas, was in the fall of 1861 assigned to Trimble's brigade of Ewell's division. When the Confederate army was moved to the Peninsula, Ewell's division was left at Gordonsville. Subsequently it was placed under Jackson's orders and united with him in time to fight at Front Royal and Winchester.

After Kenly's rout at Front Royal, Trimble's brigade set out rapidly for Winchester. Near the town, the two leading regiments, the Twenty-first North Carolina and the Twenty-first Georgia, encountered Donnelly's Federal brigade in line behind a stone fence. Kirkland's North Carolinians, in advance of the brigade, dashed at the position held by Donnelly across the road. "The North Carolinians," says Allen, "met with a bloody reception. The Federals, taking advantage of the stone fences with which that country is everywhere intersected, had posted their lines behind some of these fences and poured a well-directed front and flank fire into the Confederates as they advanced

¹ "That this concentration of 150,000 men in the immediate vicinity of Richmond would have compelled its speedy evacuation, is certainly very probable. It was, at any rate, obviously the true course for the Federal authorities to take. That this course was not taken was due entirely to President Lincoln, who . . . broke up deliberately one of the most promising combinations for the defeat of the Confederates and capture of their capital that fortune was ever likely to afford the Federal cause." Ropes: *The Story of the Civil War*, II, 132. "If McDowell, with his 30,000 or 40,000 troops had joined the Union army on the Chickahominy, Richmond must inevitably have fallen, and with it, in all human probability, the Confederacy." Steele, *American Campaigns*, 234. "By these flying movements he (Jackson) had paralyzed McDowell's force, which was to have, and should have, joined McClellan and fallen like a hammer on Richmond." Webb, *The Peninsula*, 92. "This delay took away his last possible chance to reinforce McClellan before Lee took the offensive." Alexander, *Military Memoirs*, 108.

across the open field. In a few moments the Twenty-first North Carolina, having lost both of the field officers present and a large number of men killed and wounded, fell back. The check was, however, but brief in its duration."¹ The Georgia regiment, struck heavily in its turn and Donnelly was severely shaken. A flank movement by the other regiments of the brigade dislodged Donnelly, and the entire brigade then followed the Federals through Winchester. In obedience to a personal order from General Ewell, the regiment followed Courtney's battery under Lieutenant Latimer as far as Martinsburg in the pursuit of Banks. The men felt rewarded for their hard marching by the abundance of sutler's stores that fell into their empty hands in that town.

Just after the battle the two extra companies of the regiment were detached to form a battalion of sharpshooters under Major R. W. Wharton. This battalion was thereafter known as the First North Carolina Battalion. The two organizations took part in the battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic. The casualties at Winchester were heavy. Lieutenant-Colonel R. K. Pepper was mortally wounded. Captains H. S. Ligon and J. C. Hedgecock² were killed. Colonel Kirkland, Captain J. W. Beard, and Lieutenant James F. Beall were wounded. The regiment sustained the heaviest loss in the brigade—a total of 21 killed and 59 wounded.³ At Cross Keys and Port Republic the losses were 2 killed and 11 wounded.⁴

¹ *Jackson's Valley Campaign*, 111, 112.

² These officers, together with 443 other North Carolina soldiers, are buried in the beautiful Stonewall Jackson Cemetery at Winchester. The women of that county, with tireless zeal, collected the Confederate dead from all the battlefields in reach of their searching parties, and buried them in their town. There are more soldiers from North Carolina interred there than there are from any other State. See official list prepared by the women of Winchester.

³ *Official Records*, 15, 780.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 717.

The recall of McDowell to go on what the Comte de Paris calls "a wild goose chase after Jackson," whose movements ought to have been regarded as a diversion insignificant in comparison with the stakes at hazard on the Chickahominy, was a cruel blasting of McClellan's hopes.¹ The upsetting of his plans came just when he, after painstaking thoroughness in his approach to Richmond, was apparently about to realize his vision of striking in irresistible numbers and ending the fratricidal war before it should take too heavy a toll of the resources and blood of the country.

Intelligence reached McClellan on May 26 that there was a considerable Confederate force at Hanover Court House. These troops, if they were there in force, would be in position to threaten his communications and either to reinforce Jackson or to impede McDowell's juncture should he finally be permitted to unite with him. McClellan regarded it as imperative to dislodge this force.² He, therefore, directed General Fitz John Porter to take command of an expedition against whatever troops might be found at that place. General Porter marched on May 27 with Warren's brigade, Morell's division of three brigades, and Berdan's sharpshooters—in all, fifteen regiments of infantry,³ three of cavalry,⁴ and four batteries.⁵ His total force is estimated by General Webb at about 12,000 men.⁶

¹ McClellan's view of McDowell's detachment is frankly stated in his official report: "His withdrawal toward Front Royal was, in my judgment, a serious and fatal blunder. He could do no good in that direction, while, had he been permitted to carry out the orders of May 17, the united forces would have driven the enemy within the immediate intrenchments of Richmond before Jackson could have returned to its succor, and probably would have gained possession promptly of that place." *Official Records*, 12, 37.

² *Ibid.*, 33.

³ These were as follows: Warren, 3; Martindale, 3; McQuade, 4; Butterfield, 4; Berdan, 1.

⁴ The Fifth and Sixth United States Cavalry under Emory, and the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry (Lancers) under Rush of Warren's brigade.

⁵ Allen's, Benson's, Griffin, Martin's.

⁶ *The Peninsula*, 93. Neither McClellan nor Porter states the number of men with Porter. Warren gives the strength of each of his organizations.

On reaching Slash Church near Hanover Court House, Porter found in his front only General L. O'B. Branch's North Carolina brigade. This brigade was organized at Kinston on March 31, 1862, and was regularly composed of five North Carolina regiments. These were the Seventh, Colonel R. P. Campbell; the Eighteenth, Colonel R. H. Cowan; the Twenty-eighth, Colonel J. H. Lane; the Thirty-third, Lieutenant-Colonel R. F. Hoke; the Thirty-seventh, Colonel Charles C. Lee. This composition was retained throughout the war. At this time, however, two additional regiments, the Twelfth North Carolina, Colonel B. O. Wade, and the Forty-fifth Georgia, Colonel Thomas Hardeman, were temporarily attached to the brigade. Captain A. C. Latham's North Carolina battery, "only half equipped in horses and men," joined Branch on the night before the battle. Branch gives his strength at about 4,000.¹

Branch's brigade, with the exception of Colonel James H. Lane's Twenty-eighth North Carolina, was near Peake's Station on the Virginia Central Railroad. Lane's regiment, with two of Latham's guns under Lieutenant J. R. Potts, had been detached to Taliaferro's Mill, but had drawn back on the Hanover road to await the Federal arrival. Unaware of the odds opposing him, Lane offered battle near Doctor Kinney's

The average is 653, including the cavalry regiment. If all of Porter's regiments averaged as low as Warren's, this average would give him in his eighteen cavalry and infantry regiments 11,754. His artillery would bring his number up to Webb's estimate. The official returns of June 20, give Morell's division alone "as present for duty equipped," 12,011.

¹ If Branch's seven regiments averaged the same as Porter's this would give him 4,571. It is strange that General Webb, writing in 1881, and claiming in his preface to have compared and collated "for careful investigation the new material gathered by the War Department and now for the first time made the basis of a history of that period," should say that "Branch's command must have been about 10,000 strong."^(a) Such a number would make Branch's regiments average 1,428. Even the Pinkerton Agency, with its fondness for big numbers, on the Confederate side, concedes that the Confederate regiments at this period did not average over 700.^(b)

^a Webb, *The Peninsula*, 96.

^b *Official Records*, 12, 271.

house. The Twenty-fifth New York Regiment, deployed as skirmishers and supported by Berdan's regiment of sharpshooters, came first under the fire of Lane's smooth-bore muskets and Potts's guns. The New Yorkers were driven back with severe loss,¹ but, as they drew off, Butterfield's four regiments and Berdan's men took up the attack. They, after Lane had held them at bay for a considerable time, worked their way through ravines and woods to his right flank, and, aided by the fire of Benson's and Griffin's guns, forced him to retire towards the Court House. The horses of one of Potts's guns had all been disabled and this gun was left on the field.² Lane's men were cut off from their brigade by the flank attack, and, harassed by cavalry, joined their comrades only after three days of circuitous marching. It went into the battle 890 strong; it rejoined on the Chickahominy with only 480.

When the rattle of Lane's muskets apprised Branch near Peake's Station that his isolated regiment was closely engaged, he directed Colonel Charles C. Lee with his own regiment—the Thirty-seventh North Carolina—and Colonel R. H. Cowan's Eighteenth North Carolina to reinforce Lane. These two regiments had marched but a short distance when they found two regiments of infantry and a section of artillery barring their route, for Porter had ordered Martindale's brigade to turn off the road near Peake's

¹ Major Gilbert of the Twenty-fifth New York says of his regiment, which was deployed as skirmishers in three divisions: "As they arrived at the house (Kinney's) a heavy fire was opened on them from across the (Richmond) road. Lieutenant-Colonel Savage was wounded, Lieutenant Fiske killed, and several privates killed and wounded. The skirmishers fell back behind the house. Then they rallied around the barns, being unable to hold their position at the house. There Captain McMahon was killed. The enemy crossed the road in large force, at least a regiment, and fell upon them at the barn. Here Lieutenant Thompson was killed and Lieutenant Halpin mortally wounded. Colonel Johnston, seeing it impossible to withstand the enemy, gave the order to retire." *Official Records*, 12, 715.

² Lane says of the conduct of this section, "Never were two guns served more handsomely." Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 470.

Station to protect his flank. Martindale, finding the Confederates approaching, posted the Second Maine and Forty-fourth New York, with Martin's guns, to receive them. A little later he put what Lane had left of the Twenty-fifth New York between these two regiments, and sent for reinforcements. On learning from Lee's report that battle was imminent Branch rode forward and ordered these dispositions: Lee, with the Thirty-seventh, was ordered to push through the woods and get close on the right flank of the battery. Lieutenant-Colonel R. F. Hoke, as soon as he should return from a sweep through the woods with the Thirty-third North Carolina, and Colonel Benjamin O. Wade's Twelfth North Carolina Regiment was directed to make a similar movement to the left flank of the battery. Cowan's instructions were to charge across the open ground in front with the Eighteenth. Latham meantime was to bring his four guns to bear on Martindale's center. Campbell's Seventh North Carolina and Hardeman's Georgia regiment constituted the reserve. Hoke and Wade, after a sharp skirmish in which they took 6 prisoners and 11 horses, came out too late for the movement on the left. Hoke was, therefore, ordered to Lee's support.¹

Although Cowan with the Eighteenth made, as Branch says, a gallant charge, his single regiment did not have weight enough to dislodge the regiments before him. He, therefore, threw his men into the woods, and waited for Lee, whose progress had been retarded by dense undergrowth. As soon as Lee emerged the joint attack of the two regiments broke Martindale's center. That officer thus describes the effect of the attack: "The fire of the enemy was now crossed on the battery, the Twenty-fifth New York, and the right of the Forty-fourth New York. . . .

¹ Branch's Report, *Official Records*, 12, 741.

Soon the fire of the battery was silenced, and I discovered that my center was giving way. Presently the Twenty-fifth New York retired, and also the gunners of the batteries. . . . I could not identify at this time the parties, but there was a rapid and presently a disordered movement to the rear.”¹

Porter, who had pressed on toward the Court House in pursuit of Lane, hurriedly turned his men back as the battle on his flank swelled. McQuade's brigade was the first to bring succor to Martindale's distressed regiments. Under General Morell's personal direction the Fourteenth New York took over the fighting of the Second Maine, which, its colonel says, had fired away its 60 rounds of ammunition.² General Morell says of the arrival of these reinforcements: "And it was time, for the gunners had been driven from their pieces, the remnant of the Twenty-fifth New York had broken and been reformed at a distance to the rear, and the right wing of the Forty-fourth New York had given way."³ As the Fourteenth New York engaged Lee and Cowan in front, the Sixty-second Pennsylvania, the Ninth Massachusetts, and Berdan's sharpshooters first and then the Eighty-third Pennsylvania of Butterfield's returning brigade, were thrown on the Confederate left flank. Griffin's battery, supported by the Thirteenth New York, was also pushed into the fray.⁴

¹ Martindale's Report, *Official Records*, 12, 705. Lieutenant-Colonel Rice, of the Forty-fourth New York, gives this picture of the blaze of the combat at this hour: "The enemy greatly outnumbered us. His fire swept through our ranks like a storm of hail. Our banner was pierced by over forty of the enemy's balls. For the space of one hour the struggle was desperate, our muskets, even, so heated by the continued firing that the soldiers used the water from their canteens to cool them, while many of our arms were shattered by the sweeping cross fire, and many wounded soldiers loaded muskets for others to fire." *Ibid.*, 731.

² General Webb, says: "This regiment relieved the Second Maine and Forty-fourth New York, which had been overwhelmed by Branch's large brigade." As seen above these Federal regiments were engaged only with the Thirty-seventh and Eighteenth North Carolina.

³ *Official Records*, 12, 700.

⁴ Reports of Morell, McQuade, Martindale, and Warren.

This accession of Federal strength, as General Martindale comments in his report, "necessarily ended the battle," for Branch had already realized that he was hopelessly outnumbered, and had continued the battle only with the hope that he would be reinforced.¹ He, therefore, a short time before night ordered his troops to retire toward Ashland. The rush of Federal troops to their rear, while they were still hotly engaged in front, resulted in a considerable loss in prisoners as Lee and Cowan extricated themselves under severe pressure.

The Federal loss, as officially reported, was: killed 62, wounded 223. The Twenty-fifth New York, which was closely engaged in both the morning and afternoon battles, was the heaviest loser—28 killed and 79 wounded. Its companion regiment in the afternoon, the Forty-fourth New York, and the Second Maine were the next heaviest. The Forty-fourth's loss was 86, and the Second Maine's 32.² Branch reports his casualties, exclusive of Lane's regiment, at 66 killed and 177 wounded.³ He, on June 6, forwarded to Governor Clark of North Carolina an official list of the casualties in the three regiments that bore the brunt of the battle.⁴ These were as follows: the Thirty-seventh Regiment, killed 29, wounded 76, missing 132; the Eighteenth took 539 men into battle and had 38 killed, 88 wounded, and 56 missing; the Twenty-eighth reports 6 killed, 14 wounded, and 282 missing. These lists were compiled on June 9. A very considerable number of men marked as missing reported for duty in a few days. Surgeon J. F. Shaffner remained to care for 41 wounded Confederates who had to be left

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 742. The brigades of Field and Gregg were only four miles away.

² *Ibid.*, 685.

³ *Ibid.*, 742.

⁴ Clark's Letter File, June 6, 1862.

on the field for want of transportation.¹ Branch's other regiments had few casualties. "The Thirty-third, Twelfth, and Seventh North Carolina participated but slightly, and the Forty-fifth Georgia was not engaged."²

The brushing aside of Branch's brigade from Hanover Court House practically left an uninterrupted route for any or all of the Federals operating in north-west Virginia to grasp hands with McClellan's troops. General Johnston knew that, as soon as the teeth of the alarmists in Washington ceased to chatter over Jackson's unique performances, part at least of the forces clutching at the throat of the Confederate Valley commander would be grasping at his own. It was unreasonable to suppose, to use General Upton's numerical expression, that 16,000 men could indefinitely neutralize 60,000.³ Johnston was accordingly convinced that his only chance to save his capital was to risk battle before the forces hobbling after Jackson could reinforce General McClellan. Moreover, the awkward position of the Federal army astride the Chickahominy River was an urgent invitation to attempt the destruction of one wing before it could be supported by the other.

The Confederate army was now occupying the rather feeble works prepared for the defense of Richmond. To the divisions of Generals G. W. Smith, Longstreet, Magruder, and D. H. Hill had been added two other comparatively small divisions. The first of these was General Benjamin Huger's division—a division that had seen only garrison service at Norfolk. The second was a new division composed of the brigades of Generals J. R. Anderson and L. O'B. Branch. This had been assigned to General A. P. Hill.

¹ *Fayetteville Observer*, June 30, 1862.

² Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 609.

³ *Military Policy of the United States*, 316.

The Federal army, which was now almost in cannon's throw of Richmond, was stretched from Mechanicsville on the north to Seven Pines on the south. To minimize the danger of a rise in the waters of the Chickahominy, which divided the army, bridges were rapidly built. General Fitz John Porter's corps held the extreme right of the line. His men were strongly posted along Beaver Dam Creek. Franklin's corps came next; then Sumner's, with its left not far from where the York River Railroad crossed the river. Keyes's corps had crossed the river on May 23, and, fortifying as it went, was established near Seven Pines on the Williamsburg road. Heintzelman's corps, which followed that of Keyes across the Chickahominy, was divided: Hooker's division was posted near White Oak Swamp, and Kearny's extended from near Bottom's Bridge to Savage Station. Heintzelman as ranking officer was in charge of operations south of the river. Kearny was about four miles in rear of Seven Pines, and Hooker more than seven. The two camps south of the Chickahominy contained twelve brigades—52 regiments in all, and 16 batteries.

The immediate task before General Johnston was to concentrate as many of his twenty-seven ¹ brigades as would suffice to crush the twelve Federal brigades before reinforcements could be rushed over to them. As soon as the diversion of McDowell's corps was confirmed he ordered General D. H. Hill to find by reconnoissance the position and strength of the Federals on the Charles City and on the Williamsburg road. On May 30, Hill received, says Longstreet, "a fair report of Casey's intrenched camp, and the probable strength and extent of the line of skirmishers reaching out his

¹ In *Battles and Leaders*, Johnston, in saying that he had 28 brigades, evidently forgot that Ripley's brigade of D. H. Hill's division was on detached service, and did not reach Richmond until after the battle.

left front to White Oak Swamp.”¹ When Hill delivered this report to his commander-in-chief, he was told that he would be ordered to lead an attack on the Williamsburg road early on May 31.

In consultation with General Longstreet, who as commander of the Confederate right would have charge of the expected morning battle, General Johnston, on the night of the thirtieth, assigned each division its part for the next day. Longstreet’s orders were verbal; Smith’s and Huger’s were written. A rain storm of almost unprecedented violence kept Longstreet with Johnston until a very late hour.²

The arrangements for the attack provided that D. H. Hill, already established on the Williamsburg road, should begin the battle with his four³ brigades on that highway. Huger, whose division had just joined from Norfolk, was encamped north of Gilliss Creek. He was directed to advance on the Charles City road, and, after relieving Rodes, to guard Hill’s flank, and join in the battle if opportunity offered.⁴

¹ *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 87. This reconnaissance was conducted by four companies (Companies, A, C, F, and K) of the Twenty-third North Carolina Regiment under Colonel D. H. Christie. In the skirmishing attendant on the search for information, Captain A. F. Scarborough was killed, and Captain Frank Bennett wounded. Private Letter, A. S. Webb, May 30, 1862.

² “Over three inches of rain must have fallen in the first two hours, and it kept up, more or less, until late at night. It was hoped that this rain would make our task easier by rendering the Chickahominy impassable for reinforcements to the enemy. . . . The immediate effect was only to make all of our marchings and manœuvres slower and more difficult, and the flat, swampy country of much of the battlefield was entirely inundated.” Alexander, *Military Memoirs*, 75.

³ One, of Hill’s brigades (Ripley’s), was not present. Another of his brigades (that of Rodes), was on the Charles City road, but not far distant from Seven Pines. It was ordered that Rodes be relieved by one of Huger’s brigades. This was done, but Rodes was delayed a short time in reaching his place of attack.

⁴ The first instructions that Huger received were as follows: “Be ready if an action should begin on your left to fall on the enemy’s left flank.” “P. S. It is important to move very early.” (a) His later directions were less pugnacious: “I fear that in my note of last evening . . . I was too positive on the subject of attacking the enemy’s left flank. It will, of course, be necessary for you to know what force is before you first. . . . If you find no strong body in your front, it will be well to aid General Hill; but then a strong reserve should be retained to cover our right.” (b)

a *Official Records*, 12, 938.

b *Ibid.*, 938.

Longstreet received verbal orders at the conference, but the evidence presented by General G. W. Smith and others is conclusive that on the morning of the battle General Johnston was expecting Longstreet to lead his six brigades, which lay along the Nine Mile road, into action on that road and to fight on Hill's left. Whiting's brigade of Smith's wing was ordered to march on the Nine Mile road and reinforce Longstreet.

Whether Johnston's directions, as he generously conceded, were not clear,¹ whether Longstreet simply misapprehended his part,² whether Smith's wing came on too slowly,³ or whether this wing, too, took the wrong road,⁴ or whether Huger's orders were lacking in definite fighting spirit, Johnston's program was never executed. Instead of a united rush *in the early morning* of all available brigades, when such a combination would utterly have ruined Keyes⁵ and Heintzelman before Sumner could have come to their aid,⁶ there was no crossing of fire until one o'clock, and then D. H. Hill went in alone.

This series of mischances began in the early morning. General Longstreet, instead of advancing eastward on

¹ Letter to Smith, June 28, 1862.

² "General Longstreet misunderstood the direction in which his own division was to have moved into action. Instead of striking Keyes's exposed, weak, and easily accessible right flank, when D. H. Hill commenced the attack in front, Longstreet transferred his division to the Williamsburg and Charles City roads, allowed Hill to fight for three hours without any assistance, and then gave him one brigade." Smith, *Seven Pines*, 171.

³ "He (Johnston) gave peremptory orders to that effect, but the movements were so slow that he lost patience and rode with Hood's leading brigade, pulled it on, and ordered communication with my left." Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 797.

⁴ "General Smith, instead of moving the troops by the route assigned him, marched back to the Nine Mile road near the city." *Ibid.*, 90.

⁵ Keyes says: "The left of my lines was well protected by the White Oak Swamp, but the right was on ground so favorable to the enemy and so far from the Chickahominy, that if Johnston had attacked there an hour earlier than he did I could have made but a feeble defense comparatively, and every man of us would have been killed, captured, or driven into the swamp or river before assistance could have reached us." *Fifty Years' Observations*.

⁶ Sumner was not ordered to cross until 2:30 p.m. *Official Records*, 12, 763.

his own Nine Mile road, directed his brigades to move for the Williamsburg road. This unexplained¹ mistake upset all of Johnston's plans. First, the occupation of the Richmond end of the Nine Mile road by Longstreet's brigades, some of them accompanied by wagons, blocked Whiting's troops, who had been ordered to follow Longstreet toward McLaw's position near Fair Oaks.² Second, the same troops later stopped Huger's march at Gilliss Creek, as that officer, in obedience to his orders, was seeking to make his way to the Charles City road to relieve Rodes and guard that flank. The delay caused Rodes to be late in joining Hill's battle and threw the brunt of the earliest fighting on Garland's and Anderson's brigades alone. Their combined losses from the concentrated fire of a whole division were terrible. Third, not a single one of Huger's three brigades drew a trigger. Fourth, and most fatal of all, it necessitated Longstreet's six brigades following Hill instead of falling on Keyes's exposed right flank, about which he had been so much disturbed.³ If, coincident with Hill's front attack, Longstreet's twenty-one regiments had gone at the Federal right with as much persistent vigor as Hill's nineteen regiments assailed the left, and if Huger had been properly directed against the Federal rear,

¹ "How the misunderstanding occurred has never been explained, for neither Johnston nor Longstreet, in their official reports or other writings, ever gave any explanation or even admitted openly that a mistake was made." Alexander, *Military Memoirs*, 77.

² *Official Records*, 14, 563, 564, and 12, 989. Longstreet, than whom there was no abler or stauncher fighter in Johnston's army, evidently thought that this congestion was caused by Smith's taking the wrong road and that he himself was acting in accord with Johnston's verbal orders. He says, "There was, therefore, no reason why the orders of march should be misconstrued or misapplied. I was with General Johnston all of the time that he was engaged in planning and ordering the battle, heard every word and thought expressed by him of it, and received his verbal orders." *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 88.

³ Keyes writes on May 31, "Brigadier-General Sumner told me yesterday he should probably cross the Chickahominy last night. If he did so, and takes post nigh the Old Tavern and this side, I should feel much more secure than I do now." *Official Records*, 14, 204.

Keyes's apprehension of what would have resulted from an earlier attack would no doubt have been fulfilled. Instead, however, of the coördinated Confederate sweep by which Johnston had hoped to end the struggle in an hour or two, the contest shaped itself into three almost disconnected battles on two separate days.¹ For the convenience of the reader, General Alexander's classification of these as Hill's, Johnston's, and Smith's may be accepted.²

The first of these was General D. H. Hill's successful combat on the Williamsburg road. When Hill, in obedience to Longstreet's orders, loosed his signal guns at one o'clock, his division of four brigades³ was the only Confederate force in battle array.⁴ Nine brigades, six of Longstreet and three of Huger, were strung out behind him. Hill's alignment showed Rodes's brigade on the right of the Williamsburg road with Rains's brigade in support. There were no North Carolina troops in these two brigades. Garland's brigade formed the front line on the left of the same road with the Fifth North Carolina Regiment, under Colonel D. K. MacRae, advancing along the highway. The Twenty-third North Carolina, under Colonel D. H. Christie, was also in this brigade. Anderson's brigade was Garland's support in the second line. The Fourth North Carolina Regiment, under Major Bryan Grimes, was the right regiment of the brigade, and followed the Fifth on the Williamsburg road. Two of the brigade

¹ "It is no wonder that Johnston said when he found out where Longstreet was, that he wished that the troops were all back in their camps." Alexander, *Military Memoirs*, 80.

² *Ibid.*, 85-87.

³ His fifth brigade (Ripley's), did not arrive until the next day.

⁴ Alexander says: "It was being badly started. It was on a front of only two brigades, supported by two in a second line, while nine other brigades encumbered the one good road leading to the battle. . . . It is D. H. Hill's division, about 8,500 strong, excellent troops, and there is not living a more honest fighter than D. H. Hill. They will first meet Casey's division of about equal strength, partly fortified with trenches and abatis. Behind Casey's are three other divisions, holding two lines partly intrenched." *Ibid.*, 80.

commanders, Anderson¹ and Rains,² were natives of North Carolina.

These four brigades were first to meet the three brigades of Casey, to which Peck's brigade of Couch's division was soon added. Then reinforced by R. H. Anderson's brigade, they engaged the two remaining brigades of Couch and the division of Kearny. Casey's men were in excellent position on the Williamsburg road, about five-eighths of a mile west of Seven Pines, where Couch's division was intrenched. Rifle-pits, an unfinished but defensible redoubt, abatis extending in front of his works to an open field across which the Confederates had to charge, four batteries of artillery—these were Casey's material defenses. Naglee's brigade constituted his right, Wessells's brigade his center, and

¹ George Burgwyn Anderson was born near Hillsboro, North Carolina. He was graduated from the University of North Carolina at an early age, and from the United States Military Academy in 1852. As a second and as a first lieutenant he rendered acceptable service on the western frontier. After his resignation was accepted in April, 1861, he was commissioned colonel of the Fourth North Carolina Regiment. At that time he was described by a friend as "a magnificent specimen of manhood, full six feet, erect, broad-shouldered, round-limbed, with a deep musical voice and a smile wonderfully gentle and winning." His regiment was ready for service in time to report at First Manassas, and Colonel Anderson served as commandant of that post. As senior colonel in Featherston's brigade he commanded that brigade in the Battle of Seven Pines, and so distinguished himself that on the recommendation of General Johnston he was promoted to be brigadier and assigned a brigade of North Carolina troops. He led his brigade with the growing approval of his seniors through the Seven Days Battles, and rendered notable service at Boonsboro Gap. He died from a wound received at Sharpsburg in September, 1862.

² General Gabriel J. Rains was a native of Craven County, North Carolina. After being graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1837, he was commissioned a lieutenant in the Seventh Infantry. As captain, he commanded a company in the Seminole Indian War in 1840. He was brevetted major for gallant conduct in the battle near Fort King. In this Indian campaign he first experimented with contact explosives. When North Carolina seceded he was a lieutenant-colonel in the Fifth Infantry. He entered the Confederate army as a colonel, but in September, 1861, he was appointed a brigadier-general, and assigned to service at Yorktown. During the siege he devised some subterranean shells as part of the defenses. When the Federals entered Yorktown, the explosion of some of these shells caused much consternation, as did the explosion of a few in front of the Federal cavalry on the Williamsburg road. Although the Northern press harshly denounced this "evidence of barbarism" on the part of the South, the use of the explosives grew rapidly on both sides. As a North Carolinian was the precursor in this war in adopting this form of warfare, the subjoined extracts from the official correspondence should be given as illustrative of the views

Palmer's his left. Couch's division, with three batteries, occupied the intrenched line at Seven Pines. His right was extended toward the York River Railroad. Kearny's division came up from the third intrenched line during the action.

As Hill's leading brigade under Garland answered the call to action by surging forward, the men had to fight nature in addition to the Federals. The three-inch rain during the night had formed pools in every depression of the boggy soil, and the forest was set with dense, briery undergrowth.¹ Garland's men came under the sights of every Federal gun and rifle

then held. General McClellan reported: "The rebels have been guilty of the most murderous and barbarous conduct in placing torpedoes within the abandoned works, near wells and springs, and near flag-staffs, magazines, and telegraph offices, in carpet-bags, barrels of flour, etc." *Official Records*, 14, 135. When General Johnston saw this report in the *New York Herald*, he addressed the following inquiry to General D. H. Hill, who had been in command at Yorktown: "General Johnston desires that you inquire into the enclosed report . . . to ascertain if there is any truth in the statement, to find out if there were any torpedoes placed, and if so, when, where, and by whom." *Ibid.*, 511. General Hill referred the inquiry to General Rains, who, it was understood had introduced this form of war. Meantime, General Longstreet had heard of Rains's explosives and on May 11 wrote to him through his Adjutant-General: "It is the desire of the major-general commanding that you put no shells or torpedoes behind you, as he does not recognize it as a proper or effective method of war." *Ibid.*, 509. General Rains, in answering the inquiry, comments: "For their being proper for war, they are as much as ambuscades, masked batteries, and mines. The enemy, I learn intended to mine and blow up Redoubt No. 4, known as Fort Magruder, at Yorktown, and if such means of killing by wholesale be proper, why should not smaller mines be used? For their effectiveness I refer to the enemy. Believing as I do the vast advantages to our country from this weapon, I am unwilling to forego it, and beg leave to appeal direct to the War Department." *Ibid.*, 509. Secretary Randolph, in reviewing the question, decided that the purpose for which the shells were intended should decide the issue. He said: "It is admissible to plant shells in a parapet to repel an assault or in a road to check pursuit, because the object is to save the work in one case and the army in the other. It is not admissible to plant shells merely to destroy life, and without any other design than that of depriving your enemy of a few men, without materially injuring him." *Ibid.*, 510. Shortly after this battle, General Rains was, on account of his scientific skill, assigned to the submarine defenses of the James and Appomattox rivers. Later General Rains was for a time at the head of the Conscript Bureau, and then of the Torpedo Bureau.

¹ Garland thus describes the ground: "the recent rains had formed pools of water throughout the woods, with mud at the bottom, through which the men waded forward knee-deep, and occasionally sinking to the hips in boggy places, almost beyond the point of extraction. The forest was so thick and the undergrowth so tangled that it was impracticable to see the heads of the several regiments and the deploying intervals were in consequence very imperfectly preserved." *Ibid.*, 12, 961.

in action until Rodes, pushing his men through White Oak Swamp, aligned them on his right. The men, huddled often by the nature of the ground, formed an inviting target for Casey's artillery and the guns took disastrous toll. Garland, after driving in the pickets and breaking their supporting regiment, the One Hundred and Third Pennsylvania,¹ encountered the four regiments² defending Spratt's battery, posted on the north of the Williamsburg road. These in turn were driven in,³ and the brigade reached the abatis in front of the works under hot musketry, which was supplemented by the batteries of Bates and Fitch as soon as the retirement of the four regiments opened the way for their volleys. As Garland's men halted for a few minutes at the edge of the abatis and the men drew breath for an attempt at the penetration of its interlocking branches, the fighting was close and obstinate. Officers and men were going down rapidly.⁴ At this needful moment Anderson's supporting brigade pressed to Garland's relief. General Hill at about the

¹ Casey's Report, *Official Records*, 12, 914. "The dense and tangled condition of the undergrowth prevented the regiment from falling back in any kind of order, and before it emerged from the woods it was broken into fragments." *History of the 103d Pennsylvania Regiment*, 16.

² *Ibid.* They were the 11th Maine, 92d New York, 100th New York, and 104th Pennsylvania.

³ Of this preliminary contest Colonel Davis, of the 104th Pennsylvania, says: "The battle now raged with great fury. . . . Spratt's battery had kept up a lively fire in the same direction. At about 3 p.m. the enemy . . . pressed us in front and flank . . . the colonel of the 100th New York being killed; the colonel of the 104th Pennsylvania being severely wounded; the major mortally; the lieutenant-colonel being absent: half of our men having fallen killed or wounded; the enemy ten times our number being in a few feet of us, one of them striking Sergeant Porter, the left guide of the 104th, over the neck with his musket . . . we were ordered with Spratt's battery to retire." *Official Records*, 12, 922.

⁴ Garland reports: "Within a space of a few minutes the Twenty-fourth Virginia had lost its only field officer, wounded (Major Maury); the Twenty-third North Carolina all its field officers, wounded or disabled, and 8 out of 10 company commanders, and 18 out of 29 officers killed or wounded; the Second Florida 2 field officers and 10 out of 11 company commanders, killed or wounded; the Thirty-eighth Virginia its colonel, temporarily disabled. The entire brigade of five regiments and a battalion was in front of the fight, receiving the first shock of the enemy's force with only six field officers, two regiments without any, two more with one apiece." *Ibid.*, 963.

same time sent forward Bondurant's battery—the first Confederate battery to drag its way through the miry fields. The shock of battle in the felled timbers was so fierce that Garland's men, instead of dropping in reserve, followed the battle with Anderson, some in companies, some keeping their regimental organization.¹ The two brigades then, in spite of Federal reinforcements, stormed their way to Casey's works and used them in reverse.²

Meanwhile Rodes, on Garland's right, had joined battle, with only the Twelfth Mississippi and Sixth Alabama as yet in place. Under continuous fire he gradually brought his arriving regiments into brigade front. He posted Carter's battery to the left of the Mississippians on the Williamsburg road. As soon as he was ready to give battle with his entire brigade, he asked Rains to cover his right flank, but Rains declined on the ground that he apprehended an attack on his own flank.³ General Hill, however, saw the opportunity and ordered Rains to make a detour and fall on Casey in flank and rear. While Rains was on the march, Carter's battery opened effectively, and Anderson and Garland were relentless in their forward smash. When Rains reached position his men dropped on their knees and discharged their volleys at close

¹ "The supporting brigade advancing at this opportune moment, and the passage of lines being a feat in tactics which had never been practiced by any of us, large fragments of those regiments who were left without field or company officers were joined in and continued forward with that brigade." Garland's Report, *Official Records*, 12, 963.

² McCapers, a member of the New York Battery that occupied the redoubt, gives a vivid picture of this advance: "Our shot tore their ranks wide open, and shattered them asunder in a manner that was frightful to witness; but they closed up at once and came on as sturdily as English veterans. When they got within 400 yards we closed our case shot and opened on them with canister, and such destruction I never elsewhere witnessed. It was awful to see their ranks torn and shattered by every discharge of canister that we poured right into their faces, and while their dead and dying lay in piles, closed up and still advancing right in the face of the fire." Quoted in Blacknall's MS., 26.

³ Rodes's Report, *Official Records*, 12, 972.

range.¹ This unexpected fire from an exposed flank,² combined with Carter's excellent gunnery and the pressure of Anderson and Garland on the Federal right and center,³ enabled Rodes, some of whose regiments had already suffered heavily, to reach the works on his front with fewer losses than might have been expected.⁴ When the Federals were driven from their works, they were rallied in the woods in rear of their former position, but Carter's battery and three of the captured guns, manned by Rodes's order, were turned on them. This artillery fire, combined with that of Bondurant and Dearing, together with the advance of the infantry, drove them back on Couch's work. Many, on finding the rifle-pits already crowded, continued their retreat. General Casey states his condition at this time as follows: "To be brief, the rifle-pits were retained until they were almost enveloped by the enemy, the troops, with some exceptions, fighting with spirit and gallantry. The troops then retreated to the second line, in possession of General Couch's

¹ Rains reports: "We evidently were unexpected there, were near to the foe, and struck them like an avalanche." *Official Records*, 12, 970.

² Federal as well as Confederate authorities emphasize the effect of this flank fire. General Naglee and Colonels Raulston and Belknap point out its results. Raulston, for example, who commanded Casey's left regiment, and who, therefore, came first under its fire, says: "When the firing became general, we were ordered to advance into the open field about 40 yards, when the enemy immediately advanced to the edge of the woods and opened fire on our whole front. At the same time a volley came from the woods on our left . . . and, after holding our position for some time, it became evident from the destructive fire on our left that the enemy were trying to flank us. As we could gain nothing from the position we then occupied, we retired to the cover of the woods." *Ibid.*, 930. General Johnston writes: "But the resolution of Garland's and G. B. Anderson's brigades, that pressed forward on our left through an open field, under a destructive fire, the admirable service of Carter's and Bondurant's batteries, and a skillfully combined attack upon the Federal left, under General Hill's direction, of Rodes's brigade in front and that of Rains in flank, were at last successful, and the enemy abandoned their intrenchments." *Battles and Leaders*, II, 213.

³ "Major Grimes, commanding the Fourth North Carolina, to which three companies (a) of the Twenty-third North Carolina, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. D. Johnston, had united themselves in the woods, saw the redoubt on his right, and obliqued his command to come in front of it. This regiment, therefore, came under a terrific fire." *Battles and Leaders*, II, 956.

^a These were Blacknall's, Shuford's, and Johnston's.

⁴ Report of Rodes and Bagby.

division. . . . On my arrival at the second line, I succeeded in rallying a small portion of my division, and with the assistance of General Kearny, who had just arrived at the head of one of the brigades of his division, attempted to regain possession of my works, but it was found impracticable.”¹

Thus, after nearly three hours of fierce contention, Hill's brigades alone had driven Casey's division, reinforced by two of Peck's regiments,² out of their formidable works and thrown these antagonists back on Couch.³ There was, however, a stiff battle yet ahead. Couch's division, with four batteries, was still in its intrenchments with abatis in front of its pits, and Kearny's division was heading on the field. Hill, therefore, sent back to Longstreet for some of the idle brigades on the Williamsburg road. Of the five drawn up there, only one, that of R. H. Anderson, was sent in time to join in the drive over Couch and Kearny. Kemper's brigade was ordered forward, but too late to take a serious part—only three companies of the Eleventh Alabama being called to dislodge one of Kearny's rear-guard posts.

With three battered brigades of his own division,⁴ and R. H. Anderson's fresh brigade of Longstreet's division, Hill made ready to swing forward against Couch. Three of R. H. Anderson's regiments, under the personal command of that officer, were aligned on the left of the interwoven brigades of Garland and G. B. Anderson. Two regiments, the Sixth South

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 915.

² The Ninety-third Pennsylvania and Fifty-fifth New York.

³ General McClellan reports: "Some of the guns in the redoubt were taken, and the whole line was driven back upon the position occupied by General Couch. The brigades of Generals Wessells and Palmer, with the reinforcements which had been sent them from General Couch, had been driven from the field with heavy loss and the whole position occupied by General Casey's division was taken by the enemy." *Official Records*, 12, 39.

⁴ Rains had dropped out of the battle. General G. W. Smith says: "In the records I find nothing that tends to explain or to justify the inaction of Rains's brigade after Casey's camp was captured." *Battle of Seven Pines*, 54.

Carolina and the Palmetto Sharpshooters, both under Colonel Micah Jenkins, were sent to the extreme left "to scour along the railroad and the Nine Mile road and thus get in rear of the enemy."¹ These dispositions being completed, the entire line entered on the second stage of the battle.

On his right Rodes, expecting the coöperation of Rains, moved straight for Couch's left. His brigade, however, after driving some tenacious remnants of Casey's men through a part of the abatis and forest in front of Couch's position, encountered Berry's Brigade of Kearny's division, which had just arrived on Couch's left. Berry was soon reinforced by two of Jameson's regiments.² This fresh brigade broke Rodes's right, but not until his Alabamians had sustained disastrous losses. Gordon, who commanded one of these regiments, complains in his report that, although Rains's brigade was in sight, it rendered no assistance.³ The left of the brigade maintained itself and Berry's advance was halted.

Hill's center and left were faring better. R. H. Anderson's three regiments, in conjunction with a cross-fire from around the redoubt, displaced Naglee's three regiments on the Nine Mile road by "a fire that could not be endured."⁴ As Naglee's men gave way General Keyes began to push Couch's division into serious action. He ordered Neill's Twenty-third and Rippey's Sixty-first Pennsylvania regiments to the Federal right, and then sent Russell's Seventh Massachusetts and Riker's Sixty-second New York to support

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 944.

² The Sixty-third and the One Hundred and Fifth Pennsylvania.

³ General G. W. Smith thus comments on the opportunity lost by Rains: "It is not necessary to dwell upon the effect that would probably have followed had this brigade made a determined movement against Berry's left flank and rear." *Battle of Seven Pines*, 55. General Hill says: "Had he pressed vigorously on the right, 500 casualties would have been saved on Rodes's brigade." *Official Records*, 12, 976.

⁴ Naglee's Report, *Ibid.*, 923.

them. Colonel Jenkins, however, with his two South Carolina regiments and G. B. Anderson's Twenty-seventh Georgia, fell on Neill and Rippey and cut them to pieces.¹ Jenkins's advance crowded the two supporting regiments—the Seventh Massachusetts and Sixty-second New York—out of the fighting and left them and their division commander stranded at Fair Oaks. The Tenth Massachusetts essayed to make headway on the Williamsburg road, but, says the brigade commander Devens, the regiment was so confounded that it had to fall entirely back of the rifle-pits before it could be reformed.²

"Keyes's affairs," says General G. W. Smith, "were then in a very critical condition. A large portion of Casey's troops, in falling back from their earthworks, had been thrown into almost inextricable confusion whilst crossing the second abatis under destructive cross-fire, and had left the field; two regiments under Couch, on the right, had been badly cut up, one of them routed and out of the fight, exposing the right flank and rear of Couch's earthworks; four regiments and a battery were cut off north of Fair Oaks; one of Devens's regiments on the Williamsburg road had been hurled back from the felled timber in disorder; and the Confederates were pressing into the second abatis and in the woods south of the road, seriously threatening the left flank of Couch's main line."³

When matters were thus at their worst with Keyes, Kearny's hastening troops began to arrive. Berry's brigade, as already noted, eased the pressure on the Federal left and held Rodes from further aggressive work. The Federal center and right were, however, crumbling in spite of Kearny's coming. The Confederate regiments, except Anderson's, had now at

¹ Neill's regiment lost 129 men and Rippey's 263. *Official Records*, 12, 761.

² *Ibid.*, 906

³ Smith, *Battle of Seven Pines*, 41.

six o'clock been under battle strain since one o'clock. The men were scorched with thirst, overweary, and heavy-footed, but intent on winning their field. Consequently, their wills overpowering their bodies, they hammered at each fresh Federal regiment. Jenkins, never "allowing a broken line to get through their new lines before he pushed on the new line,"¹ drove his wedge deeper into the right rear of Couch. Garland and the two Andersons, withdrawing their regiments only to restore them when their cartridges had been replenished,² kept the center in slow but steady advance.

As the shadows of evening cooled the parched lips of the wounded, and softened the storm-drawn faces of the dead, the Federals, a first and then a second rallying line having collapsed, retired to Kearny's fortified division camp about a mile and a half in rear of Couch's works. General Kearny reports of the center and right: "Once broken, our troops fled incontinently."³ General Jameson says of the left: "As soon as our line began to waver on the right, the men occupying the rifle-pits in rear of the abatis broke and ran from the field."⁴ Per contra, General Naglee reports: "I saw no running and there was no panic, but all moved off together with a single purpose, and that one, to make a stand on the line of defenses one mile in the rear."⁵

Thus the attack assigned to General D. H. Hill, to whom Longstreet left the entire conduct of the field,⁶ was, in the words of General Capers, "a splendid achievement."⁷ With an average of four brigades in

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 947.

² *Ibid.*, 963.

³ *Ibid.*, 840.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 843.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 942.

⁶ Longstreet says: "The conduct of the attack was left entirely to Major-General Hill. The entire success of the affair is sufficient evidence of his ability, courage, and skill." *Ibid.*, 940. General Wilcox adds: "Seven Pines, the successful part of it, was D. H. Hill's fight." *Ibid.*, 989.

⁷ *Confederate Military History*, V, 50.

action, Hill drove Casey's three brigades from their works, then Couch's three brigades from their intrenchments, and routed Kearny's two reinforcing brigades. He captured ten pieces of field artillery, 6,700 small arms, and no little ordnance, commissary, and medical stores. General Johnston pays this tribute to these determined fighters: "Hill's brave troops, admirably commanded and most gallantly led, forced their way through the abatis, which formed the enemy's external defenses, and stormed their intrenchments by a determined and irresistible rush."¹

If so much was accomplished by five brigades, what could have saved the Federals south of the Chickahominy if the thirteen available brigades on the right had struck in unison?

The three North Carolina regiments engaged in the carnage of this field—a carnage hitherto unequaled in American wars—contributed a full share in receiving and inflicting death. All three of these regiments were fated to give battle along the Williamsburg road, astride of which the contest raged fiercest. The Fifth North Carolina was so reduced by its disaster at Williamsburg that it mustered for battle only 180 men. Twenty-seven of these were stricken. Colonel MacRae arose from a hospital couch to lead his men, but his frail frame was exhausted by the hardships of the day, and Lieutenant-Colonel P. J. Sinclair took over the command. General Garland reports that Sinclair acted "very handsomely in supplying his place."

The Twenty-third regiment, sore from reflections on its not getting into the Williamsburg fight, went into action under its new colonel, D. H. Christie, with a determination to convince the army that its rank and file were of no mean quality. Well indeed did these officers and men carry out their determination. The

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 934.

three right companies under Lieutenant-Colonel R. D. Johnston,¹ became separated from their comrades when Colonel Christie was ordered to move by the flank in the woods. These companies joined Major Grimes's Fourth North Carolina in the assault on the lines around the redoubt. The other companies fought their way across the Nine Mile road, and, without a rest, remained in action until night. During the engagement "Colonel Christie and Lieutenant-Colonel R. D. Johnston were both disabled while doing handsome service,"² and Major E. J. Christian, "a gallant and chivalrous soldier," was mortally wounded. Of the ten captains, two—S. A. Shuford and A. F. Scarborough—were killed, and six—C. C. Blacknall, Frank Bennett, John H. Miller, A. D. Peace, W. P. Hill, and W. H. Johnston—were wounded. Lieutenants J. D. Knott and A. M. Luria were killed. The total regimental loss was 163 out of 350 taken into action—a loss of 46 per cent.

The Fourth North Carolina, owing to the fact that Colonel Anderson was commanding the brigade and that Lieutenant-Colonel John A. Young was absent on leave, was led by Major Bryan Grimes.³ The

¹ This officer entered the service from Lincoln County as captain in the Twenty-third. At the reorganization of the regiment in early May, he was elected lieutenant-colonel. He was officially commended for bravery and soldierly conduct in this battle and subsequently at Boonsboro, Sharpsburg, and Chancellorsville. At Chancellorsville he was assigned to command the Twelfth Regiment when its only field officer, Major David P. Rowe, was killed and where the entire brigade made a fine record. In September, 1863, after participation in the Gettysburg campaign, Colonel Johnston was commissioned a brigadier-general and took command of Garland's fine brigade. Under his leadership this brigade took a noteworthy part in the battles of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania Courthouse. After the battle at Winchester in Early's Valley campaign, Johnston's brigade covered the retreat in a masterful way during a time of much demoralization. Johnston continued in command until he was seriously disabled at Hare's Hill in March, 1865.

² Garland's Report, *Official Records*, 12, 964.

³ Major Grimes showed in this, his first serious battle, those instinctive qualities of soldiership that led to his promotion through successive grades to major-general. He was endowed with a cool courage that even in the hurried fury of battle enabled him to see unperturbed and with an inflexible will that rendered instant decision and persistent action natural to him. His mind was disciplined by education and thought, and his disposition just,

regiment, going forward through very thick woods and pools of water often waist-deep, came first under an artillery fire so accurate that 46 men were killed in an area of one acre.¹ Colonel E. A. Osborne says of the final assault on the works around the redoubt: "The ground was literally covered with the bodies of their dead and wounded comrades, yet they moved steadily forward, directing their fire with telling effect, until within a few yards of the fortifications, when the enemy broke and fled for their lives."² Following up this success, the Fourth worked its way forward in the attack on the second lines until ordered to halt at dark. The regiment left camp with 25 officers and 653 men present for duty. Major Grimes was the only one of the twenty-five officers who remained unhurt³; of the 673 men 77 were killed, and 286 wounded.⁴ This makes a total regimental loss of 363 or 53 per cent.

This loss was exceeded by only one other regiment, the Sixth Alabama of Rodes's brigade, which lost 368.⁵

There is no official report of the casualties in R. H. Anderson's brigade, the only one of Longstreet's brigades that joined in Hill's battle, although three companies of Kemper's had a brief skirmish. The

even to the point of severity. Naturally, then, with these qualities, he learned rapidly to become a soldier whom his men admired and on whom his official superiors leaned in confidence. His capacity to meet each enlarged command is shown by these citations. His brigade commander, General Anderson, said of him in 1862: "Colonel Grimes and his regiment are the keystone of my command." His division commander, General D. H. Hill, said of him in 1863: "He has been in many pitched battles and has behaved most gallantly in them all. His gallantry, ripe experience, admirable training, intelligence, and moral worth constitute strong claims for promotion." His corps commander, General J. B. Gordon, in 1864, said of him: "General Bryan Grimes had already distinguished himself among the illustrious sons of a state prolific in a soldiery unsurpassed in any war, and his record as chief of this stalwart command added to his high reputation."

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 956.

² Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 239.

³ "Major Grimes had a horse killed under him in the charge. His foot was caught under the horse and it was with much difficulty that he was extricated from his helpless condition. While on the ground and unable to rise, he waved his sword and shouted: 'Go on, boys! Go on!'" *Ibid.*, 239.

⁴ *Official Records*, 12, 953.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 976.

losses of Hill's division are itemized by the brigadiers, except in Rains's brigade, in which neither the strength nor the loss is given. The nearest field return (May 21, 1862,) for this brigade states the number at 1,830.¹ Rains reports that one-seventh of his men were stricken down. The following table will show the strength and losses in Hill's division in killed, wounded, and missing:

<i>Brigade</i>	<i>Present</i>	<i>Loss</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>
Rodes ²	2,200	1099	50
Garland ³	2,065	740	36
Anderson, G. B. ⁴	1,865	866	46
Rains ⁵	1,830	267	14
Totals	7,960	2,972	36.5

This record of Rodes, Garland, and Anderson, comments General Alexander, "shows great fighting power, and will compare favorably for a half day's fighting of an equal body of men with any records of the war. At Waterloo the losses were: Allies, 20 per cent; French, 34 per cent; British regulars, 29 per cent."⁶

The losses in the troops opposed to Hill were, as far as they can be separated, as follows:

Casey's division ⁷	1,429
Couch's division, exclusive of 69 casualties ⁸ on June 1, ..	1,026
Kearny's division, exclusive of Birney's ⁹ brigade	884
Total	3,339

¹ *Official Records*, 14, 531.

² *Ibid.*, 12, 976.

³ *Ibid.*, 967.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 953.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 969.

⁶ *Military Memoirs*, 81.

⁷ *Official Records*, 12, 762.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 761.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 760.

The most serious regimental losses were as follows: Sixty-first Pennsylvania, 263; One Hundred and Fourth Pennsylvania, 206; Fifth New Hampshire, 180; One Hundredth New York, 176; Sixty-fourth New York, 173.¹

The Federal reports are filled with statements as to the overwhelming numbers by which their soldiers were defeated in this part of the first day's fighting,² and some writers have echoed these reports.³ Although it is not possible in this battle, nor indeed in any, to ascertain to a man how many troops were in the firing, it is possible to get a fair approximation of the strength of the contestants on the Williamsburg road.

There are four estimates of the Federal strength. First, General Heintzelman, who commanded all the Federal troops that fought Hill, says that they numbered on the field 18,500 men.⁴ From this number must be deducted Birney's brigade, which had no hand in the fighting. Heintzelman says that this brigade numbered 2,300, but Birney gives it at only 1,300.⁵ Then, if Heintzelman is to be followed, the number of Federals was 16,200; if Birney knew best, then 17,200.

Second, Keyes says that of his corps (Casey and Couch) 12,000⁶ men were actually engaged. To this number must be added Kearny's two brigades. Kearny says that his division consisted of 5,000 "fighting men."⁷ From these "fighting men" Birney's 2,300 or 1,300 must be subtracted. In the one case this

¹ Surgeon-General's Report, *Official Records*, 12, 757.

² For instance, Keyes says: "The Confederates outnumbered us, during a great part of the conflict at least four to one." *Ibid.*, 878.

³ The Comte de Paris says: "The Federals, who had struggled vigorously against the ever-increasing numbers of their adversaries—for they were only eighteen or nineteen thousand against more than thirty thousand." II, 64.

⁴ *Official Records*, 12, 816.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 854.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 878.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 842.

would be 2,700, in the other, 3,700. This, added to Keyes's 12,000, would make the total Federals in battle either 15,700 or 14,700.

Third, Casey says that his division numbered 5,000;¹ Couch says that his division numbered 5,000;² Kearny says that his division numbered 5,000.³ If these figures be accepted, without comments on the singular coincidence, the number of Federals fighting was 15,000 less Birney again—hence, either 12,700 or 13,700.

Fourth, it so happens that there is an official Federal return for each corps, but not each division, on May 31—the very day of the battle. In this return the following numbers are given for Keyes's corps (Casey and Couch):⁴

Aggregate present and absent.....	25,317
Absent.....	7,111
On special duty, sick, under arrest, etc.....	1,074
	8,185
Total present for duty.....	17,132

Either this certified report of 17,132 men present, after deducting the men who were absent, sick, under arrest or on special duty, is wrong, or Casey and Couch are in error in reporting as above only 10,000 in action, or between morning and noon, with no march and no battle intervening, 7,132 perfectly sound men were mislaid. If the Adjutant-General's report be correct, then the addition of Kearny's 2,700 men or 3,700 gives the total number of Federals on the firing line as either 19,832 or 20,832. The total Federal strength then was one of these four: 16,200 or 17,200, according to Heintzelman and Birney; 14,700 or

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 916

² *Ibid.*, 881.

³ *Ibid.*, 842.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 14, 204.

15,700, according to Keyes; 12,700 or 13,700, according to Casey and Couch; 19,832 or 20,832, according to the Adjutant-General's return for Keyes's corps, augmented by Kearny.

There are only two estimates of the Confederate strength. General Hill, who conducted the fighting, says that his division engaged with "less than 9,000 men."¹ The only additions during this battle were R. H. Anderson's brigade, and three companies of the Eleventh Alabama of Kemper's brigade. Anderson fails to state his numbers. The nearest field return is for May 21. In this return his brigade is credited with 2,168 men.² While they were encamped on the Chickahominy, both armies suffered appallingly from sickness. Anderson could hardly have gone into action ten days after this return with the full camp strength of that date, but, allowing him full ranks, the total Confederate strength would be as follows:

Hill's division.....	9,000
R. H. Anderson's brigade.....	2,168
Three companies of Kemper (say 75 each, to be liberal)...	225
Total Confederates.....	11,393

Second, each of Hill's brigadiers except Rains gives, as we have already seen, his battle strength. If these are accepted, the Confederates engaged as follows:

Anderson, G. B.....	1,865
Garland.....	2,065
Rodes.....	2,200
Rains.....	1,830
Anderson, R. H.....	2,168
Kemper (three companies).....	225
Confederate totals.....	10,353

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 946.

² *Ibid.*, 14, 530.

Therefore, if the highest Federal estimate (the return of May 31) and the highest estimate of the Confederates (Hill's) be accepted, the Federals exceeded the Confederates by 9,439; if the lowest Federal figures (Casey's and Couch's) are credited and the lowest Confederate (the numbers given by the brigade commanders), then the Federals still had an excess of 2,347.

While this ensanguined conflict on the Confederate right was leading to the exhaustion of a few brigades, there was the same inactivity on the left that there was in the rear. Troops capable of accomplishing as much as Hill's men were then doing, were only awaiting orders to seize the inviting opportunity of crumbling the Federal right as the front gave way before Hill. For one reason or another, the battle as a whole was dragging. Pickett's brigade, pushed out by Longstreet to the railroad,¹ was not directed to join in Jenkins's determined onset.² The brigades of Hood and Whiting were near Fair Oaks, and those of Pettigrew, Hampton, and Hatton were strung out along the Nine Mile road—all in easy reach. What was holding inactive these five waiting brigades? The answer is that in battle the wind is not a trustworthy courier.

General Johnston took his battle post not far from Fair Oaks. His intentions were for the troops near him to press into the fray as soon as the roar of Hill's guns announced that he was at grips with Keyes. By some freak of the wind the noise of the battle on the right was not borne to his headquarters.³ Therefore, although the conflict was begun at one o'clock, John-

¹ "Already there had been on the railroad all day Pickett's brigade of Longstreet's division. . . . It is remarkable that Longstreet did not use this as a route of advance for some of his many brigades. . . . An opportunity for one of the most brilliant strokes of the war was here overlooked and lost." Alexander, *Military Memoirs*, 85.

² "It is believed that the annals of war show few, if any, instances of more persistent, skillful, and effective fighting than was done by the two South Carolina regiments under Colonel Jenkins." Smith, *Battle of Seven Pines*, 63.

³ Johnston's *Narrative*, 136.

ston did not know until informed by a returning staff-officer at four o'clock that his right wing was stubbornly carrying everything before it. Three hours of invaluable time had been lost by trusting to the wind for news.¹

On receipt of this startling news, Johnston ordered the nearest brigade, Hood's, to hasten to Hill's left. Whiting's brigade was set in motion in the same direction and the three remaining brigades—those of Pettigrew, Hatton, and Hampton—came forward at double-quick time. Hood, already across the railroad, was off promptly. As Whiting's brigade neared Fair Oaks, a Federal artillery and musketry fire was opened on its left and rear. Johnston supposing that the bridges over the Chickahominy were impassable for troops from the northern side of the river, and that the fire was from some of Couch's regiments cut off there,² did not stop Hood, but directed Whiting's brigade under Colonel Law³ to pause and drive the Federals off. The prompt repulse of Whiting's attack ought to have convinced the Confederates that it had been met by more than Couch's regiments, which, as already seen, had been stranded there by Jenkins, but General Johnston says: "It was near half-past 6 o'clock before I admitted to myself that Smith⁴ was engaged, not with a brigade, as I had obstinately thought, but with more than a division."⁵

Who with such opportune timeliness had so reinforced Couch's regiments as not only to relieve the fierce pressure on them,⁶ but also to prevent Whiting's five

¹ Longstreet sent a note to Johnston about three o'clock, but it was not received.

² *Battles and Leaders*, II, 214.

³ Whiting was in command of the division.

⁴ Whiting's division was under Smith as corps commander.

⁵ *Battles and Leaders*, II, 214.

⁶ General Sedgwick, whose regiments first arrived, says: "Upon debouching into the open field near Adams's house, we found Abercrombie's brigade of Couch's division sustaining a severe attack and hard pressed by the enemy."

brigades from being precipitated on the flank of the Federals who were retreating before Hill?

The continuous musketry fire on the Williamsburg road, which was not heard at Johnston's headquarters, was heard at McClellan's tent north of the Chickahominy. The Federal commander at once ordered Sumner, whose corps lay nearest the river, to stand to arms and be ready, if needed, to march on the instant of command. General Sumner, always a prompt soldier, did more than was required, for he at once moved his two divisions¹ to the bank of the rapidly rising river and rested the heads of the columns on the bridges. Orders to cross and engage reached him at 2:30 p.m. The hour's march which he had saved by being already at the bridges enabled him to reach the battlefield in time to support Couch during Whiting's attack. Sedgwick's division, having the shorter route, was earliest up. The First Minnesota Regiment was formed on Couch's right. The rest of Gorman's brigade was posted on Couch's left, and its line was prolonged toward Fair Oaks by Dana's brigade. Kirby's battery was distributed by sections along the front. Brady's was already in action. Burns's brigade was dispatched to the extreme right and only slightly engaged.² These dispositions were not entirely completed when Whiting's single brigade advanced to open what Alexander calls Johnston's battle.

The Sixth North Carolina Regiment under Pender,³ who took command after the death of Colonel Fisher at

Official Records, 12, 791. Couch, in describing Sumner's arrival, piously declares, "When the head of his column was seen half a mile distant, I felt that God was with us." *Ibid.*, 880.

¹ Those of Sedgwick and Richardson.

² The loss in this brigade was 5 killed and 30 wounded. *Official Records*, 12, 806.

³ William Dorsey Pender was a native of Edgecombe County, North Carolina. His standing at the United States Military Academy won him a commission in the artillery, but after a brief service in that branch, he obtained a transfer to the dragoons. As a junior officer he served with reputation in campaigns against the Apache and other Indians. His first Confederate

Manassas, was in the van of Whiting's brigade. As the brigade changed front to charge, Pender's regiment was either ordered forward earlier or picked its way through the woods more easily than its companion regiments, for, when it crossed the Grape Vine Bridge road, it found itself alone and with three Federal regiments on its left flank. Only by a skillful manœuvre and bold advance did Pender bring his men off without capture.¹ After falling back until the other regiments came alongside, the brigade endeavored to clear its front, but the sweep of shells from Brady's and Kirby's guns and the growing hotness of the musketry soon proved that "the errand upon which it had been sent was much beyond the dimensions of a single brigade."² When the brigade dropped back, Pender rallied and reformed the right wing³ and held it in place until the battle closed. President Davis, who had come on the

service of importance was that of post-commandant of the training camp at Garysburg. Here the young cavalryman, with his quiet grace of manner, his courteous enforcement of discipline, and his evident efficiency, so attracted officers and soldiers that he was elected colonel of the Third (afterwards the Thirteenth) regiment. In August, 1861, Governor Clark appointed him to succeed Fisher as colonel of the Sixth Regiment. Fair Oaks was his initial battle as a regimental commander, yet in it he managed with tactical superiority not only his own regiment, but in an emergency he assumed control of neighboring troops and steadied the right of the brigade under the admiring eyes of President Davis. This power to seize opportunity and willingness to assume responsibility characterized his acts in all his battles. These qualities were notably shown at Cedar Creek, where his adroit flank attack was invaluable; at Second Manassas, where he exposed himself with rare gallantry; at Fredericksburg, where the discipline of his brigade held it firm under a fierce and accurate artillery fire; and at Chancellorsville, where he bore a regiment's colors with his own hands. Yet during these days of growing fame, so little did he seek advantage by social and political influence that General Jackson, after Pender had fought a half dozen battles under him, knew him only by his gallantry on the field, the discipline of his men, and the orderliness of his camps. In speaking of his untimely death from a wound received at Gettysburg, General Lee said: "This lamented officer has borne a distinguished part in every engagement of this army, and was wounded on several occasions while leading his command with conspicuous gallantry and ability. The confidence and admiration inspired by his courage and capacity as an officer were only equaled by the esteem and respect entertained by all with whom he was associated, for the noble qualities of his modest and unassuming character."

¹ Avery's Narrative, Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 351.

² Alexander, *Military Memoirs*, 86.

³ Froebel's letter to Smith, *Battle of Seven Pines*, 98.

field a short time before night, saw the young colonel's promise and saluted him as "General Pender."¹ Adjutant B. R. Smith officially reported the losses of the regiment as 11 killed, 88 wounded, 15 missing—a total of 114.²

The prompt disposal of Whiting's brigade did not convince General Johnston that the Federals had been reinforced by troops from across the Chickahominy. Consequently, after a hurried formation, the brigades of Pettigrew,³ Hampton, and Hatton were directed to disperse the Federals and then resume the march toward the heavy firing on the right.⁴

The three brigades had to seek the Federal line through "an entangled wood and a morass covered

¹ Address on Pender by Judge Walter A. Montgomery, 442.

² Printed with names in *Fayetteville Observer*, June 16, 1862.

³ James Johnston Pettigrew, grandson of a bishop and the son of a congressman, was born at the family home, Bonarva, in Tyrrell County, North Carolina, in 1828. Under the tutelage of that manful teacher, William J. Bingham, he learned to be thorough in duty and accurate in thought. Passing to the State University at fifteen, he so impressed Governor Swain and the faculty that President Polk, who with Matthew F. Maury attended the commencement exercises at which Pettigrew was graduated, appointed him an assistant professor in the Naval Observatory at Washington. After a brief trial of scientific life, Pettigrew, who was keen of mind, diligent in habit, forceful in speech, and wealthy enough to gratify his desires, concluded, as Trescott suggests, that he would prefer to engage in conflict with men rather than with the problems of science. He, therefore, moved to Charleston, South Carolina, to study law under a relative, the social wit and ripe scholar, James L. Petigru. Two years of close study in Berlin, Germany, and a period of travel followed. Then he returned to Charleston for a brief but able legal and political experience. The prospect of war at home led him to spend another year in Europe for a study of military science. Shortly after the war began, the line officers of the companies assigned to form the Twelfth North Carolina Volunteers (afterwards the Twenty-second) elected Pettigrew colonel. Under his direction the batteries at Evansport on the Potomac were built. In February, 1862, he was appointed a brigadier-general, and this was his first engagement as brigade commander. After his recovery from a severe wound received here, he was given a brigade composed entirely of North Carolina troops. His brigade served in North Carolina in the fall and winter of 1862-63. In the spring of 1863, Pettigrew's brigade was again united to the army of Virginia and shared in the long march to Gettysburg. In that destructive battle Pettigrew, in command of Heth's division, led the left of the assaulting columns in the immortal charge of the third day. In the retreat from Gettysburg, Pettigrew was mortally wounded at Falling Waters.

⁴ "These batteries," says General Smith in his official report, "were supported by infantry, and the fire becoming troublesome, it was determined to take them, at the same time not giving up the forward movement in favor of Longstreet." *Official Records*, 12, 990.

with fallen logs and thick bushes.”¹ These impedimenta so shattered alignments as to make the attacks almost spasmodic.² This lack of concert in their onsets allowed the Federal batteries and their supports to engage them, not en masse, but in turn. Kirby’s battery was enabled to fire 343 rounds within a little over an hour from its different positions.³ Brady says that Fagan’s section repulsed “the head of the enemy’s column as it frequently appeared emerging from the woods charging on the battery.”⁴ In spite of woods and artillery, the Confederates “pushed forward with wonderful determination.”⁵ At times they were, says Smith, within 10 or 15 yards of the Federal muskets, and at another time, says Hudson, within 40 rods of the batteries.⁶ The fighting of Sedgwick’s and Couch’s men in resisting the several attacks was steady and well ordered; that of the Confederates was impatiently stubborn. However, before night caused muskets to be lowered the Confederates were driven back to the woods north of Fair Oaks.

The losses of the Confederates in this attack were nearly three times as large as those of the Federals. Whiting’s brigade alone lost more men than Sedgwick’s division. This was due, not solely to the fact that the Confederates were the assailants, but largely, as Alexander points out, to the fact that the Federal artillery devoted its “whole fire to the Confederate infantry lines, which in every case seemed to be finally repulsed only by heavy canister at close quarters.”⁷

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 990.

² “Various attempts were made to charge the enemy, but without that concert of action almost absolutely necessary to success.” *Ibid.*, 991.

³ *Ibid.*, 796.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 904.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 799.

⁶ Colonel of the Eighty-second New York. *Ibid.*, 805. He adds: “My command entered the action with an average of 60 rounds of ammunition and at the close had barely 6 rounds each left.”

⁷ *Military Memoirs*, 90.

In this part of the field, as on the right, three North Carolina regiments were engaged. The record of the Sixth Regiment has already been mentioned. The Twenty-second Regiment, admirably organized by Colonel Pettigrew, its first commander, went in action under Colonel C. E. Lightfoot, who became head of the regiment on Pettigrew's promotion. The regiment was drawn from the reserves and put into action with Hatton's brigade under the personal supervision of General G. W. Smith. An officer, who watched the regiment battling its way toward the coveted field pieces, said: "I have never conceived of anything surpassing the coolness of our men in this fight."¹ The regiment, its ranks thinned by the prevailing sickness, mustered only 550 men for the battle. It lost, according to a copy of the report of its adjutant, 144 men.² Of these 25 were killed, 95 wounded, and 24 missing. Colonel Lightfoot and Lieutenant-Colonel J. O. Long were both captured. Lightfoot never returned to the regiment and James Conner was soon afterwards elected colonel.

The Sixteenth North Carolina was in Hampton's brigade. Hampton led his men against the Federals just after Whiting's brigade was repulsed, and before Pettigrew and Hatton engaged. Consequently his troops received the fire of a good part of the entire Federal line. The commander of the Sixteenth, Colonel C. T. N. Davis, who had just been promoted from the captaincy of the Rutherford company, was killed.³ The total loss in the regiment, as shown by a list of names published in the newspapers, was 8 killed, 98 wounded, and 12 missing.

¹ Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 168.

² Published in the *Fayetteville Observer*, June 16, 1862.

³ A telegram sent from the adjutant-general's office to the wife of Colonel Davis reads: "He was wounded three times before he fell. His conduct was gallant and glorious beyond all praise."

Just as the strife was closing on account of darkness, General Johnston, the able commander of the Confederates, was seriously wounded. The direction of the Confederate armies then devolved on General G. W. Smith, Johnston's second in rank. Naturally Smith wished to continue the conflict, and issued orders for an early start on the next morning. Longstreet was to attack along his entire front with troops that had not been engaged the day before, and Smith was to take up the fighting from Fair Oaks. This day's contest on Sunday, June 1, is classified by Alexander as Smith's battle.

In the late afternoon of Saturday, Richardson's division of Sumner's Federal corps arrived, and during the night three of Sedgwick's batteries and three of Richardson's were dragged forward through the sloughs of mud.¹ The men of Richardson's division were placed to connect with Dana on Sedgwick's left. French's brigade was aligned along the railroad. The brigade of Howard formed his second line and that of Meagher his third. Birney's brigade of Kearny's division stretched also along the railroad on French's left. Still further to the left and bending south towards the Williamsburg road were two New Jersey regiments under Colonel Starr of Hooker's division, that had been pushed ahead to relieve the pressure on Couch during Hill's battle.² The brigade of Sickles of Hooker's division filled the gap between Starr's men and the Williamsburg road. The divisions of Casey and Couch and two brigades of Kearny, about 10,000 men,³ were stationed at Kearny's third line

¹ Those of Sedgwick were Owen's, Bartlett's, and Tompkin's—only Bartlett's was engaged. Those of Richardson were Pettit's, Frank's, and Hazzard's.

² Colonel Starr says of conditions during his advance: "The road and field on both sides of the road were thronged with flying regiments from the battleground, 2 or 3 miles in front, through whose routed and disorderly masses I was compelled to force my way with bayonet and saber." *Official Records*, 12, 835.

³ Peck's Report, *Ibid.*, 889.

intrenchments. The approaches to the entire Federal lines south of Fair Oaks were densely wooded, and precluded the use of artillery.¹

The Confederate position was as follows: their right wing stretched from the Williamsburg road where Wilcox confronted Sickles to Fair Oaks. On Wilcox's left were successively the brigades of Pryor, Pickett, Armistead and Mahone. Colston's brigade was in rear of Mahone. D. H. Hill's brigades were in reserve at Casey's old camp. Smith's wing, facing Sedgwick's men and Couch's four regiments, connected with Longstreet at Fair Oaks Station and then continued on the Nine Mile road. During the night and early morning General Smith was disturbed by reports that the Federals were moving across the river in large force,² and, thinking it wisest to retain defensive position, his wing was not ordered to renew the contest.

With the expectation of a general engagement, the Confederates of the right wing were, early on the morning of June 1, ordered to develop the force in their fronts. There followed, through the enveloping woods, several hours of rather desultory but at times steadfast fighting, with varying successes. Mahone's brigade and part of Armistead's—six regiments in all—fell on French's left. After an hour or two of conflict, in which the Third Alabama Regiment was especially pertinacious in its battle, the Confederates broke the Eighty-first Pennsylvania of Howard's brigade, which had been stationed on French's left,³

¹ Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 104, 105.

² See *Battle of Seven Pines*, 128, 132. On page 164 Smith says: "I knew there was still a large Federal force on the north side of the river, and there was a strong body of infantry and five batteries in front of Whiting, which had not disturbed Longstreet. If Whiting attacked the forces in his front he would have to pass over 800 or 1,000 yards of open ground in deep mud. If he succeeded in carrying their position, this would not necessarily diminish the pressure already brought against Longstreet."

³ Report of Colonel Johnston, Eighty-first Pennsylvania Infantry, *Official Records*, 12, 775.

and also part of the Fifty-second New York.¹ Two of Howard's other regiments² were called up from the second line, and his Fifth New Hampshire came up behind these. As Howard's regiments pushed in to restore the dislocated line, three of Birney's regiments, east of the severed connection, were wheeled to the right and opened on the right flank of the Confederates.³ Caught between these volleying lines, the Confederates slowly retreated into the woods. As Howard's regiments advanced, they were joined by the Fortieth New York of Birney's command. These four regiments then came under the muskets of Pickett's brigade and were stopped after being, as Colonel Cross of the Fifth New Hampshire says, "severely handled."⁴

When the firing died down, Pickett, who during the engagement had received an order from General Hill to retire in order to take his place in a concentration that Hill was trying to effect at Casey's old intrenchments, drew back. The same order went to Wilcox and Pryor, who were engaged with Sickles of Hooker's corps at the time. The reason for the order was that Hill, who was directing the fighting in front, had learned that the left wing was not participating and that no artillery had been assembled on the Nine Mile road. Under the circumstances he saw, as General Alexander puts it, that the fighting was accomplishing nothing "except a useless sacrifice of

¹ Howard's Report, *Official Records*, 12, 769.

² Sixty-first and Sixty-fourth New York.

³ Ward's Report, *Ibid.*, 856.

⁴ General Howard was wounded early in his attack. Colonel Cross, of the Fifth New Hampshire, took control of the brigade. He says, "Finding that the three other regiments of the brigade had been some time in action and severely handled, I directed that they should move out of the wood and reform in the rear of Meagher's brigade, while I advanced my regiment to occupy the ground. . . . When about ordering another charge I was struck by a rifle-ball in the thigh and disabled. Lieutenant-Colonel Langley then took command of the regiment, and the rebels endeavoring to flank us, he brought off the regiment in excellent order, carrying most of the wounded." *Ibid.*, 771.

life, and, hence, he drew back all the brigades present, with the hope that he would be attacked in position. No further advance was ordered on either side, and the fighting ended with both armies occupying practically the same positions as at daylight."¹

There were no North Carolina troops in serious contention on this morning. Colston's brigade, containing the Thirteenth and Fourteenth North Carolina regiments, was ordered to brace Armistead's brigade, but it did not become fully involved. A little after the battle ceased, General Lee, who had been assigned to succeed General Johnston as commander-in-chief, came on the field and assumed his new duties.

In their testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, some officers, mainly those unfriendly to McClellan, took the ground that the Confederate army was so shaken by the battle and by the fall of Johnston as to have offered a vigorous commander an easy conquest of Richmond.² This was controverted at the time by General Henry J. Hunt, Chief of Artillery,³ and by General Barnard, Chief Engineer of the Federal Army.⁴ Ropes, in commenting on the theory, says: "But there is nothing to indicate any such condition of demoralization, and there was no cause why such a condition should have

¹ General Pickett says: "This was the conclusion of the battle of Seven Pines. No shot was fired afterward. Our troops occupied the same ground that evening, June 1, and that night, which they had done on the one previous." *Official Records*, 12, 984.

² Testimonies of Keyes, Casey, Hooker, and Sumner. General Sumner, for example, says: "And when Johnston was knocked from his horse and taken in a litter to Richmond, the rebel army became a confused mob. And if we had attacked with our whole force, we should have swept everything before us." II, (1), 366.

³ Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War, I, 572.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 394. Although Barnard, in his report of January 26, says: "The repulse of the rebels at Fair Oaks should have been taken advantage of. . . . We know that it could have been followed into Richmond" (*Ibid.*, 418), yet in his examination by the Committee on February 26, 1863, he qualifies this statement by testifying: ". . . the conclusion came after the event. . . . It would, perhaps be wrong to say that it was apparent that we could then enter Richmond. *Ibid.*, 394.

existed. The Confederates, although decidedly successful on their right, had been, it is true, rudely checked on their left, but, in the battle considered as a whole, they not only had not been beaten, but they had driven their antagonists from their intrenchments in one part of the field, and they had guns, small arms, and colors to show as the trophies of the field.”¹ The Confederates not only remained on the ground until the morning of June 2, but stayed with so little of apprehension that Hill’s men spent a good part of the day in gleaning 6,700 Federal rifles from the field. Pickett, who commanded the rear-guard on that morning reports: “General Hill gave me special orders to cover the withdrawal of the troops with my brigade, which, by the way, proved a much easier task than I had anticipated. . . . The whole of our force filed past by half an hour after sunrise. I then leisurely moved off, not a Yankee in sight, or even a puff of smoke.”² Huger’s brigade was left well out on the Williamsburg road, and the left wing “remained in position on the Nine Mile road, closely confronting Sumner’s corps at Fair Oaks.”

The details of this battle have been given in more fullness than the scope of this book perhaps warrants. Since, however, Seven Pines was the first really great battle of the war, the particulars were incorporated in order to illustrate some matters that were characteristic of nearly all the battles between the two eastern armies.

First. The battle illustrated the blunders likely to occur when neither army has a supply of trained staff officers. This defect, cured in part as the war progressed, was never overcome by either army. If, for example, a competent staff officer, carefully rehearsed in his particular orders, could have been sent to guide

¹ Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*, II, 155, 156.

² *Official Records*, 12, 984.

Longstreet to his battle position, there would have been no interruption of Whiting's nor of Huger's marches, and both these organizations, together with Longstreet's, would have been in place to carry out the battle so admirably planned. Could Hill have had a specially instructed officer to keep Rains's brigade abreast of Rodes's fighting, a great saving of life would have resulted. In like manner a trained staff on the Federal side would have prevented the confusion of orders that led to General Birney's arrest on the field or to the ill-direction of several regiments on the march to points where they were sorely needed.

Second. This battle showed the need, especially on the part of the Federals, of a skillful intelligence department. During these two days of fighting, indeed in his entire Peninsula campaign, General McClellan was misled by his exceedingly inaccurate knowledge of the numbers opposing him, and during the same period, the Confederates, although giving combat in their own territory, were slowed down by misinformation as to roads and physical peculiarities.

Third. The battle signally marked the superiority of the Federal artillery in the early years of the war. The Federal ordnance makers, with their established shops, access to material, and large number of trained artisans, who were not called to the ranks, could, of course, produce more and better guns than the Confederates, and the Union army, of course, had a larger number of educated artillery officers.

Fourth. Seven Pines and the subsequent battles around Richmond for the next three years gave evidence of the enormous advantage arising from control of the neighboring waters. During this battle and those following, the Federals were supplied by water communication. If there had been no water route for the Federals up the James River, when they were later cut

off from the White House, it would be difficult to explain how McClellan's army could have escaped destruction. Moreover, the control of the water enabled the Federals to get their sick and wounded rapidly out of the way and to supply them on hospital transport boats with the medicines, surgical attention, and nursing that save soldiers for another day.

Fifth. The battle demonstrated the field advantage of war material. The rapidity with which the Federals built or repaired bridges across the Chickahominy—bridges which on at least two occasions saved catastrophes, could rarely be equaled by the Confederates, for they were generally destitute of the necessary tools and material.

Sixth. The contest showed how rapidly Americans can be mechanized into sturdy fighters when they have even respectable officers. The losses of an organization in battle, other things being equal, always demonstrate the character and the intensity of the fighting. Although most of the soldiers arrayed against one another on this bloody field had never before taken part in pitched battle, the losses show with what determination both sides stood to their arms. The Federals lost in all 5,031;¹ the Confederates, 6,124.² General Keyes reported that of the nine generals of the Fourth Corps, all except one was either wounded or had his horse struck. Of the Confederate general officers, Hatton was killed and Generals Johnston, Hampton, Pettigrew, and Rodes, wounded.

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 762.

² *Ibid.*, 942; 13, 506.

The North Carolina losses are summarized as follows:

<i>Organization</i>	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Wounded</i>	<i>Missing</i>	<i>Aggregate</i>
Fourth North Carolina, Major Grimes	77	286	6	369
Fifth North Carolina, Colonel MacRae	1	26	0	27
Sixth North Carolina, Colonel Pender	11	88	15	114
Sixteenth North Carolina, Colonel Davis	8	98	12	118
Twenty-second North Carolina, Colonel Lightfoot	25	95	24	144
Twenty-third North Carolina, Colonel Christie	18	145	6	169
Total North Carolina losses	140	738	63	941

The regimental strength of four of these regiments is recorded, and averages 439 men. If the other two be estimated at the average of the four, then the North Carolina troops engaged incurred a loss of a little over thirty-five per cent. This ratio of loss is rarely exceeded.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SEVEN DAYS: MECHANICSVILLE AND GAINES'S MILL

When the Confederate army was rearranging¹ itself after the battle at Seven Pines for another grapple with its invading antagonist, men and officers turned anxious eyes and apprehensive thought to their headquarters tent. Robert E. Lee, the new commander, had not yet manifested his capacity to endure the solitude and to carry the awesome responsibility of chief command. Hence, thoughtful minds in every organization were asking, "Is it well with the army?" It was well.

In discussing Pompey's greatness on the field of battle, Cicero, a master of ordered thought, asserts that four qualities are united in supreme military chieftains. These, as he thinks, are:

First. Military knowledge: this must include more than mere technical acquirement. With it there must blend an almost inspired power for divining the thought and compass of an adversary's mind.

Second. Valor: not, to be sure, the personal pluck that is indifferent to wounds or death, but that sublime audacity of soul that keeps a commander clear-eyed and strong-armed and serene-minded in hours of direst stress.

Third. Authority: a quality to be illustrated rather than defined. It is found in the answer of Jackson's soldiers to the question, "Where are you going?" "We don't know, but sure Old Jack does"; in the constant query of Cleburne's soldiers to every com-

¹ The brigades were shaken up in an attempt to include in a brigade only soldiers from the same state. General Lee was opposed to this method of organization. In a letter to President Davis on June 7, he says: "I fear the result. Nor do I think it the best organization. . . . But as it is your will and may be in conformity to the spirit of the land, I will attempt what can be done." *Lee's Dispatches*, 11.

mand of a substitute officer, "Faith, and does Old Pat say so?"; in Washington's dismissal from his presence of the officers of the Conway Cabal without a single court-martial. It is the embodiment of confidence and love.

Fourth. Good fortune. No soldiers will long fight whole-heartedly for an unlucky chief.

Did Lee possess these traits? Knowledge? How otherwise, with an army necessarily diminishing, did he compel President Lincoln to try McClellan, Halleck, Pope, Burnside, Hooker, Meade, Grant in an effort to match him in the field, and this, too, when these capable officers excelled him in every material equipment of war? Valor? It is needed only to recall how, with McClellan still lying at the doors of Richmond, Lee sent off Jackson to jar Pope's complacency and then followed himself with the larger part of his army to complete Jackson's task, or how, when fighting in the ratio of only two to five, he divided his army at Chancellorsville and overthrew the self-sufficient Hooker. The last quality mentioned by Cicero, good fortune, is a relative term. Although Lee was fought to a standstill at Sharpsburg, and baffled at Gettysburg, the admiration, even veneration, of his soldiers was undiminished. They still believed that, while circumstances might prove too much for him, no skill of an antagonist would ever surpass his battlefield strategy.

Such was the chieftain the North Carolina troops, in common with the soldiers of the South, were henceforth to follow until Appomattox came. Bomb-proof critics might assail him with shallow criticisms,¹ but

¹ General Dodge of the Federal army says: "In view of the difficulty today, with all the facts before us, of withholding from General Lee our sincere homage as the great soldier of our Civil War, of the difficulty we meet in passing any criticism upon his conduct as a soldier, it seems strange that during the war, when it was he whose unfailing equipoise and sturdy courage prolonged

the "hardest troops that ever laughed at hunger, cold, or danger" never wavered in their conviction that their leader was matchless.

When General Lee took over the chief command of the Confederate army on June 1, plans were already under way for the concentration around Richmond of every regiment that could be spared from other fields. The army under Johnston numbered twenty-seven brigades. The arrival of troops from the South¹ and of Jackson's forces added twelve additional brigades. These twelve swelled Lee's numbers to 39 brigades—in all 176 regiments and 9 battalions of

the life of the Confederacy from month to month, many of his fellow-citizens should have been bitterly arrayed against him. A dispassionate judgment places Robert E. Lee among the greatest generals of modern times." Dodge, *Birds-eye View of our Civil War*, 115.

¹ These with their numbers so far as they can be deciphered from the official records, were as follows:

Ripley, of D. H. Hill's division	2,366(a)
Ransom, of Holmes's division, but temporarily assigned to Huger's	3,700(b)
Walker, of Holmes's division	4,000(c)
Daniel, of Holmes's division	1,700(d)
Wise, temporarily attached to Holmes's division	961(e)

12,727

With Jackson there came:

Jackson's own three brigades	7,678(f)
Ewell's three brigades	6,664(g)
Lawton's brigade	3,500(h)
	17,842
	30,569

a Official Records, 13, 650.

b Ibid., 794. Ransom reported 3,000 after the 48th North Carolina Regiment was transferred to Walker's brigade.

c Ibid., 915.

d Ibid., 913.

e Ibid., 916.

f On May 3, just before he began his Valley campaign, Jackson returned his strength at 8,397 (*Ibid.*, 18, 879). His own division lost 719 men in the battles. The deduction of this loss would, without any allowance for men dying of sickness and hardship or for lost stragglers, give him this number. It is, therefore, probably too large.

g Ewell gives a field return on July 31, at the close of the Seven Days Battles, of 5,688 (*Ibid.*, 964). His losses in these battles were 976 (see Casualties). This number added to 5,688 would very nearly give his numbers on arrival, although he received some returning men after the battles—men who had been slightly wounded or broken down in the Valley.

h Ibid., 595.

infantry. Lee's total strength for the impending battles was not far from the following figures:

Jackson, including Lawton, as already explained	17,842	¹
Longstreet	9,051	²
Magruder	13,000	³
D. H. Hill, including Ripley's brigade	10,000	⁴
Holmes, without Ransom's brigade	6,300	⁵
A. P. Hill	14,000	⁶
Huger, with Ransom's brigade less the 48th North Carolina	8,008	⁷
Whiting	3,951	⁸
Cavalry	2,500	⁹
Reserve artillery	1,500	
Total	86,152	¹⁰

There is no difficulty in determining with accuracy McClellan's strength, for he forwarded to Washington a field return for his entire army on June 20, 1862—just six days before the beginning of the Seven Days Battles. This return shows a total, exclusive of General Dix's command, of 105,825. ¹¹

¹ *Official Records*, 13, 483-88.

² Alexander's careful computation, based on reports of brigade commanders.

³ Magruder's Report, *Official Records*, 13, 661.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 629.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 907. 300 allowed for batteries.

⁶ A. P. Hill's Report, *Ibid.*, 835.

⁷ Consolidation of reports of his brigade commanders, *Ibid.*, 794, 796, 806, 818.

⁸ The field returns of May 21, give Whiting's brigade and Hood's a combined strength of 4,320. The two lost at Seven Pines 369 men. Therefore, excluding losses from sickness, etc., their strength could not possibly exceed this number.

⁹ General Early's conclusions.

¹⁰ The following estimates of General Lee's strength are interesting:

Henderson: <i>Life of Jackson</i>	86,500
Allan: <i>Campaign of 1862</i>	80,000
Early: <i>Southern Historical Society Papers</i>	80,000
Ropes: <i>Story of the Civil War</i>	90,000
Taylor: <i>General Lee</i>	80,000
Alexander: <i>Military Memoirs</i>	83,500
Steele: <i>American Campaigns</i>	80,000 to 90,000
Long: <i>General Lee</i>	81,000

¹¹ Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War, II, (1), 3.

There were eighteen North Carolina regiments in the Army of Northern Virginia when General Lee assumed command on June 1. Sixteen additional regiments of North Carolina infantry and one of cavalry were at this juncture called to reinforce Lee for the great battles of the Chickahominy.¹ As explained in the preceding note, most of these regiments came with the division which the state had built up for General Holmes while he was in charge of the Department of North Carolina.

Colonels G. B. Anderson and W. D. Pender had so distinguished themselves at Seven Pines that they were promoted to be brigadier-generals; General Lee, who was carrying out the President's desire to brigade all troops by states, assigned General Anderson to a newly-formed North Carolina brigade.² General Pender, after a brief period of command of Pettigrew's mixed brigade,³ was also assigned a purely North Carolina brigade, but retained the North Carolina

¹ These regiments, in the order of their arrivals, were as follows:

The First, Colonel M. S. Stokes, and the Third, Colonel Gaston Meares, arrived with Ripley's brigade on June 2. The Thirtieth, Colonel F. M. Parker, left Wilmington on June 13, and on arrival was assigned to G. B. Anderson's new North Carolina brigade. The Twentieth, Colonel Alfred Iverson, left Fort Johnston near Wilmington on June 14, and reported to Garland. The Second, Colonel C. C. Tew, reached Richmond on June 17, and, like the Thirtieth, went into Anderson's new brigade. The Twenty-fourth, Colonel W. J. Clarke; the Twenty-fifth, Colonel H. M. Rutledge; the Twenty-sixth, Colonel Z. B. Vance; the Thirty-fifth, Colonel M. W. Ransom; the Forty-eighth, Colonel R. C. Hill; and the Forty-ninth, Colonel S. D. Ramseur; constituting Ransom's brigade of Holmes's division, reported at Richmond on June 25, and were temporarily assigned to Huger's division. The Forty-eighth was soon after transferred to Walker. The Twenty-seventh, Colonel J. R. Cooke, and the Forty-sixth, Colonel E. D. Hall, came with Walker on June 26. The Forty-third, Colonel T. S. Kenan, the Forty-fifth, Colonel J. Daniel, and the Fiftieth, Colonel M. D. Craton, left Drewry's Bluff under Colonel Daniel as brigade commander, and reached the battlefields on June 30. Two other regiments—the Thirty-second, Colonel E. C. Brabble, and the Fifty-third, Colonel W. A. Owens, were a little later assigned to this brigade. The First Cavalry, Colonel L. S. Baker, returned to Virginia duty in time for this campaign.

² Anderson's brigade consisted of the Second Regiment, Colonel C. C. Tew; the Fourth, Lieutenant-Colonel Bryan Grimes; the Fourteenth, Colonel W. P. Roberts; and the Thirtieth, Colonel F. M. Parker. It was the Fourth Brigade of General D. H. Hill's division.

³ Pettigrew was seriously wounded and captured at Seven Pines.

regiments of the former brigade.¹ Pettigrew again reported for duty in August and was given a brigade² which General J. G. Martin had formed in North Carolina for service against Burnside at New Bern, but which, at General Lee's urgent request, was sent to Virginia in July. It, however, was not in time for the Seven Days Battles.

At the opening of Lee's campaign of 1862, North Carolina had organized forty-nine regiments and one battalion of infantry, three regiments of cavalry, and three regiments of artillery—55 regiments in all.³ The state was, at the same time, credited with two major-generals⁴ and nine brigadier-generals.⁵

These newly arriving troops, who had been fretting for active service, were soon initiated into the novel sensations of battlefield strife, for Lee was busily

¹ Pender's brigade, the Sixth of General A. P. Hill's division, was composed of these North Carolina regiments: The Sixteenth, Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. McElroy; the Twenty-second, Colonel James Conner; the Thirty-fourth, Colonel R. H. Riddick, and the Thirty-eighth, Colonel W. J. Hoke.

² This brigade was made up of these regiments: The Seventeenth, Colonel W. F. Martin; the Forty-fourth, Colonel T. C. Singletary; the Forty-seventh, Colonel S. H. Rogers, and the Fifty-second, Colonel J. K. Marshall. When Martin returned to North Carolina, he took the Seventeenth with him. The Twenty-sixth was then transferred to Pettigrew. Later the Eleventh, Colonel C. Leventhorpe, was added.

³ These were distributed as follows: Thirty-four regiments and one battalion of infantry, (a) one regiment of cavalry, (b) and four field batteries (c) in the Army of Northern Virginia. Three regiments of infantry on detached duty in Virginia. (d) Four regiments in Martin's brigade that went to Virginia (e) on July 11. Two regiments reorganizing after their capture at Roanoke Island. (f) Two regiments in the Western Army. (g) With the exception of the four field batteries, the three regiments of artillery were manning heavy guns on the coast of North Carolina. (h) Two regiments of cavalry in North Carolina. (i) Four regiments of infantry in North Carolina during the summer of 1862. (j)

a First North Carolina Battalion.

b Ninth Regiment or First Cavalry.

c Brem's, Lloyd's, Manly's, and Reilly's.

d The Thirty-second at Drewry's Bluff, the Forty-second at Lynchburg, and the Fifty-third south of the James.

e See note 2 preceding

f The Eighth and the Thirty-first.

g The Twenty-ninth and the Thirty-ninth.

h The Tenth, Thirty-sixth, and Fortieth.

i The Nineteenth (Second Cavalry), and Forty-first (Third Cavalry).

j The Eleventh, Fifty-first, Fifty-second, and Fifty-fifth.

⁴ Theo. H. Holmes and D. H. Hill.

⁵ R. C. Gatlin, G. J. Rains, L. O'B. Branch, J. J. Pettigrew, Robert Ransom, J. G. Martin, T. L. Clingman, Geo. B. Anderson, and W. D. Pender.

setting his stage to forestall McClellan's attack on Richmond by throwing the Confederate army on the Federal right flank near Mechanicsville.

As the weight of this blow would fall on General Porter's corps, the only Federal corps remaining north of the Chickahominy, and as Lee, in the movement against Porter, designed to leave only a small part of his forces "to contain" the four Federal corps on the south side of the river, he desired to find out whether McClellan was either reinforcing Porter or whether there were any indications of his withdrawing Porter to join his comrades on the right bank of the Chickahominy. He therefore directed General D. H. Hill to gather this information through a reconnoissance by Ripley's brigade. The First and Third North Carolina regiments and the Forty-fourth Georgia of Ripley's command threw out a line of skirmishers extending from the White Oak Swamp to the York River Railroad on June 15, and pressed forward on the Williamsburg road until they were within 150 yards of the Federal works.¹ Although a driving rain prevented an accurate survey, yet Ripley was convinced that there had been no motion of troops towards Porter. The fact that the Federal army was occupying its usual trenches and intending apparently to move forward only by regular approaches² was confirmed on June 25 by a Federal attack which brought Ransom's North Carolina brigade into action.

On that morning Heintzelman's two divisions—Hooker and Kearny—with such support from Sumner and Keyes as might be required were ordered "to push forward the line of pickets covering the advance

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 1051.

² Rhodes, in a comment on this method of gradual approach, says: "It was substantially this same plan that Lee, who seemed to know McClellan as well as did McClellan himself, divined and undertook to thwart. . . . It was apparently the conventional design of an engineer officer, and was foreseen independently by Davis, Longstreet, and D. H. Hill." *History of the United States*, IV, 33.

of the army before Richmond.”¹ In carrying out his orders, General Heintzelman threw the divisions of Hooker and Kearny—and a little later Palmer’s brigade of Couch’s division, against Huger’s front, which extended from the York River Railroad to the Charles City road. The first assault fell on the brigades of General A. R. Wright and General L. A. Armistead. They were, however, speedily reinforced by Ransom’s North Carolina brigade, which was just arriving from Richmond. Although most of Ransom’s men were novices in war, General Huger says of their conduct, “General Ransom’s brigade behaved with great steadiness and coolness in this their first conflict with the enemy.”²

“The Twenty-fifth North Carolina, Colonel H. M. Rutledge, was pushed to the left of the Williamsburg road, where the enemy had advanced,” reports Huger,³ “and drove them back in gallant style, holding our original line of pickets.” General Ransom commends the tenacity with which Rutledge held his ground in the face of sharp attacks. He says, “From that time, 11 a.m., until sunset, this regiment held in check the enemy’s troops, who three times attempted to force them. . . . The regiment behaved admirably.”⁴ At sunset Colonel M. W. Ransom’s Thirty-fifth North Carolina relieved the Twenty-fifth. His regiment was sharply fired into about 9:30 p.m., but gave no ground.⁵

¹ *Official Records*, 13, 108.

² *Ibid.*, 788.

³ *Ibid.*, 787.

⁴ *Ibid.*, General Wright, under whose eye the regiment fought, says: “Colonel Rutledge was ordered to move down on the left of the road, supported by the Third Georgia, Major J. R. Sturges, engage the enemy, and if possible drive him out of the woods. This movement was executed in handsome style and with complete success.” *Ibid.*, 805.

⁵ As illustrative of how troops soon acquire battle poise when they are well led, General Ransom’s comment on the conduct of the Thirty-fifth is worthy of notice. He says, “At the battle of New Bern this regiment is said to have acted badly. On the night of the 25th ultimo and 1st instant it acted with wonderful staunchness and admirable gallantry. Any officer may be proud to command it.” *Ibid.*, 793.

About six in the afternoon, the Forty-eighth North Carolina, Colonel R. C. Hill, and the Fourth Georgia, Colonel Dales, were directed to attempt to regain ground on the right that had been lost in the morning. General Mahone disposed several of his regiments to support Hill and Dales in their encounter. Just as these two regiments moved forward, the Federals had likewise been ordered to advance. The charge of these two regiments, ¹ reinforced, when they were finally worn to a standstill by Mahone's men, crumpled the front of Robinson's brigade by sweeping the Eighty-seventh New York entirely from the field and driving back in disorder the Twentieth Indiana and also the Sixteenth Massachusetts, which had been sent by Grover to Robinson for the support of a battery. ² The Federals then filled the gap in their front with Birney's brigade, and after an exchange of a few volleys the firing died down. Both sides claim that on the night of the battle they posted their pickets on their original line.

During the battle the Forty-ninth North Carolina, Colonel S. D. Ramseur, and the Twenty-fourth, Colonel W. J. Clark, relieved two of Wright's regiments, but neither had any sustained action. A little before dark the Twenty-sixth North Carolina, Colonel Z. B. Vance, took over a part of the front line as a relief to the Twenty-fourth. After the regiment, unaware that a body of Federal troops was lying in line of battle just

¹ General Ransom's description of the Forty-eighth's part in this charge is as follows: "Before the approach of the enemy, the regiment, which was lying down, rose, charged, and drove him back several hundred yards, covering the ground with his dead and wounded. . . . His regiment was only two months old, and I am happy to have witnessed its courage." *Official Records*, 14, 792.

² General Robinson reports: "At this time . . . some man in the Eighty-seventh New York called out that the enemy was bringing a battery to bear on the left, when the whole regiment broke and fled to the rear . . . and did not again appear on the field. The Twentieth Indiana, then being hard pressed by reinforcements of the enemy, was forced to give way, and fled to the rear. I succeeded after a little time in rallying this regiment." *Ibid.*, 14, 174. Colonel Wyman, who was killed five days later, says of the Sixteenth Massachusetts: "But the tide was too strong and my own men were soon retiring with them to the cover of the woods." *Ibid.*, 128.

across a hedgerow, had settled itself for the night, the Federals, who did not choose to have armed neighbors so near them, arose and fired into the astonished men. "The surprise was so great," says the regimental historian,¹ "that seven of the companies on the right of the regiment went to the rear; however, companies G, H, and K, undaunted by the nearness and numbers of the enemy, remained on the field."

The total Federal loss in the day's and night's battle was 626;² the total Confederate casualties were 441.³ The North Carolina loss was 125.⁴

During the night which closed this contest, a contest soon overshadowed by clashes in which the fires of death were lighted by thousands and not by hundreds, Huger's men wondered to hear behind their lines the continuous rumble of wheels. On their return on the morning of June 26, they were amazed to find that they were the only occupants of those long lines of trenches that on the day before had been vibrant with soldier life. Lee was massing about Mechanicsville the men of Longstreet and D. H. Hill, who had occupied these trenches. He had determined to call Jackson from the Valley and with his aid to strike for the salvation of Richmond before McClellan, with the coöperation of McDowell, should move his hosts for its destruction.⁵ To mask his intentions, Whiting's division, with Lawton's brigade attached, was ordered to set out from Richmond with outspread banners and flare of drums. The newspapers were asked to announce that Whiting was bound for Jackson's camp, and that Washington would do well to look to itself. Meantime Jackson's

¹ Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 332.

² *Official Records*, 13, 37-38.

³ *Ibid.*, 983.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ "General Lee had made, at his leisure, all his arrangements for attacking the Union army, and had chosen the time and the manner of the onset—as Johnston did a month before—without the slightest reference to any possible initiative of McClellan. Nicolay and Hay, V, 420.

troops, their movement shielded by a cavalry screen, were scurrying for the Chickahominy. At Gordonsville Jackson left his mystified men, who were entirely in the dark as to their destination, to push on under Ewell's guidance. After a night in an express car, he proceeded from Frederick's Hall by relay of horses to General Lee's headquarters on the Nine Mile road. There at a conference to which Generals Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and A. P. Hill had been summoned, the details of the forthcoming attack on the Federal right wing, north of the Chickahominy, were adjusted.¹ The main detail in General Lee's mind, says D. H. Hill, "seemed to be that the crossings of the Chickahominy should be uncovered by Jackson's advance down the left bank, so that the other three divisions might not suffer in making a forced passage."² As Jackson's troops had the greatest distance to march, it was left to him to appoint the day of attack. He, confident of the marching ability of his veterans, named June 26.

Those officers who had wondered whether General Lee, an engineer officer, had sufficient audacity for a

¹ In *The Long Roll*, Miss Mary Johnston thus imaginatively paints this meeting of the Confederate chieftains whom General Lee had selected to direct his battle: "It was a large, simply furnished room, with steel engravings on the walls. There were three men in the room. One having a large frame and a somewhat heavy face kept the chair beside the table, with a kind of granite and stubborn air. He rested like a boulder on a mountain slope; marked with old scars, only waiting to be set in motion again to grind matters small. The second man, younger, slender, with a short red beard, leaned against the open window, smelled the roses and listened to the birds. The third, a man of forty, with a gentle manner and very honest and kindly eyes, studied the engravings. All three wore the stars of major-generals. The man from the Valley, entering dropped his cloak and showed the same insignia. D. H. Hill, leaving the engravings, came forward and took him by both hands. The two had married sisters; moreover, each was possessed of fiery religious convictions; and Hill, though without the genius of the other, was a cool, intelligent, and determined fighter. The two had not met since Jackson's fame had come upon him. It clothed him now like a mantle. The man sitting by the table got ponderously to his feet; the one by the window left the contemplation of the rose bush. 'You know one another by name only, I believe, gentlemen?' said D. H. Hill. 'General Jackson—General Longstreet, General Ambrose Powell Hill'." 403.

² *Battles and Leaders*, II, 346.

successful commander-in-chief, could never again doubt his willingness to take a hazard. Practically four-fifths of the Federal army was strongly intrenched on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy and within five miles of the heart of the Confederacy. Yet General Lee deliberately elected to leave Magruder and Huger with only 10 brigades to stand between his capital and twenty-three Federal brigades all on tiptoe to rush into Richmond, and to concentrate twenty-seven of his own brigades on the extreme right of the Federal army. The scheme had at first startled so pugnacious a man as President Davis, and he hurried to point out the danger of McClellan's walking into Richmond while its defensive lines were stripped.¹ He, however, conceded the excellence of the plan if McClellan would accept purely defensive tactics.²

Before dawn on June 26,³ the Confederate troops began to take the places assigned them by General Lee's order. The commands of Longstreet, Jackson,

¹ *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, II, 132.

² "From the hour that Lee crossed the Chickahominy, leaving that river and McClellan's army between him and Richmond, he risked the fate of the Confederacy upon his belief that the Union general would make no forward movement." Nicolay and Hay, V, 425. Lee "was confident that McClellan would make no serious attempt to force the lines defending Richmond; and he did not anticipate that he would boldly accept the gage of battle flung down and move the bulk of his forces across the Chickahominy to fight a pitched battle for the defense of his communications." Wood and Edmonds, 69. "Thus the attitude of the two armies was changed. Yesterday McClellan was rejoicing over the success of his advance toward Richmond, and he was confident of reinforcement by McDowell. Today all the united available forces in Virginia were thrown against his right flank, which was not in a convenient position to be supported." Porter, *Battles and Leaders*, II, 326.

³ It was a singular coincidence that Lee's advance was set for the very day on which McClellan had designed to take the offensive. He says, "On the 26th, the day upon which I had decided as the time for our final advance, the enemy attacked our right in strong force, and turned my attention to the protection of our communications and depots of supply." *McClellan's Own Story*, 410. General Porter, who in a large measure shared the confidence of his chief, and who says that McClellan "confided to him his plans as well as his hopes and apprehensions," writes: "On the 25th the pickets of the left of the main army south of the Chickahominy were pushed forward under strong opposition . . . so as to enable the Second and Third corps (Sumner's and Heintzelman's) to support the attack on Old Tavern, which it was intended to make next day with the Sixth corps (Franklin's)." *Battles and Leaders*, II, 326. In General Franklin's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, he said: "It has always been my impression that

D. H. Hill, and A. P. Hill, with Stuart's cavalry—in all about 58,000 men—were to operate offensively against General McClellan's communications on the north side of the Chickahominy, while the commands of Magruder and Huger, numbering about 21,000 men, were to prevent the 74,000 Federals¹ on the south side of the river from sweeping into Richmond. The division of General Holmes, guarding the southern approaches to Richmond around Drewry's Bluff, was to be subject to call from either Magruder or Huger.²

Every soldier in these divisions knew on this morning that the long expected hour for crossing strength between all the units of two great armies had at last arrived. The recent fighting had shown that the day of panics on a large scale was past. Both armies had, through discipline and experience, developed the qualities which have always marked American soldiers—initiative, stark fighting power, and a pride that holds them staunch in the hours of unexpected hardships and disasters. Hence, these marching men felt assured that the coming grapple in the miasmatic and insect-infested bogs, runs, swamps, thickets and forests of the Peninsula would be desperate and of an immensity hitherto unprecedented in the war, yet one of the marchers remarks that they went towards the bridges “with the hilarity of boys out for a snow-ball combat.”³

about the 25th or 26th of June the attack was to be made upon the rebels, particularly from my part of the line—the right.” II, (1), 622. McClellan wrote to his wife on June 15: “Look on the maps I sent you a day or two ago, and find Old Tavern . . . it is in that vicinity that the next battle will be fought. . . . I shall make the first battle mainly an artillery contest. As soon as I get possession of Old Tavern, I will push them in on Richmond and behind their works, then I will bring up my heavy guns, shell the city, and carry it by assault.” *McClellan's Own Story*, 405.

¹ *Official Records*, 14, 288.

² This division, consisting during Ransom's detachment to Huger of the brigades of Daniel and Walker, was practically unengaged* during these battles, as is shown by the fact that its total casualties were only 53 officers and men. *Ibid.*, 13, 984.

³ The following appraisals of the contesting armies, each appraisal written by an opponent, are noteworthy: General Porter says of the attacking army:

Under Lee's battle order, Branch's North Carolina brigade of A. P. Hill's division was to take post at Winston's Bridge, some six or eight miles above Meadow Bridge. As soon as Jackson, who was expected to notify Branch between three and four on the morning of June 26 of his approach, should send this notice, Branch was to cross the Chickahominy, and establish communication with Jackson. He was then to turn down the river, and marching parallel to Jackson's route, clear the northern bank of the stream so that A. P. Hill, with the remainder of the division could cross at Meadow Bridge. Hill, in turn, was to clear Mechanicsville of Federals in order that Longstreet and D. H. Hill might, without loss, move over the river at the Mechanicsville Bridge. After crossing, D. H. Hill was to take the Bethesda Church road to unite his division with Jackson, and Longstreet was to turn down the Chickahominy with intent to uncover the lower bridge and form contact with Magruder. The whole operation which Lee had planned hinged upon Jackson's flanking the Federals out of their defenses on Beaver Dam Creek;¹ for, as already seen, it was no part of Lee's schedule to sacrifice his men in attempts to storm a position that could not be held a moment after Jackson's flank pressure began.

Branch was promptly under arms at four o'clock in the morning in expectancy of crossing at that hour to take up his march with Jackson on his

"The forces arrayed against us . . . were the chosen of Southern manhood from Maryland to Texas. No braver or more spirited body of men was to be found among the Confederates, or any who more strongly believed in their invincibility. Their general officers, from the chief down, had been selected for earnest devotion to their cause and well-earned reputation for intelligent and energetic performance of duty on other fields." *Battles and Leaders*, II, 343. Colonel A. S. Long, of General Lee's staff, says: "The army under General McClellan was made up largely of the flower of the manhood of the Northern and Eastern States and his lieutenants were men and soldiers of very high type. . . . Nothing less than an army of the finest material, most excellently officered, could have so well resisted the terrible blows delivered by the Confederates under General Lee." *General Lee*, 84.

¹ Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 15.

left, but Jackson had found the difficulties of his long march greater than he had reckoned and was six hours late. The miscarriage of the movement on which the day's operations were pivoted, of course, threw askew all other movements. Instead of four it was ten o'clock before Branch was notified of Jackson's approach. "Within less than ten minutes," he reports, "my column, which had been resting on its arms for six hours, was in motion."¹ Even then his troubles were not over, for "he was delayed by the enemy's skirmishers and advanced but slowly."²

Meantime, since an early hour A. P. Hill, whose next move it was, had been waiting at Meadow Bridge for either tidings from Branch or the opening roar of Jackson's guns, and the divisions of Longstreet and D. H. Hill were massed for crossing opposite the Mechanicsville Bridge two miles below. The morning wore away. Soldiers keyed to battle pitch stirred restlessly; officers seeking cause for the delay crowded to the front.³ Impatience was changing to fretfulness. "Three o'clock having arrived," reports A. P. Hill, "and no intelligence from Jackson or Branch, I determined to cross at once, rather than hazard the failure of the whole plan by longer deferring it."⁴ His action was natural, but it failed to take into account the fact that it is usually unwise to tamper with the plans of the guiding intelligence of a battle. Before he had been long across, Captain T. W. Sydnor reached him with a message from General Lee to hold his hand, but it was then too late.⁵ Had he deferred crossing

¹ *Official Records*, 13, 882.

² A. P. Hill's Report, *Ibid.*, 835.

³ One group of officers included President Davis, Secretary of War Randolph, and Generals Lee, Longstreet, and D. H. Hill.

⁴ *Official Records*, 13, 835. "It is strange," comments General Alexander, "that he should have taken this responsibility without orders from Lee, who was within two miles, and who, it seems, would not have approved it." *Military Memoirs*, 118.

⁵ Colonel Henderson, on the authority of Captain Sydnor, who bore the message. *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 16.

until the next morning, Jackson's coöperation would have turned the Federals out of their fortifications without the grievous loss incurred in the attempts to storm the works.¹

The Federal position on Beaver Dam Creek was excellent by nature. General Fitz John Porter, whose division held it, thus describes his advantages: "The banks of the valley were steep, and forces advancing on the adjacent plains presented their flanks, as well as their front, to the fire of both infantry and artillery, safely posted behind intrenchments. Its passage was difficult for infantry at all points and impracticable for artillery, except at the bridge crossings."² Behind and in the rifle-pits on this crest, McCall's division—three brigades under Reynolds, Seymour, and Meade, capable soldiers all, with 20 guns in four batteries—waited the Confederate attack.

When A. P. Hill's men, without any artillery preparation,³ pressed through Mechanicsville toward this Federal stronghold, they were so thinned by a concentric artillery and rifle fire that Hill saw the fruitlessness of a direct assault.⁴ "Expecting every moment to hear Jackson's guns . . . in the rear of the enemy,"⁵ he directed J. R. Anderson's brigade to try for a lodgment by a circuit to the Federal right where Reynolds held the lines. At the same time Field, with

¹ In *Battles and Leaders*, General D. H. Hill says: "It was unfortunate for the Confederates that the crossing was begun before Jackson got in rear of Mechanicsville. The loss of that position would have necessitated the abandonment of the line of Beaver Dam Creek, as, in fact, it did, the next day. We were lavish of blood in those days, and it was thought to be a grand thing to charge a battery or an earth-work lined with infantry. . . . The attacks on the Beaver Dam intrenchments, on the heights of Malvern Hill, at Gettysburg, etc., were all grand, but exactly of the kind of grandeur which the South could not afford." II, 352.

² *Battles and Leaders*, II, 328.

³ "In the study of the earlier battles of the Civil War, the student must be deeply impressed by the nerve of the attacking infantry, which advanced to the assault without the support of artillery." Wise, *Long Arm of Lee*, I, 209.

⁴ Hill's Report, *Official Records*, 13, 835.

⁵ *Ibid.*

Archer on his left and Pender on his right, was ordered to seek an opening in front of Seymour, near Ellison's Mill. Branch's brigade, on coming up, was held in direct reserve.

Anderson and Archer in the attack on Reynolds lost men at every step until they arrived at the bank of the creek where they were partly sheltered. Colonel E. L. Thomas, with the Thirty-fifth Georgia, alone forced and maintained a position across the stream. Pender's North Carolinians, played on by what Field describes as "the most destructive cannonading I have yet known,"¹ made their way to Field's right. Two of Pender's regiments—the Thirty-eighth North Carolina, Colonel W. J. Hoke, and the Thirty-fourth, Colonel R. H. Riddick—joined in a desperate but "abortive effort to force a crossing." In this attempt the Thirty-eighth outstripped the Thirty-fourth and tenaciously fought its way within close range of the Federals, but nothing could live under the withering fire, and it was forced to retreat.² Colonel Hoke was among the wounded, and Lieutenant-Colonel R. F. Armfield succeeded to the command.

Ripley's brigade of D. H. Hill's division had crossed to the field, and General Hill was ordered to send it to Pender's assistance.³ Two of Ripley's regiments, the

¹ Field's Report, *Official Records*, 13, 841. "The Thirty-eighth, alone and unsupported, charged down the hill, the long line of infantry playing on it with a cross fire. On the soldiers charged, in the face of the fatal volleys, until the obstacles were reached, when the whole line stopped and began returning the fire." Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 680.

² As illustrative of the deadliness of fire early in the war, the casualties in Company G of this regiment are striking. This company, under Captain G. W. Flowers, went into action with 32 men. Of these 27 were either killed or wounded.

³ It should be stated that General D. H. Hill, who, of course, knew of Jackson's vicinity to Porter's right, was so averse to this frontal waste of life that he ordered Ripley in only after a second command of General Lee, confirmed by President Davis, who had ridden out from Richmond to participate in the battle. General Alexander says of this bootless advance: "Meanwhile, as the hours of daylight were closing, under urgent messages from Lee and President Davis, two regiments of Ripley's brigade of D. H. Hill's division were launched in a direct charge on perhaps the very strongest point of the whole Federal position. A more hopeless charge was never entered upon."

First North Carolina, Colonel M. S. Stokes, and the Forty-fourth Georgia, were placed on Pender's right; the Third North Carolina, Colonel Gaston Meares, and the Forty-eighth Georgia on his left. As these regiments, in conjunction with the Thirty-fourth North Carolina, rushed against the artillery crowned slope, the destruction was great.¹ The left regiments were in a measure saved by the ground in their front, but the right regiments were stricken down by scores. The Georgians lost 335 men in a few moments.² In the First North Carolina, Colonel Stokes was mortally and Lieutenant-Colonel John A. McDowell severely wounded, and Major T. L. Skinner killed. Six captains and lieutenants, and 142 men killed or wounded out of 420 taken into action.³ Seldom was there so much life sacrificed with so little gain. The most that some of the regiments achieved was to hold their places on the banks of the creek to await the morning.

Pender's other North Carolina regiments, the Twenty-second, Colonel James Conner, and the Sixteenth, Colonel J. S. McElroy, were fierce contenders during the day. Pender reports that the Twenty-second suddenly found itself facing a regiment just across the run. So close were the two regiments that there was a challenge from each as to the other's

They were the First North Carolina and the Forty-fourth Georgia, raw regiments which had never before been under fire. Their behavior illustrated the morale inspiring the army. . . . "They dashed across a wide plain through a storm of musketry, shells, and canister, and some even went across Beaver Dam and into the entangled slashing close under the Federal lines. There they were killed until their bodies lay, as a Federal account describes it, 'as thick as flies in a bowl of sugar'." *Military Memoirs*, 121.

¹ General Porter says of this attack on his left: "The forces which were directed against Seymour at Ellison's Mill made little progress. Seymour's direct and Reynold's flank fire soon arrested them and drove them to shelter, suffering even more disastrously than those who had attacked Reynolds. Late in the afternoon, greatly strengthened, they renewed the attack with spirit and energy, some reaching the borders of the stream, but only to be repulsed with terrible slaughter." *Battles and Leaders*, II, 330.

² The Third North Carolina lost 8 killed and 39 wounded. *Official Records*, 13, 658.

³ *Ibid.*, 976.

identity. Then, as each answered, a sharp collision, in which the Twenty-second lost 68 men.¹ The capable colonel of the regiment, James Conner, was severely wounded.

The Sixteenth North Carolina became separated from the brigade through the ignorance of a guide, and joined the fray with Field's brigade. It encountered the fire described above by General Field, and lost about 200 men.² Lieutenant Cathey of this regiment thus describes his night on the field of battle: "Our surroundings were deserts of solitary horror. The owls, night-hawks, and foxes had fled in dismay; not even a snake or a frog could be heard to plunge into the lagoons which, crimsoned with the blood of men, lay motionless in our front. Nothing could be heard in the blackness of that night but the ghastly moans of the wounded and dying."³

The value of field-works as a protection was amply demonstrated in this struggle to those who had been scoffing at them. The Federals fighting behind such works lost only 361 men. The losses of the Confederates could not have been less than 1,850.⁴

The Confederate soldiers, accustomed from their open-air life to study terrain, were not disheartened by their disastrous repulse. They realized that their forces, united by the arrival of Jackson instead of menaced by the coming of McDowell, were at last so advantageously situated as to give them, if they struck with full heart, an opportunity to drive their invaders from Richmond. Hence they lay on their arms that night with a keen desire to resume their task on the morrow—Richmond was to be freed.⁵

¹ Copy of official report in *Fayetteville Observer*, July 14, 1862.

² Pender's Report, *Official Records*, 13, 899.

³ Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 756.

⁴ Without counting losses in Anderson's and in Field's brigades, 1,589 casualties were reported. Both of these brigades were closely engaged.

⁵ "The Army of Northern Virginia was now fairly embarked in an aggressive campaign. It had, so thought the officers and men composing it, stood

Although he was successful in his first day's encounter, General McClellan's situation on the night of June 26 was not enviable. With Lee massed in front of his right wing and Jackson feeling for its rear, his position on Beaver Dam Creek was untenable, and his line of communication to the White House base practically cut. Only an audacity that McClellan did not possess could keep the initiative in his hands. Three courses of action were still open to him. The first was concentrate one or two corps behind Porter, fight for his communications, and an approach to Richmond from the northern side. The second was to reinforce Porter, heavily with artillery and slightly with infantry, so as to detain Lee north of the Chickahominy while his overwhelming numbers on the south side should march over Magruder and Huger into Richmond. This was the course advised by Porter, Franklin and Smith.¹ Indeed, General Webb, who was with him at the time, thought that Porter fought desperately at Gaines's Mill on the presumption that his sacrifice there would be compensated for by the fall of Richmond.² Porter, writing later than Webb, says: "Though in a desperate situation, I was not without strong hope of some timely assistance from the

on the defensive long enough. The enemy, who had for weeks been encamped, within sight of the spires of Richmond, were now to be attacked—to be forced to retreat from the neighborhood of the capital—to be routed—perhaps to be captured. A stern and resolute spirit pervaded Lee's army and they meant to attain it at whatever cost. Their ranks were full, and they had every confidence in their leaders; they knew that McClellan could not possibly maintain himself where he was, and they thought that there was every probability of defeating him; . . . and when, early the next morning McCall retired to Gaines's Mill, the spirits of the Confederate soldiers rose to a high point of confidence and elation." Ropes, *The Story of the Civil War*, II, 176.

¹ *Ibid.*, 174.

² General Webb says: "But the writer was present with General Porter on that day, having been ordered to join him, and having left the general headquarters for that purpose. He carried with him to General Porter the distinct impression then prevailing at the headquarters of the army, that he was to hold the large force of the enemy on the left bank of the Chickahominy, in order that General McClellan, with the main army, might break through and take Richmond." *The Peninsula*, 187.

main body of the army, with which I might repulse the attack and so cripple our opponents as to make the capture of Richmond by the main body of the army, under McClellan, the result of any sacrifice or suffering on the part of my troops or myself.”¹ The third course was to withdraw all his forces from the north bank of the Chickahominy, and concentrate his army around a new base on the James River. The advisability of shifting his base of supplies to the James, after its navigation had been secured to the Federals, had more than once been considered by McClellan.² He, however, according to Webb³ and Porter,⁴ dismissed the thought, as such a movement in the face of an able opponent was too hazardous.⁵ “He, however,” writes General Porter, “secured by careful examination full information of the roads, and the character of the country over which he would be obliged to move, if circumstances or policy should require a change of base.”

However, late at night McClellan, after a vacillating interview with Porter, decided to put his army in shape for this third course in case it should become necessary. He, therefore, ordered

¹ *Battles and Leaders*, II, 336.

² *Official Records*, 12, 28, 53.

³ Webb recites: “Some time in June the general called General Porter to a meeting with himself alone, halfway between their respective headquarters, to discuss the advantages of the James River as a base. The conclusion reached was that necessity, and necessity only, would warrant such a movement; that it was dangerous and difficult in the face of such a vigilant foe as General Lee, and a disaster would endanger our cause at home and abroad.” *The Peninsula*, 128.

⁴ General Porter writes: “Realizing the faultiness of his position, resulting from McDowell’s withdrawal to the north, he desired to correct the error by changing his base from York River to the James, where he could be easily reinforced and from which point his communications would be safe. This change could not be made so long as McDowell’s advance was to be expected, nor in any event could it be effected without great risk to the safety of his own army in the face of a vigilant and active foe, and without seriously jeopardizing the success of the cause to which he was devoting all his energies.” *Battles and Leaders*, II, 325.

⁵ McClellan himself writes: “Such a change of base in the presence of a powerful enemy is one of the most difficult undertakings in war.” *Official Records*, 12, 53.

Porter to fall back to the line of Powhite Creek, in order to cover the approaches to the bridges while he removed his trains and immense supplies to the south side of the Chickahominy.¹ He was so obsessed with the conviction that an "overwhelmingly strong Confederate army"² was bearing down on him that the safety of his own army and not the destruction of Lee's, became his chief thought.³

McClellan's second field of battle, about three miles in rear of the first, had been skillfully selected by Chief Engineer Barnard on a ridge above Boatswain's Creek. Its convex front, stretching from the bottoms of the Chickahominy on the left around by the McGehee house to Elder Swamp on the right, reached only about two miles, and was protected in part by the ravine of the creek and in part by what Porter describes as "boggy swamps covered extensively by tangled brush." He continues: "Near McGehee's and beyond, the ground, elevated and drier, was filled with ravines swept by our artillery and infantry, who were covered by depressions in the ground. The east bank was elevated, sloping, and timbered. The bed of the creek was nearly dry, and its west bank gave excellent protection to the first line of infantry. . . .

¹ "I determined then to resist Jackson with the 5th Corps, reinforced by all our disposable troops in the new position near the bridgeheads, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains and heavy guns, and to give time for the arrangements to secure the adoption of the James River as our line of supplies in lieu of the Pamunkey." *McClellan's Own Story*, 415.

² "The same report (that of the Chief of the Secret Service Corps) puts his numbers on the 26th of June at about 180,000." *McClellan's Report: Official Records*, 12, 51. On June 26, President Lincoln replied to one of his telegrams as follows: "The latter one of 6:15 p.m., suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by 200,000 men, and talking of where the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have, while you continue, ungenerously, I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would." *Ibid.*, 14, 259.

³ "Thus suddenly the Army of the Potomac, which was actually pressing toward Richmond . . . found itself thrown on the defensive, in the midst of its offensive operations, by Jackson's preconcerted and timely reinforcement of Lee. From this moment we have to follow the fortunes of that army on its *retreat*." Webb, *The Peninsula*, 124.

Sections or full batteries of the division artillery were posted to sweep the avenues of approach and the fields on which these avenues opened. Wherever possible and useful, guns were placed between brigades and on higher ground, in front or rear, as judgment dictated. Batteries of Hunt's Artillery Reserve were in rear of the left, covered by timber from view of the enemy, but ready to move at a moment's call, or from their stand to pour their irresistible fire into the enemy's force in case they broke our line."¹ Henderson thus describes the difficulties falling to the attackers: "The task before the Confederates, even with their superior numbers, was formidable in the extreme. The wooded ridge which encircled the position afforded scant room for artillery, and it was thus impossible to prepare the attack by a preliminary bombardment. The ground over which the infantry must advance was completely swept by fire, and the center and left were defended by three tiers of riflemen, the first sheltered by the steep banks of the creek, the second halfway up the bluff, covered by a breastwork, the third on the crest, occupying a line of shelter trenches, and the riflemen were supported by a dozen batteries of rifled guns."²

Porter placed Morell's division on his left and Sykes's division, including all the regular soldiers of the old army, on his right. McCall's division was in reserve. One hundred and twenty-seven guns were in readiness, of which 72 were supporting the infantry. As usual, the Federal artillery did murderous service.³ Porter's corps, with McCall's division acting with it,

¹ Porter, in *Battles and Leaders*, II, 333.

² Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 27.

³ "He had an immense preponderance in artillery, and that of the most superb character. Many of our field batteries did not get across the swamp at all, and those which did get over were inferior in range and power to General Porter's. Artillery seems to have been a favorite arm with General McClellan, and he had brought it to the highest point of efficiency." General D. H. Hill in *Battles and Leaders*, II, 359.

numbered, according to the official returns, 30,036 men.¹ Around four o'clock and before the severest part of the contest occurred, he was reinforced by Slocum's division of Franklin's corps, with 9,246 fine troops. His total force engaged, therefore, without counting the brigades of French and Meagher of Sumner's corps that covered his retreat, was 39,282.²

To drive so large and so ably commanded³ a force from this advantageous position required the utmost exertions of Lee's army, and it was done only after hours of savage combat. So doubtful until nearly seven o'clock was the issue of the battle, that if McClellan had thrown even a single one of his unengaged corps into action, he might have won a brilliant victory. However, during the hours in which Porter felt that he was sacrificing his determined troops in order to give his chief an opportunity to rush into the halls of the Confederate Congress, Magruder, resorting to every sort of ruse, kept up so deceptive a "clatter" that McClellan was deterred from either heavily bracing Porter's fight or driving toward Richmond.⁴

Porter was given more time to array his men in their formidable position than Lee had anticipated. The Confederate leaders, ill-supplied with correct maps and intelligent guides, were losing precious hours on account of difficulty in finding their routes.⁵ A. P.

¹ Returns of June 20, six days before the battle, *Official Records*, 14, 238.

² These figures are given as the number present for duty equipped on June 26 after deductions had been made for the sick, absent, etc. *Ibid.* The only intervening losses were the 361 at Mechanicsville.

³ "Porter himself was, perhaps, the hardest opponent to fight in the Federal army." *Military Memoirs*, 123.

⁴ A note, at 5:56 p.m., from Hooker, who was holding in front of Magruder discloses some of his methods: "The unusual activity of the rebels, the balloon ascension this morning, the shelling of the woods this evening all along my front, and the display of an unusual force this afternoon, indicate that they have in mind to advance." *Official Records*, 14, 266.

⁵ General E. M. Law says of the inaccurate maps furnished to the Confederate officers: "An accurate map in the hands of each division commander would have saved many valuable lives at Gaines's Mill as well as at Ellyson's, and time enough would have been gained to have brought the whole Confederate force upon the field at the former place several hours before it reached

Hill took the direct and shortest road for Gaines's Mill and came upon Porter's left center. Longstreet, in reserve, moved by the river road, and debouched on the Federal left. D. H. Hill, ordered to coöperate with Jackson in turning the Federal right, had the longest mileage. Hill took the Bethesda Church road before the Federals had finished their evacuation of the Beaver Dam works. On finding his way blocked, he halted his columns, and sent G. B. Anderson's and Garland's North Carolina brigades to march to the left and flank the works. This was accomplished without loss, and his men and artillery, coming up with Jackson near Hundley's Corner, led the Confederate van to Cold Harbor. He reached this point at 2 p.m.

As soon as Hill, who as General Longstreet remarks, "understood the plan of campaign,"¹ came opposite to the Federal right, he ordered Bondurant's battery to feel the Federals, and arranged his brigades for immediate attack.² General Jackson, however, "hoping," as he reports, "that Generals A. P. Hill and Longstreet would soon drive the Federals towards me,"³ drew Hill's men back to await the battle on the right. His own columns, too, under Winder, Ewell, Whiting, and Lawton, were stopped on the roads. Since Longstreet was in reserve, A. P. Hill was thus the only commander left to attack. "As on the previous day," comments Henderson, "the Confederate attack had failed in combination."⁴

there. If Porter's lines had been broken at four o'clock instead of at half-past six, he could not have had the cover of night to withdraw his routed troops, and his whole command would have been captured or destroyed in attempting the passage of the Chickahominy." *Southern Bivouac*.

¹ Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 125.

² Report of Rodes (*Official Records*, 13, 631), and of Garland (*Ibid.*, 640).

³ Jackson's Report, *Ibid.*, 553. Major Dabney, Jackson's chief of staff, writes: "He seemed to think that A. P. Hill was to drive the enemy into his corps. But in a little while the state of the firing convinced him that Porter 'didn't drive worth a cent,' and he bestirred himself to let out his full strength." *Battles and Leaders*, II, 335.

⁴ Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 29.

A failure in communication and execution—a form of failure nearly always evident in the early days of the war—swayed the issues of this battle in both armies. At a later period Lee was almost incomparable in getting men to the spot where they were most needed. Here, when he had been in command only a little over three weeks, his organization, although led, as Nicolay and Hay think, by his ablest generals,¹ did not function smoothly. Jackson, as Henderson points out, was at Old Cold Harbor in time to have attacked conjointly with A. P. Hill.² Yet, from lack of rapid and skilled communication, that aggressive fighter was waiting for Longstreet and A. P. Hill to drive the Federals toward his corps while General Lee was holding Longstreet until Jackson should strike.³ Later in the day, owing to a numerically inadequate staff, Jackson was further delayed by having to entrust an order for a general advance to an inexperienced volunteer aide.⁴ Hence, instead of a united sweep against

¹ "With the exception of the nine brigades left on the south side of the river under Magruder and Huger to hold McClellan, the whole army of General Lee, numbering over 60,000 men, was advancing on Porter's single corps. It was led by the best generals of the South—Longstreet, the two Hills, Whiting, Hood, Ewell, and the redoubtable Jackson." *Abraham Lincoln*, V, 428.

² Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 29.

³ General Lee reports: "The arrival of Jackson on our left was momentarily expected, and it was supposed that his approach would cause the extension of the enemy's line in that direction. Under this impression Longstreet was held back until this movement should commence." *Official Records*, 13, 492. In regard to the effect of a prompt assault on Porter's right wing, General Alexander says: "But had Jackson's march that morning been pushed with the swift fierceness natural to him on such occasions, and had he, during A. P. Hill's attack, thrown his whole force on McClellan's right, a comparatively easy victory would have resulted. As has been stated, the enemy's right flank was his weakest point. It was not found. D. H. Hill would have attacked it even before A. P. Hill's battle had not Jackson stopped and withdrawn him, instead of reinforcing and pushing him, as it was naturally expected that Jackson would do—although no man ever needed pushing less than D. H. Hill." *Military Memoirs*, 132. It, however, must not be forgotten that Jackson and his men were wearied to the point of exhaustion by their long trip from the Valley.

⁴ "It may be noted that Jackson's command had now been increased by two divisions—Whiting's and D. H. Hill's—but there had been no increase in the very small staff which had sufficed for the Valley army." Henderson, II, 34. See also Major Hotchkiss in *Confederate Military History*, III, 289.

Porter in the early afternoon, a movement that would have succeeded more easily than it did at dusk, when Porter had been reinforced by Slocum's 9,000 men, the Confederates did not surge forward with all their divisions in place until nearly dark.

Across the guns similar mishaps were occurring. Porter's first request for help did not reach McClellan.¹ Hence, Slocum's division did not arrive on the field until 4 p.m. If this fine body of men had not been recalled in its morning march to Porter,² or if it had marched at Porter's first call, Porter would no doubt have felt strong enough to carry out his projected assault on D. H. Hill's and Jackson's moving troops, and thus have upset Lee's plans.³

When A. P. Hill, about 2:30 p.m., attempted alone to storm Porter's center, nine North Carolina regiments were under his command. These were in the brigades of Branch and of Pender.⁴ Branch's men were in the front line; Pender's in reserve. So fiercely did the contest at once rage that Pender's regiments were speedily forwarded to Branch's support. General Porter, watching from his station near the Watts house the approach of Hill's five brigades, thus describes their assault which fell mainly on the brigades of Warren and Griffin: "Dashing across the intervening plains, floundering in the swamps, and struggling against the tangled brushwood, brigade after brigade seemed

¹ "Porter's first call for relief, through General Barnard, did not reach me." McClellan's Report, *Official Records*, 12, 56.

² Franklin's Report, *Ibid.*, 13, 429.

³ See Porter in *Battles and Leaders*, II, 336-37.

⁴ These were as follows: in Branch's brigade, the Seventh, commanded in turn by Colonel R. P. Campbell, who was killed, by Lieutenant-Colonel E. G. Haywood, who was wounded, and Major J. L. Hill; the Eighteenth, Colonel R. H. Cowan; the Twenty-eighth, Colonel James H. Lane; the Thirty-third, Lieutenant-Colonel R. F. Hoke; the Thirty-seventh, Colonel C. C. Lee, and then, on his wounding, by Lieutenant-Colonel W. M. Barbour; in Pender's brigade, the Sixteenth, Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. McElroy; the Twenty-second, Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. Gray, the Thirty-fourth, Colonel R. H. Riddick; the Thirty-eighth, Colonel W. J. Hoke. Pender had also with these regiments the Second Arkansas Battalion and the Twenty-second Virginia Battalion.

almost to melt away before the concentrated fire of our artillery and infantry; yet others pressed on, followed by supports as dashing and as brave as their predecessors, despite their heavy losses and the disheartening effect of having to clamber over many of their disabled and dead, and to meet their surviving comrades rushing back in great disorder from the deadly contest. For nearly two hours the battle raged, extending more or less along the whole line to our extreme right. The fierce firing of artillery and infantry, the crash of the shot, the bursting of shells, and the whizzing of bullets, all combined, was something fearful.¹

General A. P. Hill, riding with the men who were thus being mowed down, says: "Desperate but unavailing attempts were made to force the enemy's positions. . . . The Sixteenth North Carolina, Colonel McElroy, and the Twenty-second North Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. Gray, at one time carried the crest of the hill and were in the enemy's camp, but were driven back by overwhelming numbers. . . . Gregg and Branch fought with varying success, Gregg having before him the vaunted Zouaves and Sykes's regulars. Pender's brigade was suffering heavily, but stubbornly held its own."²

When Branch went into action on the main road, the Seventh and the Twenty-eighth regiments formed his front line. The severity of the contest soon forced him to order his three reserve regiments—the Eighteenth, Thirty-third, and Thirty-seventh—to prolong his line. Of the bearing of his men in this single-handed contest, Branch reports: "My brigade held its ground with heroic tenacity, but must have been driven back by overwhelming forces but for the timely arrival of reinforcements. The Seventh having been the first

¹ *Battles and Leaders*, II, 337.

² *Official Records*, 13, 837.

engaged and having remained continuously under heavy fire, suffered most severely in officers and men. Its colonel (Reuben P. Campbell), who might justly be classed among 'the bravest of the brave,' fell while bearing in his hand the colors of his regiment."¹ Pender's brigade, on closing in to Branch's assistance, was exposed to the same storm of missiles under which so many of Branch's men had gone down and of which Cowan says, "nothing but the thickness of the woods saved us from total destruction," but Pender records, "My men here fought nobly and maintained their ground with great stubbornness."

The costly persistence of A. P. Hill's men materially contributed to the final Confederate victory; for, as General Longstreet testified, "it was their long and steady fight that thinned the Federal ranks and caused them to so foul their guns that they were out of order when the final struggle came."² They battered Warren's brigade and three of Griffin's regiments to such an extent that they had to be withdrawn from the front,³ and their places supplied from Newton's arriving brigade.

While A. P. Hill's men were reforming their shattered lines after each repulse, General Lee was exerting himself to press home his battle by a simultaneous blow. Night was about to close on his troops with Porter unmoved. Unless the Federals could be dis-

¹ *Official Records*, 13, 883. Lieutenant-Colonel E. G. Haywood gives a concrete illustration of the intensity of the fire when he says: "The colors, when the advance began, were in the hands of Corporal Henry T. Fight of Company F. He was instantly shot down, when they were seized by Corporal James A. Harris of Company I; he was also shot down, when Colonel Campbell himself seized the colors, and, advancing some 20 paces in front of his regiment, ordered them not to fire but to follow him. Within 20 paces of the enemy's line he was shot down, when Lieutenant Duncan C. Haywood, commanding Company E, again seized our flag, the staff of which had been shot in two, and advanced to the front of the regiment. He also immediately lost his life, whereupon the flag of the regiment was carried out of the action by Corporal Peavey of Company C. The flag bore upon its shield the marks of thirty-two bullets." *Ibid.*, 889.

² Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 129.

³ See reports of Griffin and Warren, *Official Records*, 13, 312, 377.

placed so as to allow a better concentration of his army, the situation might be disastrous. Staff officers and couriers from Lee's battle-station were breaking through thickets and swamps with orders for every commander to get his men into close play before the day closed.

Longstreet, who on Lee's extreme right was executing a diversion in favor of A. P. Hill, promptly changed his feint into a determined charge to push Porter from his entire front. There were no North Carolinians in Longstreet's ranks, but as his men, played on by batteries from both sides of the river, started, Whiting's two brigades under Law and Hood broke from the woods, and aligned themselves on Longstreet's left. The Sixth North Carolina under Lieutenant-Colonel I. E. Avery, was in Law's brigade. The alignment of Hood and Law was immediately behind Hill's still struggling men. Whiting directed his division not to halt on reaching Hill's troops, but to use his line as a "jumping off point" for a swift-footed onward rush with trailed arms. The two brigades swept up the incline in spite of a loss of one thousand men, broke through the Federal defenses, and captured fourteen pieces of artillery and the remnants of two gamely fighting regiments.¹ Captain N. W. Ray, a survivor of the Sixth Regiment, says of its participation in this success: "The advance across the open field on the west side of the creek; crossing the creek and working our way up the hill through the fallen timber; driving the two lines of infantry from behind their breastworks, and capturing the artillery posted on the ridge behind them, was a severe test of those qualities which have made the Confederate soldiers famous."² During the

¹ These regiments were the Eleventh Pennsylvania Reserves of McCall's division, and the Fourth New Jersey of Slocum's division. They surrendered together 1,071 men. *Official Records*, 13, 40.

² Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 304. Major R. W. York says: "We advanced with trailing arms at a double-quick . . . the battery and the lines of in-

battle, Lieutenant-Colonel Avery was wounded and Major R. F. Webb took charge of the regiment for the remaining battles around Richmond.

D. H. Hill's division, acting during this campaign under Jackson, was the next after Longstreet to engage. Hill's troops, it will be recalled, were on the extreme Confederate left, and thus opposed to Sykes's division of regulars, the flower of the Federal army. Two of Hill's brigades—G. B. Anderson's and Garland's—were composed entirely of North Carolinians and a third—Ripley's—contained the First and Third North Carolina regiments. His two remaining brigades were Alabamians and Georgians. Jackson had ordered an advance of all his troops, but as Hill's men had been in battle array since two o'clock, they dashed off at the order. Childe says of the onset of this division: "Hardly was the order received before the latter [D. H. Hill] rushed through everything—the marsh, the river, the brushwood, and the obstacles raised to guard the extreme right of McClellan, thrusting everything he met before him, and at nightfall, by a last charge, he put the enemy to rout."¹

The defeat of Sykes's trained regiments, strengthened at 4:30 by Bartlett's brigade,² was not accomplished without severe loss and persistent courage. Sykes was a gallant leader and his men stood to their arms desperately and were sustained by an excellent distribution of disciplined batteries. They were dislodged just as Porter's line was crumbling along its whole length from the combined Confederate hammering. General Hill says of the last attack of his

fantry opened upon us; men fell thick and fast, but the storming column halted not—the double-quick merged into a run; then the wild yell as we leaped the gully, and the trailed arms opened fire, and we swept upward and onward until the hot and smoking Napoleons were in our possession." Address at Cedar Fork.

¹ *Life and Campaigns of General Lee*, 95.

² Bartlett's Report, *Official Records*, 13, 447.

North Carolina brigades: "Brigadier-Generals Samuel Garland and George B. Anderson asked permission to move forward to attack the right flank and rear of the division of regulars. The only difficulty in the way was a Federal battery with its infantry supports, which could enfilade them in their advance. Two of Elzey's regiments, which had gotten separated in crossing the swamp, were sent by me, by way of my left flank, to the rear of the battery to attack the infantry supports, while Colonel Alfred Iverson, of the Twentieth North Carolina Regiment, charged it in front. The battery was captured and held long enough for the two brigades (Garland's and Anderson's) to advance across the plain. 'The effect of our appearance,' says General Garland, 'at this opportune moment, cheering and charging, decided the fate of the day.'" ¹ General Garland says of the attack on the battery: "As our line moved forward, several regiments on the left, viz.: the Twentieth North Carolina and the Third North Carolina were swung around by Major-General [D. H.] Hill's orders to attack this battery and thus prevent it from playing on the other troops charging over the plain. In this movement the Twentieth North Carolina, Colonel Iverson, participated, sustaining a heavy loss, ² and at a later period I sent Colonel A. M. Scales, Thirteenth North Carolina, to reinforce our troops there. The attack was partially successful, our troops acting handsomely." ³

¹ *Battles and Leaders*, II, 356.

² General Curtis, then a captain in the Federal army, says: "The Twentieth North Carolina accomplished a most difficult task in capturing Edwards's [?] guns, for difficult it was to advance against Sykes's regulars, but not more difficult than that of recapturing the section after it had been ten minutes in the hands of the enemy, during which he had advanced his infantry to their support. Nearly three years later I had occasion to test the stubbornness of North Carolina troops at Fort Fisher, and it is with admiration and respect that I speak of their daring, fortitude, and valor." *Bull Run to Chancellorsville*, 121.

³ *Official Records*, 13, 642. In further reference to the attack on this battery, Garland says: "The twentieth North Carolina, after Colonel [Alfred] Iverson was wounded, was led by Lieutenant-Colonel Franklin J. Faison.

Only one other North Carolina regiment faced the horrors of this gory field. When Ewell's division entered the fighting zone on D. H. Hill's right, General Trimble personally led an advance of the Sixteenth Mississippi and the Twenty-first North Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Fulton, with the First North Carolina Battalion, Major Rufus W. Wharton, attached. In order to save lives in ascending the opposite slope, these men were ordered not to fire, but to take the hill on a run. Trimble, after mentioning how this force, in coöperation with Lawton, swept their victorious way against the Federals opposed to them, pays the regiment this tribute: ". . . the charge of the Sixteenth Mississippi and the Twenty-first North Carolina, sustained from the first without a falter, could not be surpassed for intrepid bravery and high resolve."¹ In addition to these infantry regiments, Captain James Reilly's Rowan battery went into action at a gallop just before the final advance. It engaged until the infantry rushed into its range a three-inch rifled battery, which was supplemented by three repeating cannon that were captured before dark by the infantry. On the next day General Law presented to Captain Reilly as a tribute to the gallantry of his men one of the choicest of the captured rifled pieces. The Federal retreat, while in some places confused, never degenerated into a panic. "Knots of brave men, hastily collected by officers of all ranks, still offered a fierce resistance, and, supported by the batteries, inflicted terrible losses on the crowded masses which swarmed up from the ravine; but the majority of the infantry, without ammunition and with but few officers, streamed

It advanced gallantly and took the battery, which it held for ten minutes. The gallant Faison received a mortal wound in the very act of turning one of the captured pieces on the fleeing foe, and breathed out his noble spirit in the moment of victory." *Official Records*, 13, 644.

¹ *Ibid.*, 616.

in disorder to the rear.”¹ “Then,” writes general Law, “we had our innings. As the blue mass surged up the hill in our front, the Confederate fire was poured into it with terrible effect. The debt of blood, contracted but a few minutes before, was paid, and with interest.”²

The retreat of General Porter under cover of the reserve artillery and some of the reposted batteries already engaged, was facilitated by darkness and by the arrival of Meagher’s and French’s brigades. These fresh troops, greeted by tumultuous shouts, pushed their way sternly through the disorganized masses that were leaving the field.³ Although too tardily sent to join in the fighting, their arrival could not have been more opportune in staving off a panic, for, as General Porter reports, they gave renewed confidence to his men whose regiments formed under their protection, and were all withdrawn that night to the other side of the Chickahominy.⁴

The Confederate troops who had fought their victorious way to the crest were, of course, in much disarray on their arrival. Brigades were so intermingled from their converging advance through miry swamps and briery tangles, as well as from the usual obscurities of a smoke-enveloped field, that hardly a unit could receive orders through the ordinary channels. Nevertheless, the temptation to pursue a beaten foe was inviting. If the officers, who with strained faculties were peering into the lightless forest enshrouding the

¹ Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 36.

² *Battles and Leaders*, II, 363.

³ General French describes the situation on his arrival: “Reaching Gaines’s Mill, the main body of the right army corps was found in full retreat, making it almost impossible for my reinforcements to pass through the mass of congregated troops of the various arms of the service which had fallen back upon a confined space. I therefore ordered the heads of regiments to force their way through any intervals they might find by the force of the bayonet, which was immediately done and my command extricated.” *Official Records*, 13, 76.

⁴ *Ibid.*

retiring Federal army, could have known then the extent of the confusion in that army, perhaps they would have hazarded the delicate uncertainties of a night pursuit. However, it was nearly nine o'clock when the ridge was finally cleared; the troops were thoroughly worn; artillery to shell the woods was not at hand; organizations were so separated that orders could with difficulty be sent; the alignment of friend and foe could not be readily ascertained; the country was unknown; the Federal cheering over the arrival of French and Meagher clearly announced an unknown number of reinforcing troops—these circumstances had all to be weighed against the military axiom to pursue a stricken foe. General D. H. Hill, to whom the commanders on the left were reporting as they reached the crest, deemed it unwise under the circumstances to gamble on the chances of a night pursuit, and Generals Lee and Jackson, who were following the field, acquiesced in the decision.

Until far into the night heavy-footed Confederate soldiers threw the feeble glare of lanterns, candles, and pine torches into the dark recesses of the field as they sought the dead and wounded. "Treat both fields alike," came General Lee's orders, and the searchers brought in disabled Federal soldiers with the same care as they did their own comrades. It would have been well if the costly sacrifice of this battle had convinced commanders that an American army in position can be routed only by enormous losses; if this lesson had been learned there would have been no Malvern Hills and Gettysburgs for the Confederates and no Fredericksburgs and Cold Harbors for the Federals.

As trophies of the field the Confederates gathered in 2,836 prisoners,¹ 22 guns, and about 10,000 eagerly

¹ *Official Records*, 13, 41.

welcomed small-arms, and many a North Carolina soldier exchanged his heavy smooth-bore for a lighter and more effective rifled gun. The Confederate loss, however, exceeded that of the Federal by about 1,500 men. The entire casualties of the Federals were 6,837;¹ the Confederate about 8,358.²

¹ *Official Records*, 13, 41.

² Some of the Confederate reports do not separate the losses in each of the Seven Days battles, but give the aggregate for the week. General Alexander estimates the losses by divisions and brigades as follows:

A. P. Hill's division, 6 brigades.....	2,688
Longstreet's division, 6 brigades (only 5 engaged).....	1,883
D. H. Hill's division, 5 brigades.....	1,423
Whiting's division, 2 brigades.....	1,017
Ewell's division, 3 brigades.....	764
Jackson's division, 3 brigades (only 1 engaged).....	91
Lawton's brigade, 1 brigade.....	492

Total 26 brigades.....	8,358
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CHAPTER XIV

THE SEVEN DAYS: SAVAGE STATION, FRAYSER'S FARM, AND MALVERN HILL

The defeat of General McClellan's right wing at Gaines's Mill was a shock to President Lincoln and his cabinet,¹ who were daily anticipating the capture of the Confederate capital.² It was hard for them to realize that the expensively equipped Grand Army, on which their hopes and expectations of swiftly ending the war were fixed, had turned its back to Richmond. It was perhaps equally hard for President Lincoln to understand the despairing and defiant wail in which General McClellan announced his reversal;³ for at midnight on June 27 McClellan had sent a most remarkably insubordinate telegram. The gist of this message is in these words: "On the left bank our men did all that men could do . . . but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers. . . . The loss on both sides is terrible. . . . I have lost this battle because my force was too small. . . . As it is, the government must not and can not hold me responsible for the result. I feel too earnestly tonight; I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to

¹ "The news," writes Rhodes, "was a terrible blow to the President. The finely equipped army, which had cost so much exertion and money and had gone forward with high hopes of conquest and apparently bore the fate of the Union, had been defeated and was now in danger of destruction or surrender." *History of the United States*, IV, 44.

² "Mr. Seward believes that July 4th will be celebrated by us in Richmond. He and McClellan spread this hope." Gurowski, *Diary*, June 1862, 226. "After many weary months of preparation, McClellan was now engaged in the great campaign that was expected to end with the capture of Richmond. That won, it was assumed that the Confederacy would soon collapse." Bancroft, *Life of Seward*, II, 286.

³ "He could only wonder what terrible catastrophe, already accomplished or to come, could have wrung such an outcry from the general commanding. Even the surrender of the army was not an impossible disaster to expect from a general capable of writing such a dispatch." Nicolay and Hay, V, 443.

feel otherwise than that the government has not sustained this army. . . . If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other person in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.”¹

President Lincoln, ignoring the strictures of this telegram,² replied, “Save your army at all events. Will send reinforcements as fast as we can.”³ The nearest available large force was that of Burnside in North Carolina. Burnside had on June 25 been directed by McClellan to advance instantly from New Bern to Goldsboro in order to give Lee “a kick in the flank” when McClellan had driven him from Richmond. Just as Burnside was taking the road for Goldsboro, he was astonished to receive an order from the President to go with all available force to McClellan’s rescue. He accordingly, as already seen, turned over the command of the Department of North Carolina to General J. G. Foster, and with two divisions left for the Peninsula. At the same time General Dix, commanding at Fort Monroe, and Admiral Goldsborough, commanding the Atlantic Blockading Squadron, were ordered to strain every nerve to assist the retreating Federals. An order for Halleck to send 25,000 men from Corinth, Mississippi, was later countermanded.

President Lincoln, on further weighing McClellan’s despondent telegram, felt assured that the Peninsula campaign was about to end in failure and that a new levy of troops would be necessary. Yet, while he wanted volunteers badly, he was, as he says in a carefully prepared letter to Secretary Seward, fearful that

¹ *Official Records*, 12, 61.

² Nicolay and Hay rather bitterly comment: “The evident panic and mental perturbation which pierced through its incoherence filled the President with such dismay that its mutinous insolence was entirely overlooked.” *Abraham Lincoln*, V, 443.

³ *Official Records*, 14, 269.

"a general panic and stampede would follow" if he "publicly appealed to the country for this new force";¹ for the desperate strait of the Federal army on the Peninsula was being withheld from the people.² How otherwise than by direct call, queries Bancroft, "could a hundred thousand new soldiers be obtained? Seward was a master of political strategy, and Lincoln was no novice. Here is the device: it was principally Seward's."³ Seward, taking with him the President's letter just mentioned and an equally adroit letter to the governors of the Northern states, hurried to New York and other cities for personal and telegraphic conferences with such governors and other men of influence as could meet him. During these conferences Seward so shaped matters that the responsibility for a new levy was seemingly shifted from the President and assumed by the governors of the several states. To give the appearance of reality to the transaction he formulated a petition for the loyal governors to sign. The petition recites: "The undersigned, governors of states of the Union, impressed with the belief that the citizens of the states which they respectively represent are of one accord in the hearty desire that the recent successes of the Federal arms may be followed up . . . respectfully request, if it meets your entire approval that you at once call on the several states for such numbers of men . . . as may in your judgment be necessary to garrison and hold all the

¹ Lincoln to Seward, June 28, 1862. "This letter," explain Nicolay and Hay (VI, 116), was of course not needed for the personal information of Mr. Seward, but was placed in his hands to enable him to reassure those who might doubt the President's courage and determination."

² "As to the state of affairs in Virginia some of Seward's statements were thoroughly misleading and are to be explained only on the ground that he thought the government's interest demanded a concealment and misrepresentation of the facts." Bancroft, *Life of Seward*, II, 287. "Far from letting the people know what was taking place around Richmond, the Secretary of War . . . gave out that the Army of the Potomac had undertaken a strategic movement which would result in the capture of Richmond." Comte de Paris, II, 111.

³ Bancroft, *Life of Seward*, II, 352.

numerous cities and military positions that have been captured by our armies and to speedily crush the rebellion.”¹ To this uniquely contrived petition, the President graciously replied: “Fully concurring in the wisdom of the views expressed to me in so patriotic a manner by you . . . I have decided to call into the service an additional force of three hundred thousand men.”² When the correspondence, “purporting to be the *voluntary* request of eighteen governors to the President,”³ was published on July 2, the people were still ignorant of McClellan’s discomfiture. When they learned that the army had been driven to Harrison’s Landing, the trick had been turned.⁴ “The alarm and anger of the North,” adds Bancroft, “were great, but the prospects of having large reinforcements saved the administration from serious embarrassments.” Under this call 421,465 men were secured.⁵ To stimulate volunteering Secretary Stanton agreed, at Seward’s request, to go beyond his lawful authority and advance \$25 out of the \$100 bounty promised to each recruit.⁶

In the effort to “save his army at all events,” General McClellan announced to his corps commanders on the night of June 27, that he would abandon his White House communications and transfer his army to the James River. In an appeal to Flag Officer Goldsborough for gunboats to protect his flank on the James, he makes it plain that this movement, which

¹ Document 143, *Moore’s Rebellion Record*.

² *Ibid.* Bancroft says that, with the exception of the number of men called for, Seward wrote the reply as well as the petition.

³ Nicolay and Hay, VI, 118.

⁴ See Rhodes, IV, 55; Nicolay and Hay, VI, 118; Bancroft, *Life of Seward*, II, 352-53. Bancroft admiringly says of the transaction: “It is doubtful if any one except Seward could have accomplished this remarkable feat so speedily and so successfully.”

⁵ Phisterer, *Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States*, 4.

⁶ “It is thought here and in Massachusetts that without such payment recruiting will be very difficult, and with it probably entirely successful.” Seward to Stanton, June 30, 1862.

had previously been considered and rejected as too risky, was now a necessity; for he says: "We have had a very severe repulse today, and I am obliged to fall back between the Chickahominy and the James River."¹

General McClellan aptly describes the manœuvre into which he was now forced as hazardous and difficult. In addition to the danger to his troops, who would be constantly pressed by a vigilant army, the removal of supplies for a large army is a stupendous task.² The daily marches were cumbered by an almost endless train of 3,450 ammunition and provision wagons and ambulances.³ The reserve artillery, including siege guns, had to be protected. Fifty-two field batteries were to be guarded and kept in ammunition. Beef cattle, to the number of 2,518, driven from the White House, added to the confusion⁴ by their bellowing complaints. Coincident with the beginning of the retreat, such of the immense stores at the White House

¹ *Official Records*, 14, 267. McClellan telegraphed to Stanton at 1 p.m. on June 27, during the progress of the battle of Gaines's Mill: "If I am forced to concentrate between the Chickahominy and the James, I will at once endeavor to open communication with you." (*Ibid.*, 264) At 3 p.m. he sent this: "We have been fighting all day against greatly superior numbers. We shall endeavor to hold our own, and if compelled to fall back, shall do it in good order, upon James River if possible. Our men fight like veterans, and will do all men can do. If we have to fall back on James River, supplies should be passed up to us under protection of the gunboats as rapidly as possible." (*Ibid.*, 265). General Porter, who fought the battle, says: "After the battle this change [from the Chickahominy to the James] became a necessity, in the presence of a strong and aggressive foe, who had already turned our right, cut our connection with York River, and was also in large force behind the intrenchments between us and Richmond." (*Battles and Leaders*, II, 406.) In view of such statements as these, it is surprising for so careful a writer as Ropes to say: "The movement of the Army of the Potomac from the Chickahominy to the James was not the result of the Confederate attacks on it; the movement was dictated by the absolute necessity of establishing a new base of supplies." *Story of the Civil War*, II, 205.

² "The difficulties of supplying an army of 100,000 men," reports General Van Vliet, quartermaster of the army, "are not generally comprehended. Each man consumes 3 pounds of provisions per day, and every horse 26 pounds of forage. One hundred thousand men would, therefore, eat up 150 wagon loads of subsistence daily." *Official Records*, 12, 159. Six hundred tons had been forwarded each day, rain or shine, from the White House to the front. *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, 165.

⁴ *Ibid.*

as could not be forwarded to the front or loaded on the 400 waiting vessels were burned.¹

After having announced his intended withdrawal to the James, General McClellan manuevred his army energetically. Keyes's corps on the extreme Federal left was swung back across the rebuilt bridge over the creek in White Oak Swamp, and shortly after sunrise on June 28, was drawn up with its back to the Quaker road, south of Charles City Cross roads, to cover the debouches of the lower roads² from Richmond, by which the Confederates were expected to move in an effort to cut the Federals off from Malvern Hill. Porter's corps, nursing the shock to its organization from its steadfast battle, was next across the swamp, and came in on Keyes's right so as to guard the upper roads from Richmond.³ Both of these corps, as soon as they could be relieved, were pushed on to hold Malvern Hill. Behind the ranks of Keyes and Porter the almost interminable train of wagons, guns, and ambulances, sometimes three or four abreast, toiled steadily toward the gunboats on the James. The three remaining corps—those of Franklin, Sumner, and Heintzelman—were held in their intrenchments on the Richmond front, to mask the movements behind them during June 28. On the morning of June 29, they were, however, all withdrawn and concentrated around Savage Station, where "troops in motion seemed to

¹ Chaplain Marks has this to say of the scenes around Savage Station on the night of June 27: "It now began to be apparent to us that a retreat from our position was inevitable. . . . Groups of men were seen collected together, discussing with anxious faces our probable destiny and fate. In spite of all that could be done to avoid inquiry and to throw us on a false scent, our real condition began to make itself sensible to every mind and to blanch a thousand cheeks. Every way we looked there was destruction and death. Cut off from the base of our supplies, in a country surrounded by our foes, embarrassed by thousands of wounded and sick men, with all the avenues of escape closed up, the prospect before us was most gloomy and appalling. During the entire night all was hurry and confusion." Marks, *The Peninsula Campaign*, 227.

² The Darbytown and the New Market roads.

³ The Williamsburg and Charles City roads.

appear on all sides and on all roads.”¹ Heintzelman, however, remained at the station only long enough “to give the necessary orders for the destruction of the railroad cars, ammunition and provisions still remaining on the ground.”² He then saw that the entire open space at Savage Station was crowded with more troops than “could be brought into action judiciously,”³ and, exercising his own discretion, he set off across the swamp. This action, unexpected by his brother officers,⁴ left the first battle in the Confederate pursuit to be fought by Sumner and Smith of Franklin’s corps, for Slocumb, in command of Franklin’s other division, had been ordered to relieve the divisions of Couch and Peck of Keyes’s corps.

While the Federals were thus feverishly completing their dispositions to disappear into the dark morasses of the great swamp,⁵ General Lee was trying to fathom

¹ *History of One Hundred and First Pennsylvania*, 11.

² *Official Records*, 12, 9. General Webb says: “Lines of fire marked the camps and depots of the Union troops. Millions of rations, hundreds of tons of fixed ammunition and shells for the siege guns were thus lost.” *The Peninsula*, 137. Chaplain Marks records his observations at Savage Station: “About noon the work of destruction commenced, and no language can paint the spectacle. Hundreds of barrels of flour and rice, sugar and molasses, salt and coffee, were consigned to the flames. . . . The men, blackened with smoke and cinders, were hurling into the fire boxes of goods, tents, fragments of broken cars, and barrels of whiskey and turpentine. . . . The ammunition was not so easily disposed of, and shells, kegs of powder, were placed in cars. The engine attached was ready at any moment to spring; each of the cars was set on fire, and when the flames began to wind around the wooden structures the train was put in motion. Being a descending grade, it was soon rushing with the wildest fury, and every revolution of the wheels added to the volume of flames. . . . I knew that the long bridge over the river was burned. . . . On it thundered until there was a stupendous crash (as it dashed into the river) . . . This was immediately succeeded by the explosion of innumerable great bombs and kegs of powder.” *The Peninsula Campaign*, 245.

³ *Official Records*, 13, 99.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 50, 430. *Battles and Leaders*, II, 374.

⁵ “Across his line of march ran the White Oak Swamp, bordered by thick woods and a wide morass.” Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 45. A war time correspondent of the Cincinnati *Commercial* leaves this account of the Federal army as it retired from Savage Station: “The advance and all that mighty train had now been swallowed in the maw of the dreary forest. It swept onward, onward, fast and furious like an avalanche. Every hour of silence behind was ominous, but hours were precious with us. Pioneer bands were rushing along in front, clearing and repairing our single road; recon-

their next move. The burned bridges, with powerful batteries trained on their former sites along his own front and the long line of occupied works in front of Magruder and Huger, prevented any reconnoitering forces from gathering information. As Lee saw it, the Federal army was now forced to one of three movements. McClellan might first elect "to give battle to preserve his communications"¹ with his expensively constructed and bountifully stored base on the Pamunkey. To be ready for such a movement he, on the morning of June 28, ordered Ewell's division and the main body of his cavalry under Stuart to press down the Chickahominy, destroy portions of the York River Railroad, which supported the Federal army, and watch for any approach by the Federals toward the lower bridges. The waiting hours were spent in gathering up the wounded and the dead from the battlefield of the day before and in rebuilding New Bridge.

About noon on the same day great clouds of dust arose behind the Federal front. McClellan was astir. "Where is he headed?" was the question. Lee could only await reports. Then couriers began to gallop in from Ewell and Stuart: "Enemy retire rapidly on our advance—evidently observational forces"; "No indications so far of Federal approach to river"; then a significant message: "Enemy has just burned the railroad bridge at Dispatch Station." Evidently the burning of the bridge on the road which fed his army meant that McClellan would not fight for the White House base.

There now remained only two other movements. The roads on which the Federal army stood led directly down the Peninsula by way of Bottom's Bridge and

noissance officers were seeking new routes for a haven of rest and safety. The enemy was in the rear pressing on with fearful power. He could press down flankward to our front, cutting off our retreat. Would such be our fate?"

¹ Lee's Report, *Official Records*, 13, 943.

the Long Bridge to his original base at Fort Monroe. Was it possible that McClellan would swallow his military pride, forego the advantages of a base nearer to Richmond, and confess a failure by ending at his starting point? Lee's insight into McClellan's character, as well as his respect for his ability, led him to reject this conclusion.¹ Therefore he telegraphed to Mr. Davis, on the morning of June 29, that it seemed to him that McClellan's only course was "to make for James River and thus open communications with his gunboats and fleet," and that "though not yet certain of his route, the whole army has been put in motion on this supposition."²

Lee's dispositions on putting his army in motion, while they included battle everywhere on contact,³ especially contemplated a most obstinate, perhaps decisive, contest near Charles City cross roads or Glendale, where all his converging columns were expected to unite.⁴ The four commanders on the north side of the river were ordered forward by two roads. Jackson, with D. H. Hill under his command, was directed to cross the Chickahominy at Grapevine Bridge and follow at the heels of the Federals toward Savage Station and the James. Magruder, in position on the Williamsburg road across the river in front of Franklin, Sumner, and Heintzelman, whose line of retreat would take them to Savage Station just north of the swamp, was ordered to follow the Federals with vigor on this old plank road. Longstreet, with A. P. Hill attached, received orders to cross the rebuilt New bridge, reach the Darbytown or Central road, and arrive at the converging point by that road. Huger,

¹ "Lee had but little idea that McClellan would return to Yorktown, judging rightly that the military pride of his distinguished opponen would not permit him to march back a defeated column to the point from which he had started." *Battles and Leaders*, II, 385.

² *Lee's Confidential Dispatches*, 20.

³ *Official Records*, 13, 685.

⁴ Longstreet in *Battles and Leaders*, II, 399.

whose troops were instructed to gain their position by the Charles City road, was expected to join Longstreet and A. P. Hill in a flank attack as the Federal columns emerged from the swamp on their way to Malvern Hill. Holmes, who was guarding Drewry's Bluff, was to advance on the New Market road, coöperate with Longstreet, and, if possible, keep the Federals from securing Malvern Hill. Stuart had followed the Federals to the White House, and did not rejoin the infantry during the pursuit. Lee was, therefore, during these days of constant collisions, without any cavalry except one regiment on the Charles City road, and two—the Fifth Virginia and seven companies of the First North Carolina Cavalry—under Colonel L. S. Baker, in advance of Holmes. The three other companies of the First North Carolina under Lieutenant-Colonel James B. Gordon were with Stuart.¹ The activity and keen observation of Stuart would have been invaluable to the commander-in-chief during the pursuit.

As all the Confederate troops were in hand, their commanders were off on the hour set. The movements on which the Confederates thus started on June 29, were admirable in their conception. Lee's aim was the utter rout of the Army of the Potomac. His combination, if each column met expectations, bade fair to achieve this result, but battles are rarely fought as designed, and, after all, are more or less mad scrambles. His plan, like all converging battle-

¹ During Stuart's absence Colonel Baker, with five of his own companies and part of the Third Virginia Cavalry was ordered to make "a daring scout and find where the enemy was." Near Willis's Church, Baker's troopers dashed clear into Couch's camp on the New Market road. Two batteries—Battery C, and a section of Battery D, First Pennsylvania Artillery supported by the Second Rhode Island and the Seventh Massachusetts Infantry, were guarding the road. Their position, says Couch, was masked by the woods. Baker's men, meeting first case and canister from the batteries, then a rifle fire, were speedily hurled back. Major Thomas N. Crumpler was killed, eleven wounded, and Captain Thomas Ruffin and 46 men captured. Reports of Couch, Peck, Baker, Munk, Dougherty.

plans, was liable to fatal disarrangement from the distance apart of the columns, from the nature of the ground, from the hesitancy or slowness in an emergency of the commander of a column, and from the necessary separation of the commander-in-chief from the marching units.¹ Lee's error, if there were one, seems to have been in riding with Longstreet on the flank instead of with Magruder in the center. Could he by his personal presence have pulled his center and left along more rapidly on the 29th and 30th, McClellan would have fared far worse.

Magruder, advancing on the Williamsburg road shortly after the fortifications before him were evacuated at daylight on June 29, was the first to encounter the Federals. As he neared Savage Station, after a brush with French at Allen's farm, he found, as already noted, Sumner's corps and Smith's division of Franklin's corps, waiting to stand off Confederate pursuit until McClellan's trains could clear the swamp. Magruder was marching circumspectly, and anxiously waiting for Jackson to fall on the Federal right. Jackson's march, however, had been delayed, as Lee reports, "by the necessity of reconstructing Grape Vine Bridge."² At Magruder's earnest request, Huger, who was marching on the Charles City road, now stopped Ransom's North Carolina and Wright's Georgia brigade and accompanied them back to Seven Pines. There he seems to have concluded that Magruder had troops enough of his own for the occasion, and at two o'clock resumed his own march.³

¹ "The situation demanded rapid marching, close concert, and delicate maneuvers. The Confederate army was in rear of the Federals, and separated from them by the Chickahominy, and to reach the James, McClellan had only 14 miles to cover. . . . If he could transfer his whole army south of this stream without molestation, he would find himself within six miles of his gunboats; and as his left flank was already resting on the swamp, it was not easy for Lee's army to prevent his passage." *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 45.

² *Official Records*, 13, 494.

³ In his report, Huger says: "As the enemy had abandoned their works and retired, I could not conceive their attack was a serious one, but the demon-

This countermarching not only failed to help Magruder, but so used up Huger's day that he got no further than Brightwell's by night. The delay enabled Kearny's division to pass his line of march without molestation¹ and allowed the Federals time to obstruct his road to the next day's battle ground.

Magruder, thus left to fight alone, threw only two of his six brigades against Sumner and Smith.² These brigades gave battle with enthusiasm aroused by finding their opponents turned away from Richmond, but, of course, the fewness of their numbers accomplished nothing in retarding the Federal retreat.³ After the combat closed in darkness the Federals set off for an all-night march for the south side of the swamp, and crossed in the early morning. This rear guard action enabled McClellan to withdraw the last of his trains from Savage Station, and to mass his six corps between the swamp and the James River. He was forced, however, to leave 2,500 sick and wounded men at Savage Station. There were no North Carolina troops except Manly's battery in the brigades used by Magruder, nor were its guns called into action.

stration was only to delay us, and as General McLaws occupied the ground, I might leave, and sent a message to General Magruder that under my orders I had decided it was not necessary for me to stay." *Official Records*, 13, 789.

¹ "I had reconnoitered it [the road to Jourdan's Ford] in the morning, and found that the enemy was in force on the Central road but not on the Charles City road, and did not then seem to be on the lookout. . . . General Berry's brigade, however, finding Fisher's Ford, unobstructed, passed by that route." Kearny's Report, *Ibid.*, 162.

² These were Kershaw's and Semme's brigades, reinforced by two of Griffith's Mississippi regiments.

³ During the battle the Confederates brought in action an armored railway car, designed at the request of General Lee and jokingly called the "Land Merrimac." The car had a sloping roof of iron and armored sides, with a port-hole for one 32-pounder gun. This novelty in warfare was commanded by Lieutenant James E. Barry. General Sumner paid this tribute to the steadiness of the small band of Confederates opposing him: "The attack was very well sustained. It was renewed repeatedly, and I was obliged several times to reinforce from my reserves." Committee on Conduct of the War, II, (1), 364.

General Lee was keenly disappointed in the result of the day's operations.¹ His deep concern lest his opportunity should be spoiled by loss of time finds expression in a note to Magruder at the close of the day: "I regret much that you have made so little progress today in the pursuit of the enemy. In order to reap the fruits of our victory, the pursuit should be most vigorous. I must urge you again, then, to press on his rear rapidly and steadily. We must lose no more time or he will escape us entirely."²

In spite of a limp and halting day on June 29, General Lee, on the morning of June 30, had pleasant "anticipations of the result of a combination supposed to be complete and prepared for concentrating battle."³ He knew, to be sure, that McClellan, with his army now over the morass, would finish the eight hazardous miles before him by nightfall and find shelter under his gunboats, unless he struck with power during the day. He, however, felt assured that the nearness of his own converging columns would enable him to deliver a disastrous stroke before those miles were accomplished, for McClellan's army was stretched from the White Oak Bridge to Haxall's Landing. Jackson, now across the Chickahominy, had left his bivouacs about 2:30 a.m., and was expected to fall with Valley-like power on McClellan's rear. Huger was counted on to envelop the Federal's right, while Longstreet and A. P. Hill, both ready, were to rush at his center. Magruder, who had been moved over to the Darbytown road, was supposed to be in position to brace Longstreet's contention. Holmes, with 6,000 men and six batteries, was at New Market before 10 a.m. to make headway on the extreme right against the

¹ "This day's operations were a great success for McClellan. . . . He had succeeded in placing White Oak Swamp between his army and the main body of his adversaries." Comte de Paris, II, 120.

² *Official Records*, 13, 687.

³ Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 134.

Federal surge for Malvern Hill. Small wonder, then, that the Confederate commander had "pleasurable anticipation" on this critical morning, when McClellan would either be crippled or escape.

To meet this formidable combination McClellan took three steps, and then about noon left the field for his corps commanders to direct as they saw fit.¹ His first step was to send Keyes and Porter with the heavy guns to secure and hold Malvern Hill, and open communications with the gunboats. His second step was to post Franklin with the divisions of Smith and Richardson and the brigade of Naglee at the sites of the bridges in White Oak Swamp, for the Federals had destroyed these structures as soon as they had crossed. Franklin was a little later reinforced for a time by the brigades of Dana and Sully. Franklin was charged with the duty of warding off Jackson. The third step was to hurry all other disposable troops to the intersection of the Charles City and the Long Bridge (New Market) roads with the Quaker road. This was the point of Lee's convergence. The debouches of these roads must be held or the trains would be lost and the Federal army cut into two sections.

McCall's division, on reaching this intersection about 7:00 a.m. on June 30, was ordered "to halt until the whole of our immense train, which had safely crossed White Oak Creek, had passed on toward James River, and to repel any attack that the enemy might make on it."² This division was set in order of battle with its back to the Quaker road and its front astride the Long Bridge (New Market) road. Hooker's division was on its left; Kearny's on its right; Sedgwick's in its rear. These twelve brigades, reinforced as the attack on Kearny grew hot by the brigades of Taylor and Caldwell, met the twelve brigades of

¹ Franklin in *Battles and Leaders*, II, 377.

² *Official Records*, 14, 388.

Longstreet and A. P. Hill. Slocum's division, on the right of Kearny, faced Huger's advance on the Charles City road. Five batteries took their places in front of McCall's infantry. Kearny used two, Sedgwick two, Slocum three, and Hooker one section of a reserve battery. As was usual in these Peninsula struggles, the Federals relied greatly on their capital guns for terrible execution against the impulsive Confederate charges, and their reports abound in illustrations of the havoc wrought by their batteries.¹ Thus aligned the Federals awaited the Confederate assault on June 30. The battle fought in the afternoon—a battle which General Kearny characterizes as “one of the most desperate of the war, the one the most fatal if lost,”² is known as that of Nelson's Farm, Frayser's Farm, or Glendale.

In describing the occurrences on the Confederate side of this most critical day³ it will be convenient first to find out wherein General Lee's carefully-weighted plan failed of realization, and, second, to follow the North Carolina troops through their part in what was accomplished. The story will be simplified somewhat by starting with Lee's left on the Chickahominy and tracing the events around to his right on the James.

¹ For instance, General McCall reports: “Soon after this a most determined charge was made on Randol's battery by a full brigade advancing in wedge shape, without order, but in perfect recklessness. Similar charges had, as I have stated, been previously made on Cooper's and Kern's batteries by single regiments without success, they having recoiled before the storm of canister hurled against them. A like result was anticipated by Randol's battery, and the Fourth Regiment (the battery support) was requested not to fire until the battery had done with them. Its gallant commander did not doubt his ability to repel the attack, and his guns did indeed mow down the advancing host; (a) but still the gaps closed and the enemy came in upon a run to the very muzzle of his guns.” *Official Records*, 13, 391.

^a The “advancing host” was only the Eleventh Alabama.

² *Ibid.*, 164.

³ “The battle of Glendale or Frayser's Farm was the crisis of the ‘Seven Days.’ Had Lee been able to concentrate his whole strength against the Federals, it is probable that McClellan would never have reached the James. But Longstreet and (A. P.) Hill fought unsupported. As the former very justly complained, 50,000 men were within the hearing of the guns, but none came to coöperate.” Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 48.

First. Jackson, who had been relied on to fall on the Federal rear, was again stopped by destroyed bridges. His troops, D. H. Hill's division leading, left their bivouacs at 2:30 a.m. on June 30. Before the command covered the seven miles leading through "a blind alley" to White Oak Bridge, Hill's men had captured a thousand stragglers, and picked up so many "flung away rifles," as the soldiers called them, that Hill had to detach the Fourth and Fifth North Carolina regiments under Colonel Bryan Grimes to take prisoners and arms to Richmond.¹ Jackson reached White Oak Bridge at noon—just two hours after Duane's engineer battalion² had by order of General French destroyed the main bridge.³ During the morning Heintzelman had also dismantled the one at Brackett's, about two miles above.⁴ The Confederate commander found General Franklin with nine brigades⁵ aligned on the opposite bank to bar his connection with Huger and Longstreet. The crossings, Jackson reports, were dominated by Franklin's artillery, and repair of the bridges prevented by sharpshooters concealed in a dense woods.⁶

Massing⁷ twenty-six of D. H. Hill's guns and five of Whiting's, Colonel Crutchfield, Chief of Artillery, tried to open a way for Jackson's infantry.⁸ The

¹ General G. B. Anderson, declaring that although small in numbers Colonel Grimes's regiment was the keystone of his brigade, remonstrated against its detachment. Cowper, *Extracts from Letters*, 18.

² Curtis, *Bull Run to Chancellorsville*, 135.

³ General French, who commanded the Federal rear guard, reports: "This duty was successfully performed, and by 10 o'clock a.m. on the next day (Monday) all our train was across and the bridge cut up." *Official Records*, 13, 77. General Sedgwick confirms this hour, as he says "the bridge was broken up and burned by about 10 o'clock a.m." *Ibid.*, 55.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 99.

⁵ Six of Richardson's and Smith's division, Naglee's and Dana's and Sully's sent by Sumner at 12 o'clock. *Ibid.*, 51.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 556.

⁷ A growing use of massed artillery fire to precede infantry attacks is observable from this date. The fact that such a massing broke down at Malvern Hill accounts in a measure for the enormous losses there.

⁸ *Official Records*, 13, 557.

concentrated fire broke up Mott's battery, caused the temporary retirement of those of Hazard and Ayres, and forced a rapid reformation of Franklin's lines, but made no such impression as to lead Jackson to order the storming of the position.¹ During the readjustment of the Federal lines, Jackson and Hill, accompanied by Munford's cavalry regiment, crossed the stream for observation. They met a sudden and severe fire from sharpshooters and a newly posted battery. The two generals recrossed at the same spot; the cavalry however, sought and found a ford lower down. Jackson, in his official report, sums up his difficulties: "A heavy cannonading in front announced the engagement of General Longstreet at Frayser's farm, and made me eager to press forward; but the marshy character of the soil, the destruction of the bridge over the marsh and creek, and the strong position of the enemy for defending the passage prevented my advancing until the following morning. During the night the Federals retired." Thus about 23,000 Confederates on this road were unengaged.

Second. Huger, moving on the Charles City road, with his own three brigades and Robert Ransom's North Carolina brigade of five regiments, allowed some felled trees to so delay his march that he did not get his infantry into action at all, but contented himself with a cannonade so mild that General Heintzelman, who had ridden out on the Charles City road to reconnoitre, soon concluded that "we had nothing to fear from that direction,"² and sent part of Slocumb's division, which was waiting for Huger, to the hard-pressed Kearny. Thus on this second road Huger, with 9,000 perfectly

¹ During this bombardment, Captain James Reilly's North Carolina battery, attached to Whiting's division, fired 450 rounds of ammunition. Pettit's Federal battery across the stream reports the firing of 1,600 rounds. *Official Records*, 13, 57.

² *Ibid.*, 100.

fresh men, failed to throw their weight against McClellan's right flank.¹

Third. Passing for a moment Magruder's columns on the Darbytown road, the movements of Holmes's command on the James River will next be considered. Holmes at the head of Daniel's North Carolina brigade, Walker's brigade, in which were the Twenty-seventh, Forty-sixth, and Forty-eighth North Carolina regiments, Wise's brigade of two Virginia regiments, and six batteries of artillery, bivouacked on the night of June 29, at Cornelius Creek on the New Market road. A night march would have enabled him to seize Malvern Hill at an early hour on June 30. He reached New Market at 10 a.m. the next day. There he remained until 4 p.m. During the night of June 29, Porter's corps, with McClellan's reserve artillery, was making an all-night march for this same Malvern Hill. By 10 a.m. on June 30, Porter, who appreciated the value of this stronghold and his luck at finding it unoccupied, had crowned its slopes with light and heavy batteries and had Warren's brigade in place to defend approach from the river road. His other troops followed in rapid succession.

At four in the afternoon Holmes, at the suggestion of Engineer Officer R. K. Meade,² ordered his chief of

¹ Huger reports as follows: "Mahone (at daylight) advanced cautiously, captured many prisoners, and killed some cavalry scouts. . . . After passing Fisher's house (map) we found the road obstructed by trees felled all across it. General Mahone found it best to cut a road around the obstructions. For such work we were deficient in tools. The column was delayed while the work was going on, and it was evening before we got through and drove off the workmen who were still cutting down other trees. As we advanced through the woods and came to an open field on high ground (P. Williams's on map) a powerful battery of rifled guns opened on us. General Mahone disposed his troops and advanced a battery of artillery (Moorman's) and a sharp artillery fire was kept up for some time. The enemy's fire was very severe, and we had many killed and wounded. . . . I went to the front and examined the position. I withheld most of our guns and only kept up a moderate fire." *Official Records*, 13, 789. Alexander comments on this report: "It seems incredible that this division, within four miles of Lee, could have been allowed to spend the whole day in a contest of axemen." *Military Memoirs*, 143.

² Holmes's Report, *Official Records*, 13, 907.

artillery, Colonel Deshler, to select two rifled guns from each of three batteries, move them down the river road, plant them in the woods at the foot of Malvern Hill, and try to disturb the march of the Federals, whom Meade thought to be in confusion. Two of the rifled guns selected were from Brem's North Carolina battery. As this section under Lieutenant Thaddeus Coleman went into battery, it did not know what an unwelcome surprise it was to receive. The dust clouds arising from Holmes's march on the river road, as he moved his entire division to support his rifled guns, told the commanders of the Federal gunboats on the James that the Confederates were intruding on territory needed by McClellan. They, therefore, began to throw their big, noisy shells into the Confederate ranks. Daniel's brigade, with Wise on his right, was drawn up behind the rifled guns, and Deshler was ordered to bring his guns into play. Their opening roar, revealing their position, was the signal for a greater roar as most of the thirty-one¹ Federal guns posted on the western slope of the eminence added a fire almost at right angles to that from the boats. This blast of projectiles, especially of heavy naval shells that the veterans of the Peninsula called "lamp posts," demoralized the cavalry in front. Then two batteries not in action stampeded. Cavalry and artillery crowded wildly back over the infantry, and injured not a few of them.² Some of the footmen were caught by the panic, but Daniel managed presently to restore steadiness in his brigade. General Holmes, however, as at Malvern Hill on the next day, "deemed it out of the question to attack the strong position of Malvern Hill" with his force,³ and withdrew his men. Deshler's guns maintained their fire for about an hour

¹ Porter in *Battles and Leaders*, II, 409.

² Daniel in *Official Records*, 13, 913.

³ Holmes's Report, *Ibid.*, 908.

before dropping back very considerably damaged. Of these sections Deshler reports: "Captain Branch, First Lieutenant Cooper of French's battery, and First Lieutenant Coleman of Brem's (North Carolina) battery served their pieces themselves, and did everything men could do to encourage their men and make their fire effective."¹ This was the only contribution of these 6,000 men to the day's struggle.²

Fourth. There remains now only Magruder's column to be followed. When Holmes was driven back on the river road, as just seen, General Lee apprehended from Holmes's report that the Federals might push forward in Holmes's wake, and endanger his right.³ He, therefore, ordered Magruder, who was in place to join in Longstreet's attack, to cross to Holmes's relief. The distance was greater than supposed, and Magruder was not only too late to do anything for Holmes, but his march away from the battlefield prevented his return in time to join in the strife. His 12,000 men were marching instead of fighting during the entire half day.

These miscarriages by which about 50,000 Confederates, within a radius of three miles of the field, were deterred from contributing their part, left Longstreet and A. P. Hill to fight the crucial battle of the campaign with 20,000 men, whereas General Lee had hoped to wage it without an absent regiment or a

¹ *Official Records*, 13, 911.

² Lieutenant J. C. Ellington of the Fiftieth North Carolina Regiment, who shared in the day's action, thus records his convictions: "Without presuming to criticise the conduct of this battle . . . I will simply recall the fact that as early as the night of June 29, and all day of the 30th, General Holmes was within a short distance of the naturally strong position of Malvern Hill with more than 6,000 troops, and could easily have occupied this position. During the day of June 30, General Porter of the Federal army took advantage of this opportunity to occupy and fortify these heights, and thereby cover the retreat and make possible the escape of McClellan's army, while the 6,000 troops under General Holmes for two days and nights served no other purpose than to furnish targets for the Federal gunboats and batteries." Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 3, 166.

³ Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 139.

silent musket. Although his disappointment must have been heart-sickening, yet in his report of the battle there is not a vestige of disapproval.¹ He thus explains why Longstreet and Hill fought without their brother officers: "Magruder, who had reached the Darbytown road, was ordered to reinforce Holmes, but being at a greater distance than had been supposed, he did not reach the position of the latter in time for an attack. Huger reported that his progress was obstructed, but about 4 p.m. firing was heard in the direction of the Charles City road, which was supposed to indicate his approach. Longstreet immediately opened with one of his batteries to give notice of his presence. This brought on the engagement, but Huger not coming up, and Jackson having been unable to force the passage of White Oak Swamp,²

¹ "At Willis's Church I met General Lee. He bore grandly his terrible disappointment of the day before, and made no allusion to it." General D. H. Hill in *Battles and Leaders*, II, 391.

² There were thirteen North Carolina regiments under Jackson's command on this day. The descendants of these soldiers have been disturbed by suggestions that Jackson did not do all that he might have done to get his men into this battle. Friends and foes alike have differed on this point, as the following citations will show, but whatever may be said, those North Carolina soldiers never abated one iota of their implicit confidence in their indomitable leader. Colonel Henderson of the English army, the most thorough and discriminating of Jackson's biographers, shifts the responsibility of Jackson's standing at bay before destroyed bridges on Lee, who, he thinks, ought to have directed Jackson to seek a new route. He concludes: "The only fair criticism on Jackson's conduct is that he should have informed Lee of his inability to force the passage of the swamp and have held three divisions in readiness to march to Glendale." (a) Wise, in commenting on Alexander's criticisms, thinks: "The feat which seems so simple to the critic certainly must have been attended with some elements of difficulty not mentioned. . . . In the topographical features of the position Jackson undoubtedly recognized many elements of danger for his command, and sought in vain to overcome them." (b) Doctor McGuire, Jackson's chief surgeon, says: "Jackson, himself, accompanied by three or four members of his staff, of whom I was one, followed the cavalry across the swamp. The ford was miry and deep and impracticable for either artillery or infantry." (c) Per contra, Colonel Allan, in his carefully studied book, remarks: Jackson, ignorant of the country, had in the swamp and Franklin's veterans substantial causes of delay, but they were not such obstacles as usually held Jackson in check. Vigorous demonstrations at the fords above and below, as well as at White Oak Swamp bridge would probably have secured a crossing at one point or another, and the tremendous prize at stake was such as to justify any efforts. Jackson's comparative inaction was a matter of surprise at the time and has never been satisfactorily explained. (d) General Franklin, who opposed Jackson on that

Longstreet and Hill were without the expected support.”¹

At noon Longstreet, with A. P. Hill in reserve, “advanced under desultory fire of skirmishers to close position for battle, awaiting nearer approach of Jackson and signal of approach of our troops on the Charles City road.”² He waited solicitously; for the all-important hours were wearing away with nothing as yet done. Finally, at three o’clock “reports of cannon fire came from the direction of the Charles City road, signaling, as we supposed, the approach of Huger’s column.”³ At this sound Longstreet’s guns, under the eyes of the Confederate President and of his commander-in-chief, broke into supposed return greetings to Huger, and accompanying the infantry lurched toward the Federal lines to bandy chances with Death.

There were no North Carolina troops in Longstreet’s attacking brigades, but in A. P. Hill’s command there were nine regiments whose ranks, depleted by the toll at Mechanicsville and Gaines’s Mill, had in

day, after pointing out how Jackson could have advanced, says: “In fact it is likely that we should have been defeated on that day had General Jackson done what his great reputation seems to make it imperative that he should have done.”(e) Ropes declares: “But Jackson exhibited on this day none of his customary energy and enterprise.”(f) Doctor Dabney, chief of Jackson’s staff, explains: “This temporary eclipse of Jackson’s genius was probably to be explained by physical causes.”(g)

a *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 58.

b *Long Arm of Lee*, I, 218, 220.

c See Garnett in *Southern Historical Society Papers*.

d *Army of Northern Virginia*, 121.

e *Battles and Leaders*, II, 381.

f *Story of the Civil War*, 195.

g *Life of Jackson*.

¹ Lee in *Official Records*, 13, 495. This direct statement of General Lee negates the belief of Doctor McGuire: “If General Lee had wanted Jackson, he would have sent for him, but General Lee did not want him. He expected to defeat McCall, and isolate Franklin and Sumner, and then capture them with Jackson’s coöperation from the position he occupied.” Address on Jackson at Virginia Military Institute.

² Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 134.

³ *Ibid.*

some measure been filled by conscripts to whose bearing on this field Longstreet pays deserved tribute.¹

In spite of harassing ground and artillery volleys of savage accuracy and persistence, Longstreet's men hurled themselves against McCall in a straight stand-up fight; for there were no field works on either side except a barricaded log house and barn (Whitlock's) held by the Twelfth Pennsylvania Regiment and a slight breastwork on Robinson's fort.² Kemper's brigade was the first to reach the open field across which the battle undulated. Breasting a converging fire, these Virginians drove off the cannoneers from Knieriem's German battery, broke through the Twelfth Pennsylvania, and headed for the Quaker road.³ They, however, were not to have their own way long. As Seymour's "left gave way and broke toward us in confusion,"⁴ McCall pushed in two regiments under Simmons. These, with the rest of Seymour's line, fell heavily on the shouting Confederates. As Kemper felt this new pressure, he looked about for his own supports. On finding none, he fell back to the woods with five Federal regiments at his heels and flanks. Branch's North Carolina brigade "with springing steps"⁵ now came up behind Kemper, and "General Branch," Kemper reports, "was shown by me into the position which my gallant men had vainly sought to hold against overwhelming odds, and immediately afterwards the Third Brigade of this division, Colonel Hunton commanding, took position on Branch's right."⁶ The two brigades went manfully at Kemper's pursuers. In his history of the Eighteenth North

¹ *Official Records*, 13, 759.

² "During the few hours . . . before the commencement of the engagement the command constructed a breastwork—precious hours well employed, saving many valuable lives." Brown's Report, *Ibid.*, 176.

³ General Seymour's Report, *Ibid.*, 403.

⁴ General Burns's Report, *Ibid.*, 92.

⁵ General A. P. Hill's Report, *Ibid.*, 838.

⁶ General Kemper's Report, *Ibid.*, 765.

Carolina Regiment, Adjutant W. H. McLaurin of that regiment describes the advance of Branch's men: "They gave us a warm reception with grape, canister, and minie, and were greatly aided by those on their left, who gave us a galling flank fire—so trying at all times—before becoming engaged with those on our right, who did not advance as quickly as we did. With a yell and a rush everything was carried before us, but at a fearful cost in killed and wounded."¹ Lieutenant-Colonel Robert F. Hoke, of the Thirty-third North Carolina Regiment, writes to his commander: "We at the same time were enfiladed by grape-shot; neither fire upon the front or flank at all stopped the men, but they pressed on and soon silenced the fire upon them."² The Federal commanders, without a head but acting in harmony, were, however, also backing up their firing line. Sumner crowded in Burns's brigade and called back on the run the brigades of Dana and Sully that were with Franklin.³ When Hooker, in position on the left of McCall, saw the disorder, he turned the regiments on the right of Grover's brigade against the battling Confederates. This new combination fought Branch and Pickett to a standstill.⁴

While this bitter struggle was under way on the Confederate right, the center and left were wrestling

¹ Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 27.

² *Official Records*, 13, 895. Major Roy Stone (afterwards General Stone) of the Thirteenth Pennsylvania (Bucktails) says of the effect of this advance: "I soon saw our troops giving way, and, halting, faced my men by the rear rank to the then front. We lay down upon the ground while all our own troops ran over us. I begged their officers in passing to reform behind us, and when our front was unmasked, rose and gave the enemy a volley and continued firing for some minutes; but finding that we were the center of a murderous fire . . . that my men were falling fast, and that I should soon have none left, I gave the order to retire just in time to escape being surrounded." *Ibid.*, 417.

³ "Messengers came to me almost every moment from General Sumner to hurry up my command by regiments in double-quick time." Dana's Report, *Ibid.*, 94.

⁴ "Branch, on the left, pushed ahead until he came out into the open field, where coming under the heavy fire from the batteries on McCall's center, he fell back to the edge of the woods and continued the fighting until the close of the engagement." Meade, *Life of Meade*, II, 289.

with equally alternating fortunes; for both armies, fully aware of the stakes at issue, were with few exceptions storming at each other with the grimest courage. After Jenkins had been repulsed in a fierce charge on Cowper's and Amsden's batteries, Wilcox, with two Alabama regiments on each side of the Long Bridge road, made a wedge-shaped drive at Randol's and Cooper's five batteries. With what McCall styles "perfect recklessness"¹ those on the left of the road ran over Randol's guns² after driving off the supporting regiments—the Fourth and Seventh Pennsylvania regiments. The two regiments on the right captured Cooper's battery with less loss. Wilcox, like Kemper, however, was battling single-handed, and the Federals soon after encompassed him and retook the guns.

Longstreet, who had pitched his battle with the expectation of concert from Huger and Jackson, now determined to put in his reserve division. He says: "Ten thousand men of A. P. Hill's division had been held in reserve in the hope that Jackson and Huger would come up on our left enabling us to dislodge the Federals, after which Hill's troops could be put in fresh to give pursuit and follow them down to Harrison's Landing. . . . As neither Jackson nor Huger came up and as night drew on, I put in Hill to relieve my troops."³

¹ The Eleventh Alabama made the capture.

² McCall's Report, *Official Records*, 13, 391. Although we read much of "bayonet crossing" in this campaign, this is one of the few actual instances. General McCall says: "I had ridden into the regiment and endeavored to check them, but with only partial success. . . . Bayonet wounds, mortal or slight, were given and received. I saw skulls crushed by the butts of muskets, and every effort made by either party in this life or death struggle, proving indeed that here Greek had met Greek." *Ibid.*, 391. General Wilcox, the opposing Confederate commander, reports: ". . . men and officers alike engaging in the most desperate personal conflicts with the enemy. The sword and bayonet are freely used." *Ibid.*, 777. He cites that Captain Parker received three bayonet wounds and that Lieutenant Michie survived three bayonet wounds in the face and two in the breast.

³ *Battles and Leaders*, II, 401.

The field at the hour of A. P. Hill's arrival was still neither won nor lost to either contestant. McCall's flanks had been battered back, with the loss of batteries, for some distance. His center, however, behind Cooper's now silent guns at which both armies were glaring in covetous longing, had almost held its ground. Kearny on the right, reinforced as the battle proceeded by Taylor's and by Caldwell's brigades, had baffled Pryor and Featherston. Hooker, having had little fighting, was still practically in his original position on the left, but Carr had been moved up for instant support. Burns's brigade, after honest fighting in the interval between Hooker and Seymour's first position, had been relieved by Sully, and Dana on his arrival was aligned on Sully's right.¹

The advent of A. P. Hill's division brought Field's Virginians and Pender's North Carolinians into action behind Wilcox. They came too late to save Wilcox from retiring, but in time for Field, who was in advance, to regrasp the guns just torn from Wilcox's impetuous Alabamians. In the dash for these disturbing batteries, Field's brigade, with Pender's following on its right rear, was divided, just as Wilcox's had been, by the road. The Fifty-fifth and the Sixtieth Virginia regiments on the right, after seizing Cooper's guns, pushed on through the woods in the growing darkness well-nigh to the Quaker road. Then suddenly realizing how far afield they were, they returned undisturbed to Cooper's guns. On the right of the guns they were relieved to find Pender's brigade. Pender reached the firing just in time to drive off Dana's Seventh Michigan and Twentieth Massachusetts, both questing to retrieve Cooper's lost guns, to establish the line between Field and Archer, and to relieve some of Branch's regiments.² The two left regiments of Field

¹ See Meade, *Meade*, I, 295.

² *Ibid.*

—the Forty-seventh Virginia and the First Virginia Battalion—after at times a hand-to-hand engagement, regained Randol's guns and "swept back the force of Meade that had retaken the battery from Wilcox."

Twilight was now blotting out distinctions between friends and enemies, and the firing, for fear of mistakes, became very cautious. After Thompson's battery on the left of Field and Pender was withdrawn with the loss of one of its guns, the interchange of shots became less frequent. Between nine and ten o'clock the wearied contestants separated to rest. Toward the close of the strife, General McCall, accompanied by a few companions, rode into the Forty-seventh Virginia Regiment, and was captured. Although his division had been worsted, it was "only his stubborn resistance," as General Meade thinks, "that enabled the concentration during the night of the whole army on the James River that saved it."¹ His opponent for the day, General Longstreet, declares: "He was more tenacious of his battle than any one who came within my experience during the war, if I except D. H. Hill at Sharpsburg."²

The Confederates during this sanguinary battle gained some ground, they acquired sixteen guns, and captured a goodly share of prisoners and small arms, but, on account of the breakdown in getting all their divisions united on the field, they failed to achieve the object of the day—the discomfiture of General McClellan's army. While the battle was waging the Federal trains passed safely behind the field,³ and after

¹ *Official Records*, 13, 395.

² Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 139.

³ "The line of wagons appeared interminable; happily, the roads were firm and in good order, and they proceeded at a good pace, occasionally quickened by the sound of artillery in their rear or by the rifles of detached parties on their flanks; then the teamsters would urge their horses and mules into a gallop, giving some idea of the terrible confusion which would have arisen if the enemy had appeared on the flank." Fletcher, *History of the Civil War in America*, II, 98.

darkness precluded further pursuit, the Federal army, without further interruption, was all at last reunited and massed under naval guns on the almost impregnable Malvern Hill. Worse yet, the drawn combat at Glendale led to the costly flow of Southern blood in the hopeless attack of the next day. Ropes does not overstate the case when he concludes: "The battle of Glendale (or Frayser's farm) closed the second act in the drama of the 'Seven Days Battles.' The attempt to break up the orderly retreat of the Federal army there failed, just as the attempt of the day before at Savage Station to crush the rearguard failed. General Lee's opportunity of striking the army of his antagonist a fatal blow during his change of base had now passed away. The critical period of the movement was over."¹

At nightfall on the day of battle General Franklin, in the absence of his chief, "took the responsibility of moving my [his] command to the James River."² This, of course, necessitated the retirement of Heintzelman and Sumner to the lines occupied by Porter and Keyes. Hence when Jackson and Huger joined General Lee on the morning of July 1, only the Federal wounded remained before the army.

Porter, at the head of the Fifth Federal corps, had been ordered on the night of June 29, "to the elevated and cleared lands (Malvern Hill) on the north of Turkey Creek, there to select and hold a position behind which the army and all its trains could be withdrawn with safety."³ Porter on arriving saw with elation⁴ that he had fallen on an ideal defensive position of Nature's

¹ Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*, II, 200.

² *Official Records*, 13, 431. Sumner says of Franklin's movement: "This of course compelled me to retire at once, which I certainly should not have done without orders from the commanding general if these generals had not fallen back." *Ibid.*, 51.

³ *Battles and Leaders*, II, 407.

⁴ He sets forth its advantages: "The hill was flanked with ravines, enfiladed by our fire. The ground in front was sloping, and over it our artillery and

own handiwork.¹ With the capable assistance of the chiefs of engineers and of artillery, Barnard and Hunt, and of General Humphrey, Porter proceeded on June 30, to set his lines in order "to welcome our eager and earnest antagonists." All day on June 30, and far into the night, regiments, brigades, divisions were, as they arrived, posted under Porter's and Humphrey's personal supervision, so as to take every advantage of the crests and depressions. Artillery, to do on the Federal side more effective service here than in any other battle except Gettysburg, rumbled into nature's own emplacements.

Porter's corps and Couch's divisions of Keyes's corps were to take in charge the first line of defense on this well-chosen eminence. Warren's brigade, to which was attached the Eleventh United States Infantry, was established along the western slope of the hill to meet any assaults from the river road. From Warren's position to that of Sykes's other brigades at the northwest angle of the hill—a distance of about one mile—the crest bristled with light and heavy batteries.² In addition, fourteen of Tyler's

infantry, themselves protected by the crest and ridges, had clear sweep for their fire." *Battles and Leaders*, II, 409.

¹ Colonel Henderson, after visiting this elevation, wrote: "Malvern Hill, a plateau rising to the height of 150 feet above the surrounding forests, possessed nearly every requirement of a strong defensive position. The open ground on the top, undulating and unobstructed, was a mile and a half in length by a half mile in breadth. . . . The base of the hill, except to the east and southeast, was covered with dense forest; and within the forest at the foot of the decline ran a tortuous and marshy stream. . . . Only three approaches, the Quaker and the river roads, and a track from the northwest, gave access to the heights." *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 73.

² The extreme difficulties under which an army in proximity to its alignment moves, especially when far from its base, is shown by Tyler's report, which also indicates the fidelity and capacity of American soldiers. After mentioning that all the heavy ammunition used at Malvern Hill had to be transported by wagon by way of Gaines's Mill, Savage Station, and White Oak Swamp, and that of 26 guns only one was lost, Tyler says: "This was accomplished under the most unheard of difficulties, with mule trains constantly breaking down, driven by frightened citizen teamsters, who deserted whenever the fire became too heavy. Frequently teams had to be pressed into service to replace those which had been exhausted by the labor of drawing the guns, and sometimes for miles the guns were drawn by hand by the different companies of the regiment." *Official Records*, 12, 274.

siege guns¹ had been drawn by hand to the summit of the acclivity near the Malvern house and were so situated as to pour their effective volleys over the heads of the other troops. The line of fire of the 100-pounders and the 11-inch Dahlgrens of the navy, the missiles of which passed high over the Federal troops and plunged into the advancing Confederates, was parallel to Warren's front.²

Morell's division of Porter's corps held the northern front of the hill as far as the Quaker road. Morell's men faced north and were at right angles with Warren's. Couch's division, on Morell's right, occupied the front line from the road nearly to the Binford house on the Western Run. Behind Couch were the troops of Franklin, Heintzelman, and Sumner. McCall's division, now under Seymour, was well in the rear. Batteries, varying in guns from light field pieces to the 20-pounders of Diedrich and Knieriem and the 32-pounders of Grimm, were crowded along the rim of the hill to shatter heads of columns before they could deploy into line, and beat down their sundered ranks before they could use their rifles. As often as a front line battery emptied its chests or was at all disabled, its place was immediately supplied from the reserves; for, says Webb, "wherever one was needed, a battery made its appearance at the moment."³ Artillery had as yet played no such part in American war as it played in this combat. Draper bursts into picturesque words as he describes the grim preparations to meet the oncoming Confederates. He says: "There were crouching cannon waiting for

¹ It is interesting to note the variety of these guns. Tyler specifies as follows: Five 4½-inch Rodmans, five 30-pound Parrotts, two 8-inch howitzers, and two 10-pounder Whitworths. *Official Records*, 12, 274.

² The long-range fire of the naval guns was stopped during the engagement, as many of their shots fell on Union troops. General Porter thinks that the naval guns did little damage to the Confederates. The reports of Confederate soldiers do not bear him out. *Ibid.*, 13, 636, 751, 824, *et seq.*

³ Webb, *The Peninsula Campaign*, 155.

them, and ready to defend all the approaches. Sheltered by ditches, fences, ravines, were swarms of infantry. There were horsemen picturesquely careering over the noontide, sun-seared field. Tier after tier of batteries were grimly visible upon the slope, which rose in the form of an amphitheater. With a fan-shaped sheet of fire they could sweep the incline, a sort of natural glacis up which the assailants must advance. A crown of cannon was on the brow of the hill.¹ The first line of batteries could only be reached by traversing an open space of from 300 to 400 yards exposed to grape and canister from the artillery and musketry from the infantry. If that were carried, another and still more difficult remained in the rear."² The setting, if the Confederates assaulted, "was," as Wise sees it, "complete for a tremendous disaster."³

Would the Confederates attempt a direct storming of a hill so set with the engines of death? The counsels of Lee's leaders were divided on the subject. General Jackson was opposed to a frontal attack, but wanted to try General McClellan's right flank.⁴ General D. H. Hill, who had previously been warned by a native of the county of the great natural strength of Malvern Hill and who on his own approach had examined the Federal preparations in the light of his early artillery training, was decidedly averse to the sacrifice that must follow a direct assault on McClellan's entire army in so strong a position.⁵ General Longstreet, who as senior corps commander had been

¹ During the day 22 Union batteries participated in the engagement.

² *The Civil War in America*, II, 411.

³ Wise, *Long Arm of Lee*, 223.

⁴ Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 61.

⁵ Wise says: "But one man there was in Lee's army who forecasted the result. D. H. Hill was familiar with the character of the new Federal position, for a resident had described it to him, his informant stating that its commanding height, the difficulties of approach, its amphi-theatrical form and ample area, would enable McClellan to arrange his 350 guns, tier above tier, and sweep the plain in every direction. Meeting General Lee on the first, Hill promptly apprised him of the substance of this report, and remarked that if

called to headquarters by a temporary indisposition of General Lee and who had reconnoitered the field, was, however, of another mind. He believed that a cross-fire obtained by massing "for advancing combat" 100 guns "in the spacious open along Jackson's front" on the left, and 40 guns in position on the crest before Armistead's brigade on the right, might so disorder Porter's batteries as to justify assault and that the tremendous game at issue called for adventure."¹ He adds, "I so reported, and General Lee ordered disposition accordingly, sending the pioneer corps to cut a road for the right batteries of position."²

While their disposition was thus under consideration, the Confederate troops were approaching the field for the last great combat of the Peninsula invasion—Malvern Hill—fought on July 1. They found the usual Peninsula condition of battle: that is, they were to fight against a foe in position and to struggle through forests, streams and swamps. Whiting's three brigades, Hood, Law, and (temporarily) Hampton³ of Jackson's command, held the front line of the Confederate left in the Poindexter fields. The Sixth North Carolina, Major R. F. Webb in command, was the only North Carolina regiment in this division. Trimble's brigade, containing the Twenty-first North Carolina Regiment, Colonel W. W. Kirkland, and the First North Carolina Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. Wharton, was posted in Hood's left rear. Jackson's remaining brigades were in reserve. None

General McClellan is there in force we had better let him alone, but Longstreet, who was present, jocularly scoffed at the suggestion," *Long Arm of Lee*, 223. General Hill says of this interview: "At Willis's Church I met General Lee. I gave him Mr. Allen's description of Malvern Hill, and I presumed, 'If General McClellan is there in force, we had better let him alone.' Longstreet laughed and said, 'Don't get scared, now that we have got him whipped.' It was this belief in the demoralization of the Federal army that made our leader risk the attack." *Battles and Leaders*, II, 391.

¹ Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 142.

² *Ibid.*, 143.

³ *Official Records*, 13, 566.

of these troops on the left participated in the direct assaults of the day, but most of them either in their positions or in marching for support duty, came under severe and continuous shell fire. The five brigades of D. H. Hill, on the right of Whiting, occupied the angle between the Willis Church road and the road that led into the Long Bridge road, and faced Couch. These men had driven Couch from his intrenchments at Seven Pines, but, as they saw the exposed open stretches over which they should have to charge to reach his lines, and as their eyes fell on the muzzles of battery on battery already trained to comb these stretches, even the conscripts recently arrived among them as replacement men for the North Carolina regiments realized that a more arduous task was before them. Ordinarily there were eleven North Carolina regiments in Hill's division, but the Fourth and Fifth North Carolina regiments had not yet returned from their Richmond detail and were spared the horrors of this day. Directly in Hill's left rear were the commands of Lawton, Winder, Jones, and Early—all of Jackson's corps—and Ransom's North Carolina brigade of Huger's division; in rear of Hill's center and right were those of Magruder's brigades under Toombs, Barksdale, and Kershaw. In the front line on the Confederate right were the brigades of Armistead and Wright—both of Huger's division. Behind these were the brigades of Mahone, of Semmes, to which Manly's battery was attached, and of Cobb, in which the Fifteenth North Carolina Regiment under Colonel H. A. Dowd fought. The commands of Longstreet and A. P. Hill were in reserve. Holmes's division, in which there were five North Carolina regiments and two batteries, was on the river road. It had been expected that Holmes would throw in his men on the Confederate right, but he "allowed the day to pass and the battle to be decided in

his hearing,"¹ without doing more than forming his men in line of battle.²

According to General Longstreet, who was the second in command and who on account of General Lee's sickness spent the morning of the battle in consultation with his commander-in-chief, this battle of Malvern Hill was an "accident resulting from the armies standing close abreast for many hours."³ In what way can so terrific a shock of battle be called "an accident"? A glance at the Confederate formation at midday will throw light on Longstreet's statement.

Whiting on the left, D. H. Hill in the center, Armistead and Wright of Huger's division on the right, were in their assigned places before noon.⁴ There they impatiently awaited orders, for they were assured that every hour lost would enable the Federals to protect their troops more adequately.⁵ They were forced to nurse their impatience until late afternoon, for Magruder, whose men were footsore and exhausted from marching for the greater part of the day and night of June 30, was coming forward more slowly, and efforts were making to get an assemblage of batteries for the cross-fire mentioned by Longstreet. As the division commanders awaited their battle directions, they saw with growing concern that the batteries designed to pave the way for the advance of their men were coming into action almost singly and being knocked into pieces almost as soon as they opened by the concentrated guns of the Federals. They dreaded to think what must be the fate of their men if

¹ Allan, *The Army of Northern Virginia*, 127. See also reports of Daniel and Wise, *Official Records*, 13, 914, 917.

² General Holmes reports: "On Tuesday morning I moved my division to a point on the river road half a mile below the upper gate at Curl's Neck, and there remained during the night in line of battle; but, as before, I deemed it out of the question to attack the strong position of Malvern Hill from that side with my inadequate force." *Ibid.*, 908.

³ Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 151.

⁴ *Official Records*, 13, 566, 636, 818, 833, 834.

⁵ General Birney says: "We held the front line during the furious cannonade and intrenched our entire front." *Ibid.*, 14, 182.

they had to charge over those murderously open spaces without artillery protection. Uncertainty was added to their concern when General Lee's order was received, for as Colonel Powell says, "the order was based upon intentions instead of upon facts."¹ The order must be given in full for the reader to understand the uncertainty it caused in the minds of the commanders who had to assume the responsibility of ordering their troops into spaces that would be covered with shells as with a garment at the first stir of their men. It reads as follows:

Batteries are established to rake the enemy's line. If it is broken, as is probable, Armistead, who can witness the effect of the fire, has been ordered to charge with a yell. Do the same.

R. H. CHILTON,
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*²

The commanders of the storming columns saw clearly that the conditions on which an advance was based were not being fulfilled—no lines were being successfully raked, no break was likely to occur under the fire then prevailing.³ What were they to do? Armistead earnestly appealed for more artillery to clear his way. Longstreet promised to send it, but it did not get there.⁴ D. H. Hill, whose own batteries were at Fair Oaks,⁵ dispatched an officer to his immediate chief, General Jackson, stated field conditions, and asked for in-

¹ Powell, *History of Fifth Army Corps*, 161.

² *Official Records*, 14, 677.

³ General Garland, leaving his North Carolina brigade to ride forward with General D. H. Hill to better observe the fire, says: "So far from producing marked effect, the firing was so wild that we were returning to our posts under the impression that no movement of infantry would be ordered, when suddenly one or two brigades on our right (either Magruder's or Huger's) charged out of the woods with a shout." *Ibid.*, 643.

⁴ Armistead reports: "I asked for more artillery repeatedly. . . . About 3 p.m. General Longstreet came where I was, to whom I made known my wants, and he promised to let me have what I required." *Ibid.*, 819.

⁵ These guns had used up their ammunition in the all day cannonade at White Oak Swamp, and in the absence of transportation had to be sent back to replenish.

structions. Jackson, always a literal constructionist of directions, "repeated the order for a general advance at the signal of the shouting from General Armistead."¹ Magruder, as soon as he arrived, gave orders for his artillery chief to plant thirty rifled pieces on the crest by Armistead's position, but before they could arrive he felt compelled, under his orders, to send his infantry into "the sheet of fire."²

What was delaying the artillery? General Lee explains that the "obstacles presented by the woods and swamp made it impracticable to bring up a sufficient amount of artillery to oppose successfully the extraordinary force of that arm employed by the enemy, while the field itself afforded us few positions favorable for its use and none for its proper concentration."³ Hence, instead of forty guns on Armistead's front, two of Grimes's and six of Moorman's that came into play first were speedily disabled by the concentrated Federal batteries. Then Pegram and Davidson, after a game struggle, were seriously crippled. In Jackson's front, Whiting, who had been assigned to supervise the artillery,⁴ was striving, not indeed to keep 100 guns in "advancing combat," for that was impossible, but to keep alive batteries in position. Reilly's North Carolina battery, first up after difficulties,⁵ was ordered into position on the Poindexter field. Within a few moments after it opened twelve men and eight horses had gone down, and so intense was the fire

¹ *Official Records*, 13, 628.

² Magruder says: "General Armistead having informed me that General Longstreet would send him two batteries, I deemed such an artillery force inadequate, and soon after ordered Lieutenant-Colonel S. D. Lee to bring up from all the batteries 30 rifled pieces if possible. . . . But as they did not arrive the interval was, perhaps, too brief before I was ordered to make the attack.

³ *Official Records*, 13, 496. General Pendleton, in command of the reserve artillery, says: ". . . no site was found from which the large guns could play upon the enemy without endangering our own troops." *Ibid.*, 536.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 567

⁵ General Hill, in *Battles and Leaders*, (II, 392) says: "I saw Jackson helping with his own hands to push Reilly's North Carolina battery farther forward."

centered on it, that Whiting ordered Reilly to withdraw it.¹ Following Reilly, Balthis, Poague, Carpenter, Courtney, and Wooding, almost successively, secured positions a little more protected, and delivered interrupted, and at times desultory, volleys for several hours, but the fire never at any time reached barrage proportions.

General Lee, as well as the waiting division commanders, speedily realized that the Confederate batteries so slowly rolling into position were no match for the Federal guns already placed. He, therefore, began to cast about for a change of tactics. It was at this juncture that what Longstreet ascribes to "an accident resulting from the armies standing close abreast for many hours," but what it now seems clear was Lee's direct order, precipitated the delayed battle. Longstreet, after describing the disabling of the Confederate batteries, says:

So the plan for battle and order of the day were given over by the Confederate commander, who sent for me to ride with him over to his left in search of a route by which the enemy's right might be turned. This seemed feasible under the hasty reconnoissance, and he ordered the reserves on that move. As we started on the march, the noise of battle reached us and the march was arrested. Under the impression that his officers realized the failure and abandonment of his original plan, General Lee failed to issue orders specifically recalling the appointed battle.

It seems that just as the troops marched to the left under the last order, information was received by some of the officers at the front that the enemy was getting away from us.

¹ "The battery took the best position it could get and opened fire. The fire of the enemy's five batteries was concentrated on our one and was terrific. The battery had been in action fifteen or twenty minutes when General Whiting rode into the battery, and seeing the situation, said: 'Reilly, take your men out of this.' . . . Expended 120 rounds of ammunition." Ramsay's Narrative, Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 569. Lamb writes in the *Southern Historical Society Papers*: "Only a battery or two could get into position at a time, and as soon as exposed on the edge of the field, fifty field pieces turned on them, and they were crushed at once. An eye witness of that fight, I shall never forget the spirit and the gallantry displayed by the batteries I saw go in and engage the enemy." 25, 214.

To ascertain as to this matter, and anxious to atone for lost opportunities of the day before, part of our troops near our right moved forward, and soon encountered the enemy's infantry as well as the formidable artillery. This impact burst into the noise of battle and was taken as the signal of assault under the original order of the day.¹

In an earlier account of this battle, Longstreet said: "I issued my orders accordingly for the two divisions to go around and turn the Federal right, when in some way unknown to me the battle was drawn on."² What caused the change in plan? It evidently arose from an error in observation—an error so serious that it induced, not "the troops near our right who were anxious to atone for lost opportunities on the day before" to plunge forward on their own initiative, but induced General Lee himself to issue orders for an immediate assault. Just after Longstreet parted from Lee to move his own and A. P. Hill's reserve divisions in the ordered movement to feel for an opening on the Federal right, General Whiting and those near him noted what apparently was the retirement of Sumner's reserve corps for better protection from the artillery fire.³ Whiting reported to Lee and Jackson that the Federals were withdrawing from the field.⁴ On receiving this report General Lee gave over his thought of a flank attack and hastened to make ready for a general assault. He sent orders to Magruder to press in with his own and Huger's troops,⁵ and Jackson sent a

¹ Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 144.

² *Battles and Leaders*, II, 403.

³ Porter (*Ibid.*, 416) says: "While the enemy's artillery was firing upon us, General Sumner withdrew part of his corps to the slope of Malvern Hill."

⁴ Whiting reports: "After some time the movement of baggage and troops in retreat by the Turkey Bridge road could be plainly observed." *Official Records*, 13, 566.

⁵ General Magruder, according to General Wright, came on the field and assumed command about 4 o'clock. (*Ibid.*, 814). Shortly after he received Colonel Chilton's "charge with a yell" order. On its receipt he sent to hurry up his troops. He says: "I then received an order from General Lee, through Captain Dickinson." This order, based on the report of the retirement of

similar order to D. H. Hill.¹ These orders show conclusively that no accident was responsible for the Confederate assault between five and six in the afternoon, unless the error in observation can be called an accident. Lee's men hazarded the terrors of that bristling hill, not because Lee's staff officers failed to rescind his first battle order, not because Armistead was ordered to attack prematurely and his advancing yell was mistaken for the signal for general battle, but because it was the direct order of their commander-in-chief,² who after deciding to change his method of attack, was led by the report of a Federal retreat to return to his first orders.

Under these orders Magruder, commanding his own and Huger's troops, got Armistead and Wright, supported by Cobb and Mahone, off to the charge

the Federals, was as follows: "General Lee expects you to advance rapidly. He says that it is reported the enemy is getting off. Press forward your whole line and follow up Armistead's successes.(a) I will have Mahone's brigade in the place just occupied by Colonel Anderson. Ransom's brigade has gone on to reinforce General Cobb." *Official Records*, 13, 677.

a Three of Armistead's regiments had driven back the Federal skirmishers and were then lying under a crest about three-fourths of a mile in advance. *Ibid.*, 819.

¹ While G. B. Anderson's North Carolina brigade was readjusting its position for advance, it came about 3 o'clock, p.m. under a blast of fire from the batteries of Ames, Kingsbury, and Livingston and from Palmer's brigade of infantry.(a) General Anderson was wounded and the brigade "roughly handled." General D. H. Hill rode to this troubled brigade and remained for some time with the Second Regiment, which had become separated from the other two regiments.(b) While he was with this regiment, he received General Jackson's order. Captain Matt Manly of this regiment, in reference to his regiment's part in this battle, says: "At Malvern Hill it received orders directly from General D. H. Hill, when the message came from General Jackson: 'Press forward on the right, the enemy is retreating.'" Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 165.

a *Official Records*, 13, 287.

b The Fourteenth and the Thirtieth. The Fourth, it will be recalled, had not returned from Richmond.

² Captain John Lamb, who at the time of this battle was one of Magruder's couriers, says: "I heard this order twice delivered to General Magruder as he was urging the commanders of his nine brigades to do all in their power to overcome the difficulties of the swamp and woods, and press up to the batteries." *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 25, 214. General Magruder says: "It will be seen by this report and these documents in support of it, first, that my attack on the enemy at Malvern Hill was made after repeated orders from my superiors." *Official Records*, 13, 674.

between five and six o'clock.¹ The two supporting brigades, Cobb's and Mahone's, were unduly hurried into place, and Cobb's men became sandwiched in between Armistead's regiments.² Magruder's other brigades were not up at the beginning, for all his men were dragging their feet from hunger and constant marching over country at enmity with rapidity.³ Moreover, a controversy about roads had consumed time in countermarching. Hill, as usual when a fight was on foot, was ready at the signal, and, having an interior line, his men became engaged in force before Magruder could develop his strength.

"Once launched," says Lieutenant-Colonel Powell of the army that fought them that sultry day, "there was no faltering in the Confederate assault. Ardor and determination sought to atone for lack of comprehensive method and coöperation. In clearly defined lines, and with standards waving, they moved forward with the swift sweeping step peculiar to the Confederates, firing as they advanced, the spirit of battle inspiring the order of a review. Fiery 'Prince John' Magruder, smarting under undeserved strictures upon his weary march of the day previous, and urged by repeated orders from General Lee, hurled column

¹ As always happens, the time of an advance is variously given. Magruder says that he ordered his front brigades into action at 5:30 (*Official Records*, 14, 670); Wright puts the hour at 4:45 (*Ibid.*, 814); Armistead at "between 5:00 and 6:00 (*Ibid.*, 819); Cummings at 5:00 (*Ibid.*, 705); Luffman at 5:00 (*Ibid.*, 715). In the center, Hill says that he attacked "about an hour and a half before sunset" (*Ibid.*, 628). This would be about six o'clock. Gale says "about a half hour before sunset" (*Ibid.*, 638); DeRosset at 6:00 (*Ibid.*, 659); Ripley at 6:30 (*Ibid.*, 650). On the Federal side, Porter fixes the general assault at 6:00 (*Ibid.*, 229), and Palmer at 6:00 (*Ibid.*, 214). This list is cited to show that the battle was opened by Magruder and Hill at practically the same hour, and under the same orders.

² Armistead's Report, *Ibid.*, 819.

³ Cobb, having the Fifteenth North Carolina in his command, says: "It is but justice to the men of my command to state the fact that for more than forty-eight hours previous to the battle, they had neither rest nor food." *Ibid.*, 749. Magruder says: "My command, being separated from the wagons, had been almost constantly marching from Sunday until Tuesday evening without tents and without food." *Ibid.*, 672. Branch reports of his North Carolinians that for a week they had been without cooking utensils. *Ibid.*, 884.

after column, until nine brigades had tested Porter's strength. D. H. Hill, conscious of the serious task assigned him and indignant at his lack of support, pressed six brigades upon Couch's front and right with a persistence that for nearly two hours refused to accept repulse. Only the coming of night prevented further sacrifice in the brigades of the reserve, which were pressed forward too late for more than covering the reorganization of the debris of the field."¹

Porter, who as at Gaines's Mill saw from an elevation the Confederate onslaught, writes: "As if moved by a reckless disregard of life, equal to that displayed at Gaines's Mill, with a determination to capture our army or destroy it by driving us into the river, regiment after regiment, and brigade after brigade, rushed at our batteries; but the artillery of both Morell and Couch mowed them down with shrapnel, grape, and canister; while our infantry, withholding their fire until the enemy were in short range, scattered the remnants of their columns. . . . The havoc made by the rapidly bursting shells from guns arranged so as to sweep any position far and near, and in any direction was fearful to behold. Pressed to the extreme as they were, the courage of our men was severely tried. The safety of our army—the life of the Union—was felt to be at stake."²

The two North Carolina brigades in Hill's division—G. B. Anderson's and Garland's—and the two North

¹ Powell, *History of the Fifth Army Corps*, 166. How severely the Confederate assaults tested the strength of the Federal defenders is shown by the testimony of Union officers. General Hunt, who so ably controlled the fire of the batteries, said to the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "The battle was desperately contested and frequently trembled in the balance. The last attack was made with all their forces, and was nearly successful; but we won from the fact that we had kept our reserves in hand for such an attack. On this point I can speak confidently." II, 1, 574. General Kearny writes admiringly of his opponents: "They face *grapeshot* as Napoleon laid it down as an axiom to be impossible. They are noble fellows. Our men displayed just as much courage, but have not yet been led against batteries." De Peyster, *Philip Kearny*, 382.

² *Battles and Leaders*, II, 417.

Carolina regiments in Ripley's brigade, were never more strenuously tested as to courage and endurance than they were in their dash at this plateau so thickly set with guns that "batteries were always at hand when wanted to relieve others and to open fire in new directions,"¹ and infantry so massed that regiments could be and were withdrawn for fresh ones as fast as they wearied. Anderson's brigade, commanded by Colonel C. C. Tew after its brigadier was wounded, was nearest the Federals. Captain Manly describes the charge of the Second North Carolina Regiment in words that apply equally to the other two regiments² in the brigade: "Going out of the woods, wheeling to the left across an open field, thence through the pines, and up in the deadly cornfield in the face of such volleys of grape and shrapnel as we had never met before, it fought until night came, and the firing dwindled from rapid volleying to infrequent shots."³

Garland's North Carolinians fared even worse than Anderson's for they had no cover under which to deploy. Captain R. S. Williams has left on record a graphic picture of the brigade's struggle: "The position that Garland's brigade, and especially the Thirteenth Regiment, occupied was one of the most difficult and dangerous that I was ever in up to that time or even after it. We marched across a large field of bottom land, across a creek, through briers, vines, and every kind of obstacle, along up an old plantation cart-way to the top of a high hill. . . . The enemy opened the most terrific and destructive fire in the face of the old Thirteenth that ever any troops met since the world began. Within five minutes it was impossible to distinguish one man from another on account of the smoke and the dust caused by the cannon in our

¹ Porter's Report, *Official Records*, 13, 230.

² The Fourteenth and the Thirtieth; the Fourth being absent.

³ Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 165.

immediate front. The men would rush forward as they were urged, and then it seemed as though the whole line would sway back as a field of corn would before a wind. Though the sun was shining bright when we went in, everything was soon so dark one could scarcely see. Men were falling like leaves in an autumn wind.”¹ General John B. Gordon, who commanded an Alabama brigade in this division, reports that “the dead of his brigade marked a line nearer the batteries than any other.”² He then adds this tribute to one of Garland’s hard-fighting regiments: “Some of the Twelfth North Carolina Regiment nobly rushed forward and perished among the dead of my right regiment.”

General Ripley, in whose brigade were the First and Third North Carolina regiments, relates of his brigade: “Gordon’s and Anderson’s brigades were on my right, and the troops of the three mounted the hill in a gallant fashion. At its brow our troops were met with a furious fire of shot, shell, and musketry; officers and men fell fast, but they maintained their grounds, opening and keeping up a severe fire on the enemy in return, before which his advanced battery fell back and his troops wavered. He pressed hard on our left, however, and, while moving his regiment to its support, the gallant and accomplished Colonel Gaston Meares, of the Third North Carolina Regiment, fell.”³ At the time of his death Colonel Meares was answering an appeal for aid from the First North Carolina Regiment. In spite of his fall, these two regiments after their juncture held their own so tenaciously that General Winder, coming to their relief after dark, reports: “On emerging from the swamp, I found a handful of gallant men from the First and

¹ Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 662.

² *Official Records*, 13, 635.

³ *Ibid.*, 650.

Third North Carolina regiments receiving a most terrific fire.”¹

After an hour's exposure to that “wall of lead and iron,” Hill's brigadiers began to report that without more troops they could make no further headway. Hill in turn, finding, as General Jackson reports, that he was “not supported by a general advance as he had anticipated,”² sent to Jackson for reinforcements. Here again he met another of the disappointments of this ill-starred field that led Sergeant T. J. Watkins to piously jot down in his war diary, “The Lord was not on our side during this battle”;³ for, as Lee's order designated only Hill's division to make the left attack, the reserves had not been moved up in close support.⁴ Hence, before Winder, Early, Stafford, and Trimble could break through wood and swamp, Hill had met one of the bloodiest repulses of the war. When these troops reached him it was too dark to essay a new attack. “His tenacity and the courage of his soldiers have only had the effect of causing him to sustain heavy losses.”⁵

The Comte de Paris, of McClellan's staff, recounts how Hill's attack was viewed from the Federal side:

He had before him Morell's right, Couch's division reinforced by Caldwell's brigade, which had been temporarily detached from Richardson, and finally the left of Kearny. . . . The remembrance of Cold Harbor doubles the energy of Hill's soldiers. They try to pierce the line, sometimes at one point, sometimes at another, charging Kearny's left first, and Couch's right, formed

¹ *Official Records*, 13, 572.

² *Ibid.*, 557.

³ Smith, *The Anson Guards*, 130.

⁴ Henderson has this thought: “The order for attack had undoubtedly named only D. H. Hill's division. But there was no good reason that it should have been so literally construed as to leave the division unsupported. Whiting was guarding the left flank, and was not available; but Ewell and Winder were doing nothing, and there can be no question but that they should have been advanced to the edge of the woods directly D. H. Hill moved forward.” *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 64.

⁵ *The Civil War in America*, II, 142.

by Caldwell's and Howe's brigades, and afterwards throwing themselves upon the left of Couch's division. But here, after having nearly reached the Federal positions, they were repulsed. The conflict is carried on with great fierceness by both sides, and for a moment it seems as if the Confederates are at last about to penetrate the very center of their adversaries and of the formidable artillery which but now was dealing destruction in their ranks, but Sumner, who commands on the right, seeing no likelihood of any attack on that side, detaches Sickles' and Meagher's brigades to Couch's assistance.¹

While Hill's men were thus struggling with sullen obstinacy on the left, Magruder, under General Lee's urgency,² was pushing his brigades into the combat on the right. "I never saw anything more grandly heroic," says General Hill, "than the advance after sunset of the nine brigades under Magruder's orders. Unfortunately they did not move together, and were beaten in detail."³ Armistead and Wright, with Cobb and Mahone in support, dashed toward the Crew house on the summit of the slope about 5:30. The Fifteenth North Carolina Regiment, under Colonel H. A. Dowd, moved with Cobb into the storm of missiles that awaited the brigades. Lieutenant H. C. Kearny, a survivor of the regiment, in describing the difficulties that the Fifteenth encountered but portrays those met by all the other regiments. He writes: "The Fifteenth Regiment, forming the right of the brigade, moved to the attack through an open field of several hundred yards, broken by ravines, and was exposed to a murderous fire of grape and canister from the artillery and

¹ *The Civil War in America*, II, 141. The dauntless fighting of Hill's men so impressed General Jackson that he wrote to his wife of this division, which lost 1,746 men in its assault: "On Tuesday we had another engagement, in which General D. H. Hill, with his division, accomplished more than any other part of the army. Other troops were sent to support him, but his division may be said to have borne the brunt of the battle, and he was by far the most distinguished officer engaged that day." Jackson, *Life of Jackson*, 301.

² In a supplement to his report, Magruder says: "It will be seen by this report . . . that my attack on the enemy at Malvern Hill was made after repeated orders from my superiors." *Official Records*, 13, 674.

³ *Battles and Leaders*, II, 394.

mortar shells from the gunboats on the James River, and a heavy fire from the infantry in front. The regiment formed a part of the first line of battle and remained under fire until night, no reinforcements ever reaching the position occupied by the regiment.”¹ The regiment lost 131 men and its colonel was severely wounded.

As the contest progressed both armies sought reinforcement. On the Confederate side, Magruder sent in Barksdale's brigade, which lost one-third of its staunch Mississippians in brief space.² D. R. Jones was next up with the brigades of G. T. Anderson and of Toombs. Anderson followed in the wake of Armistead. Toombs, in the confusion of the field, was pushed over to the left,³ where D. H. Hill caught up his brigade and personally led it to Garland's aid. About seven o'clock Ransom's large North Carolina brigade of 3,000 men began to reach the field. Under discretionary orders from Huger,⁴ his division commander, Ransom answered an urgent call from Magruder by sending him first the Twenty-fourth Regiment under Colonel William J. Clarke, and then the Twenty-fifth under Colonel H. M. Rutledge, and the Thirty-fifth under Colonel M. W. Ransom. "As each of these first named regiments reached the field," says Ransom, "they were at once thrown into action by General Magruder."⁵ Going forward almost singly, these regiments encountered "as fearful a fire as the mind can conceive."⁶ The brigades in their part of the field were now retiring, and these fresh troops became targets for every gun and rifle in range. At every step men

¹ Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 739.

² *Confederate Military History*, VII, 117. Every regimental commander in the brigade was wounded.

³ Reports of D. R. Jones (*Official Records*, 13, 692), of Toombs (*Ibid.*, 697), of Hill (*Ibid.*, 628).

⁴ *Ibid.*, 794.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

were gasping out their lives or clutching at disabling wounds. So evident did it become that their errand was too much for their strength, that the regiments fell back under the crest of some intervening hills. At this juncture Ransom himself arrived with the Twenty-sixth North Carolina under Colonel Z. B. Vance and the Forty-ninth led by Colonel S. D. Ramseur. Ordering all of his regiments to the right to form under cover, he then plunged toward the guns through a field thronged with stricken regiments. He reports of the charge which left so many desolate homes in North Carolina: "It was now twilight. The line was put in motion and moved steadily forward to within less than 100 yards of the batteries. The enemy seemed to be unaware of our movement. Masses of his troops seemed to be moving from his left toward his right. Just at this instant the brigade raised a tremendous shout, and the enemy at once wheeled into line and opened upon us a perfect sheet of fire from musketry and the batteries. We steadily advanced to within 20 yards of the guns. The enemy had concentrated his force to meet us. Our onward movement was checked, the line wavered, and fell back before a fire the intensity of which is beyond description. It was a bitter disappointment to be compelled to yield when the guns seemed almost in our hands."¹ In this unavailing response to orders, 499 North Carolinians of this brigade were stretched dead or helpless before that farm house.²

Magruder had now exhausted all of his troops except the two small brigades of Kershaw and Semmes of McLaw's division.³ Just before Ransom's regiments were forced to retire, these brigades "entered the

¹ *Official Records*, 13, 794-95.

² *Ibid.*, 795.

³ Kershaw numbered 956 (*Ibid.*, 719); Semmes only 557 (*Ibid.*, 723) on the day of the battle.

fighting out of sight of each other”¹—Kershaw on the left; Semmes on the right. Kershaw joined part of his brigade to Early’s on the latter’s arrival,² and both commanders suffered on taking over the front lines. There were no North Carolina regiments enrolled in these brigades. However, as Semmes halted under a slope about 500 yards from the batteries to breathe his men for their dash across the open, the remnants of Ramseur’s Forty-ninth North Carolina Regiment, men of firm soul who were unwilling to accept defeat, attached themselves to the left of his line,³ and a second time hazarded their lives on that fatal slope. This charge, like those which had preceded it, broke down from lack of weight, and Semme’s men dropped for shelter behind some houses “not more than 60 yards from the nearest gun.”⁴ At nine o’clock Semmes withdrew his men, who in the dusk had been a target for friends as well as Federals, and the savage contest died down to occasional line volleys and a somewhat protracted Federal artillery discharge.

The persistent Confederate assaults shook but never shattered the Federal defense. The continued retreats and constant night marches had made some of the Federal regiments jumpy. Now, however, as the army, reunited at last, established itself on the protected and easily defended eminences around the Crew and West houses, and as the jaded infantrymen saw cannon planted so thickly around them that “a wagon could hardly pass between the guns,”⁵ both the shaky and the staunch regiments fought with the confident steadfastness of men who, to use their own vernacular, are “fixed for fighting.” Moreover, the determination arising from admirable position was

¹ *Official Records*, 13, 719.

² Kershaw’s Report, *Ibid.*, 729.

³ Semmes’s Report, *Ibid.*, 723; Wright’s Report, *Ibid.*, 815.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 724.

⁵ Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 622.

further steeled by the thought that defeat on that day meant the possible ruin of their army.¹

The field movements of the Federals engaged in the repulse of Hill's assaults which were directed mainly against Couch, reinforced as the battle gained headway by the brigades of Caldwell, of Sickles, and of regiments from Robinson's and from Birney's brigades,² are thus stated by General Couch: "The action now being general, I . . . ordered up the reserves on the left; placed in position regiments falling back, and halted those moving bravely forward, many of these regiments having already masked the fire of our artillery. Upon seeing the advance on the left, Abercrombie and Palmer pushed forward their brigades in front of the artillery in order to drive the foe. The enemy continually reinforced their column of attack, besides advancing heavy reserves in support. Abercrombie and Palmer became engaged to their left and right. General Caldwell, of Richardson's division, having been sent to my support by General Sumner, now went into action, joining my brave division fiercely engaged. The enemy were making desperate efforts to drive in my right. . . . Later General Sickles of Hooker's division, reported to me

¹ "I went along the line of my regiments," says General Martindale of Morell's division, "and reminded them that a retreat would be annihilation . . . that there was no Washington to fall back upon, as at Bull Run; no Chickahominy to cross, as at Gaines's Mill. We must be victorious or perish." General Martindale, *Official Records*, 13, 293.

² Although Kearny reports, "None but our artillery and skirmishers were immediately engaged" (*Ibid.*, 165), General Robinson, one of his brigadiers reports, "After the enemy advanced to attack our line, I detached and led to the support of Couch's division the Fifty-seventh and Sixty-third Pennsylvania and the Eighty-seventh New York. These regiments were afterwards employed in supporting a battery attached to that division and De Russy's battery, and rendered efficient service." (*Ibid.*, 176.) Birney, another of Kearny's brigadiers, reports, "The Fourth Maine and four companies from the Third Maine held the wooded ravine in front of Kearny's line, and when Couch's line was in danger of being driven back by an unexpected and furious onslaught, that portion of my command gallantly aided him in driving the enemy back." (*Ibid.*, 182.) General Howe, who was the recipient of these latter regiments, reports, "At this time I was reinforced by detachments from two Maine regiments, which . . . gave me additional strength." (*Ibid.*, 209.)

with three regiments, leading his men directly into action.”¹ Some of Couch’s regiments used up 60 rounds of ammunition.

Magruder’s objective was the hills around the Crew house. General Morell, who with the brigades of Griffin, Martindale and Butterfield commanded this sector, reports his dispositions in meeting this attack, as follows: “The enemy in great force emerged from the woods, and, notwithstanding the severe fire from the batteries, advanced steadily until they arrived near them, when the supporting regiments . . . gallantly moved forward and repulsed them; but [the enemy] being reinforced by fresh troops, who extended their line on the right and left, these regiments were compelled to fall back to their former position, where they maintained their ground until their ammunition was exhausted, and they were regularly relieved.”² The brigades of Butterfield and Martindale then took over the firing line until, adds Morell, “they in turn were relieved by part of Sykes’s division³ and the Irish Brigade, General Meagher.”⁴

Hardly had the booming of his cannon ceased before General McClellan, “who was anxious only to find a safe and permanent location for his army and was in no mood to undertake the offensive at that time,”⁵ ordered his commanders to retire to Harrison’s Landing. Both before and after the battle, his confidence in the ability of his army to withstand further attacks seems

¹ *Official Records*, 13, 204.

² *Ibid.*, 276.

³ The brigades of Buchanan and Lovell. *Ibid.*, 351.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 276. General Meagher reveals the opportuneness of his arrival: “The advance of the regiments was marked by an alacrity and enthusiasm which found their expression in vehement cheers, which had the effect of rallying several fragments of regiments that had, after bravely sustaining themselves under an overpowering fire, been forced to retire from the front.” *Ibid.*, 73.

⁵ Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*, II, 207.

to have been shaken.¹ On the morning of the conflict he distressed Washington with these words: "My men are completely exhausted, and I dread the result if we are attacked today by fresh troops. If possible, I shall retire tonight to Harrison's Bar, where the gunboats can render more aid in covering our position. Permit me to urge that not an hour should be lost in sending me fresh troops. More gunboats are much needed. . . . I now pray for time. My men have proved themselves the equals of any troops in the world, but they are worn out. . . . We have failed to win only because overpowered by superior numbers."² In the afternoon, after his men had repulsed all attacks and were so admirably posted that many of his commanders³ deemed it an opportune time to counter-attack, he directed another night withdrawal—a withdrawal that in the rain and crowded roads became so confused and precipitate as to lead General Hooker to declare in his emphatic manner: "We retreated like a parcel of sheep: everybody on the road at the same time; and a few shots from the rebels would have panic-stricken the whole army."⁴ How-

¹ "The commanding general, however, determined to fall back from Malvern Hill, notwithstanding the victory won by our army. He seems to have regarded his army as entirely unfitted to meet the enemy." Committee on the Conduct of the War, II, (1), 26.

² *Official Records*, 14, 282. Henderson comments on this message: "Surely a more despairing appeal was never uttered. The general whose only thought was 'more gunboats and fresh troops,' whatever may have been the condition of his army, had reached the last stage of demoralization." *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 67.

³ Porter (*Battles and Leaders*, II, 423); Sumner (Committee on Conduct of the War, II, (2), 366); Kearny, who in a letter to Major Ryerson from Harrison's Landing on July 10, says: "Our coming here has been a most cowardly and unwise alternative. . . . Instead of all this . . . he loses head and heart, throws himself back on the shipping, and gulls the silly public with a hard name, namely, that he had changed his base of operations. This is false and by this time he knows it." De Peyster, *Philip Kearny*, 376.

⁴ Testimony before Committee on the Conduct of the War, II, (1), 580. Colonel Trobriand, who was waiting at Harrison's Landing to rejoin his regiment, thus describes the arrival of the Federals: "And what a retreat! The rain falling in torrents rendered the roads impracticable, and multiplied the obstacles to the moving of the trains and the artillery. The infantry, broken up by that last night of retreat succeeding a day of battle, was moving

ever, as no immediate pursuit followed, the Federal army reached Harrison's in safety.

The commanders in these swift-following conflicts had no time to report their casualties battle by battle, but in most instances consolidated them in returns for the entire week. Hence the losses at Malvern Hill can be given only approximately. The Confederate losses were over 5,000;¹ the Federals, fighting in position and largely with artillery, suffered much less. Averell, whose cavalry assisted in covering McClellan's retirement, estimates the loss at 2,500.²

The North Carolina losses in the week of battle that closed at Malvern Hill were enormous. By regiments³ they were as follows:

<i>Regiments</i>	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Wounded</i>	<i>Missing</i>	<i>Total Loss</i>
First.....	49	181	7	237
Second.....	22	112	0	134
Third.....	30	105	7	142
Fourth.....	11	54	0	65
Fifth.....	10	22	4	36
Sixth.....	5	110	5	120
Seventh.....	35	218	0	253
Twelfth.....	51	160	1	212

without order, men separated from their commands, regiments mingled together, brigades without connection, divisions scattered everywhere and assembled nowhere." *Four Years with the Army of the Potomac*, 270. General Hill reports: "None of their previous retreats exhibited such unmistakable signs of rout and demoralization." *Official Records*, 13, 629. Colonel Nance gathered from the field around Shirley alone, six miles from Malvern Hill, 925 rifles that had been thrown away. *Ibid.*, 739. General Sickles of the Federal army reports: "Many of my own wounded were left behind. They were brought to the rear and placed beside others of our men in some farm buildings near General Couch's headquarters. It was painful beyond expression to abandon so many brave men." *Ibid.*, 142.

¹ Jackson's division, 203; Ewell's, 177; Whiting's, 175; D. H. Hill's, 1,746;(a) Huger's, 1,609;(b) Magruder's without Barksdale's, 1,147.(c) Total 5,057.

^a *Official Records*, 13, 559.

^b *Ibid.*, 981-84.

^c *Ibid.*, 977-79.

² *Battles and Leaders*, II, 432.

³ These lists were prepared from *Official Records*, 13, 502-07, 973-84, and from official lists with names attached that were furnished to the Adjutant-General of North Carolina, and published in the state newspapers.

THE SEVEN DAYS TO MALVERN HILL 179

Thirteenth.....	29	80	4	113
Fourteenth.....	17	85	0	102
Fifteenth.....	21	110	0	131
Sixteenth.....	33	199	0	232
Eighteenth.....	37	187	0	224
Twentieth.....	93	281	6	380
Twenty-first.....	1	29	15	45
Twenty-second....	28	133	0	161
Twenty-third.....	6	80	0	86
Twenty-fourth....	11	49	12	72
Twenty-fifth.....	24	113	5	142
Twenty-sixth.....	9	50	25	84
Twenty-seventh...	0	6	0	6
Twenty-eighth....	19	130	0	149
Thirtieth.....	31	146	11	188
Thirty-third.....	8	52	15	75
Thirty-fourth.....	53	158	0	211
Thirty-fifth.....	19	96	18	133
Thirty-seventh...	11	112	15	138
Thirty-eighth.....	6	153	0	159
Forty-third.....	0	1	0	1
Forty-fifth.....	2	14	0	16
Forty-sixth.....	0	0	0	0
Forty-eighth.....	18	70	0	88
Forty-ninth.....	14	75	16	105
Fiftieth.....	0	7	0	7
First Battalion....	0	5	4	9
First Cavalry.....	1	14	46	61
Brem's Battery....	0	7	0	7
Reilly's Battery...	0	12	0	12
Manly's Battery...	0	0	0	0
Lloyd's Battery...	0	0	0	0
	704	3,425	216	4,345

To accomplish the retirement of the great Federal army from the very suburbs of Richmond, General Lee used 175 regiments and 12 battalions of infantry. Counting two battalions as the equivalent of one regiment, the Confederate army then consisted of 181 infantry regiments.¹ Although twelve Southern States

¹ Table of Organization, *Official Records*, 13, 483-89.

were represented in the campaign, North Carolina furnished a little over one-fifth of these 181 regiments, for its contribution was 35 ½ regiments.¹ The total number of Confederates killed² was 3,301; the North Carolina killed numbered 704,³ or a little over one-fourth of the total. Of the 15,958 Confederates slightly, severely, or fatally wounded, 3,425, over one-fourth again, were from North Carolina.⁴ Thus during this week so replete in fatalities, it appears that one-fifth of the regimental flags in Lee's army floated over North Carolina bayonets; that every fourth Confederate who dropped a musket from hands palsied by death left a vacant chair in some North Carolina home; and that every fourth man who passed into the crude hospitals⁵ of the Confederacy wore a North Carolina uniform.⁶

¹ Table of organization, *Official Records*, 13, 483-89.

² The casualties by states, so far as shown by the *Official Records*, (12, 502-07, and 973-84) were as follows: Alabama, 2,483; Arkansas, 13; Florida, 137; Georgia, 3,894; Louisiana, 1,074; Maryland, 20; Mississippi, 1,571; North Carolina, 4,658; South Carolina, 2,240; Tennessee, 255; Texas, 443; Virginia, 3,288.

³ This number varies slightly from the additions in the official summary (973-84) because the losses in G. B. Anderson's and Pender's North Carolina brigades, not itemized in that summary, are checked by returns to the Adjutant General of North Carolina.

⁴ Table of Casualties, *Official Records*, 13, 502-07, and 973-84.

⁵ Randolph A. Shotwell, who after the battle of Glendale searched both field hospitals and those of Richmond for a gallant brother, mortally wounded, describes in his diary his impressions. He says of the first-aid hospitals: "Two large fires were generally built, and a rude table, formed of rough slabs resting on barrel heads or between two wagons, was placed between the fires for the surgeon's use in amputating the scores and hundreds of shattered limbs of the thousands of poor wretches gathered there. Severed arms, legs, hands, feet, eyes, and other fragments of the human body lay in piles like cord-wood." He finds in Richmond "the sick and wounded from both armies from the recent battlefields, including Seven Pines, Oak Grove, and some of Jackson's Valley victories—making an aggregate of from 30,000 to 35,000 patients. Every large building, public and private, that could possibly be obtained was filled with them. Almost every private residence had its one, two, three, or half a dozen soldiers." MS. Diary, 486. No North Carolinian should ever mention these days of hospital horrors without grateful acknowledgments to Captain Thomas Eppes and his gracious wife, who virtually turned their comfortable Richmond home into a hospital for wounded North Carolinians.

⁶ Twenty-five regiments lost 200 or more men—the Forty-fourth Georgia with 400, and the Twentieth North Carolina with 380, incurring the heaviest losses. Of the twenty-five regiments sustaining such unusual casualties, seven, or over one-third, were from North Carolina.

Among the killed the state mourned some of the most promising officers.¹

The retirement of McClellan's vast and expensively equipped army was a grievous blow to the people of the North. They had been led to believe that "the magnificent army, which had been organized with so much pageantry at Washington, and moved down Chesapeake Bay with so much pomp," would soon capture Richmond and end the war. As the news slowly trickled through² that the Grand Army after leaving "thousands and thousands in the dark glades and gloomy marshes of the Chickahominy,"³ was at last crowded into narrow limits at Harrison's Landing, the people realized that disaster had come. They were not to be cajoled into serenity by the military

¹ The following field and company officers in North Carolina regiments are reported as killed in this series of engagements: (a) Colonels Reuben P. Campbell, Charles C. Lee, Gaston Meares, and Montford S. Stokes; Lieutenant-Colonels Franklin J. Faison, Oliver C. Petway; Majors Thomas N. Crumpler, Benjamin R. Huske, Tristram L. Skinner; Captains John B. Andrews, W. T. Arrington, Jesse W. Atwood, John Benbury, Thomas H. Blount, Ephraim B. Bouldin, Robert N. Carter, Thomas J. Clegg, A. W. Coleman, William K. Gore, Henry C. Gorrell, William B. Gulley, Charles E. Harper, Louis T. Hicks, Matthew H. Peoples, J. B. Randolph, R. W. Rives, Harvey A. Sawyer, William H. Smith, John T. Taylor, Abram G. Walters, James A. Wright; Lieutenants, John W. Alexander, J. W. Barnett, Harper E. Charles, William A. Class, Elbridge Cook, M. T. Covington, Miles M. Cowles, Robert S. Cowan, Joseph W. Darden, Thomas J. Foote, William P. Gill, Patrick H. Grandy, Isham C. Hartzog, Duncan C. Haywood, W. J. Kriminger, Arthur N. Jones, Isaac A. Jones, Isaac L. King, Hardy L. Lassiter, Julius E. Link, L. J. Merritt, D. M. Miller, John P. Parker, David Rhodes, A. Hamilton Shotwell, Marcellus Thompson, John T. Townsend, Rufus M. Warlick, John W. Williams, William A. Wooster.

^a This list is compiled from official reports, from regimental histories, from newspaper files, and from the honor rolls. There are doubtless some omissions and errors in it, but search was made of all preserved material.

² "The War Department did not hear from McClellan from June 28 to July 1, and not until July 3, could the President have felt sure that his army was safe. Lincoln grew thin and haggard, and his dispatches from the first of these days are an avowal of defeat." Rhodes, IV, 56. "How much of expectation had been staked upon that Army of the Potomac! All the Northern people for nearly a year kept their eyes fastened with aching intensity upon it. Good fortune which befell elsewhere hardly interrupted for a moment the absorption in it. . . . Correspondingly cruel was the disappointment at its ultimate miscarriage. Possibly, as a single trial, it was the most severe that Mr. Lincoln ever suffered." Morse, *Abraham Lincoln*, 70.

³ Draper, II, 416.

euphemism of a "change of base."¹ They knew that at the beginning of the battles their army was crouched to spring on Richmond; now it was nearly thirty miles away with its chief imploring the government for more men and more gunboats. The disaster, however, to the ill-starred campaign, while it produced a serious depression, did not dispirit the North.² Before they knew the extent of the Union loss in men and material, the governors, as already noted, had been induced by Secretary Seward to join in a request to the President for a call on July 2 of 300,000 three-year men.³ Even after they were aware that the army which they had deemed sufficient for the overthrowal of the Confederacy was huddled in the maws of malaria⁴ on the banks of the James, the governors, rep-

¹ "But the Northern people were not deceived. Learning after five days of suspense that McClellan's army had reached the James River, they recognized that it had been defeated and forced to retire. The event was spoken of as a disaster, the news of it causing a panic on Wall Street. Days of gloom followed." Rhodes, IV, 57. "The abrupt change of the part played by the Federal general from the role of the invader to that of the retreating and pursued enemy was too dramatic not to arrest general attention. It was in vain that careful observers pointed out to the Northern public that the Union army . . . was now in a much better position in a strategical sense than it was before the 'Seven Days Battles' began; these considerations sounded like attempts at excuse and palliation and they were impatiently disregarded." Ropes, II, 209. Gurowski notes in his diary: "Mr. Seward writes a skillful dispatch to explain the battles on the Chickahominy. But no skill can bamboozle the cold, clear-sighted European statesmen." 240.

² "The people, sublime," writes Gurowski, "runs again to the rescue, and Mr. Seward is so sacrilegious, so impious, as to say that the people is generally slow." *Diary*, 236. In August he adds, "Within the last four weeks 600,000 new levies are called to arms. With the 600,000 men levied previously, it is the heaviest draft ever made from a population. No emperor or despot ever did it in a similar lapse of time." p. 246.

³ It is noticeable that while some of the eastern states, for example, Maine, Vermont, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, did not raise the quotas assigned them under the call, the northwestern states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, exceeded their allotment by over 87,000 men. See Phisterer's *Statistical Record*, 5.

⁴ Medical Director Letterman reports of the army at Harrison's Landing: "After about 7,000 sick and wounded had been sent away, there remained 12,975, making a total of nearly 20,000." *Official Records*, 12, 213. Worse still, he says: "The number reported sick on the regimental returns cannot by any means be taken as the true condition of the health of the army upon its arrival there. It does not give the real amount of its effective fighting strength. The want of proper nourishment, the poisonous exhalations from the streams and swamps of the Peninsula, the labor undergone, and the anxiety felt, had undermined the strength and withered the spirits of a great many who were apparently well." *Ibid.*, 215.

resenting the people, offered no serious opposition to a further call on August 4 for 300,000 militia.

The deliverance of their capital from the burrowing approach of General McClellan's army, whether that deliverance was called a change of base or a defeat at arms, was, of course, an immeasurable relief to the people of the South. Moreover, it quickened their belief in the final success and begat a new confidence in General Lee and his leaders.¹ There was, however, mourning in too many homes for the voice of exultation to be heard.² Richmond to which the wounded and sick were carried, was little more than a hospital. Ambulances, carriages, buggies, farm carts and wagons, plied between the town and the battlefield, bringing in the mangled and the dead, while long processions of the more slightly wounded staggered toward the city. Warehouses, factories, stores, and hotels were turned into cheerless hospitals, for, with finances slowly accumulating and with the pressure for war material unabated the administration had as yet been able to build and equip few hospitals. The streets were

¹ "Apart from all other considerations, the Peninsula campaign was of immense value to the Confederate cause because it established on a sure basis Lee's reputation as a commander in the field. Before it he had been known as a profound thinker, a master of the theory of war; after it he was regarded as a superb fighter and a determined leader in the face of the enemy." Wood and Edmonds, *History of the Civil War in the United States*, 80. Gurowski, thoroughly disliking everything Southern, but without patience with McClellan, makes this grumbling contrast: "Our troops are better fed, clad, and armed, but over our army hovers the thick mist of strategy and indecision; the rebels are led, not by anaconda strategians, but by fighting generals; . . . energy inspires their councils, their administration, and their military leaders." *Diary*, 247.

² "A solemn calm pervaded the population [of Richmond], brought for the first time face to face with the awfulness of war, and the sorrow and suffering consequent even upon a series of victories. But along with this was a deep sense of gratitude, a long sigh of relief from the tension of anxiety and apprehension which had oppressed the city during the two months since Johnston's army had retreated from Yorktown, followed closely by the invading hosts . . . but hearts grew light at the knowledge that Richmond was safe and free, and could pet and praise the defenders to her fill; eyes smiled through their tears upon dear ones still left to them. The city kept open house to every one who had fought or prayed for her safety." General Pendleton in his *Memoirs*, 201.

thronged with visitors from various states who had come to search for their slain or minister to their sick.

In his official report General Lee directed no criticism against those reponsible for the miscarriage of his plans, but with rare forbearance simply said that "under ordinary circumstance the Federal army should have been destroyed." He modestly summed up the achievements of his army in these words: "The siege of Richmond was raised, and the object of a campaign, which had been prosecuted after months of preparation at an enormous expenditure of men and money, completely frustrated. More than 10,000 prisoners, including officers of rank, 52 pieces of artillery and upward of 35,000 stands of small arms were captured."¹

¹ *Official Records*, 13, 497.

CHAPTER XV

FROM THE PENINSULA TO CEDAR RUN

After Jackson's elusion in the Valley campaign of all the telegraphic snares set for his army by President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton, these officials concluded that their scattered armies in that field could not be directed by civilians in Washington.¹ Hence on the day that Jackson with his "foot cavalry" reached Mechanicsville to take part in the breathless conflict on the Peninsula, President Lincoln issued an order to consolidate "all the loose and stray armies"² in front of Washington into one organization to be known as the Army of Virginia. General John Pope, who had won some successes in the Western Army under Halleck, was summoned to Washington and directed to take command. The new Army of Virginia was at first composed of the three independent corps³—of General Fremont of the Mountain Department, General Banks of the Shenandoah Department, and General McDowell of the Rappahannock Department. It included also General Sturgis's troops at Alexandria.⁴ General Fremont, who was Pope's senior in rank, declined to serve under him. He was, therefore, relieved, and his corps assigned to General Sigel, a German officer.⁵ President Lincoln assigned to the

¹ "Although constitutional commander-in-chief, the fruitless strategy in the valley campaign convinced the President that neither he nor the Secretary of War had any of the qualifications of a military commander." Upton, *Military Policy of the United States*, 316.

² Gordon, *Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain*, 263.

³ "The authorities at Washington . . . at last apparently realized the fact that the object of the war was not solely to provide popular political generals with independent commands." Lieutenant-Colonel Horton in *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, (2), 33.

⁴ *Official Records*, 18, 435.

⁵ "It was thought that his appointment would conciliate the Germans and promote enlistments; though why intelligent Germans should wish to 'fight with Sigel' when they could fight with any one else remains a mystery." *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, 36.

new army an ambitious program. "The Army of Virginia," declares his order, "shall operate in such manner as, while protecting Western Virginia and the national capital from danger or insult, it shall in the speediest manner attack and overcome the rebel forces under Jackson and Ewell, threaten the enemy in the direction of Charlottesville, and render the most efficient aid to relieve General McClellan and capture Richmond."¹

Directions to take the same army whose units Jackson had just paralyzed² and with it and some additions to crush the same Jackson in his native mountains, and "to relieve McClellan and capture Richmond," would have staggered a general less self-confident than Pope. He, however, after receiving the copious order, outlined to the Committee on the Conduct of the War on July 8 a proposed campaign that rivaled the President's in bold purposes.³

The formation of a second Union army in Virginia raised at once questions of a proper correlation of the two forces. President Lincoln was tired of trying to exercise military command, for which, of course, his training did not fit him.⁴ He felt the need of a

¹ *Official Records*, 18, 435.

² "In this short passage at arms Jackson . . . had kept three armies playing at hide and seek. . . . So soon as the enemy left the Valley, Fremont, Banks, and McDowell each retraced his steps, disheartened and decimated by useless countermarching." Dodge, *Bird's-eye View of the Civil War*, 58.

³ In reply to the question, "So you mean to attack?," Pope said, "I mean to attack them at all times that I can get the opportunity. . . . It is not necessary, in my opinion, in order to protect the capital, that I should interpose myself between the enemy and the place itself . . . for, wherever I could put myself, they could place themselves between me and the capital by attacking my flanks. By laying off on their flanks, if they should have only 40,000 or 50,000 men, I could whip them. If they should have 70,000 or 80,000 men, I would attack their flanks and force them, in order to get rid of me, to follow me out into the mountains. . . . They could not march on Washington with such a force as that on their flanks." II, 1, 278.

⁴ John T. Morse, biographer of President Lincoln, after stating that Mr. Lincoln "so filled the requirements of the times that many persons have been tempted to conceive him to have been divinely led," gravely remarks that "he made mistakes hardly consistent with the theory of inspiration by Omnis-

military adviser of sufficient rank and ability to adjust the relationships of all the Union armies and direct their operations in the field.¹ He, therefore, by an executive order of July 11,² called General H. W. Halleck, the commander of the Western armies,³ to Washington as General-in-Chief of all the Federal armies. Hardly had General Halleck arrived at the capital before he was confronted by a question that unfortunately for him was political as well as military.

Just after the creation of the Army of Virginia there was an abrupt change in the military situation. The disastrous collapse of the Federal campaign up the Peninsula left the Army of the Potomac temporarily idle in a sickly⁴ climate and with political and military opponents insisting on the demotion of its leader.⁵

cience," and adds, "He interfered in military matters; and being absolutely ignorant of military science . . . he blundered, and on at least one occasion blundered very badly." *Abraham Lincoln*, 69.

¹ Ropes, II, 234. On the authority of Mr. Sumner, Doctor Mahan declares that President Lincoln, after visiting Harrison's Landing and hearing the diverse opinions of the superior officers of the army, asserted: "My mind became perfectly perplexed, and I determined right then and there to appoint a commander-in-chief who should be responsible for our military operations." *Critical History of the Late American War*, 144.

² *Official Records*, 14, 314.

³ In reference to the appointments of Halleck and Pope, the Comte de Paris writes: "The brilliant successes of the armies of the West had won the admiration of all men; these successes were supposed to be due to the superiority of those armies over Eastern troops, and in taking their generals it was thought that they would bring victory with them. But the President was extremely ill-advised; from those armies, which numbered among their generals a Grant, a Sherman, a MacPherson, a Sheridan, he selected Halleck and Pope for the supreme command." II, 243. Rhodes says: "The armies of the West, as contrasted with the Army of the Potomac, had accomplished positive results, and to the ability there he looked for aid. A fortnight previously he had placed General John Pope . . . in command of the newly christened Army of Virginia. . . . His eyes now turned to Halleck, the commander in the West, who was versed in the theory of military art, had written books on tactics and international law, and was generally regarded with favor." *History of the United States*, IV, 97.

⁴ On August 3, after a very large number of sick and wounded had been sent to Northern hospitals, McClellan reported that he then had 12,500 sick. *Own Story*, 494.

⁵ "After the failure of the Peninsula campaign, Chase (Secretary of the Treasury) was very anxious to be rid of McClellan." Hart, *Life of Chase*, 296. "This unwise letter, and the reverses of the army, with the active hostility of Stanton, brought Halleck, a vastly inferior man, to Washington. . . . On coming to Washington, Pope who was ardent and I think courageous, though not always discreet, very naturally fell in with the views of Secretary Stanton,

As a result of this totally unexpected change, the Confederate troops were squarely between the two Federal armies. Pope's forces were at first too few in numbers and too uncertain in quality¹ to risk an overland advance to McClellan's rescue. They could not be sent by water without uncovering Washington and the Valley of Virginia.² The question then before Halleck as general-in-chief was whether to reinforce McClellan and allow him to carry out his plan for an advance on the Confederate capital from its most vulnerable point—namely, the south side of the James, or to dismember the Army of the Potomac and add its units to Pope for a campaign either by the Orange and Alexandria Railroad or by Fredericksburg.

McClellan ably pointed out³ the wisdom of operating along the James with his seasoned and disciplined army

who improved every opportunity to denounce McClellan and his hesitating policy. Pope also reciprocated the commendations bestowed on him by Halleck, by uniting with Stanton and General Scott, in advising that McClellan should be superseded and Halleck placed in charge of military matters at Washington." Secretary Gideon Welles: *Lincoln and Seward*, pp. 191-92.

¹ "The army corps of General McDowell, about 19,000 strong, is by far the best, and in fact the only reliable portion of my command." Pope to McClellan, *Official Records*, 14, 296.

² "It was thought that the attempt to reinforce McClellan by Pope would give the ever-watchful enemy the opportunity of exchanging Richmond for Washington, as Pope must be for that purpose withdrawn from before the capital." General Quincy in Address before Massachusetts Military Historical Society, 5.

³ On August 4 McClellan wrote to Halleck: "This army is now in excellent condition and discipline. We hold a debouch on both banks of the James River, so that we are free to act in any direction, and with the assistance of the gunboats, I consider our communications as now secure. We are 25 miles from Richmond, and are not likely to meet the enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle until we have marched 15 or 18 miles, which brings us practically within 10 miles of Richmond. We can supply the army by water during its advance certainly to within 12 miles of Richmond. At Aquia Creek we would be 75 miles from Richmond with land transportation all the way. . . . The result of the movement would thus be to march 125 miles to reach a point now only 25 miles distant and to deprive ourselves entirely of the powerful aid of the gunboats and of water transportations. . . . Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion. It is here that our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of this nation. . . . A decided victory here, and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses we may meet with elsewhere; here is the true defense of Washington. It is here on the banks of the James River that the fate of the Union should be decided." *Official Records*, 16, 8.

of between 90,000 and 100,000 men.¹ In an interview with Halleck on July 25, he proposed to cross the river and cut the Confederate communications to the south at Petersburg, then but slightly fortified.² Success in this operation would have thrown Lee on the defensive, and in all likelihood have forced him, from the necessity of holding so long a line, to recall Jackson, and thus leave Pope unopposed on the Rapidan. McClellan's appeal not to forego the tremendous advantages of his position was supported by most³ of his general officers and by Commodore Charles Wilkes,

¹ After a visit to the army, President Lincoln wrote to General McClellan: "I am told that over 160,000 men have gone into your army on the Peninsula. When I was with you the other day, we made out 85,000 remaining, leaving 73,500 to be accounted for. I believe 23,500 will cover all the killed, wounded, and missing in all your battles and skirmishes, leaving 50,000 who have left you otherwise. Not more than 5,000 of these have died, leaving 45,000 of your army still alive and not with it. . . . If I am right, and you had these men with you, you could go into Richmond in the next three days." (*Official Records*, 14, 319.) In reply, on July 15, McClellan says: "I find from official reports that I have present for duty: Officers, 3,215; enlisted men, 85,450; in all present for duty, 88,665; absent by authority, 34,472; without authority, 3,778." (*Ibid.*, 321.) His official return of July 20, 1862, gives, present for duty, 101,691. *Ibid.*, 329.

² *Ibid.*, 337. "Once master of this point, he could cut the communications of Richmond with the south, and secure the fall of the capital without having to attack it in front. He was thus foreshadowing the plan followed precisely by Grant in the last campaign of the war." Comte de Paris, II, 247. "The fall of Petersburg would unquestionably have worked a vast change in the situation of the contending forces: it is in fact doubtful whether Richmond could have been long held by the Confederates after the capture of Petersburg." Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*, II, 243.

³ It seems that Halleck was wrong in saying (*Official Records*, 16, 11) that a majority of McClellan's general officers favored the abandonment of the Peninsula; for Nicolay and Hay, anxious as they were, mention the names of only Generals Barnard, Franklin, and Keyes as favoring the evacuation. (V, 453, 457.) General Meade, one of the ablest of McClellan's officers, recounting the difficulties of roads and transportation during Burnside's advance on the Fredericksburg road, says: "All this comes from taking the wrong line of operations, the James River being the true and only practicable line of approach to Richmond." (*Life and Letters*, I, 330.) After Burnside's utter failure, Meade writes on December 22, 1862: "The army are willing enough to go to Richmond, if they could only see the way to get there. Two routes have already been tried this fall—the one by Gordonsville and this by Fredericksburg. Both have failed, and the only one deemed by military men as practicable they obstinately refuse to let us take—by the Peninsula." *Ibid.*, 340. General Dix, although not of McClellan's command, but as commander at Fort Monroe, thoroughly familiar with the situation, wrote to Halleck: "If we can ever reach Richmond, it seems to me the object can be best effected from the position we now occupy." *Official Records*, 14, 348.

commander of the James River Flotilla.¹ But McClellan, while retaining the affection and admiration of his army, had in a large measure lost the confidence of the administration.² He could not, therefore, by any arguments prevail on the War Office to see, what General Grant discovered after most appalling losses,³ namely, that the approach to Richmond by way of Petersburg was the manœuvre hardest for the Confederates to checkmate.⁴ Hence, from lack of military prescience and from fear of superseding a commander

¹ See Wilkes's strong letter to Secretary Welles. *Official Records*, 14, 356.

² "But the great difficulty about the question of removal was one which could not be stated; the government had lost confidence in General McClellan, and the removal of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula provided them with a convenient mode of disposing of their superfluous general." *The Army Under Pope*, 14.

³ General Curtis of the Federal army charges these losses to Halleck's lack of sagacity in not perceiving the real door to Richmond. He writes: "General Halleck's views as to the *impracticability* of operating from the James River as a base were accepted by the President. . . . It may be well to recall some of the losses sustained by this noble army, fought after its departure from the James River, till its return under General Grant, twenty-two months later, to the base from which its final triumph was won. In Major-General Pope's campaign . . . ; the Maryland campaign; the surrender of Maryland Heights, Harpers Ferry, and Bolivar Heights; Fredericksburg; Chancellorsville; the Gettysburg campaign; and Rapidan to James River, there were 18,683 killed, 92,223 wounded, and 46,244 missing, a total of 160,150 men, more than ten army corps. . . . This number was lost in action, and in addition large numbers by death from disease and exposure. These facts may well be considered in passing judgment on the generalship of one who opposed the plans of General McClellan, and the plan pursued by General Grant, operating from the true base on the James River, in destroying the army of Northern Virginia." *Bull Run to Chancellorsville*, 149. General Alexander of the Confederate army is of the same mind: "So orders were given, and the Federal army, on August 14, began the evacuation of the only position from which it could soon have forced the evacuation of Richmond. They were only to find it again after two years fighting, and the loss of 100,000 men; and they would find it then only by being defeated upon every other possible line of advance." *Military Memoirs*, 179. Ropes, after a dispassionate survey, says of Halleck's action: "He persisted in withdrawing McClellan from the Peninsula, and it was not until two years had elapsed, and many bloody battles had been fought, and many long marches made, that the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac saw again the waters of the James." *Story of the Civil War*, II, 243.

⁴ Among the advantages of the James River route, inclusive of Petersburg, were absolutely safe naval bases; a short distance from army base to objective; an inland water route to the capital; a line of operation perpendicular to the base with one of the flanks protected by gunboat fire; a paralyzing of Confederate communications to the South; a length of front disadvantageous to the smaller army.

whom it distrusted, but the troops loved,¹ the administration stuck to its decision to start a second time from near Washington, and to let the army bury its hopes of speedy laurels alongside its dead. "Thus," declares Morse, "the first great Peninsula campaign came to an end in disappointment and almost in disaster, amid heart-burnings and crimination. 'It was,' says General Webb, 'a lamentable failure—nothing less'."²

While this controversy was creating abiding animosities, General Pope, pending the arrival of Halleck, remained about a month in Washington as a semi-official military adviser to the President.³ From that city as headquarters, he mobilized his troops with activity and boldness, but to the handicaps already menacing his success⁴ he soon added contributions of his own making. Aware of the sensibilities that had

¹ "At the same time, such was the political situation that the Government did not dare to remove him. . . . What then could be done? The army might be removed to Northern Virginia, portions of it might from time to time be incorporated in the army of General Pope, and if that officer made a successful campaign, the difficulty as to McClellan would settle itself." Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, 15.

² *Abraham Lincoln*, 68.

³ "Halleck will be here day after tomorrow. The President is unwilling for me to leave here until he arrives." Pope to McDowell, July 20. *Official Records*, 18, 487.

⁴ In a survey of the handicaps, Colonel Theodore Lyman, of General Meade's staff, finds:

(1) "A United States army commanded in chief by three persons, *de facto* or *de jure*, viz.: the President, the Secretary of War, and General Halleck. Of these two were without military education and singularly wanting in a soldier's instinct; the third, a man of strong intellect and the best military training, had slender ability as a strategist, and none at all as a field-fighter.

(2) "Two beaten armies—one of which was moving in all haste by water from the Peninsula to Alexandria to reinforce the other.

(3) "Two commanders in the field—Pope and McClellan. . . . There were, then, three incompetent commanders-in-chief at Washington, dealing out strategy by telegraph; two commanders in the field, distrustful each of the other; and two beaten armies, not yet come together; the whole in the presence of an enemy active and united and full of revolutionary ardor.

"This is one of those rare historical cases where it might be stated *a priori* that nothing but confusion, mismanagement, recrimination, and final disaster could result." *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, 305.

been wounded by his selection from the Western armies and by his elevation over officers who were his seniors in rank, a more prudent officer than General Pope would have sought by tact and courtesly to win the good will of his fellow-fighters. Instead of this, he, unconscious of hurling a boomerang, issued on July 14 an address to his soldiers that by innuendo cast aspersions on the army then under his command and on the army shortly to come under his orders.¹ Moreover, the arrogance of the address, and the exhortation to fling to the winds all "such traditions of the past as lines of retreat, bases of supplies, strong positions, magazines, which had bothered all commanders from Agamemmon to General Banks,"² coming from a general who had not yet laid aside the armor of achievement, awoke the wonder and ridicule of even one-year-old soldiers.³ In Pope's army, therefore, there was none of that cementive affection and uncritical confidence that always existed in General Lee's organization, but, at the same time, there was, as one of its officers, General Gordon, found, "a determination to do all that mortals could do to

¹ The parts of the address most resented were these: "I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary and beat him when he was found; whose policy has been attack and not defense . . . I presume that I have been called here to pursue the same system and to lead you against the enemy. . . . Meantime I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases, which I am sorry to find so much in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of 'taking strong positions and holding them,' of 'lines of retreat,' of 'bases of supplies.' Let us discard such ideas. . . . Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves." *Official Records*, 18, 473.

² *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, 35.

³ Probably no address that was ever issued to an army created such a storm of hostile criticism as this did. It was supposed to draw injurious comparisons between the troops of the West and those of the East. It was taken to exhibit a contempt for all military rules in the management of a campaign. Finally, it was considered bombastic and egotistic to an unheard of degree." *Ropes, Army under Pope*, 9. Rhodes adds: "To the officers and soldiers of the three corps which made up his Army of Virginia, it was unjust and almost insulting. . . . Regarded also as a slur upon the Army of the Potomac, it made almost every officer in it his enemy." *History of the United States*, IV, 100.

retrieve the losses sustained by the Army of the Potomac, be it under Pope or the Devil.”¹

Then, having set his own army by its ears, Pope proceeded by a succession of orders to stir the Confederates into retaliatory legislation. The first of these orders directed that, as far as practicable, his troops “should subsist on the country in which the operations were carried on.”² Vouchers, it is true, were to be given to the owners of seized property, but the payment of these vouchers was hedged about with conditions that rendered them practically worthless, for the debts were not to be paid until the end of the war, and then only on testimony that “such owners have been loyal citizens of the United States since the date of the voucher.”³ That this order, coupled with another, forbidding guards to be set over private property,⁴ was misinterpreted “by many officers and soldiers” into license to pillage, is clear from Pope’s own testimony, for he states in a supplementary order of August 14 that he discovers with great dissatisfaction that General Order No. 5, requiring the troops of this command to be subsisted on the country, has either been entirely misinterpreted or grossly abused by many of the officers and soldiers of this command.”⁵

The second order directed that wherever within the Union lines of operation a railroad, wagon road, or telegraph was injured, or whenever there were attacks on trains or straggling soldiers by bands of guerillas, “the people living within five miles of the spot shall

¹ Gordon, *From Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain*, 274.

² General Orders No. 5, *Official Records*, 16, 50.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 509.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 573. In view of these orders and “the known sentiments of the commander-in-chief, it is not strange that the opinion should have prevailed in the army that a rebel had no property which a soldier was bound to respect.” *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, 43. “The orders, therefore, issued to this effect were of little avail . . . and were made the occasion or pretext for much pillage and many disorders, which had the double effect of ruining the country through which the army was passing, and of striking a serious blow at discipline in the ranks.” Comte de Paris, II, 252.

be turned out in mass to repair the damage," and they were also to pay the wages and expenses of the soldiers who should "coerce the performance of the work." In case any soldier or legitimate follower of the army were fired on from any house, the house should be razed to the ground and the inhabitants imprisoned.¹

In the opinion of experts these two orders, although harsh, may be justified by the practice of civilized warfare. "They were," exclaims Colonel Henderson, "mild and humane in comparison with the third."² For the third order, which was submitted to President Lincoln before it was published,³ "it must be conceded, there is absolutely no justification."⁴ Wood and Edmonds, the English military writers, brand it as "nothing short of barbarous."⁵ This order made it the duty of all Federal commanders of corps, divisions, brigades, and detachments, "to arrest all disloyal male citizens within their lines or within their reach in the rear." Those who were willing to take the oath of allegiance to the United States and to furnish security for its observance were allowed to remain. Those who refused were to be expelled from their homes. If any person violated his oath, he should be shot and his property seized.⁶

These orders, which General Pope late in life said were inspired by Secretary Stanton,⁷ introduced into

¹ General Orders No. 7, *Official Records*, 16, 51.

² *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 82.

³ Pope to Lincoln, July 23, *Official Records*, 18, 500. "I think some of General Pope's orders are very injurious, and have so advised him; but as I understand they were shown to the President before they were issued, I felt unwilling to ask him to countermand them." Halleck to McClellan, August 7, *Ibid.*, 14, 359.

⁴ Ropes, *Army under Pope*, 10-11. "A commander in the field has nothing to do with allegiance, or oaths of allegiance in his treatment of the enemy . . . He was not there as a United States marshal, acting under the orders of a court, and arresting persons against whom a jury had found indictments for treason."

⁵ *History of the Civil War in the United States*, 96.

⁶ General Orders, No. 11, *Official Records*, 16, 52.

⁷ Rhodes on authority of General J. D. Cox, *History of the United States*, IV, 101.

the conduct of the war a severity not hitherto interjected; for General McClellan had waged his campaign on the principle that his troops were to fight only men with muskets in their hands. That the policy of Pope was not in accord with the views then entertained also by the Western Federal armies is shown by Halleck's disapproval.¹ Even General W. T. Sherman wrote to Senator John Sherman: "The idea of making them take the oath is absurd."²

The Southern people were naturally incensed by these edicts. Their war office at once issued a retaliatory order.³ This order, expressing regret that "some of the military authorities of the United States . . . have determined to violate all the rules and usages of war," directed that General Pope and his commissioned officers should not be "considered as soldiers and therefore not entitled to the benefit of the cartel⁴ for the parole of future prisoners of war," but, if any of these officers were captured, they should be kept in close confinement. The order further directed that the execution of any citizens of the Confederacy under the orders of Pope should be followed by the death of an

¹ *Official Records*, 14, 359.

² Sherman, *Home Letters*, 230.

³ General Orders of the Confederacy, No. 54, 66.

⁴ The cartel to which reference is made had been in effect only ten days. No general system for the exchange of prisoners was arranged until a year after hostilities began. On July 13, 1862, General McClellan notified General Lee that Secretary Stanton had clothed General John A. Dix with authority "to negotiate for a general exchange of all prisoners." On receiving notice that in this delicate matter the Confederate representative would have to deal with a man who was not only a professional soldier, but an able lawyer and diplomat, General Lee selected a North Carolina officer, General D. H. Hill, as Confederate commissioner. The two generals met at Haxall's Landing, and after a conference of five days agreed, with a few exceptions, on a cartel prepared by General Hill.^(a) This agreement was approved by the two governments, and remained the basis of exchange, whenever the Federals would agree to any exchanges, until the close of the war. When General Lee received a copy of the cartel, he wrote to General Hill: "I hope it may be productive of good. I thank you for your efforts and management of the matter."^(b)

^a General Dix to Secretary Stanton, *Official Records*, 117, 265.

^b *Ibid.*, 825.

equal number of his officers.¹ These orders, productive of so much bitterness, fortunately went with Pope into sudden eclipse when General McClellan was restored to command in September.

During the time covered by this verbal warfare, General McClellan, recuperating his worn troops and begging for reinforcements to strike a heavier blow at Richmond, remained encamped at Harrison's Landing in threatening nearness to Confederate headquarters. Not until August 3 did he receive orders² to transfer his army to Aquia Creek, and unite it with the Army of Virginia.³ Burnside, who had been withdrawn from North Carolina to assist McClellan, was encamped at Newport News with two divisions,⁴ but on August 1 was directed to Aquia Creek and Fredericksburg "to hold the Rappahannock between Fredericksburg and General Pope's command."⁵ There he was joined by General Stevens with seven regiments which had been stationed in South Carolina. Pope, still in Washington and winning the favor of the administration by his assurances of an activity for which it was longing,⁶ was concentrating his scattered corps and trying to get them welded into an homogeneous army.

The Confederate army, which we left torn and bleeding at the foot of Malvern Hill, was now, unjostled by Union troops, occupying in the main, its old position in front of Richmond. The army had not, however,

¹ General Orders of the Confederacy, No. 54, 66.

² In his acknowledgment of this order General McClellan writes to Halleck: "I must confess it has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced." *Official Records*, 12, 81. "From that moment Pope's army, which had been organized for the purpose of playing a secondary part, was to have the principal role in the campaign." Steele, *American Campaigns*, 241.

³ *Official Records*, 12, 83.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 532.

⁶ "From the nature of the case public sentiment demanded that the rival of McClellan should assume at once a vigorous offensive, and Pope had given proof by his addresses to his army that to find the Confederates and defeat them was his own purpose and desire." Rhodes, *History of the United States*, IV, 114.

given over the pursuit until General Lee had assured himself that the Federals were "too secure under the cover of the boats" for him to "risk an attack on the results of which so much depended."¹

His battle-stricken divisions, therefore, secured a brief rest. General Lee spent this time in reorganizing and in attempting to get reinforcements.² He took the opportunity to carry out further his government's desire to brigade the regiments according to states. He studied anxiously the service and character of officers recommended for promotion. The excellent rifles captured in the recent battles were issued as far as they would go in place of the smoothbore muskets hitherto largely in use. The Confederate batteries were especially improved by the guns taken on the field.³ The reserve ordnance train was also enriched.⁴ The brigades of Evans and of Gregg were called from South Carolina,⁵ and Governor Clark permitted his last brigade, Martin's, to be drawn from North Carolina.⁶ The Forty-second North Carolina, under Colonel George C. Gibbs, and the Fifty-seventh North Carolina, under Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Jones, both new regiments, were also sent to Lee.⁷ Conscripts enrolled under the act passed in April were now arriving and were wisely assigned to fill the gaps in reduced regiments.⁸

¹ Lee's Confidential Dispatches to Davis, 27, 29.

² *Official Records*, 14, 635.

³ "Among the guns captured from McClellan were many fine, serviceable pieces. . . . The deficiencies in harness and equipment were now beginning to be made up to some extent by the Bureau of Ordnance, its manufacturing activities being in full swing by this time, thanks to the unremitting efforts of General Gorgas." Wise, *Long Arm of Lee*, I, 243.

⁴ Alexander, *Military Memoirs*, 176.

⁵ *Official Records*, 14, 644.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 631.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 675.

⁸ For example, 500 conscripts from North Carolina were assigned to the First Regiment; 400 to its companion regiment, the Third North Carolina; 130 to the Seventh; 250 to the Fifteenth. Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, I, 140, 184, 286, 372, 739.

As McClellan's army still lay at Harrison's Landing during this period, General Lee and President Davis were concerned lest General McClellan should make the very movement that he was in vain urging on Halleck; namely, cross the James River, seize Petersburg, and advance on Richmond from the south side of the river.¹ To meet such an emergency General Lee selected General D. H. Hill to relieve General Holmes of his division and of the Department of North Carolina, the defenses of which extended from the James River to the mouth of the Cape Fear,² and ordered him to set the department in a thorough state of defense. In a letter of instruction to Hill, General Lee says: "Push the works around Drewry's Bluff. Make every preparation for the advance of the enemy. See where the troops in your department are and how they can best be posted. I rely greatly upon your intelligence, zeal and energy."³

General Hill found that, although the works around Drewry's Bluff were under way, "not a spadeful of earth had been thrown up about Petersburg."⁴ Assisted by General S. G. French, who was sent to the department from Wilmington, he laid off a line of fortifications that extended from Drewry's Bluff south, encircled the exposed side of Petersburg, and ended on the Appomattox River, west of the town. Heavy

¹ *Official Records*, 14, 632.

² *Ibid.*, 476. This Department included an effective force of 17,217 men and 141 pieces of artillery on July 15, 1867.

³ *Ibid.*, 117, 826. Lee's anxiety, expressed in frequent telegrams to Hill (*Ibid.*, 14, 658, 661, 666, 667) for a usable line of defenses was due, not only to the possibilities of an advance by McClellan, but also to a desire on his own part to have the Petersburg and Richmond line fortified in case he had to move a part of his army against Pope. As soon as he learned that McClellan was ordered to withdraw, he became even more insistent, for he wanted the fortifications so completed that they could be held by a few men during his absence. General Lee sent his own Chief Engineer, Colonel J. F. Gilmer of North Carolina, as inspector of the works, and assigned to General J. G. Martin the details of administration in North Carolina in order that General Hill might "be enabled to give most of his time and attention to the troops in Virginia." *Ibid.*, 657, 668.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 16, 639.

details from the North Carolina brigades of Daniel and Ransom, and the semi-North Carolina brigade of Walker, together with the men of R. H. Anderson's division, toiled eight and ten hours a day on these works during the intense heat of the season.¹ General Hill also collected 1,000 negroes, chiefly from North Carolina, to expedite the work.² These defenses, thus actively begun, were completed by General French after General Hill was called back to his division for the Maryland Campaign. Although these lines were not used largely at this crisis, they in 1864 "gave one year of life to the Confederacy."³

As General Lee wished to interfere as much as possible with the Federal river communications, he directed General Hill to annoy the gunboats and the transports on the river whenever plans to do so could be devised. The most enterprising attack on the Federal shipping and encampments was made on the night of July 31 at Coggin's Point, opposite Harrison's Landing. Under General Lee's orders his chief of the reserve artillery, General W. N. Pendleton, reported to General Hill at Petersburg with 34 guns.⁴ To these were added two batteries from Hill's artillery. The infantry escort consisted of Daniel's North Carolinians and Walker's mixed brigade containing the Twenty-seventh and Forty-sixth North Carolina.

¹ *Official Records*, 14, 679.

² Hill's Report, *Ibid.*, 16, 939. Hill adds of other operations in the department: "The defenses of the Appomattox were also strengthened, and a movable car planned and ordered to prevent a landing at City Point. An effort was made to organize and make efficient the numerous independent companies in the department, which had been of little use and much expense to the country. A concentration of these troops at Weldon and Goldsboro was ordered to prevent the cutting of our important lines southward. . . . Arrangements were made for the defense of the Blackwater, Chowan, and Tar rivers, and a point selected on the Roanoke to secure Weldon."

³ French, *Two Wars*, 147. "These intrenchments, in 1864, defeated some attempts at surprise; and at last enabled Beauregard with two divisions to withstand the attack of Grant's whole army between July 15 and 18 of that year." Alexander, *Military Memoirs*, 172.

⁴ Pendleton's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 943.

The immediate command of the expedition was entrusted to General S. G. French. The troops reached the banks of the river without being discovered. Under the cover of darkness 41 guns were placed in battery, and at 12:30 discharged about 1,000 shells¹ into the shipping on the river and the encampments beyond. The guns were immediately withdrawn before the gunboats could enmesh them with their heavy shells. Beyond a wild commotion among the Federals when the midnight shells began to burst about their ships and among their tents, no very material damage was done. After this surprise, however, McClellan built field works on the south bank of the river, and transported Reynolds's division over to occupy them.

While the reorganization and recuperation of his army was progressing, Lee was canvassing future possibilities. There was no divided council behind him, as was the case with McClellan; whatever he advocated would be done. Three options lay before him. The first was a passive holding of his lines to await Federal developments, but Lee rarely entertained long a passive suggestion. Second, he could gather his strength and make a new leap at his antagonist on the Peninsula, but McClellan's formidable position with twenty-four gunboats² on his flanks suggested the possibility of another Malvern Hill. Third, Pope's army, isolated in a measure, incompletely welded, and led by a man who from his announced plans and vociferations seemed likely to blunder in an emergency, gave fair prospect of a military harvest.

Lee decided that, if unattacked, he would start at the earliest possible moment for the "suppression of Pope." He could not, however, leave Richmond until the defenses were in better shape and until he knew whether McClellan would come at him either from the

¹ *Official Records*, 16, 945.

² *Naval Official Records*, I, 7, 581.

north or the south of the James.¹ It is an anomaly of war that at this juncture both Pope and Lee desired the same movement on the part of the Confederates, but, of course, for different reasons. Pope wanted Lee to move part of his troops against his Army of Virginia in order that McClellan, expectant of a second forward swing towards Richmond, might have easy traveling. Lee was eager to send his men against Pope, for the Federals were concentrating in territory which the Confederates could not spare. Lee could not allow Pope to wreck the two railroads converging at Gordonsville, cut the Confederacy off from the rich mountain section of Virginia, and bar the doors to the North. Yet his army was too weak to act offensively in force against Pope and at the same time defensively against McClellan. He, however, resolved as a first step to spare Jackson with only Winder's and Ewell's divisions to make such headway as so small a force could in slowing down Pope's activities until reinforcements could be forwarded.² On receipt of his orders on July 13, Jackson, who had been chafing for action in this direction, was off with a will for Gordonsville.

Nor did Lee start Jackson too soon. Pope, still in Washington, ordered General Hatch on July 14 to dash with his cavalry to Gordonsville and destroy the Virginia Central Railroad toward Richmond and toward Charlottesville.³ Hatch, however, much to Pope's displeasure,⁴ cumbered himself with infantry, artillery, and a wagon train, and advanced so slowly

¹ "Although feeling weak, uncertain which side of the James River the enemy will advance, and being obliged to watch both, I could send you a force to suppress Pope could I see a chance of your hitting him which did not involve its too long absence." Lee to Jackson, July 25.

² The only North Carolina troops in these divisions were the Twenty-first Regiment and the First Battalion.

³ *Official Records*, 18, 473.

⁴ "I was greatly surprised to learn from General Hatch's dispatch that he had gone to execute the duty I assigned to him with infantry, artillery, and a wagon train. I never dreamed of such a thing." Pope to Banks, July 19.

that Jackson, who had moved with swiftness, stopped his expedition by occupying Gordonsville ahead of him. Shortly after Jackson reached Gordonsville he applied for reinforcements. General Lee, who was already surmising that General McClellan was in trouble and who knew that Pope was "too strong to be allowed to remain so near our communications," resolved to incur further risk, and on July 27 ordered General A. P. Hill, with his own division and Stafford's brigade of Louisianians to report to Jackson.¹

The coming of these sturdy campaigners cheered Jackson into an immediate search for a Federal force with which he might safely cope. "Having received information that only part of General Pope's army was at Culpeper Court House, and hoping through the blessing of Providence to be able to defeat it before reinforcements could arrive there,"² Jackson set his three divisions in motion toward Culpeper. The Federal cavalry under Bayard and Buford opposed the heads of his columns at every vantage point, and gave General Pope full notice of his approach.³ So active was the Federal cavalry that Jackson detached two of his brigades—Lawton's and Gregg's—to guard the fords and protect his trains.

On the morning of August 9, as Early's brigade in Jackson's van arrived within about eight miles of Culpeper Court House, it found the Federals in its front near Cedar Run, a short distance north and west of a considerably elevated knob bearing the ill-omened name of Slaughter Mountain. Jackson was not expecting to be attacked and was advancing cautiously with a view of delivering a blow at Culpeper. His marching columns were strung out for five or six miles. He rapidly formed his leading divisions, Ewell's and

¹ Branch's brigade of five and Pender's of four North Carolina regiments, and Latham's North Carolina battery came with Hill.

² Jackson's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 182.

³ *Ibid.*, 55, 133.

Winder's, and set officers spurring to quicken the pace of A. P. Hill's troops, who were well in the rear. Early's brigade deployed into battle line on the right of the Culpeper road under the protection of a ridge overlooking the coming field of strife. Hay's Louisiana brigade under Colonel Forno and Trimble's brigade, which included the Twenty-first North Carolina Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Saunders F. Fulton and the First North Carolina Battalion, Major Rufus W. Wharton, were placed on the northwestern slope of Slaughter Mountain. There was a gap between these two brigades and Early's line, into which Thomas's brigade was subsequently rushed. On the left of Early were Winder's three brigades—Taliaferro's alongside the Culpeper road, Garnett's reaching to the woods on the extreme Confederate left, the Stonewall under Ronald in rather distant reserve. The fire of 26 guns¹ that Jackson's chiefs of artillery rushed in three groups to the front line made it possible for this formation to be almost completed before the Federal storm broke against it.

The Federal force which was thus crossing Jackson's path was Pope's Second Army Corps under General N. P. Banks, one of Jackson's former antagonists in the Valley, whose troops "panted for a fight."² Pope, who was under orders "to so operate upon the enemy's lines of communication to the north and northwest as to force him to make such heavy detachments from his

¹ Their experience in the Peninsula had taught Confederate officers that they were not relying enough on their artillery to save the blood of their men. Their observation in those battles forced upon them the practical calculation that for every foeman brought down by a long-range shot a musket with its capacity for thirty or forty close-range shots went also to the ground. Hence at the close of those battles they had reorganized their artillery systematically. The havoc wrought by the artillery in this its first essay under the new system clearly demonstrated the wisdom of the change. Wise in *Long Arm of Lee*, says: "In the battle of Cedar Mountain, in which the batteries were directed by divisional chiefs, is to be found by far the best tactical employment of field artillery up to that time exhibited by the Confederates." I, 250.

² Banks's testimony before Committee on the Conduct of the War, III, 46.

main force at Richmond as would enable the Army of the Potomac to withdraw from its position at Harrison's Landing,"¹ was concentrating at Culpeper for a demonstration against Gordonsville.² On August 7, Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps reached Culpeper, where Crawford's brigade of Banks's corps had been encamped for two weeks. Pope, on August 8, ordered Banks at Hazel Run and Sigel at Sperryville to meet him at Culpeper. Banks arrived promptly, but Sigel, waiting to inquire about roads when there was only one,³ reached the town so late as to render "it impracticable for that corps to be pushed forward on the afternoon of the next day."⁴ While waiting for these two corps, Pope moved Crawford's brigade to Cedar Run as a support to Bayard's cavalry, which Jackson was pressing back, and Ricketts's division to a cross-roads about three miles in rear of Crawford. When Banks came up he was directed to pass Ricketts and reunite his corps at Cedar Run.

Therefore, at the opening of the battle of Cedar Run in the afternoon of August 9, the Federal forces were thus disposed: Banks's corps, with nine batteries and four cavalry regiments, was alone in battle position.⁵ Three miles in his (Banks's) rear and within easy

¹ *Official Records*, 16, 23. McClellan's evacuation began August 11.

² "Unless the enemy is heavily reinforced from Richmond, I shall be in possession of Gordonsville and Charlottesville within ten days." Pope to Halleck, *Ibid.*, 527.

³ Pope's Report, *Ibid.*, 23.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Banks, despite Pope's efforts to obtain one from him, (a) made no report of this battle. In his volunteered testimony on this subject before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, he says on one page that he "had about 6,000 men," and Jackson 23,000; on the very next page he declares, "We were 5,000 men against 25,000 in those woods and on that hill." (b) Pope, as inaccurate as Banks about figures, says that Banks's strength was "reported at 14,500, but in reality (was) only 8,000." (c) This last figure, 8,000, has been accepted by many careful writers, but it seemingly does not tally with the itemized reports of the officers engaged. Generals Gordon and Crawford commanded the brigades of the right wing under General Williams. The left wing, consisting of the brigades of Geary, Greene, and Prince, composed Augur's division.

supporting distance, Ricketts's division had been posted.¹ Sigel's corps was lunching at Culpeper, and Milroy was on the march to that town from Woodville.

An acrimonious controversy later arose as to whether Banks was directed, as he claims, to fight on sight,² or whether, as Pope asserts,³ Banks was to take one of those reprobated "strong positions" and wait until

Gordon reports (<i>d</i>) officers and men actually engaged	1,500
Crawford reports (<i>e</i>) 88 officers and 1,679 men	1,767
Augur reports (<i>f</i>) only the enlisted men of his three brigades engaged	3,013
Augur's officers (11 regiments) estimated at average of Crawford's	242
Bayard's Cavalry:	
First New Jersey, (Bayard to Schriver (<i>g</i>) August 9)....	290
First Maine (Official Report, August 9 (<i>h</i>)).....	492
First Rhode Island, Returns of August 16 (<i>i</i>).....	566
First Pennsylvania (no report; estimated at average of other three)	449
	1,797
Artillery, (<i>j</i>) (nine batteries,).....	1,224

Total of Banks's Corps	9,543
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a Pope's Letter, January 12, 1865, to Committee on Conduct of War, III, 50.

b *Ibid.*, 45-46.

c *Official Records*, 16, 20.

d *Ibid.*, 808.

e *Ibid.*, 152.

f *Ibid.*, 157.

g *Ibid.*, 18, 550.

h *Ibid.*, 555.

i *Ibid.* On July 31, returns show 530. *Ibid.*, 523.

j Committee on Conduct of War, II (Supplement), 118.

¹ *Official Records*, 16, 26. Pope's Report.

² In his testimony, already quoted, Banks states, first, that he was ordered to give battle; second, that the Confederates were the aggressors. "What I want to say," he testifies as to the first assertion, "is that this battle was fought under positive orders." Of the second assertion, he says: "About 5 o'clock, which is the usual time for them to make an attack, they made a desperate attack on our right." General Quincy comments on this assertion: "Nothing can be farther from the fact. Confederate testimony in abundance will show that by our furious and utterly unexpected charge their troops were thrown into confusion." *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, 23. General Pope says: "In this case, too, it was not the enemy that advanced against Banks's strong position, but Banks who advanced against the enemy's chosen position." Committee on Conduct of the War, III, 47.

³ "The object in sending Banks's corps to the front to take and hold a strong position against the advancing enemy, until Sigel's corps and Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps could be united in his rear, was so plain and so clearly understood by every man of ordinary intelligence that I find it impossible to believe that General Banks did not understand it. . . . As I have stated in my official report, I never designed that Banks should attack the enemy before McDowell and Sigel joined him, and gave no order whatsoever to that effect." Pope to Wade, 50.

Pope's concentration was effected.¹ Be the truth what it may, Banks at once adjusted his troops for battle. Williams's division with Gordon's brigade finely posted on a commanding knoll on the extreme right, and Crawford's brigade on Gordon's left and front, composed the right wing. Augur's division, with Geary's brigade joining Crawford, Prince's brigade on Geary's left, and Greene's small brigade on the extreme left, constituted his left wing. After a cannonade, lasting for over two hours, Banks, who says of his frame of mind, "I was a little desperate because we supposed that General Pope thought we did not want to fight,"² ordered the brigades of Crawford, Geary, and Prince forward in attack,³ while those of Gordon and Greene secured their flanks.

The three brigades, advanced at first under cover of the forest, then burst with loud cries from the woods, and swept across the open fields with great determination. Prince, on the left, however, exposed to a flank fire from the batteries on Slaughter Mountain, struck Early's brigade, which was soon reinforced by Thomas and his sturdy Georgians, and was rather speedily fought to a standstill. On the right and center the Federals fared better for a time. Crawford's brigade, with six companies of Gordon's Third Wisconsin annexed to its right, overlapped Garnett's brigade on the Confederate left, and, after a fierce but

¹ Lieutenant-Colonel Horton says: "It is somewhat difficult to decide exactly the truth of these conflicting tales; but the probability is that Banks, believing that he had only Jackson's advance in front, desired to gather for himself some of those laurels which had not fallen to him in the Valley of the Shenandoah." *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, 48.

² Committee on the Conduct of the War, III, 46.

³ In addition to Confederate testimony, the reports of Banks's division commanders show that he was the assailant. General Williams says: "Receiving urgent directions to hasten the movements of Crawford's brigade, I dispatched Captain Wilkins with orders to General Crawford to begin his advance as soon as his brigade was in line." *Official Records*, 16, 146. General Augur reports: "Just at this period I received an order from the major-general commanding the corps to advance my brigade through the woods and prepare to move on the left flank of the enemy." *Ibid.*, 150.

brief resistance,¹ bore it back into the woods. Obliquing to the left, Crawford's men threw themselves against Taliaferro's left just as Geary's brigade fell on its front. The double blow, sustained for a time with resolute hardihood, routed Taliaferro's troops.² As they broke, they took with them to the rear the left regiments of Early's brigade, which was then fighting Prince and a part of Geary's brigade.

Affairs now looked as though Banks was about to retrieve his lost laurels. Of the four Confederate brigades in the battling zone, two and one-half had temporarily crumbled. Only Thomas's brigade and one-half of Early's were standing unflinchingly on the original line, and three Federal brigades were now converging on them. Jackson's reserves, the Stonewall brigade, and Branch's five regiments of North Carolinians were, however, in this crisis at opportune hand. The Stonewall brigade, under Colonel Ronald, charged in about where Garnett's route had left an opening. Ronald's left regiments encountered at first slight resistance, for they stretched beyond the Federal line of attack, but his remaining regiments had to confront the victorious sweep of the Federals. In the shock along the Culpeper road his Thirty-third Virginia regiment was endangered when the Twenty-seventh Virginia on its right gave way before the Federal assault.³ As the men of the broken regiment drifted back, Branch's brigade, hot from a toilsome march, opened its ranks for Ronald's fugitives to pass to the rear, and then caught breath for a vigorous charge.

¹ Every one of Garnett's regimental commanders went down in this conflict, and his brigade lost 301 men.

² "The storm broke suddenly on the enemy. It came while they were deciding that there was no hostile infantry in their front, and gave them barely time to open fire." Gordon, *Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain*, 294.

³ See Haynes's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 196.

"At this moment," says Allan, "Branch¹ came forward in splendid order, his line extending to the road on his right, and struck Crawford in full force and quickly changed the aspect of affairs."² "But," reports Colonel Ronald, "General Branch's brigade coming up at this moment (his line being perpendicular to the road while the line of the First Brigade [Ronald's] was parallel), General Branch opened a vigorous fire on the enemy, which soon succeeded in driving him from his position."³ When Branch relieved his right, Ronald, pivoting on his Thirty-third Virginia Regiment had wheeled his other regiments to face the Federals and, as Branch drove them before him, Ronald's men, as well as the men of Garnett and Taliaferro who had rallied behind Ronald and Branch, poured on them a destructive flanking cross-fire, and drove them back, but not until they had made a manful and desperate stand.⁴ As Crawford and Geary reeled back, Banks gave an order that was productive of further

¹ Branch's brigade had not been changed. It was still composed of the Seventh North Carolina, Colonel E. G. Haywood; the Eighteenth, now under Lieutenant-Colonel T. J. Purdie; the Twenty-eighth, Colonel J. H. Lane, the Thirty-third, Colonel R. F. Hoke, and the Thirty-seventh, Colonel W. M. Barbour.

² *The Army of Northern Virginia*, 174.

³ Ronald's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 192.

⁴ General A. P. Hill reports: "Winder's (Ronald in command) brigade, immediately in front of Branch, being hard pressed, broke, and many fugitives came back. Without waiting for the formation of the entire line, Branch was immediately ordered forward, and passing through the broken brigade, received the enemy's fire, promptly returned it, checked the pursuit, and in turn drove them back." *Ibid.*, 215. Jackson adds: "At this critical moment, Branch's brigade of Hill's division, with Winder's brigade, further to the left, met the Federal forces, flushed with their temporary success, and drove them back with terrible slaughter." *Ibid.*, 183. General Crawford, in his report, confirms this statement of his losses. He says: "The slaughter was fearful. The field officers of the regiments which had driven the enemy back were killed, wounded, or prisoners. Most of the company officers had fallen by the side of their men. . . . Out of 88 officers and 1,679 men taken by me into action, 56 officers and 811 men are killed, wounded, and prisoners." *Ibid.*, 152. Thomas H. Sutton, of the Eighteenth North Carolina, says: "After this fight and victory, General Jackson rode out in front of our brigade and dropped his hat in silent acknowledgment of our deed in holding an important point, which the old Stonewall Brigade had failed to do." Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 68.

Federal slaughter.¹ He directed General Gordon to lead his brigade, the only unengaged one on the field, to the support of the collapsing Union lines. Before Gordon could descend from his crest and reach his companions, they had been hopelessly overwhelmed, and "the rattle and roar of musketry had given place to a dreadful and ominous silence."² The Confederate brigades of Archer and Pender³ of A. P. Hill's division had by this time arrived and aligned themselves on the left of Branch, and two squadrons of the First Pennsylvania Cavalry had recklessly dashed against the advancing infantry to cover Crawford's retreat. Gordon had, therefore, to dare fortune not only with the brigades of Branch and Ronald and the partly restored brigades of Taliaferro and Garnett, but with the fresh brigades of Archer and Pender closing in on his right flank. "We had come at top speed," writes Gordon, "to support Crawford, but his whole line had melted away. We had come to sustain, but we remained alone to bear the brunt of the fight."⁴ His brigade, a useless sacrifice, was, of course, crushed in a few moments by a crash of rifle fire extending from Pender on the left to Early on the right.

The repulse of the Federal right and center enabled Ewell, who had been shut off from aggression by his

¹ Major Gould, of the Tenth Maine Regiment, gives a graphic picture of his men's behavior as they were stricken in this battle. He says: "The behavior of those who were hit appeared most singular, and, as there were so many of them, it looked as if we had a crowd of howling dervishes dancing and kicking around in our ranks. The bullet often knocks over the man it hits and rarely fails to disturb his equilibrium. Then the shock causes a sudden jump or shudder. Now, as every man, with hardly an exception, was either killed, wounded, hit in his clothes, or jostled by his wounded comrades, it follows that we had a wonderful exhibition." *History of the Tenth Maine*, 176.

² Gordon, *From Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain*, 303.

³ Pender's brigade of four North Carolina regiments—the Sixteenth, Colonel J. S. McElroy; the Twenty-second, Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. Gray; the Thirty-fourth, Colonel R. H. Riddick; and the Thirty-eighth, Captain John Ashford—was sent to work its way through the woods to the extreme Confederate left. It came into action on Archer's left in time to join in the repulse of Gordon, but was not under heavy fire.

⁴ Gordon, *From Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain*, 304.

position, to push the brigades of Trimble and Forno against the Federal left. "Thus repulsed," reports Jackson, "from our left and center, and now pressed by our right, center, and left, the Federal force commenced retreating, leaving their dead and wounded on the field of battle."¹

The heavy firing toward Cedar Run warned General Pope at Culpeper that Banks had blundered into a test of strength with Jackson. He, therefore, accompanied by Ricketts's division and followed by Sigel's corps and Milroy's brigade, hastened toward the firing. He, however, arrived too late to do more than check the Confederate pursuit after midnight. On the next morning Jackson, who had learned that practically all of Pope's force was before him, retired to his original position at Slaughter Mountain, and posted his troops to receive an attack if the Federals decided to advance. He spent the day in "sending the wounded to the rear, burying the dead, and collecting arms from the battlefield."² The Federals on the morning of the eleventh obtained permission³ to search further for their wounded, and to bury such of their dead as Jackson's men had not already interred.

Leaving his camp fires burning, Jackson late on the same night set his troops in motion for the vicinity of Gordonsville.⁴ His retirement had a double object; first, he was not in sufficient force to resist the numbers gathering around Pope; second, he hoped that "General Pope would be induced to follow him until he was

¹ *Official Records*, 16, 184.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, 179. Lee's Report, 18, 563.

⁴ "His retreat to Gordonsville has been represented as a flight. He is said to have abandoned many wounded and stragglers and to have barely saved his baggage. In all this there is not one word of truth." Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 105. "The hostile forces stood for two days watching each other. Jackson hoped Pope would attack him in position. Failing this, he fell back all the way to Gordonsville, hoping that Pope would be tempted by this 'apparent confession of weakness' and Pope's 'own boastings' to come forward and assault him." Steele, *American Campaigns*, 243.

reinforced.”¹ Pope came near falling into the snare. He announced, on August 12, his intention of moving across the Rapidan on Lousia Court House as soon as Reno’s division arrived,² but Halleck, with a warning that “feigned retreats are secesh tactics,”³ forbade his crossing the Rapidan,⁴ and suggested that until reinforcements from McClellan’s army joined him, he would be safer behind the Rappahannock.⁵ Had Pope crossed the Rapidan, the movement would have thrown his army into the lap of the Confederates, for Longstreet and Hood arrived at Gordonsville on August 14, and Pope, ahead of reinforcements and far from his base, would have been forced to give battle under desperate disadvantage.

The official lists of casualties disclose that the Federal losses were nearly double those of the Confederates. This marked difference in casualties is to be expected when one antagonist battles in position with effective batteries in its front. The total Confederate losses⁶ were 1,314; the total Union⁷ 2,381. The North Carolina losses⁸ were 111 men. Latham’s battery, which took part in shelling the woods ahead of the pursuing columns, reports no loss.

There are few reports from North Carolina officers in the official records—not a single regimental officer

¹ *Official Records*, 16, 185. “He had accomplished all that he dared to undertake with the force under his command; he had attacked a portion of the army under General Pope, routed it before it could be reinforced, greatly alarmed the authorities at Washington, and given to them a final argument, if one was needed, in favor of the withdrawal of the army under General McClellan from its position on James River to the support of the army in front of Washington.” Taylor, *General Lee*, 88.

² *Official Records*, 18, 565.

³ *Ibid.*, 564.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 564.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 576.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 16, 185.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 136 *et seq.*

⁸ These were distributed as follows: in the Seventh Regiment, which became separated from Branch’s other regiments and was only slightly engaged, 2; in the Eighteenth, 14; in the Twenty-eighth, 29; in the Thirty-third, 36; in the Thirty-seventh, 15. Pender’s brigade lost 15, but the losses are not given by regiments. The Twenty-first lost 2.

reporting. The list of men commended for gallantry or efficiency on the field of battle is, therefore, very inadequate. General Pender calls attention to the gallantry and skill of Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. Gray and Major C. C. Cole, Captain John Ashford of the Thirty-eighth, Captain S. A. Ashe, and Lieutenant John Young. General Branch commends Captain F. T. Hawks and Lieutenant J. A. Bryan, and General Jackson pays a tribute to Lieutenant J. G. Morrison of his staff.

Of Jackson's three divisions, the strength of Ewell can be fixed with accuracy, for he forwarded an official return, made, as Early says,¹ on the day of the battle. The numbers of A. P. Hill, too, may be determined with reasonable accuracy from his returns of July 20, for it is probable that his gains from conscripts offset his losses during the intervening days. Winder's divisional strength can only be estimated, for he made no reports. The following, then, closely approximates Jackson's paper strength, but makes no allowances for losses from heat, sickness, and travel:

Ewell's division ² (Early, Forno, Trimble).....	5,027	
A. P. Hill's division ³	10,651	
Winder's division (13½ regiments estimated at Ewell's average).....	4,050	
Stafford's brigade attached to Hill.....	1,650	
Robertson's cavalry (4 regiments, not engaged in battle)	1,400	
Hill and Winder's artillery (7 four-gun batteries) ⁴ ...	504	
		23,282
Less Lawton's brigade, detached, ⁵	2,159	
Less Gregg's brigade detached, ⁶	1,500	3,659
Total on field.....		19,623

¹ *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 8, 305.

² *Official Records*, 18, 965.

³ *Ibid.*, 645.

⁴ Wise, in *Long Arm of Lee*, gives 72 men as the average field battery strength at this date, I, 244.

⁵ Early's statement, *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 8, 305.

⁶ Caldwell, *History of Gregg's Brigade*.

CHAPTER XVI

FROM THE RAPIDAN TO BULL RUN

The battle at Cedar Run, fought before there was any general movement of McClellan's troops from the Peninsula,¹ convinced Halleck that "Lee did not propose to wait either his or McClellan's leisure"² before turning his guns against Pope. While Pope was pleading that McClellan's men should be busied against Richmond in order that Lee might not reinforce Jackson³ and crush his army, Halleck was bent on getting the veterans of the Army of the Potomac under Pope's banner. He saw no reason why they should not be transported from Fort Monroe in time to assure Pope a triumphant campaign. He, therefore, began to deluge McClellan with telegrams, some of them very ill-natured, all feverishly insistent on rapidity in forwarding the troops. Pope was constantly assured that reinforcements would soon be at his command. Meantime he was admonished "to fight like the devil and yield no inch of ground."⁴

Impatient as Halleck was to speed troops to Pope, he was no more anxious than Lee was to forward men to Jackson; for Lee, of course, saw that his best military play was, not to follow McClellan down the Peninsula, but to fall on Pope with every man that could hob-

¹ "The question whether to reinforce Pope or McClellan was decided. Stonewall Jackson was in front of the army covering Washington. Halleck's orders for the evacuation of the Peninsula by McClellan's army must be carried out. Burnside, hanging for so long a time between McClellan and Pope, must go to Pope." Lee, *Life of Lee*, 179.

² General Quincey in *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, 2, 15.

³ "Please make McClellan do something to prevent reinforcements being sent here." "The only hazard in such a policy is the supineness of the Army of the Potomac." Pope to Halleck, August 11.

⁴ "Dispute every inch of ground and fight like the devil till we can reinforce you. Forty-eight hours more and we can make you strong enough." Halleck to Pope, August 21, *Official Records*, 16, 57.

ble, before he could be overwhelmingly reinforced.¹ There followed, then, a race between Lee and Halleck to see which could first get troops to their outlying generals.

On August 13, the day on which General McClellan ordered his land march down the Peninsula to begin, General Lee was informed that Burnside's command had left Fort Monroe for Fredericksburg. He at once interpreted this to mean that Federal activity would now be centered on the Rappahannock. He therefore ordered Longstreet with ten brigades, Hood with two, and Stuart's cavalry, to entrain for Gordonsville.² There were no North Carolina troops with Longstreet. The Sixth North Carolina, under command of Major R. F. Webb, was in Law's brigade of Hood's division, and Captain James Reilly's Rowan battery was also attached to Hood. There were, therefore, in the campaign against Pope only eleven regiments and one battalion of North Carolina infantry,³ the First Regiment of cavalry, Colonel L. S. Baker, in Hampton's brigade of Stuart's division, and the batteries of Latham and Reilly.

General Lee wrote to President Davis on August 14: "Unless I hear from you to the contrary, I shall leave for Gordonsville at four a.m. tomorrow."⁴ Within a few hours after the troops around that town had given their commander a tumultuous welcome, he put them on the road to spar for an opening with Pope. He was greatly relieved on August 17 by a telegram from D. H.

¹ "The failure to attack this army in front, therefore, signified that General Lee was playing for results at once more brilliant and decisive. If he could cut off General Pope's retreat by interposing his whole army between the Army of Virginia and the Army of the Potomac, he might destroy the former, and then falling upon the latter before it was wholly assembled drive it back routed and demoralized to the defenses of the capital." Upton, *Military Policy*, 360.

² *Official Records*, 14, 675-76.

³ Five regiments in Branch's brigade and four in Pender's of A. P. Hill's division; the Twenty-first and First Battalion in Trimble's brigade of Ewell's division; and the Sixth in Law's brigade of Hood's division.

⁴ Lee's Confidential Dispatches, 48.

Hill, stating that the Federal troops had disappeared from both banks of the James.¹ On receipt of this pleasurable news Lee proceeded to strip Richmond of all its defenders² except the North Carolina brigades of Daniel³ and Martin⁴ and the small Virginia brigade of Henry A. Wise. The division of R. H. Anderson (formerly Huger's) had gone forward on August 15. The divisions of McLaws, Walker, G. W. Smith, and Hampton's cavalry were next set in motion. As General Lee wished to have General D. H. Hill with him during the campaign, President Davis relieved Hill of his departmental command, and he returned to his former division.

¹ *Official Records*, 18, 932.

² Nothing better indicates the confidence existing between Davis and Lee than the correspondence of this period. Lee, satisfied that the President would sustain him in his momentous decision to transfer the seat of war, makes all his plans, and issues orders to lay the Confederate capital bare to the bone. Then in perfect recognition of the President's supremacy, he writes, "Should you not agree with me in the propriety of this step, please countermand the order and let me know." *Ibid.*, 942. President Davis, after pointing out that Lee's orders will uncover Richmond from the direction of Fredericksburg; that he hears of new Federal troops going to Point Comfort; that the York and James rivers are open to Federal boats; that the absence of the cavalry will leave Richmond blind as to Union movements; that the troops at Petersburg and in North Carolina are all recruits, tells Lee, "Confidence in you overcomes the view which would otherwise be taken of the exposed condition of Richmond, and the troops retained for the defense of the capital are surrendered to you on a renewed request." *Ibid.*, 945.

³ Daniel's North Carolina brigade consisted during the Seven Days Battles of only the Forty-third Regiment, Colonel T. S. Kenan, the Forty-fifth, which was Daniel's own regiment, and the Fiftieth, Colonel M. D. Craton. (Daniel's report, *Ibid.*, 13, 913.) The Thirty-second, Colonel E. C. Brabble, and the Fifty-third, Colonel W. A. Owens, and the Second Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. Shober, were added after that campaign. The Fiftieth was permanently detached from the brigade in June, 1863. Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 3, 173.

⁴ Martin's North Carolina brigade, hurriedly formed from new troops, was composed when it was ordered on July 5, to Petersburg, of the Seventeenth, Colonel W. F. Martin; the Forty-fourth, Colonel Thomas Singletary; the Forty-seventh, Colonel G. H. Faribault; the Fifty-second, Colonel J. K. Marshall. Martin, at that time both a brigadier-general in the Confederate service and adjutant general of North Carolina, was soon recalled to North Carolina by the governor. The general took with him for home defense the Seventeenth Regiment, but the Twenty-sixth, Colonel Harry K. Burgwyn, was transferred to fill the place of the Seventeenth. The brigade was then assigned to General J. J. Pettigrew, who though still weak from wounds and imprisonment, had reported for duty. In December the Eleventh Regiment, Colonel C. Leventhorpe, was added.

These changes took other North Carolina regiments toward the area of combat. There were no North Carolinians in R. H. Anderson's or in McLaw's division, but in D. H. Hill's division there were eleven regiments—five under Garland,¹ four under G. B. Anderson,² and two under Ripley.³ In Walker's division there were four regiments under Robert Ransom⁴ and three under Manning.⁵ In all eighteen additional North Carolina regiments were making their way to Lee in high hopes of breaking a lance against the author of General Order No. 11. None of these latter regiments, however, reached Lee in time to share in Pope's discomfiture, for General Hill, with his own and McLaw's division, was first ordered to Hanover Junction to guard Lee's right against a Federal advance from Fredericksburg, and Walker was moved by Rapidan Station.

When Lee reached Gordonsville on August 15, Pope's army was stretched along the Rapidan River with its left near Raccoon Ford, its center around Slaughter Mountain, nearly opposite Jackson's base on Gordonsville, and its right on Robertson's River about five miles west of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. His troops were massed towards the center and his left was weak. Although of course apprehensive that Lee would reinforce Jackson as soon as McClellan's retirement was known, Pope had no knowledge until August 18 that Longstreet's entire command was massed behind Clark's Mountain opposite his left, and even at that date he

¹ The Fifth, Colonel D. K. MacRae; the Twelfth, Colonel B. O. Wade; the Thirteenth, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Ruffin, Jr.; the Twentieth, Colonel Alfred Iverson; the Twenty-third, Colonel D. H. Christie.

² The Second, Colonel C. C. Tew; the Fourth, Colonel Bryan Grimes; the Fourteenth, Colonel R. T. Bennett; the Thirtieth, Colonel F. M. Parker.

³ The First, Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Brown; the Third, Colonel W. L. DeRosset.

⁴ The Twenty-fourth, Lieutenant-Colonel John L. Harris; the Twenty-fifth, Colonel H. M. Rutledge; the Thirty-fifth, Colonel M. W. Ransom; the Forty-ninth, Lieutenant-Colonel Lee M. McAfee.

⁵ The Twenty-seventh, Colonel J. R. Cooke; the Forty-sixth, Colonel E. D. Hall; the Forty-eighth, Colonel R. C. Hill.

seems not to have known that Lee was before him in person. He telegraphed Halleck on August 16 that unless the Confederates were reinforced they would not stand before him,¹ and on August 17, while Longstreet and Jackson were marching to fall on what he considered his weak spot,² his left, he reported that the "main body of the enemy has fallen back to Mechanicsburg and lies between Louisa Court House and Charlottesville."³ Not until the accidental capture of an order disclosing Confederate plans did he realize his danger. The revelation of Lee's intention to throw a crushing force on his left led him promptly and wisely to do what he had just admonished his army not to think of—namely, to take thought to his "lines of retreat and bases of supplies." He hastily dropped back from the Rapidan and gathered his army behind the Rappahannock River.

What had gone wrong with Lee's preparations to force a battle before Pope could retreat or be heavily reinforced? Lee's first thought on reaching Gordonsville and learning of Pope's advanced position was to strike heavily at the Federal left, for he at once recognized its weakness. Longstreet was set in motion on August 16 to cross the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford. Jackson, already in position, was directed to cross at Somerville Ford. Stuart's cavalry was ordered to speed to the right, block off Federal reinforcements from Fredericksburg, and destroy the railroad bridge in Pope's rear at Rappahannock Station. The loss of this bridge would have severed Pope's communications. The three commands, then, were to sweep forward for

¹ *Official Records*, 18, 575.

² "The weak point of my position is the left. There is danger that forces coming from Richmond may unite with Jackson . . . and thus interpose between me and Fredericksburg." Pope to Halleck, *Ibid.* Halleck realized the same danger, for he telegraphed Pope on August 16, "Look out well for the crossing at Germanna, and do not let your left flank be turned." *Ibid.*, 576.

³ *Ibid.*, 589.

battle on the eighteenth, while Pope was still unaware of their presence. With Lee's numbers and with Pope's disadvantageous position such a combination should have wrecked Pope's army.¹

However, two of those unexpected mishaps that so often upset military plans came pat with the occasion. The plan of operation was largely pivoted on the success of the cavalry. Stuart, who had gone ahead of his troopers for a consultation with General Lee, directed General Fitzhugh Lee, his brigade commander, to report to him at Verdiersville on the afternoon of August 17. It was intended that the horsemen should cross at Raccoon Ford ahead of Longstreet and operate on the Confederate right flank. Fitzhugh Lee, who states that he did not understand that "it was necessary to be at this point on that particular afternoon, marched out of the way to replenish his ammunition and rations, and did not reach his chief when expected."² Stuart, fretting over loss of time at such a juncture, dispatched his adjutant to search for the missing brigade. This officer, who bore on his person Stuart's copy of Lee's orders for August 18, was captured in the darkness, and the important document was forwarded in all haste to Pope. The nearness of catastrophe disclosed by the capture of this paper stirred Pope to immediate action, and retiring from the Rappahannock, he skillfully established his army behind the high

¹ Colonel Henderson says: "On the afternoon of August 17, Pope's army seemed doomed to inevitable destruction. The Confederate army, ready to advance, was concentrated behind Clark's Mountain, and Lee and Jackson, looking toward Culpeper, saw the promise of victory in the careless attitude of the enemy . . . and had the army moved as Lee intended, there can be no question but that the Federal army . . . would have been disastrously defeated." *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 114. General E. P. Alexander agrees with Henderson in these words: "The topography gave him a beautiful opportunity to mass his army . . . behind Clark's Mountain, fall on Pope's left flank and sweep around it with a superior force, cutting off Pope's retreat to Washington. Probably at no time during the war was a more brilliant opportunity put so easily within his grasp. He appreciated it, and promptly gave the necessary orders on the very day of his arrival." *Military Memoirs*, 186.

² Lee, *General Lee*, 183.

banks of the Rappahannock.¹ Thus, notwithstanding his lamentable address, he was at his first confrontal with Lee maneuvered into "turning his back on the the enemy."² As General Halleck had every reason to think that he could in a few days reinforce Pope heavily from the Army of the Potomac, then moving to Acquia Creek and Alexandria, he telegraphed him to fight hard to retain the Rappahannock line.³

General Lee at once followed to the Rappahannock, a river thick with fords. Then for five days, days marked by cavalry clashes, sullen or fiery artillery bombardment across the river, and an occasional infantry collision,⁴ Lee feinted for an opportunity to cross without undue fatality, but, as the Confederates marched up the south bank, the Federals ascended the northern side, and at each succeeding ford barred their crossing. That the Confederates had to do something and that quickly was made evident on the night of August 22, when Stuart in a daring raid on Catlett's Station cap-

¹ *Official Records*, 16, 56.

² "Lee, who could hardly believe that Pope after his vaunts would dare to fall back without a battle, watched from the summit of Clark's Mountain the withdrawal of the Federals and 'with a deeply drawn breath, expressive at once of disappointment and resignation,' said to Longstreet, 'General, we little thought that the enemy would turn his back upon us this early in the campaign'." Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 162.

³ *Official Records*, 16, 56.

⁴ The Twenty-first North Carolina Regiment took a gallant part in the most serious of those minor collisions—the one near Freeman's Ford, on August 22. General Henry Bohlen's Federal brigade of Carl Schurz's division crossed to the south side of the river and was attacked by Trimble's brigade of three regiments, supported by Hood. General Trimble reports: "The Fifteenth Alabama and Twenty-first Georgia were ordered on the enemy's flank by a slight detour, unobserved, while the Twenty-first North Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Saunders Fulton, advanced under my immediate command in the center. After a sharp conflict with the Twenty-first North Carolina the enemy was driven back to the hills on the river, where they made another stand. At this point, supported by their artillery on the north side of the river, they made an effort . . . to encourage their men to charge. The command was given to drive them at the point of the bayonet. Our men boldly advanced with enthusiastic cheers, and drove the opposing forces into the river and across it in great disorder to seek protection in General Sigel's camp and under his guns. . . . It is specially due to Lieutenant-Colonel Fulton, Twenty-first North Carolina, that I should mention the conspicuous gallantry with which he took the colors and led his regiment into the charge." *Ibid.*, 719.

tured Pope's army headquarters and all his correspondence. The information gained from this correspondence "showed Lee that his campaign was to be an utter failure unless within the next seven days he could bring Pope to battle on open ground";¹ for in addition to the 8,000 men under Reno, who had just reached Pope, Sturgis's men from Alexandria, Cox's hardy men from the Kanawha, Reynold's Pennsylvania Reserves, and the two veteran corps of Heintzelman and Porter were swarming the roads leading to his camps. The seasoned corps of Franklin and Sumner were only awaiting their artillery to report to their new commander.²

Deliberately weighing the growing disparity in numbers³ between his own and Pope's accumulating

¹ Alexander, *Military Memoirs*, 190.

² "In two days Pope would have about 50,000 men, and in four days more he would have near 130,000." Alexander, 190. "Thus within five days Pope would have nearly 130,000 troops." Steele, *American Campaigns*, 244.

³ General Lee's strength at this date has to be gathered from scattered sources. The nearest official return for most of his organizations is dated July 20, made of course while his army was still around Richmond.(a) There are no returns for the month that has elapsed. The following troops, with the numbers reported at that date, engaged in the campaign against Pope:

Longstreets wing:

Longstreet's former division	8,514
R. H. Anderson's (formerly Huger's division)	6,136
D. R. Jones's division, to which Drayton's brigade had been added	3,724
Hood's division, formerly Whiting's	3,860

22,234

Evans's brigade, joined from South Carolina(b)	2,200
Drayton's brigade, joined from South Carolina(c)	2,400
Stuart's two cavalry brigades—Robertson's and Fitzhugh Lee's(d)	2,541
Artillery, 20 batteries(e)	1,520

30,895

Jackson's wing, as already stated,	23,282
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Total for the campaign(f) 54,177

a *Official Records*, 14, 645.

b *Ibid.*, 27, 940.

c Assistant Adjutant General H. E. Young, of Drayton's brigade reports the two brigades, then under Drayton at 4,600. *Four Years with General Lee*, 60.

d The total Confederate Cavalry reported on July 20, was 4,041 (*Official Records*, 14, 645). Hampton's brigade of about 1,500 men was left in front of Richmond. This number subtracted from the total as above.

forces,¹ General Lee, whose audacity in an emergency was almost unparalleled, decided on one of the boldest operations in his career. Although the daring manœuvre now executed has been much criticised by sticklers for not abiding by the "recognized principles of military strategy," yet it is not to be wondered that a general, who knew the rules of war but was never hampered by them, should have determined under the

^e The average field strength of the Confederate battery at this date was 76.

^f Lee's total strength for the approaching campaign is thus given by the following writers: Allan, 54,268; Taylor, 49,077; Henderson, 55,000; Ropes, 50,000 to 55,000; Rhodes, 49,000; Longstreet, 53,000.

¹ The absence of complete reports forbids the fixing of Pope's numbers with comfortable certitude. Pope, it is true, gives his numbers often enough, but so carelessly that confirmation has always to be sought. He telegraphed Halleck on August 20: "That you may know exactly my condition I append a statement of my effective force." (*Official Records*, 18, 603). The figures given are: McDowell, 18,000; Sigel, 12,000; Banks, 7,000; Reno, 8,000—total 45,000. These figures do not concur with such official reports as are on record. Can Pope's real strength for August 20, a date before sharp fighting occurred, be closely approximated? Four days prior to this dispatch, August 16, General McDowell sent in his official itemized return of numbers. He gave as present for duty equipped, 22,117. (*Ibid.*, 580). Of these 2,698 were cavalymen. If Pope meant to exclude McDowell's cavalry, he erred in the estimate of the infantry by 1,419. There are no official returns for Sigel's corps after July 31, when its numbers were given as 13,099. (*Ibid.*, 523.) Colonel Meigs, quartermaster general, who was feeding the men, reports on August 18 (*Ibid.*, 597), that Sigel's regiments averaged from 550 to 600 men. As Sigel's corps contained 20 regiments of infantry, (*Ibid.*, 582) the lesser of Meigs's regimental averages would give that corps 11,000 men exclusive of his cavalry and his nine batteries of artillery. The nine batteries would number at least 1,000. Hence, 12,000 is about right for Sigel. On July 31, Banks's corps is returned officially at 14,785 (*Ibid.*, 583). It fought at Cedar Run with far fewer men than this number, but its small force on that day was due to detachments that afterwards returned. There is, however, an official return of Banks's corps for the month of August, and of course prepared before the battles at Manassas. This report which is not open to suspicion, states the corps at 8,851 present for duty (*Ibid.*, 781). Reno's strength is generally accepted as 8,000 men. Thus, on August 20, Pope's strength, judged by these reports and exclusive of Bayard's and Buford's cavalry, should have been very nearly as follows: McDowell, 19,419; Sigel, 12,000; Banks, 8,851; Reno, 8,000—a total of infantry and artillery of 48,270. Between August 20 and August 30, Pope was reinforced by: First, The Pennsylvania Reserves, formerly under McCall, then under Reynolds; Second, by Porter's corps; Third, by Heintzelman's corps; Fourth, by Piatt's small brigade from Sturgis; Fifth, by four of Cox's Kanawha regiments. When Reynolds left Fort Monroe his division was reported as having "about 8,000 men" (Tucker to Halleck, *Ibid.*, 600); when it left Falmouth to join Pope it was still reported at "about 8,000" (Burnside to Halleck, *Ibid.*, 615); when it reached the front, Pope himself states its number at 8,000 (Pope to Reno, *Ibid.*, 611). Why in his official report (*Ibid.*, 16, 30) Pope reduced it to 2,500—5,500 below its true strength—is known only to Pope himself. Porter's corps consisted of the two divisions of Morell and Sykes.

circumstances, on an unconventional stroke.¹ He could not break through the troops massed across the river without losing more soldiers than he could spare. He had not marched from the James to the Rappahannock to retire with only Jackson's victory at Cedar Run as the fruitage of a costly campaign.

Therefore, relying on the character of his antagonist and the stamina of his troops,² Lee resolved to divide his army of about 55,000 men, and head the enterprising Jackson, with around 23,000 soldiers, into a territory in which 130,000 Federals were supposed to be concentrating.³ While Jackson was driving his men

Porter's official return for August states his numbers at 10,056 (*Ibid.*, 781). These figures are more than confirmed by an official return of Morell's division at 6,741 on August 21, (*Ibid.*, 619) and by Sykes's statement that he joined with about 4,750 men. (Porter court martial, 1001.) This would make a total of 11,221 men for Porter. The judge advocate in the Porter court martial accepted 10,000 as Porter's strength (993). Even Pope on the Porter trial puts this corps at from 8,500 to 9,000 without Piatt (833) and finally Porter, in his hearing before the board of army officers in 1878, puts his force from 9,000 to 10,000. For Heintzelman's corps of Hooker's and Kearny's divisions we shall have, in the absence of other reports, to accept Pope's estimate of 10,000 men, although Kearny says on August 21, "My division is 7,000 marching men." (*Ibid.*, 614.) Thus without Piatt, and without Cox's Kanawha men, and exclusive of his cavalry, Pope seems to have numbered 48,270 of the Army of Virginia and 28,056 from the Army of the Potomac—a total infantry for the campaign from these two armies of 76,326. Pope reports his cavalry at 4,000. If this is correct, his total force for the operations against Lee was around 80,326 men.

¹ "General Lee said after the war, in referring to criticisms that had been made upon the great risks he had taken in this and in some of his other operations, that such criticisms were obvious, but that the disparity of forces between the contending armies rendered the risks unavoidable." Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*, 200.

² Ropes thus comments on the army of Lee at this period: "There were no experiments tried in the Army of Northern Virginia. The most distinguished officers that the Government of the Confederacy could find were put in the highest posts. There was hardly an officer of rank that was not a graduate of West Point. The war was conducted on their side on strictly military principles, and, without any possibility of doubt. Their adherence to these principles enabled them to gain successes that would otherwise have been unobtainable with their limited resources. . . . It was a veteran army. Their discipline, to be sure, was not very strict, but the troops were well led. The men were sturdy and active yeomen, accustomed to an outdoor life and to the use of arms; they had a year's campaigning, and they were full of confidence in their leaders." *Army under Pope*, 34. General Charles F. Walcott, U. S. Volunteers, says: "The Confederate army, led by real masters in the art of war, who were trusted, respected, and loved by fellow-officers and men, was victorious, united, and fiercely enthusiastic." *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, 143.

³ It is only certain that we have record of few enterprises of greater daring. . . . But to risk cause and country, name and reputation, on a single

by a circuitous route behind the Bull Run mountains to Pope's rear, Longstreet was to demonstrate ostentatiously along the Rappahannock to contain Pope as long as possible. Lee's hope in taking this audacious hazard was that by severing Pope's lines of communication and reinforcement and by interposing an army between the Federals and their capital, he could force Pope to battle before the Union concentration was completed.

No sooner was the decision reached than Jackson struck off while the stars were still shining on the morning of August 25.¹ Ten and a half North Carolina regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and Latham's battery followed the swift-moving Jackson on that silent, sweltering, dust-choking march of fifty miles in two days.² Across the upper Rappahannock at Hinson's with no one except their taciturn leader aware of their destination, the soldiers, stimulated by the mystery³ and wondering what mischief was afoot, plodded without halt on north through Orleans to sink into exhausted sleep at Salem. As the columns file sharply east on leaving Salem and the men feel

throw, and to abide the issue with unflinching heart is the supreme exhibition of the soldier's fortitude." Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 124.

¹ "Long before dawn the divisions were afoot. The men were hungry, and their rest had been short, but they were old acquaintances of the morning star, and to march while the east was still gray had become a matter of routine." Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 125.

² One who shared that march says: "The hot August sun rose, clouds of choking dust enveloped the hurrying column, but on and on the march was pushed without relenting. Knapsacks had been left behind in the wagons, and haversacks were empty by noon; for the unsalted beef spoiled and was thrown away, and the column subsisted itself, without process of commissariat, on green corn and apples from the fields and orchards along the route, devoured while marching; for there were no stated meal-times and no systematic halts for rest. . . . There was no mood for speech, nor breath to spare if there had been—only the shuffling tramp of the marching feet, the steady rumbling of wheels, the creak and rattle and clank of harness and accoutrements, with an occasional order, uttered under the breath, and always the same: 'Close up! Close up, men!'" Redwood in *Battles and Leaders*, II, 532.

³ "The troops moved as men will move when they are impelled by enthusiasm. . . . They seemed to have been lifted out of the obscurity of their lives into a higher plane of glorious achievement." *The Army of Virginia*, 113.

the cooler air of Thoroughfare Gap, they at last realize that they are making squarely and alone for Pope's rear. With a Confederate soldier's power to correlate topography and tactics they knew that they were marching into almost unparalleled danger, but with a sublime confidence in their leaders, they marched without perturbation.¹

Late in the afternoon of August 26, Jackson, after a march of 30 miles, fetched up his worn men at Bristoe Station on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.² He must destroy the bridge over Broad Run before he could delay to feast his men on the rich Federal storehouses of Manassas. Bristoe having been secured, General Trimble, in spite of the thirty-mile march of the day, volunteered to lead the Twenty-first North Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Saunders F. Fulton, and the Twenty-first Georgia another seven miles to capture Manassas Station, where Jackson had learned of an immense accumulation of Federal supplies. Quick action was necessary, for it was feared that warnings sent from Bristoe would bring heavy reinforcements from Alexandria to Manassas. The two regiments, subsequently joined by General Stuart as senior commander, with a few cavalry regiments, stumbled through the darkness and approached the Station about midnight. Stuart sent the Fourth Virginia Cavalry around to the rear of the station.³ The two infantry regiments took position—one on the north and one on the south side of the

¹ "We were exactly between these two great armies and completely cut off from our friends, and it looked as though the Federals only had to move together and crush us with their mighty weight. The men as well as the generals knew that our position was an extremely critical one, but not one of us had any fears of being crushed or captured. That Jackson was with us and could lead us out, was felt and expressed." Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 153.

² "He had marched all that afternoon some fifteen miles in rear of our army with his 25,000 men, and our army knew nothing about it. It is hardly necessary to say that this was the result of great negligence." Ropes, *Army Under Pope*, 51.

³ *Official Records*, 16, 734.

railroad track. General Trimble describes the result: "The position of the (Federal) batteries on each side of the railroad having been ascertained pretty accurately, the word was given, 'Charge,' when both regiments advanced rapidly and firmly, and in five minutes both batteries were carried at the point of the bayonet."¹

Trimble's report records the enormous booty that fell into the hands of the Confederate army as a result of this enterprising night march.² As soon as Trimble ascertained the value of the stores, he became uneasy lest Federals then known to be moving for Manassas should disperse his small force and wrest the spoils from him. Jackson, however, relieved his anxiety on the next morning by ordering the divisions of A. P. Hill and Taliaferro to Manassas. Jackson's third division under Ewell was held in observation at Bristoe Station, but with instructions to retire if attacked in force, for it was no part of Jackson's plan to fight at that place.

When A. P. Hill reached Manassas, Branch's brigade of North Carolinians brushed back about 600 men of Wagner's Second New York Heavy Artillery. This regiment, with the uncaptured section of Puttkammer's battery, had approached Manassas with no knowledge that Jackson's corps was being mobilized within the gates of the Federal army.³ After scattering this regiment, Branch was summoned in company with the brigades of Archer, Thomas, Field, and Pender to meet another oncoming Federal force that the indefatigable

¹ Of the eight guns thus captured, six belonged to Puttkammer's Eleventh New York Battery and two to Battery C, First New York. *Official Records*, 16, 402.

² The schedule of captures filed by General Trimble includes: 50,000 pounds of bacon, 1,000 barrels of corned beef, 2,000 barrels of salt pork, 2,000 barrels of flour, 2 trains loaded with promiscuous stores, clothing, etc., large stores of oats and corn and whiskey, 8 brass pieces of light artillery, caissons and ammunition, 72 artillery horses and harness, 175 draught horses, 42 wagons and ambulances, 4 sutler stores and contents, 200-300 new tents." *Ibid.*, 723.

³ *Ibid.*, 402.

Colonel Herman Haupt, Superintendent of Federal Railways, had succeeded in getting forward. This was General G. W. Taylor's New Jersey brigade of Slocum's division. The brigade, still under the impression that the Confederates at Manassas were only a party of raiders,¹ pressed into action with an expectation of recapturing their supply base. Taylor's men were greeted by a hot artillery fire, and Hill's division scattered them in confusion back to the bridge over Bull Run. When the New Jersey men reached this stream, Colonel E. P. Scammon, with the Eleventh and Twelfth Ohio regiments of Cox's Kanawha division, had just arrived at that point under orders to protect the bridges along the railway. General Taylor, who had been mortally wounded early in the engagement, turned his command over to Scammon. The two Ohio regiments battled gamely for a time, but were, of course, in too hopeless a minority to stop Hill's division, and were soon dislodged from their bank of the stream with a loss of 106 men. Two of Pender's North Carolina regiments followed them across the Run, but were recalled. Stuart's cavalymen harassed the fugitives of the day as far as Burke's Station, where their presence within twelve miles of Alexandria excited not a little commotion. General Jackson reported that Taylor attacked his men "with great spirit and determination."² Scammon, on the other hand, "felt constrained to say that the behavior of the New Jersey brigade after General Taylor retired from the field was discreditable."³

¹ Even so alert an officer as Haupt telegraphed Halleck: "It is probable that when our troops get there no enemy will be found." *Official Records*, 18, 680.

² *Ibid.*, 16, 644.

³ *Ibid.*, 406. These troops, whose antecedent record was fine, may have thought that they were obeying Taylor's orders, for in a subsequent report Scammon says: "They declared that the general had ordered them to retire, and retire they did most disgracefully." *Ibid.*, 407.

During the afternoon of this same day Ewell, who, it will be recalled, was left with three brigades at Bristoe Station, was attacked by Hooker's division, which Pope, still unaware of Jackson's proximity, had directed to restore the interrupted communications at the station. A sharp conflict followed, but as soon as Ewell found that a large force was before him, he obeyed his orders and drew back behind Broad Run. Night was at hand, and Hooker, already short of ammunition, made no effort to cross the stream. As the Twenty-first Regiment was with Trimble at Manassas, there were no North Carolina troops in this engagement.

In spite of his apparently perilous position, Jackson, who felt that with the railroad torn up and Stuart's cavalry guarding every approach, he was master of the situation for a few hours at least, then permitted his exhausted troops at Manassas to spend the remainder of the day in rest and in a carnival of pillage. The records of the North Carolina regiments abound in reference to the bodily satisfaction derived from this feast at Federal expense.¹

"The first step in Lee's plan of operations against Pope," says Gordon, "had been taken. Jackson had met with a success that exceeded even the most san-

¹ "Weak and haggard from their diet of green corn and apples, one can well imagine with what surprise their eyes opened upon the contents of the sutler's stores containing an amount and variety of property such as they had never before conceived of. Then came a storming charge of hungry men rushing in tumultuous mobs over each other's heads, under each other's feet, anywhere, everywhere, to satisfy a craving hunger. There were no laggards in that charge, and there was abundant evidence of the fruits of victory. . . . Men, ragged and famished clutched tenaciously at whatever came in their way, whether of clothing or food, of luxury or necessity. Here a long yellow-haired, barefooted son of the South claimed as prizes a tooth-brush, a box of candles, a quantity of lobster salad, a barrel of coffee; while there another whose butternut colored homespun hung around him in tatters crammed himself with sardines, potted game, and sweetmeats, and washed them down with Rhenish wine. As there were no wagons at hand to transport these captured delicacies, every soldier ate what he could and carried away the lighter articles. . . . The naked were clad, the barefooted were shod, the sick and wounded were provided comforts and luxuries to which they had long been strangers." Gordon, *The Army of Virginia*, 149-50. "The history

guine hopes of his commander, as high as his hopes may have been raised when he let loose such an agent as Jackson to mar and destroy the plans of such commanders as Halleck in his chair at Washington, and Pope as his subordinate in the field.”¹ Warned by Ewell’s battle in the afternoon and by the report after report from Stuart’s vigilant riders that the Federals in strength were converging on him by the very route over which he had come and along the railway south of Bristoe, he formulated alone his second step. He had not marched his men into the very jaws of his adversaries merely to destroy supplies that the wealthy Federal government could soon replace. He had undertaken this perilous adventure with the hope that by tapping the railroad that fed the Union army, by destroying supplies in the very back yard of that army, and by placing his men almost squarely between the Federals and their capital, he might create such consternation as would enable the Confederate army, when it was reunited by Longstreet’s arrival, to deliver a stunning blow. He must, therefore, now tolling Pope away from the easily defended line behind Bull Run, select a new position accessible to Longstreet’s route and strong enough for him to hold alone until Longstreet marched alongside. In addition, to shorten the time in which he must fight alone, he must conceal as long as possible the location of his men.

of war records many extraordinary scenes, but there are few more ludicrous than this wild revel at Manassas. Even the chagrin of Northern writers gives way before the spectacle; and Jackson must have smiled grimly when he thought of the maxim which Pope had promulgated with such splendid confidence: ‘Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents and leave our own to take care of themselves’.” Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 134.

¹ *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, 107. “He had,” say Wood and Edmonds, “swept round the Federal flank, broken their line of communications, destroyed their supplies, and now established himself with his whole command on the north side of the Warrenton turnpike, within 12 miles of Thoroughfare Gap and ready to reach out his right hand and join with Lee.” *Civil War in the United States*, 104.

A familiar knowledge of the ground led him to select the nearby field of First Manassas as meeting his requirements. Waiting until night would conceal the dust clouds raised by his marching columns, he set his three divisions in motion on three separate roads. Taliaferro, who was to protect such booty as was being moved by Jackson's few wagons, moved in extreme darkness on the nearest road—the Sudley Springs-Aldie Gap road—to the woods north of Groveton. Ewell, having stopped in Manassas long enough to furnish his men with such necessities as time permitted them to secure, crossed Bull Run at Blackburn's ford as though bound for Centreville. Then, turning up the stream, he recrossed the Run by Stone Bridge, and took post in the woods on Taliaferro's left. It fell to the lot of most of the North Carolinians with Jackson to follow A. P. Hill by the longest route. Marching out of Manassas at midnight by the glare arising from the Confederate destruction by fire of the remaining stores, they trudged to Centreville, where they remained until about ten o'clock on the next morning. Their presence there, coupled with Stuart's cavalry raid to Burke's Station, added to Pope's confusion as to Jackson's position. Hill, then, took the Warrenton pike, crossed the run at Stone Bridge, and established himself on Jackson's left. Thus, at noon the whole corps was united, having suffered no loss, greatly refreshed and elated by their successful expedition and full of confidence in their leader.”¹

¹ Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, 59. “The ground occupied by the Confederate troops was familiar to them. . . . From here in 1861 they had threatened the national capital, and from here they had withdrawn when their own capital at Richmond was in danger from the march of McClellan's army up the Peninsula. And now that the Federal army had been vanquished; now that the Confederate capital was no longer threatened by a hostile force, again had they returned to Manassas to strike the first blow in a series of strategical movements whose boldness and whose vigor more than ever before threatened the very existence of our national life.” Gordon, *The Army of Virginia*, 147.

Pope could not have permitted Jackson to select a line better suited to the Confederate leader's purpose than the one that he now occupied behind the Warrenton pike. If too hard pressed, a route of retreat through Aldie Gap was open to Jackson. Longstreet had only twelve miles to cover before he reached him, and the removal of Ricketts's Federal division from Thoroughfare Gap left the way open for his hastening brigades. Better still for Confederate purposes, the line was suited for offensive purposes as soon as Lee and Longstreet should stand beside Jackson; for, as before indicated, Jackson's task was only half finished. He had already forced Pope to turn loose his hold on the Rappahannock, but it was no part of Lee's purpose to hold his hand until Pope was forced into battle at minimum strength. The dangerously sought way was now opened.

What had the Federal commander been about while Jackson was thus toying with his communications? Pope was informed on the morning of August 25 of Jackson's march. So intent were his signalmen on an accurate report that they counted how many wagons, batteries, regimental flags, went past an open point in an hour.¹ Pope, however, seems to have concluded that the Confederates were headed for the Shenandoah Valley.² He apparently did not conceive that Lee would be daring enough³ to "march contemptuously around his position at Warrenton."⁴ McDowell, who commanded Pope's advance, was equally at sea as to

¹ *Official Records*, 18, 655.

² Pope to McDowell, at 9:30 p.m., August 25: "I believe that the whole force of the enemy has marched for the Shenandoah Valley by way of Luray and Front Royal." *Ibid.*, 16, 67.

³ "That Lee would dare divide his army they had never conceived; that Jackson would march fifty miles in two days and place his single corps astride their communications was an idea which had they thought of they would instantly have dismissed." Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 138.

⁴ *The Army in Virginia*, 130.

Jackson's destination.¹ With reports trickling in throughout August 26 that the marching column of Confederates had attained a position, if in force, to threaten seriously his right, Pope is still apparently unconcerned about Thoroughfare Gap.² Even when it was reported in the evening that his communications had been cut at Bristoe, he was still convinced that our fight should be made at Warrenton,"³ and that the aggressive intruders were only cavalry raiders. With this conviction dominating, he directed Heintzelman to put one regiment "on a train of cars and send it immediately to Manassas to ascertain what has occurred, repair the telegraph lines, and protect the railroad there.⁴ At midnight he is dubious whether Lee's whole force or part of it has gone round."⁵

¹ At the very hour on the 26th that Jackson was passing Gainesville, directly in his rear, McDowell almost ran the gamut of conjectures as to the movement. Was the enemy going through Rectortown toward Washington? Some thought so. Was he making for a march down the Shenandoah? Others thought so. Was he, after gathering supplies in the Valley, going to turn east for battle? Still others thought so. Was this baffling, hurrying column just a decoy, while the main body was bound for Sperryville? His purpose was not easy to discover. *Official Records*, 16, 68.

² "General Pope, indeed, tells us in his report (p. 140) that he confidently expected that by the afternoon of the 26th Franklin would have been at or near Gainesville; and that the forces under Cox and Sturgis would have been at Warrenton Junction. There may, undoubtedly, have been a time when he did expect this. But he certainly did not *on the evening of the 26th* suppose that Franklin was at Gainesville, for we find him writing to Porter at seven o'clock that evening this: 'Franklin, I hope, with his corps, will, *by day after tomorrow night*, occupy the point where the Manassas Gap Railroad intersects the turnpike from Warrenton to Washington City,' i.e., Gainesville. And in this letter he tells him what he expects about Cox and Sturgis . . . namely, that Cox, will join him *in the afternoon of tomorrow* and that Sturgis will move forward *the day after tomorrow*. . . . The truth is just this: he knew perfectly well, on the evening of the 26th that there was no force of our army at the gap, or near it, but he did not suppose that Jackson was coming through the gap." Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, 51, 52. Pope, "thinking that the enemy's entire army was thus stealing away from him for the purpose of going to operate in the Shenandoah Valley, does not seem to have thought of Thoroughfare Gap, which lay open on his flank." Comte de Paris, II, 276.

³ Pope to Halleck, 8 p.m., *Official Records*, 16, 69.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 70. Captain H. J. Bliss, commanding the Third New York Excelsior (Seventy-second Volunteers) was sent on this futile errand. The captain reports that "his judgment rebelled against his desire" to lead his men against so large a force. *Ibid.*, 450.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 70.

McDowell, too, is gravely concerned by the reports as to the Confederate positions, and suggests to Pope that if he cannot get massed at Gainesville in time, Manassas or Centreville offers desirable situations for defense.¹ Early the next morning Pope takes a wise step—he orders a concentration on Gainesville.²

Unless Pope intended to make the entirely safe movement, suggested by McDowell, of retiring behind the strong line of Bull Run until Franklin and Sumner and Cox and Sturgis could join with troops enough to crush Lee, the occupation of the hamlet of Gainesville, about half way between the eastern debouch of Thoroughfare Gap and Manassas Station and, therefore, squarely between the positions of Lee and Jackson, was the best conceivable manœuvre.³ There, with the corps of McDowell and Sigel he could detain Longstreet in the gap while he threw the divisions of Reno and Reynolds and the corps of Porter, Heintzelman and Banks against Jackson, and force him either to fight at great odds or to retire with loss of prestige by way of Aldie Gap. In case Jackson elected to withdraw by Aldie, and was thus separated from Longstreet, the Federal concentration could then be thrown against the isolated Longstreet.⁴ This was the course now adopted, and McDowell, in hearty accord

¹ *Official Records*, 16, 351.

² *Ibid.*, 70.

³ "Gainesville, where the turnpike and the railroad passing through Thoroughfare Gap intersect the main road from Alexandria to Warrenton, was the strategic point." Comte de Paris, II, 280.

⁴ Pope's army would be lying between the two wings of the Confederates; by holding Thoroughfare Gap he could prevent Longstreet coming through to the aid of Jackson, against whom he could still concentrate a greatly superior force; or he might boldly assume the offensive, and, crossing the Rapahannock, attack with his whole army Longstreet's isolated corps." Wood and Edmonds, *The Civil War in the United States*, 101. "These forces could cut off Jackson's retreat, and with the Bull Run mountains to hold, could keep back the rest of Lee's army." Steele, *American Campaigns*, 255.

with its glorious promise,¹ set about the execution.²

While McDowell was massing his troops for what might have been a master stroke, Pope, on the morning of August 27, undertook to do with Hooker's division what he had failed to accomplish on the night before with Bliss's single regiment—namely, to open the road (the Orange and Alexandria Railroad) by driving away what he still thought only cavalry intruders. This done, Pope expected to take Hooker with him to join McDowell.³ Hooker, in the execution of this order, ran into Ewell, and, as already told, the sharp conflict on Broad Run, immediately in front of Bristoe Station, followed. Pope rode on the field just as the battle was closing. Then for the first time, the startling truth that Jackson, horse, foot, and artillery, was complacently ensconced on his line of supplies struck home.⁴

To this time General Pope's military directions, with the exception of rapid changes of mind⁵ that led to needless marching,⁶ had been generally sound

¹ At 5:30 a.m. of the 27th, Pope telegraphs McDowell: "It therefore, appears to me that we had best move with our whole force to Gainesville, so as to secure our communications with Alexandria. . . . Give me your views immediately." (*Official Records*, 16, 352). A detailed plan for the operation seems to have been offered by McDowell, for at 8:30 Pope telegraphs: "Execute the movement you suggest, but be careful not to let the enemy know until the last movement. Send the trains by this way, and call Banks to you. I will open the road and join you as soon as I can. We must get to Gainesville tonight." (*Ibid.*, 353.)

² General McDowell reports: "The night of the 27th I saw General Sigel at Buckland Mills and informed him that Longstreet would be coming through the gap next morning, and that, as the head of his corps (Sigel's) was now on the road leading from the gap to Manassas Junction, I would give him one of my divisions (a third of my force) and charge him with the duty of marching to Hay Market, watching the gap and engaging the forces when they came through whilst I would take the remainder of my force and go against those who had already passed." *Ibid.*, 335.

³ *Ibid.*, 353.

⁴ "I had by that time," he reports, become conscious that the whole force under Jackson . . . was south of the Warrenton turnpike and in the immediate neighborhood of Manassas Junction." *Ibid.*, 35.

⁵ "He was a man subject to sudden and violent changes of opinion." *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, 61.

⁶ "He wore his men out with marching and countermarching and destroyed their confidence in himself with vacillating and contradictory orders." Steele, *American Campaigns*, 257. General McDowell writes of the efficient cavalry

and discreet. From this important junction, however, when his final success or failure was dangling in the balance and when, if ever, a commander needed a clear, cool head, Pope seems to have lost his mental stirrups. We do not wish to judge him by "after light," but at the hour at which he jumped to the conclusion that he could demolish Jackson his "head was full of Jackson and Jackson only." "He seems," comments Steele, to have given no thought at the time to Longstreet's wing of Lee's army."¹

Therefore, while Jackson was making ready to de-camp from Manassas by the light of blazing Federal material, while Longstreet in his steady tramp to link forces with Jackson was distant only a Jacksonian day's march, and while McDowell, at Buckland Mills, was preparing orders for Sigel, supported by Reynolds, to block off Longstreet, and for King and Ricketts, to find Jackson,² Pope suddenly reached the conclusion that by a rapid shift of his troops he could "bag Jackson" at Manassas. His thought appeared to be that Jackson would either remain at Manassas or fall on the Federal right wing.³ He, therefore, ignoring the fact that at Gainesville he had, as he declares, "interposed completely between

commanders: "Bufford and Bayard both report their cavalry as broken down. The former says his is disorganized; the latter, that his will neither charge nor stand a charge." *Official Records*, 16, 348.

¹ Steele, *American Campaigns*, 256.

² "At half an hour before midnight(a) on the 27th the following order was drawn up by General McDowell at Buckland Mills: . . . Major General Sigel's corps will, without delay, be concentrated at or near Haymarket and Gainesville. A division of their corps will be left at Buckland Mills to operate against the flanks of the enemy or march to Haymarket as shall be found most expedient. King's and Ricketts's divisions will march to Gainesville, and start at 2 o'clock, a.m. to attack the enemy's position in the direction of Manassas." *History of Duryea's Brigade*, 87, 88.

^a This, of course, was before the reception of Pope's 9 o'clock order.

³ "Pope thought that Jackson would throw himself upon his right, at the risk of being driven into the deep waters of the Potomac; . . . and even in his report he blames the victorious Jackson for not having executed so strange a manœuvre." Comte de Paris, II, 281. "Why the Federal commander did not expect this swift moving adversary to sweep around his left flank to rejoin Lee it is difficult to imagine." Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*, 222.

Jackson and the main body of the enemy,"¹ made for his army the disastrous mistake of foregoing this immense advantage and of ordering a convergence of all troops on Manassas.² At 6:30 p.m. from Bristoe Station he calls to Porter at Warrenton Junction to be with him by daylight on the twenty-eighth. At 9 o'clock orders go to Kearny and Reno: "March at the very earliest blush of dawn for Manassas; be prompt and expeditious and we shall bag the whole crowd."³ The execution of these three orders would not have seriously benefited the Confederates, but the command to McDowell, including Sigel and Reynolds, to disregard the Confederates coming through the gap and hasten to Manassas took more than Pope's assurance to him: "Be expeditious and the day is our own,"⁴ to convince McDowell of its wisdom.⁵ McDowell, to be sure, obeyed the order promptly, but on his own responsibility did all that he dared to rob the order of its fatality by sending Ricketts with his division to contest with Longstreet the passage of Thoroughfare Gap. Hence, the morning found the Federals, in utter ignorance of Jackson's whereabouts, converging, with the exception of Ricketts's division, on that

¹ Pope's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 35.

² "In ordering McDowell to quit Gainesville and move on Manassas, instead of guarding Thoroughfare and Hopewell gaps against Longstreet's advance, Pope committed his fatal mistake." (Steele in *American Campaigns*, 256.) "But on the evening of the 27th . . . Pope lost his head." (Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 139.) "This is the order which lost Pope his campaign." (Alexander, 196.) "The prospect of capturing Jackson's entire command disturbed his mental balance, and his subsequent maneuvers revealed him as the victim of a strong delusion. It was not given to such a capacity as Pope's to fathom the far-reaching and daring plans of Lee and Jackson." (Wood and Edmonds, *The Civil War in the United States*, 105.) "When Pope failed to realize his expectations from such acts of consummate folly, he resorted to his usual pretexts, and declared his failure was due to the disobedience of others." (Gordon, *Army of Virginia*, 205.) "His blunder made him abandon the important positions of which he had a chance to possess himself without a fight." Comte de Paris, II, 281.

³ *Official Records*, 16, 72; 18, 704.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 16, 72.

⁵ "Exhausted, confused, and dispirited, this new and puzzling march is made by the divisions concerned. . . . Jackson could ask no better treatment." Dodge, *Bird's-eye View of Civil War*, 76.

adroit officer's supposed position. The assemblage of all these troops would certainly have "bagged" the Confederates if Jackson, who was not in the habit of complying with the wishes of his adversaries, had stayed to be ensnared.¹ When, however, the Federals, after slow and toilsome marches,² began to arrive at Manassas, they found only smouldering ruins.³

When Pope at noon reached deserted Manassas, he was utterly at sea. With the Federal net spread and with the country swarming with Union troops⁴ Jackson's 23,000 men, accompanied by artillery and wagons, had vanished. Not an officer in Pope's command seemed to have had sufficient enterprise to pick up a few shoeless stragglers from Jackson's overmarched men, and thus determine the whereabouts of the elusive commander.⁵ After two or three hours of perplexity Pope began to receive news that still further misled him. He writes to Mc-

¹ Ropes thus summarizes the objections to the movement: First and foremost, it failed to recognize the immense importance of preserving our central position between the two wings of Lee's army. . . . Second, Pope had a sufficient force wherewith to fight Jackson without disturbing McDowell and Sigel. . . . Lastly, Pope's dispositions did not take into account that Jackson might be doing something very different from what he anticipated. . . . Taking it altogether, the concentration of the entire army on Manassas . . . was an inconsiderate and ill-judged movement and was . . . the parent of much disaster." Ropes, *Army under Pope*, 62, 63.

² "The Federal troops were tired, and the movements of McDowell's wing were slow and confused." Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*, 226.

³ "Old 'Blue Light' had played with Pope and won the first part of the game, and while we were approaching Manassas Junction, expecting to meet Jackson—or at least Ewell—those generals with their commands were north of Groveton, seven miles distant. Our disgust can be imagined, when, on reaching the railroad station, we found nothing but a heap of smouldering ruins." Todd, *History of the Seventy-ninth New York Highlanders*, 190.

⁴ "Thus at midday Pope was in possession of Manassas with the corps of Heintzelman and Reno, while Porter was but four miles in his rear at Bristow, and McDowell, with Sigel and Reynolds, was not far from Gainesville on the way to join him." Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*, 228.

⁵ "Had an enterprising officer been charged with this duty, he would have been sure to pick up some stragglers . . . and would have found out the direction taken by A. P. Hill and Taliaferro, as well as have observed the retreat of Ewell." *The Army under Pope*, 64. "Unfortunately . . . this opportunity to crush Jackson was lost, as General Pope had no information and was left to divine the enemy's movements from what he could learn at Manassas." Upton, *Military Policy of the United States*, 338.

Dowell at 4:15: "The enemy is reported in force on the other side of Bull Run, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, as also near Centreville."¹ "On the other side of Bull Run" was well behind Pope's lines; Fairfax and Burke stations, where Fitzhugh Lee's men had shown themselves the day before, were on his single railroad to Washington. "Pope could not afford to have Jackson burning bridges and tearing up tracks and destroying magazines again"² in his rear. Hence, without waiting to verify these reports, he determined to look to his communications. Accordingly, he ordered McDowell to march straight by Jackson's place of concealment on the Warrenton turnpike to unite with the remainder of his army in encompassing Jackson at Centreville, a good seven miles from where the Confederates were comfortably resting in the woods behind Groveton. The right wing reached Centreville while the left, its destination changed from Manassas to Centreville, was still on the march. As the wearied soldiers in advance at Centreville, exasperated and dejected by so much futile marching, were going into early bivouac, the sullen throb of distant cannonading to the west was borne across Bull Run. Had Jackson been at last run to earth in those distant woods? They were almost too worn out to ask or care, but at 10 p.m. their commander learned that Jackson had disclosed his position by a vigorous attack on King's division of McDowell's corps, as it was marching across his front at Groveton on its way to Centreville.

Why did Jackson, who had so successfully thrown Pope off his track, reveal his hiding place before the arrival of his companions in arms? His intention, of course, was to remain inactive until the reunited wings could give general battle, but in the afternoon Captain George R. Gaither of Stuart's cavalry captured an

¹ *Official Records*, 16, 360.

² *Ropes, The Army under Pope*, 72.

order from McDowell directing his commanding officers to converge on Manassas.¹ This captured dispatch says General Taliaferro, "aroused Jackson like an electric shock."² The order indicated to Jackson's mind that Pope meant to mass behind Bull Run, and there in unassailable position await the coming of Franklin and Sumner with their large corps of seasoned men. Jackson did not intend to lose the fruits of his own and Lee's strategy by permitting such a manœuvre. Pope, instead of being allowed to fall back, must be enticed forward by an alluring prospect of smiting Jackson while still single-handed. Jackson, therefore, broke cover with the intention of holding Pope until Lee's arrival, even if his disclosure entailed the necessity of fighting Pope's entire army. Acting on this belief, Jackson ordered Taliaferro and Ewell to advance their divisions and strike whatever force they found on the Warrenton turnpike.

These officers precipitated their troops on the "Iron Brigade" of stalwart Westerners commanded by one of the only two North Carolina generals in the Federal army, General John Gibbon,³ always an intrepid fighter. This brigade commander, in the absence of King, the division, and of McDowell, the corps commander, conducted his own battle,⁴ and with the aid of only three regiments from Doubleday, kept five Confederate brigades at bay for some time in one of the most hotly contested battles of the campaign.

King's division, bringing up McDowell's rear in the movement that was at first directed on Manassas and

¹ Taliaferro in *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 507.

² *Ibid.*, 508.

³ General Gibbon, who was born in Mecklenburg County, was graduated from West Point in 1847. He was a captain at the outbreak of the war, and elected to remain in the Union army. Two of his brothers, Captain Nicholas Gibbon and Surgeon John Gibbon, were members of the Twenty-eighth North Carolina Regiment, which took part in the battle of the next day.

⁴ General King was sick in Gainesville; General McDowell had gone to seek a conference with Pope, an act for which he was censured by a court of inquiry.

then on Centreville, was marching on the Warrenton turnpike entirely unaware of danger.¹ Hatch's brigade, immediately in front of Gibbon, had passed the subsequent point of attack within an hour.² Behind Gibbon was Doubleday's brigade, and then Patrick's. Suddenly, just above the village of Groveton two four-gun batteries under Captain George W. Wooding and Lieutenant A. W. Garber³ opened on the marchers, for it was there that Ewell and Taliaferro had struck the pike. Taliaferro's three small brigades,⁴ in which there were no North Carolinians, held the right of the battle line. Lawton's and Trimble's brigades of Ewell's division constituted the left wing. The Twenty-first North Carolina Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Saunders Fulton, and the First Battalion, Major R. W. Wharton, were with Trimble. These five Confederate brigades were the only ones actively engaged in the two divisions.⁵

When these guns opened, Gibbon, supposing that the unexpected shots were from "one of the enemy's cavalry batteries," brought up Campbell's guns at a gallop to reply, and ordered the Second Wisconsin Regiment to wheel to the left and drive away the troublesome pieces. As the regiment ascended the elevation on which the guns were posted, it met a slaughtering fire from the Confederate infantry be-

¹ "It will thus be seen that we were completely surprised whilst marching in flank on the Warrenton Turnpike, no precautions having apparently been taken to protect that flank." Gibbon, *Official Records*, 16, 381.

² *Ibid.*, 381.

³ Crutchfield's Report, *Ibid.*, 651. Jackson, more and more relying on artillery, ordered twenty batteries to support the attack, but the dense woods delayed them.

⁴ Jackson's regiments were much reduced. Alexander (*Memoirs*, 200) says that the Stonewall Brigade numbered only 600. The reports of the regimental commanders, would indicate that they took into battle about 794 men, an average of only 159 men to the regiment.

⁵ Early's, Ferno's, and Johnson's brigades were not engaged." Taliaferro, *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 510.

hind the guns.¹ Gibbon speedily put in his other regiments, and seeing that the Confederates were coming on beyond his strength called urgently for assistance. As there was, however, no superior officer present to direct the action, each brigade commander followed his own inclination as to sending help. The regiments that Hatch started from the front brigade came too late. Doubleday sent two of his regiments to join the battle line and his remaining one to support Campbell's battery. Patrick, Gibbon complains, stood fast without sparing a man.² These seven regiments and Campbell's effective battery³ engaged Jackson's men desperately in what General Taliaferro terms a "stand-up combat, dogged and unflinching, in a field almost bare."⁴

At the beginning of the Federal fire only the Confederate brigades of Baylor (Stonewall), Starke, Lawton, and Trimble were aligned. Then, as A. G. Taliaferro's brigade swung into position on Baylor's right,⁵ the Confederates advanced impetuously. Of the fighting at this moment, General Rufus R. Dawes, then a major in Gibbon's brigade, says: "It was evident that we were being overpowered and that our men were giving ground. The two crowds, they could hardly be called lines, were within, it seemed to me, fifty yards of each

¹ This regiment, now famous for the fact that in proportion to numbers it had more men slain in battle than any other regiment in the Union Army, lost in this sundown battle 298 men out of about 500 entering the contest. Dawes, *Service with the Sixth Wisconsin*, 64.

² "I sent repeatedly and urgently to Generals King, Doubleday, and Patrick for assistance, but the two regiments of Doubleday's brigade was the only assistance furnished me. General Hatch gallantly moved his command toward the sound of the firing, but arrived on the ground too late to render any assistance. Patrick's brigade remained immovable and did not fire a shot." Gibbon's supplementary Report, *Official Records*, 16, 381.

³ On August 16, just 12 days previous to this date, with no battles, but much hard marching intervening, the official report of McDowell's corps gave Gibbon 2,735, present for duty equipped, and Doubleday, 1,539—a total for the two brigades of 4,274. *Ibid.*, 18, 580.) This is the nearest return antecedent to the battle. What the shrinkage for the 12 days of service was cannot be told.

⁴ *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 510.

⁵ Taliaferro's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 656.

other, and they were pouring musketry into each other as rapidly as men could load and shoot. . . . The low ground saved our regiment, as the enemy over-shot us in the darkness."¹ As the Federals were being pushed back, Doubleday's two regiments rushed into the fray and for a few moments their weight stayed the Union line. The two Confederate batteries had been crowded out by the closeness of the infantry,² but Pelham, of Stuart's horse artillery, undeterred by woods and darkness, engaged two of his guns on the right until the action closed.³

The Confederates gathered their strength at eight o'clock and surged again toward the turnpike in the face of unfaltering opposition. General Gibbon reports of the closing scene, about nine o'clock: "The fight was kept up vigorously until after dark, when finding that we were far outnumbered and outflanked on the left, where I at last lost all hope of getting help from Patrick's brigade, I ordered the line to fall back, which was done in good order."⁴

As it was nine o'clock when Gibbon withdrew, the Confederates, both their division commanders wounded,⁵ made no attempt to follow their hardy and pertinacious foeman. General Gibbon felt that his commander-in-chief never accorded to his brigade due credit for its desperate stand under adverse circumstances.⁶ His Confederate opponents on the field, however, cheerfully conceded that his troops were of the same

¹ Dawes, *Service with the Sixth Wisconsin*, 62.

² Crutchfield's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 652.

³ Pelham's Report, *Ibid.*, 754 (Second Report).

⁴ *Ibid.*, 378. Gibbon's Report.

⁵ General Dawes, re-living in 1890 the smart of that night when "the best blood of Wisconsin and Indiana was poured out like water for naught," writes: "What a painful contrast is presented in the records of the generals of the enemy. . . . Two rebel generals of divisions were shot in the fight (Ewell and Taliaferro). Jackson had exact knowledge of the field, a clear purpose, concentrated action by his troops, and his generals led their men to battle." *Service with the Sixth Wisconsin*, 68.

⁶ See letter to the Adjutant General, December 4, 1863, *Official Records*, 16, 380.

mettle as their own men. General Jackson says that the contest was "fierce and sanguinary,"¹ and General Taliaferro reports: "For two hours and a half, without an instant's cessation of the most deadly discharges of musketry, round shot, and shell, both lines stood unmoved, neither advancing and neither broken or yielding, until at last, about nine o'clock at night, the enemy slowly and sullenly fell back, and yielded the field to our victorious troops."²

When General King, on hearing of the battle, joined his division late in the night, he was perplexed beyond measure to know what to do. General Pope was over near Centreville; General McDowell was lost in the woods; General Jackson was just at his elbow. His orders to go to Centreville were, says Captain Rufus King, "objected to strenuously by Stonewall Jackson's corps, and they were in the majority."³ After communicating with General Ricketts, who was retiring from Thoroughfare Gap on Bristoe Station in consequence of an unsuccessful effort to thwart Longstreet, King decided on the advice of his brigade commanders to take the same step and retire on Manassas. Thus the two divisions in the best position to hold Longstreet off while Pope fell on Jackson were marching away from Longstreet all night, and removing the last obstacle to a compacted Confederate army. "Strategically," therefore, remarks Henderson, "the engagement was decisive,"⁴ for there were now no Federal forces in position to prevent the junction of the two Confederate wings.⁵

¹ *Official Records*, 16, 645.

² *Ibid.*, 657.

³ *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 495.

⁴ *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 149.

⁵ "It is not too much to say that this unnecessary retreat of King and Ricketts affected the battle of the next day far more than the inaction of Fitz-John Porter, of which so much has been said." *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, 77.

Both the Twenty-first North Carolina Regiment and its now rather tiny appendage—the First Battalion, lived up to their Valley prestige in this their first pitched battle since their return to the uplands.

After recounting the conduct of his entire brigade in the earlier part of the action at Groveton, General Trimble describes the gallant behavior of the two of his regiments in the charge. He reports: "About 8 o'clock a charge was ordered, when the Twenty-first Georgia, Major Hooper, and the Twenty-first North Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Fulton, gallantly advanced in the face of a terrific fire of musketry—Colonel Fulton taking his flag and displaying most conspicuous bravery. The fire was the more fatal from the circumstance that the Fifteenth Alabama, being in a skirt of woods, did not advance—not hearing the order. This exposed the two regiments to a front and cross fire from the enemy, who out-flanked them, and whose position under the hill enabled them to see the forms of our men against the sky. They rose up when our line was within thirty steps and delivered a most deadly fire, in which Colonel Fulton was mortally wounded. The two regiments held their ground most resolutely until ordered to fall back to the fence, forty steps in the rear."¹

A soldier could desire no nobler eulogy than that bestowed by General Trimble, himself a veteran of the Mexican War and an indomitable fighter, on the youthful colonel of the Twenty-first North Carolina, who fell in the successful charge with his regiment. General Trimble says: "I cannot omit to mention here the truly gallant and heroic bearing of Lieutenant Colonel Fulton in this as in former engagements. He fell in a desperate charge mortally wounded and died the same night, requesting in his last moments that the

¹ *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 8, 307.

Confederate flag he had himself borne should be displayed before his failing sight. The Confederate States Army had no braver officer or kinder hearted gentleman. His state should cherish his memory and tell her sons in all time to emulate his patriotic virtues.”¹

The losses in this hotly-waged contest of which the veteran Trimble said, “I have never known so terrible a fire as raged on both sides for an hour,”² were unusually large in proportion to the numbers engaged. The two Confederate division commanders, General Ewell and Taliaferro, were wounded—Ewell losing a leg. The Twenty-first Georgia lost 146 out of 242 men engaged.³ The total Confederate loss was apparently about 1,200; the total Union loss around 1,100. The Twenty-first North Carolina Regiment and the First Battalion suffered, according to the report of Adjutant S. C. James, a loss of twenty killed and seventy wounded.⁴

¹ *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 8, 308.

² Trimble's Report, *Ibid.*, 308.

³ *Ibid.*, 308.

⁴ The list of killed, made up by acting Adjutant S. C. James just after the battle and, therefore, likely to contain some errors, is as follows: Lieutenant-Colonel Saunders Fulton; Lieutenants D. P. Jackson, W. L. Owen, W. B. Schaub; Corporals J. C. Hartman, Sandford Hill, J. A. Schultz; Privates John A. Blackburn, J. D. Blackburn, A. S. Boyles, John Brown, Alexander Faucette, Alfred Hedgecock, John Hendrix, W. A. Petree, E. W. Rierson, A. D. Shore, W. H. Williamson, L. D. Wright. *Winston Sentinel*.

CHAPTER XVII

SECOND MANASSAS: THE FIRST DAY

The severe battle of August 28 improved the strategic position of the Confederates. The retirement of King and Ricketts, as already noted, opened the way to Longstreet for an unimpeded march. As Jackson, however, on the morning of August 29, watched, from his position on the ridge, the Federals gathering in many divisions on the Warrenton pike, he must have needed all his indomitable will to convince himself that with his diminished numbers he could stand the impending blows until his friends stood beside him.¹ Still, in addition to his faith in the flexible hardihood of his followers, two observations cheered him. The first was that unless the widely scattered marchers² within range of his glasses and those from whom his cavalry were bringing reports halted for some hours to await one another's arrival, they could attack him only in piecemeal; if they halted any appreciable time, Lee's muskets would be joined to his own. Second, he could but grimly rejoice that Pope was complying with General Lee's desires in approaching for battle instead of awaiting at Centreville for further reinforcements from McClellan's army. Lee had risked much, but he had also gained much.

¹ "His situation seemed to be desperate, except, perhaps, to himself." Gates, *The Ulster Guards*, 252.

² "The orders and counter-orders, the marches and counter-marches of August 28, and the consequent dispersion of the Federal army are sufficient in themselves to prove the deep insight into war possessed by the Confederate leaders." Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 151. "The morning of the 29th, therefore, found the Union army very badly dislocated. . . . Sigel's corps and Reynolds's division were the only troops in close proximity to Jackson; they were at or near Groveton. Banks's corps, Porter's corps, Ricketts's division of McDowell's corps were at Bristoe Station; King's division of McDowell's corps was at Manassas Junction, as was also Hooker's division of Heintzelman's corps; the other division of Heintzelman's corps (Kearny's) and Reno's two divisions were at or near Centreville." Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*, II, 275.

While it was still dark Jackson set his army in battle trim along a flat-topped, wood-interspersed ridge extending from Sudley Springs on the north to the Warrenton pike near Gainesville on the south. Just to the front of the woods that had concealed Jackson's position ran an unfinished railroad, the cuts and embankments of which gave advantageous posting for his firing line. It was over this railroad bed that the battle swayed for two days, and at places the dead of the two armies were as thick as cross-ties. Taliaferro's division, now under General W. E. Stark, held the Confederate right; two of Ewell's brigades—Lawton's and Trimble's—occupied the center; A. P. Hill's six brigades held the left on a rocky projection overlooking Sudley Springs and the road to Aldie Gap. Early, with his own and Hays's brigade now under Forno, was stationed to the right of Taliaferro to cover the Manassas road. Sixteen guns were excellently distributed on the rear of the left center, and twenty-four were grouped behind the right center. Latham's four-gun North Carolina battery under Lieutenant John R. Potts was in the left center. The North Carolina regiments were distributed as follows: Nine under Branch and Pender, with A. P. Hill on the left. One regiment and one battalion with Trimble in the center, and one regiment with Law was coming up with Longstreet. Jackson's line was about two miles long, and, according to Henderson's computation, there were five muskets to each yard of his front.¹ Orders to divisional commanders were to receive the attack, and not to press far across the railroad.² Thus disposed, Jackson awaited the coming battle.

Pope, who was spending the night of the twenty-eighth near Centreville, was, like Jackson, not without

¹ *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 154.

² See Reports of Jackson, A. P. Hill, Early, McGowan, etc.

his share of satisfaction for the coming day. When he received news, but not particulars, of Gibbon's battle at Groveton, he "reveled in cheering delusions."¹ Without clear information "he jumped to the conclusion" that Jackson was in full retreat for Thoroughfare Gap and that King had met the head of his column.² Unaware that King, nursing his Groveton wounds, and Ricketts, rebuffed at Thoroughfare Gap, had both disappeared from their vital position at Gainesville,³ he began to issue urgent orders for his army to assemble on the Warrenton Pike—orders, of course, based on the erroneous assumption that McDowell's corps was still at Gainesville. During the night Pope forwarded orders to Heintzelman and Kearny, announcing that "General McDowell has intercepted the retreat of the enemy," and that "unless he can escape by passes leading to the north tonight, he must be captured,"⁴ and directing them to pursue on the pike. Porter was instructed "to move on Centreville at the first dawn of day."⁵ McDowell and King were admonished "several times during the night" to hold their ground "at all hazards to prevent the retreat of Jackson to the west,"⁶ but of course these admonitions were undelivered.

General Pope's satisfaction died with the night; for he reports: "To my great disappointment, however, I learned toward daylight on the morning of the 29th that King's division had fallen back in the direction of Manassas Junction, thus leaving open the road to

¹ *The Army in Virginia*, 243.

² Steele, *American Campaigns*, 247.

³ "Thus the way had been left open for the retreat of Jackson to Thoroughfare Gap or for the advance of Longstreet from that point, and ample time had elapsed for them to effect a junction either at the gap or near Groveton." Report of Board of Army Officers, *Official Records*, 16, 518.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 74, 75.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 75.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 37.

Thoroughfare Gap and making new movements and disposition of troops immediately necessary."¹

Instead of waiting until he knew where his own divisions were and also what progress Longstreet had made, before he planned these "new movements and dispositions,"² Pope, still convinced that Jackson was eager to escape, ordered Sigel and Reynolds to attack Jackson immediately and vigorously, and "bring him to a stand if it were possible to do so."³ Porter was directed in an order which he did not receive until 9:30 to change his destination from Centreville to Gainesville.⁴ King was to come with Porter and Ricketts as soon as McDowell could find him. Heintzelman, with the divisions of Hooker and Kearny, and Reno were already under orders to close in on Sigel's right along the pike. Pope's thought at this hour seems to have been that if the Confederates under Jackson would just wait for battle, he could crush them before Longstreet with his forces could intervene,⁵ and then retire that night on Centreville for provisions and reinforcements.⁶ Later in the morning, but before he came on the field where Sigel and Reynolds were already engaged, he seems in doubt whether there

¹ Pope's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 38.

² In the joint order received by McDowell and Porter about noon on the 29th, Pope says: "I do not even know Ricketts's position, as I have not been able to find out where General McDowell was until a late hour this morning." *Ibid.*, 76. "There is," thinks Colonel Theodore Lyman, U. S. A., perhaps no instance in the war where a commander showed greater ignorance of the position not only of the enemy's troops, but of his own." *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, 309.

³ *Official Records*, 16, 38.

⁴ *History of Fifth Army Corps*, 203; *Official Records*, 16, 518.

⁵ "The fact is, Pope never, from first to last, seems to have realized the need of holding the gap and Gainesville." *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, 67.

⁶ General Pope sent this dispatch from Centreville about noon on the 29th to Generals Heintzelman, Reno, and Sigel: "If you find yourselves heavily pressed by superior numbers of the enemy, you will not push matters further. . . . The command must return to this place tonight or by morning, on account of subsistence and forage." In the joint order to McDowell he says: "It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run at Centreville tonight. I presume it will be so on account of our supplies." *Official Records*, 16, 76.

will be a serious battle on the plains of Manassas; for about 10:30, just after the first lull in Sigel's battle, he sends the famous "Joint Order" to McDowell and Porter. In this order, while he directs them to move forward toward Gainesville, there is no intimation of haste, but a positive command for the "whole command" to halt as soon as communication with the right is established.¹ The same order shows how easy his mind was about Longstreet, whose men were deploying on McDowell's and Porter's front when they received the order, for he informs them: "The indications are, that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by tomorrow night or the next day."² Moreover, about noon, when the incompleting railroad was being baptized in blood, he reiterates his thought in an order addressed to Generals Heintzelman, Reno, and Sigel. The closing words of this order are these: "The command must return to this place [Centreville] tonight or by morning, on account of subsistence and forage."³

It is an easy matter to bring a pugnacious commander "to a stand" when he is already stripped for battle. Hence, when Sigel climbed the slopes of Young's Branch in "pursuit" of Jackson about 6:30 on the morning of August 29, he found that bewildering officer, not "retreating toward Gainesville," but rather waiting along the cuts and embankments of his railroad to dispute ground with any battle-seekers. Sigel formed with Schenck's division on his left, Milroy's in the center in front of the Stone house, and Schurz's division on his right. Reynolds with his division of Pennsylvania Reserves formed on the left of Sigel, and in his advance "crossed the Warrenton pike within a half mile of Groveton."⁴ Schurz's division on Sigel's

¹ *Official Records*, 16, 76.

² *Ibid.*

³ Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, 88.

⁴ Meade's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 397.

right, the most persistent Federal contenders in the forenoon, encountered A. P. Hill's division on the Confederate left. Consequently it fell to the lot of Branch's five and Pender's four North Carolina regiments to come under the artillery fire of this division early in the morning, and from that hour until the battle was over on the second day these troops had little opportunity for rest.

In his official report, which was not written until January 27, 1863, Pope states that, when Sigel attacked, "Jackson fell back several miles, but was so closely pressed by these forces that he was compelled to make a stand and to make the best defense possible. He accordingly took up a position . . . with his line covered by an old railroad grade."¹ This assertion, like so many others in this report, is entirely wrong; for the evidence is absolutely conclusive that Jackson fixed his defensive line along and behind the railroad before the battle began.² For him to have "fallen back several miles" to the incompleted railroad would have necessitated his occupation on the night of August 28 of all the territory around the Stone bridge, the Robinson, the Henry, the Chinn, and the Stone houses. The statement is noteworthy only as it shows how misinformed Pope was as to the positions of his own and of his adversary's organizations.³

When Sigel and Reynolds, alone of the Federal army, threw their forces forward on the morning of August 29, Jackson's hope of a fragmentary Federal attack began to be realized. Had Pope not been so obsessed with

¹ Pope's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 39.

² See reports of Lee, Jackson, A. P. Hill, Archer, Thomas, Early, McGowan, McGrady, etc. "Not mentioned by Jackson or any of the subordinate commanders of either army. Jackson appears to have received the attack in position as stated by General Pope in the next sentence." Editorial note, *Battles and Leaders*, II, 474.

³ On that night, for instance, Schurz was encamped near Mrs. Henry's house (*Official Records*, 16, 296); Schenck "on a hill east of the Stone house" (*Ibid.*, 279); Meade "in the vicinity of the Conrad house." (*Ibid.*, 397.)

images of a fleeing Jackson, he, no doubt, would have delayed this attack at least until Heintzelman's corps and Reno's two divisions, now close at hand, could have added their weight.

Sigel's left division under Schenck was caught under the massed fire of the Confederate batteries as soon as it appeared, and did little for the rest of the day. Milroy, in the center, was more actively engaged, as will presently be seen. When his regiments were halted by the same fire that brought Schenck to a standstill, he sent two of his four regiments to Schurz on his own volition.¹ On observing "that the two regiments engaged were being driven out of the woods by the terrible fire of the rebels,"² he sent a third to stiffen their resistance, but the men of this regiment, too, were "met by such a destructive fire from a large rebel force that they were soon thrown into confusion and retired in disorder."³ In spite of these disasters, Milroy, according to his report, was not appalled. He thus describes his next step: "The enemy now came on in overwhelming numbers. General Carl Schurz had been obliged to retire an hour before, and then the whole rebel force was turned against my brigade, and my brave lads were dashed back before the storm of bullets like chaff before the tempest."⁴

It will be well to inquire what "overwhelming numbers" were thus unkindly exterminating Milroy so early in the morning. To do this it will be necessary to follow Sigel's right division under General Carl Schurz. This division, largely made up of Germans, with its right brigade under Schimmelfennig and its

¹ This seems to be one of the rare occasions when a commander did not welcome reinforcements. Schurz reported: "A short time afterwards I discovered that two small regiments sent to my support had slipped in between my two brigades, and were occupying part of my line in the woods." *Official Records*, 16, 298.

² Milroy's Report, *Ibid.*, 320.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

left brigade under Krzyzanowski, encountered no serious opposition until it entered the strip of woods that ran parallel to the abandoned railroad. There Schurz's advance regiments collided with the First South Carolina Regiment. This regiment, out across the railroad cut on a reconnoissance, was a part of Gregg's South Carolina brigade of A. P. Hill's division. Gregg was holding, not only the left of his own division on the rocky hill above Sudley's Ford, but the left of Jackson's entire line. Branch's brigade of North Carolinians was in reserve behind Gregg, and Pender's North Carolinians were the reserves for Thomas's brigade, just on Gregg's right. The troops holding this critical flank had been instructed to stay there despite the cost, and their offensive and defensive conduct on this day when they "repulsed six distinct and separate assaults,"¹ was worthy of their commander's confidence.

As the single South Carolina regiment retired through the woods with sharp volleys before the oncoming advance, Schurz naturally thought that he was driving the Confederate line before him.² Although Confederate orders were to stay close to their own side of the old railroad Gregg could not stand to see one of his regiments manhandled before his eyes, and sent three regiments on the jump to sustain the fight. The four South Carolina regiments drove fiercely in between Schurz's two brigades, pushed them apart, and broke his central regiments.³ Schurz rallied his men, and then, reinforced by one regiment from Steinwehr⁴ and by the two regiments from Milroy, he again set his men against that fatal railroad. The South Carolinians met the onset with a fierce counterstroke,

¹ A. P. Hill's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 671.

² Schurz's Report, *Ibid.*, 297.

³ "Immediately after the enemy began to press my center so severely that it gave way." Schurz's Report, *Ibid.*, 297.

⁴ The Twenty-ninth New York under Colonel Soest.

and Thomas's Georgia brigade on their right came shouting alongside their flank. These two brigades alone, not "heavy masses" as Schurz reports, nor "overwhelming forces" as Milroy says, fell on Schurz's center, just where Milroy's two regiments had been "slipped in." General Schurz thus describes the result: "The two regiments above mentioned, as well as the Thirty-fourth New York, broke, and were thrown out of the woods in disorder,¹ the enemy advancing rapidly and in great force to the edge of the forest. The Twenty-ninth New York poured several volleys into them, checking the pursuit of the enemy only for a moment, and then fell back in good order."² Milroy seeing their discomfiture sent in the Second West Virginia, but "they were met by such a destructive fire that they were soon thrown into confusion."³ General A. P. Hill then recalled the two brigades to defensive battle, and they took their former position behind the railroad.

These troops, tired from charge and countercharge, enjoyed only a short respite from strife. Although already twice rebuffed, Schurz was heartened by news about 10 o'clock of Kearny's arrival on the field. While Kearny was still busy in forming his battle lines on Schurz's right, Reno and Hooker came up in Schurz's rear. A coincident attack of all the Federal troops then on the field would have seriously endangered the Confederate left, but the Federal commander was not present, and the blows of his lieutenants fell without solidarity. Shortly after Kearny's arrival Schurz was shown a letter from Sigel to Kearny in which Sigel stated that "Longstreet was not able to bring his troops in line of battle on that day and

¹ The Eighth West Virginia should also be included. *Official Records*, 16, 298.

² Schurz's Report, *Ibid.*

³ Milroy's Report, *Ibid.*, 320.

requesting him (Kearny) . . . to advance if possible against the enemy's left flank."¹ Whereupon Schurz, thinking that Kearny would comply,² ordered an advance of all his troops.³ To stiffen into conclusive vigor the power of Schurz's attack, Sigel drew on Stevens of Reno's command for two regiments for Milroy's left and two⁴ for the assistance of Schurz.⁵ Steinwehr's brigade under Koltes was also ordered in.⁶

Their fighting line thus strengthened, the Federals again turned their rifles against the obstinate railroad in a most determined onset. The two German officers—Schimmelfennig and Krzyzanowski, who were directing affairs on the immediate right front, were experienced and skillful commanders, and the center had gained a most capable officer in General Stevens, who accompanied Leasure's brigade. Schenck, in spite of his reinforcements, was again held at bay by the uninterrupted artillery fire in his open front, and Benjamin's battery was severely pounded.⁷ The remainder of Sigel's columns attacked impetuously. Schurz's division, finding a somewhat sheltered gap between Gregg's and Thomas's Confederate brigades, stormed across the railroad cut, and for a short time Gregg's brigade was in danger of isolation.⁸ The Federal triumph was, however, brief. Gregg's Fourteenth South Carolina and Thomas's Forty-ninth Georgia wheeled savagely on the flanks of the intruders and hurled them back across the railroad. As the

¹ Sigel's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 267.

² In Schurz's Report, (*Ibid.*, 298), he says: "I am persuaded that if General Kearny had done at that moment what he did so gallantly late in the afternoon—that is to say, if he had thrown his column upon the enemy's left flank . . . we might have succeeded in destroying the enemy's left wing."

³ Schurz's Report, *Ibid.*, 298.

⁴ Leasure's brigade—Todd, *History of the Seventy-ninth New York Highlanders*, 197.

⁵ Farnsworth's Brigade, *Ibid.*

⁶ Sigel's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 267.

⁷ This battery lost 30 men and two pieces. Todd, *op. cit.*, 198.

⁸ Jackson's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 646.

Federal center was thus repulsed, Branch, called from the reserves when the Federals crossed the railroad, led three of his North Carolina regiments against Schurz's right. His two other regiments—the Twenty-eighth under Colonel J. H. Lane and the Thirty-third under Lieutenant-Colonel Robert F. Hoke, had already been posted in the cornfield on the extreme Confederate left when an advance there was threatened. Branch personally led Lieutenant-Colonel W. M. Barbour's Thirty-seventh North Carolina to the left of Gregg's men. The regiment met steadily a galling fire. The Eighteenth North Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel T. J. Purdie, and the Seventh North Carolina under Captain R. B. McRae were soon alongside their engaged regiment. These regiments, with Gregg and Thomas, pushed Schurz's lines back into quietude after a close struggle.¹ Hooker relieved all of Schurz's regiments around two o'clock.² The Twenty-eighth North Carolina was not closely engaged during this contest, but Hoke's Thirty-third North Carolina, stationed in the cornfield on the extreme left, fought,

¹ In a letter written just a week before he was killed at Sharpsburg, General Branch says: "These regiments swept the enemy back almost in the twinkling of an eye, regaining the ground lost by General Gregg and reestablishing our line at that point. The enemy made six distinct charges on this point, but did not succeed in breaking it. . . . During the last two attacks I had not a round of ammunition in my brigade, and all I could do was to stand in line of battle with bayonets fixed determined to receive them in that way if they should break the line before me." *Southern Historical Society Papers* 10, 243.

² The evidence conflicts as to the relative status of the combatants at 2 o'clock. The Confederates are positive that they never loosed their grip except temporarily on the railroad (See Reports of A. P. Hill, McGowan, Thomas, Lane, McCrady); Schurz and Krzyzanowski assert that their lines held a part, if not all, of this road. There is no report from Schimmelfennig. However, Captain Lusk, acting aide to General Stevens, gives this account of his search for Farnsworth's brigade, which had been sent to Schurz: "I was directed to find Farnsworth; was sent by Sigel to Schurz, and by Schurz to Schimmelfennig. The gallant German, when at last found, exclaimed: 'Mein Gott! de troops, de all runned away, and I guess your men runned away too!' (Todd, *op. cit.*, 199). Schimmelfennig's men, however, had fought welk

and "once gallantly advanced in the open field and drove the enemy back in disorder."¹

These hours of conflict had jaded Hill's troops, but their pluck and tenacity were to be further tried. Pope reached the fighting zone shortly after noon. He was still unaware that Longstreet's men had preceded him on the field and were now in position to hold off Porter, on whom Pope was counting to fling back Jackson's right flank.² His first anxiety on reaching the field was about his center, for Sigel reported that "his line was weak and that his troops required to be withdrawn from the action."³ Before Pope's arrival Carr's brigade of Hooker's corps had formed on the field and moved up two of its regiments to Sigel's relief,⁴ and Grover's brigade had also reported to Sigel, but only one of his regiments⁵ had been used.⁶ Pope began at once to crowd his available troops to the center, for, as already stated, he looked to McDowell and Porter to take care of his left, and to turn

¹ Lane's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 676. It is not clear from the reports whether Hoke engaged Schurz or Kearny. Kearny's division, consisting of the brigades of Birney, Robinson, and Poe, began to arrive on the field about 8 a.m. The three brigades were all up apparently by 10 a.m. (See Reports of Colonel Elijah Walker, Hobart Ward, N. A. Gesner.) Between 9:30 and 10 a.m., (a) Birney, noticing "tired regiments in the center falling back," sent three regiments (b) "to give them a hand." (c) These regiments were engaged, according to Walker's Report, for an hour. They must have fought Hill's division. Robinson reports that his brigade was ordered to the extreme right of the battle "to turn the enemy and cut off his retreat through the railroad cut." He found the cornfield (near where Hoke was stationed) filled with the enemy. The Federals on his left gave way, but before he could occupy the deserted ground, he was fiercely attacked. (d)

a Walker's Report, *Ibid.*, 427.

b Fourth Maine, Fortieth New York, One Hundred and First New York.

c Kearny's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 416.

d *Ibid.*, 421.

² In his report, written in January, 1863, Pope strangely says: "I believe—in fact, I am positive—that at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the 29th General Porter had in his front no considerable body of the enemy. I believed then, as I am very sure now, that it was easily practicable for him to have turned the right flank of Jackson and to have fallen on his rear; that if he had done so, we should have gained a decisive victory . . . before he could have been joined by any of the forces of Longstreet." *Ibid.*, 40.

³ Testimony before Committee on Conduct of the War, I, (2), 832.

⁴ Carr's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 455.

⁵ The First Massachusetts.

⁶ Grover's Report, *Ibid.*, 439.

the Confederate right flank. Taylor's brigade of Hooker's division was ordered to push in behind Carr.¹ Reno's two brigades under Nagle and Ferrero were led to Hooker's left.² Robinson's brigade of Kearny's division, still on the extreme Federal right, was directed to bear to the left so as to draw toward the center and relieve the pressure there.³ The reinforcing troops were mainly disciplined regiments, and could be counted on for an honest fight. Their good will for the contest was increased by shouts from Pope's staff: "Fight sharp! Porter is in their rear. We'll get 'em sure."⁴ The lines thus readjusted swept resolutely through the woods about two o'clock.⁵

Hill's men, already picking up cartridges from the dead, caught their breath for steadfast endurance as the burst of cannon fire announced the coming of fresh infantry. When the blue lines burst through the crackling brush, the men of Field, Thomas, Branch, and Gregg, lying down to load, fired deliberately at close range. Lane's Twenty-eighth North Carolina, not hitherto engaged and going astray because of an undelivered order, found itself fighting on Field's left as this new storm broke. Notwithstanding the savagery of their greeting, the Federals pounded pitilessly toward the red embankments of the railroad, dyed redder each moment by the blood of heroic contestants. The lines swayed serpentine fashion as first one and then the other battler won a grim momentary triumph. On the right the troops of Robinson's brigade, raked by an oblique artillery fire from the batteries of Braxton, Crenshaw, Pegram, and Latham's four North

¹ Taylor's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 445.

² General Walcott, *Twenty-first Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers*, 143.

³ Kearny's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 416.

⁴ Walcott, *op. cit.*, 143.

⁵ Henderson, Alexander, and others give this hour as 1 o'clock. This is too early. Carr says his brigades advanced at 2 o'clock (page 445); Taylor, that he did not arrive until 2 o'clock (444); Crutchfield gives the hour as 2 o'clock (652); McGowan at 3 o'clock (681); Colonel Jones at 2 p.m. (693).

Carolina guns under Lieutenant J. R. Potts¹ and by the deliberate musketry of Branch and Gregg, "were obliged," as Kearny reports, "to confine themselves to holding their own."² In the center the Federals encountered desperate resistance, but stubbornly made headway for a time.³ Thomas's brigade was pressed back⁴ and Hill's line endangered. Pender, watching through the smoke against the moment that his supporting brigade should be needed, now called his four North Carolina regiments⁵ to restore the line. The North Carolinians passed to Thomas's right and went at their task with a will. Joined by many of Thomas's rallying men as they passed⁶ they drove the Federals "back across the railroad cut, through the woods on the opposite side, and beyond the batteries in the adjoining field."⁷ Pender's spirited advance,⁸ coming as a climax to the hard blows of Hill's front line regiments, wrecked the Federal brigades of Nagle⁹

¹ Crutchfield's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 652. He says of Latham's battery: "By this time the batteries of Captains Crenshaw and Latham had moved out so as to get an oblique fire on the infantry and also bear on the battery on their right. The latter was quickly forced to retire by the fire of the batteries of Captains Braxton and Crenshaw, while the latter, with that of Captain Latham, poured a heavy fire on their infantry at about 450 yards distance."

² Kearny's Report, *Ibid.*, 416.

³ Caldwell, of the First South Carolina, thus describes the contest at this hour: "They seemed determined not to abandon the undertaking; we were resolved never to yield. There was a perfect death-storm all around. All the sounds of Babel roared about us; the trees and the earth were raked with balls. Standing, kneeling, lying, we fought them so close that men picked out their marks. Officers used their pistols with effect." *Gregg's South Carolina Brigade*, 36.

⁴ Thomas's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 703.

⁵ On this day the Sixteenth North Carolina was led by Captain L. W. Stowe; the Twenty-second by Major C. C. Cole; the Thirty-fourth by Colonel R. H. Riddick; and the Thirty-eighth by Captain John Ashford.

⁶ Thomas's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 703.

⁷ Pender's Report, *Ibid.*, 697.

⁸ "General Pender's brigade advanced promptly and in fine order to the assistance of the Third." Thomas's Report, *Ibid.*, 703.

⁹ General Walcott, then a Captain in Ferrera's brigade, and watching his companion brigade while his own was supporting artillery, says: "Our noble boys are coming back broken and shattered; and good God, how few of them." *Twenty-first Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers*, 143. Gould of the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania says: "The men began dropping in ranks, dead or wounded, the rebels appeared, and the line broke and fled in confusion." *The Story of the Forty-eighth*, 66.

and Carr,¹ and Taylor's brigade, on its way to relieve Carr, was pushed back first by the broken brigades in its front and then by their pursuers, who saw the confusion and charged straight to increase it.² Pender's counterstroke, effective as it was, had now brought his men under the concentrated fire of all the Federal batteries in that part of the field. Hence, he gave over the pursuit and dropped back to the railroad, where he was relieved by Archer's brigade until he could rest his men.³

When the Federal brigades came reeling back, Pope ordered Hooker's third brigade under Grover to press in where his other troops had failed. Doubtless this single brigade would not have been hurled against Hill's resolute rifles had not Pope been expecting every minute to hear the opening roar of Porter's and McDowell's guns on his left and Kearny's on his right;⁴ for he was yet without knowledge that Porter had run afoul of Longstreet's solid lines, and, like Heintzelman, Pope was puzzled by the silence in front of Kearny.⁵ Grover's men, as it turned out, went forward, not

¹ Carr reports: "About four o'clock we were relieved by General Reno and Colonel Taylor, but did not reach the skirt of woods before a retreat was made and the woods occupied by the enemy." *Official Records*, 16, 455.

² Taylor reports of the rout in his front: "On they rushed over and through my line perfectly panic-stricken, breaking and carrying away with them the left of my line. The enemy seeing this charged after them. . . . Finding my line completely flanked and turned . . . I gave the order to fall back." *Ibid.*, 445. Colonel Young of the Seventieth New York, one of Taylor's regiments, says: "We had fairly time to reach the spot indicated when the rebels, with a murderous shout, accompanied by a sharp fire, broke through the brigade in front, forcing them pell-mell on our line of battle, at the same time skillfully turning our left flank and routing the brigade on our left from the wood. . . . As it was we held our ground until many of our wounded officers were dragged from their horses and our colors within the enemy's grasp." *Ibid.*, 447.

³ Pender's Report, *Ibid.*, 698.

⁴ "About 2 o'clock several pieces of artillery were discharged on the extreme right of the enemy's line, and I fully believed that Generals Porter and McDowell had reached their positions and had become engaged with the enemy." Pope's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 39. A little later he was informed that McDowell would reach the field about 4:30.

⁵ General Heintzelman complains: "All this time General Kearny's division held its position on our extreme right. Several orders were sent him to advance, but he did not move until after the troops on his left had been forced back, which was near 6 p.m." *Ibid.*, 413.

accompanied by Porter and Kearny, but alone.¹ They started about 1,300 yards from the railroad. In their memorable charge they lost 483 men;² that is, one man went down for every two yards traversed. Their actual fighting time was "not more than twenty minutes."³ Hence, about 24 men were left bleeding on the ground or staggering wounded to the rear for each moment of the engagement.

When, shortly after 3 p.m.,⁴ Grover's men, who had been resting since 9 a.m.,⁵ aligned for their turn at the coveted railroad, Hill was without a reserve brigade. His regiments were dwindled from seven hours of battle, but his men were still intent on regarding just an ordinary railroad bed as one of their jewels as long as General Jackson prized it, and, consequently they were hard to budge. With speculative concern as to its potentiality, they watched Grover's brigade coming forward, in accordance with its orders, "slowly until it felt the enemy's fire,"⁶ but when they saw the steady, well-ordered onset of the New Englanders⁷ under that fire, they set their jaws for a grim struggle. Nor did Grover's men fall short of expectations, nor their general report too much when he said: "We rapidly and firmly pressed upon the embankment, and here occurred a short, sharp, and obstinate hand-to-hand conflict with bayonets and clubbed muskets."⁸ Their fierce thrust in the face of volleys that were deliberate and withering bore a part of Hill's men back over the railroad, and then further back toward

¹ The Comte de Paris asserts that Pope insisted on this assault in spite of Hooker's suggestion that "such an attack stood little chance of success." *Story of the Civil War*, II, 290.

² Grover's Report, *Ibid.*, 439.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ This brigade was composed of the First, Eleventh, and Sixteenth Massachusetts regiments, the Second New Hampshire, and Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania.

⁸ Grover's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 439.

the artillery. Had Kearny's men struck then in support as hard as they did alone an hour later, the sacrifice of Grover's men might not have been so futile; for "then beckoned victory to him who had held his reserves in hand."¹ As it was, the unsupported valor of these Army of the Potomac men was leading only to slaughter. Gregg's men, worn as they were, kept striking at their right. Archer, to whose left they had passed, turned his rifles on that flank. Generals Bradley, Johnson and Starke, recognizing the menace of a break in the battle front at this central point, left their own stations to repel the intruders. Jackson, too, was in no mood to stand trespassers on territory that he was expected to hold until General Lee was ready for battle. Two of his brigades—those of Hays and Early—relieved by Hood's arrival, had returned to his reserves. At 3:30² he thrust Hay's brigade under Colonel Forno at the point of the wedge made by Grover. These rapid counterstrokes, Grover reports, "caused the necessity of falling back, first to the embankment, and then to our first position."³

Four divisions, Schurz's, including Milroy's independent brigade, Hooker's, Steinwehr's,⁴ and Reno's, aided by Stahel of Schenck's division and Robinson of Kearny's, had now failed to dislodge A. P. Hill's sturdy fighters. Henderson estimates that 4,000 Federals had fallen in the woods and along the cut which lay in front of Hill's brigades.⁵ The contest had been stark, and the wearying shifting of regiments under a hot sun almost unremitting. Yet these nerve-racked Southerners, whose mouths were dry, lips blackened from biting cartridges, eyes smarting from powder fumes, ears roaring from gun bursts, and feet leaden

¹ Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 159.

² Early's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 712.

³ Grover's Report, *Ibid.*, 439.

⁴ Steinwehr's division contained only one brigade. *Ibid.*, 250.

⁵ *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 159. Gregg lost 613 men during the day.

with fatigue, had to stouten their hearts for one more trial of strength.¹ Kearny's division had been on the field practically all day, but beyond Robinson's repulsed attempt on the Confederate left, Kearny's operations had been disappointing to his fellow assailants.² "He had failed to coöperate with Schurz, and Hooker had been permitted to attack alone and be beaten. At last, however, after 5 p.m., he was ready to attack."³ Thinking that he might drive the battle-worn Confederate left "by an unexpected attack through the woods,"⁴ he strengthened Robinson by four of Birney's "most disciplined regiments"⁵ and by one of Poe's,⁶ and directed him to fall with might on the left flank of Hill's division.

The shock of this new assault shook Gregg's depleted regiments loose from the ground to which they had clung since morning. They, however, gave back without breaking their formation. Here and there men were standing in place without a cartridge. "Tell General Hill," the heroic Gregg answered when asked whether he could hold his own, "that my ammunition is exhausted, but that I will hold my position with the bayonet."⁷ In the midst of Kearny's flank attack, Federal shouts in front announced a new menace. Stevens was coming in front of the cut to add his weight to Kearny's. Truly, as General Hill reports, victory was trembling in the balance.⁸ But Gregg and Thomas, obstinately yielding, were not to be unus-

¹ "Our feet were worn and weary, and our arms were nerveless. Our ears were deadened with the continuous roar of the battle, and our eyes were dimmed with smoke. Ah, we too needed rest, the rest Schurz's men were having yonder, over the hill in their rear." *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 13, 32.

² See reports of Schurz and Heintzelman, *Official Records*, 16, 298, 413.

³ Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*, 251.

⁴ Kearny's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 416.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ The Third Michigan. "This was the only regiment of the brigade hotly engaged under a musketry fire." Poe's Report, *Ibid.*, 434.

⁷ Hill's Report, *Ibid.*, 671.

⁸ *Ibid.*

tained. Branch, his coat thrown aside, bore into the fray with his North Carolinians. "Never," says Lane, reporting for Branch, "have I witnessed greater bravery and desperation than was that day displayed by this brigade."¹ Field's brigade, grieved over the wounding of its leader, came in angrily, and Crutchfield's artillery snatched eagerly at every opening to ply its guns. The unslacking resolution of Hill's diminishing brigades was slowing down, but not stopping Kearny and Stevens. Hill looked about him for fresh men. No chieftain ever excelled Jackson in keeping reserves husbanded under his hand. Early's Virginia brigade was awaiting opportune action. At Hill's call this brigade, with two attached regiments, sprang at the Federals, whose driving power was receding. With "comparatively slight loss"² Early cleared the railroad cut of the attackers, and before he could arrest the impetuosity of his men, they had followed their routed antagonists into the woods.³ The dispersion of this final attack closed the battle in Hill's front. Battered, but elated over their holding power, the six brigades spent a good part of the night in filling cartridge boxes and shaping themselves for the conflict of another day.

While this bitter struggle on the left was dying down, another North Carolina force was going into action on Jackson's right. As already seen, Longstreet's men were arriving on the battle-ground during the time of Schurz's last attack. Hood, whose division was leading Longstreet's march on that day, says that he joined General Jackson about 10:30 a.m., and that without delay his division, which established contact with

¹ Lane's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 676. Colonel McGowan, reporting for Gregg, says: "It was now 4 p.m., and there was no abatement in the fury of the assaults, when the brigades of Generals Branch and Early, having been sent to our assistance, came in most opportunely and gallantly." *Ibid.*, 681.

² Early's Report, *Ibid.*, 712.

³ *Ibid.*

Jackson's right, was formed across the Warrenton turnpike.¹ Law's brigade, of which the Sixth North Carolina Regiment under Major R. F. Webb² was a part, was formed on the north of the turnpike; Hood's own brigade on the south. Evans was in support to Hood. The remaining brigades were formed to Hood's right as they arrived, except Wilcox's, which for a time was in Hood's left rear. Jackson's men were faced almost southeast; Longstreet's almost northeast. The apex of the obtuse angle thus formed by the two armies was studded with artillery—Reilly's North Carolina battery, Froebel reports, "was the earliest ordered into position."³ The batteries at this angle had an enfilade field of fire on Jackson's front that was to have an important bearing in the next day's battle.

¹ *Advance and Retreat*, 33. The bitter Federal controversy about Porter's actions during the day hinges largely around the time of Longstreet's arrival. It will be of interest to note whether Hood's statement of the arrival of Longstreet's van is corroborated by other officers. General Law, who commanded one of Hood's brigades, writes that he is absolutely sure that the head of the column reached Jackson's battlefield before 10 o'clock. (As quoted in *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 528.) Major Froebel, Hood's chief of artillery, reports that he posted Bachman's battery at 11 a.m., and that Reilly's North Carolina battery was then already in position. (*Official Records*, 16, 607.) General Robertson, commanding one of Stuart's cavalry brigades, who aided in posting the arriving troops, testified before the board of officers reviewing the Porter case that the Confederate line of battle was completed at 11:30. (p. 75.) Longstreet's article, "Our March against Pope," contains in a note this statement: "This would place the head of my column at Gainesville about 9 a.m., and the line deployed and ready for battle at 12 m., which agrees with my recollection and with my evidence in the F. J. Porter case. (*Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 518.) The report of the board of officers, who in the light of reports, maps, orders, and oral hearing, patiently investigated the facts, says: "The range of our investigation has not enabled us to ascertain the source of the great error which was committed in the testimony before General Porter's court-martial respecting the time of arrival of Lee's army on the field of Manassas. But the information which was in possession of the Union officers at noon on the 29th of August, and afterwards published in their reports, together with the testimony before the court-martial, affords clear, explicit, and convincing proof that the main body of that army must have been there on the field at that time." (*Official Records*, 16, 528.)

² Colonel I. E. Avery was not yet recovered from a wound at Gaines's Mill.

³ *Official Records*, 16, 607.

General Lee wished to give general battle as soon as Longstreet's troops were in array,¹ but did not so order in deference to Longstreet's request to be allowed to examine his right for Federal forces reported to be coming from Manassas. In the light of after events it seems that battle by the united Confederate armies at 12 o'clock, before McDowell, and possibly even Porter, could have been utilized, would have been disastrous to General Pope.² Officers, however, must not be judged by light that has intervened.

The Federal force that was giving Longstreet concern about his right was the two army corps of McDowell and Porter. These corps under Pope's orders were marching from Manassas Junction toward Gainesville. About noon, when Longstreet had completed his formation, Porter's head of column had reached Dawkins Branch, about two and a half miles from Groveton, and McDowell's had approached Bethlehem Church, nearly four miles from Jackson's right. Pope, who continued sadly misinformed as to his antagonist's progress, had based his afternoon attacks on the assumption that Porter and McDowell would be

¹ "As soon as the troops were arranged, General Lee expressed his wish to have me attack. . . . It appeared easy for us, except for the unknown quantity at Manassas Junction, to overleap the Federal left and strike a decisive blow. . . . General Lee was quite disappointed by my report against immediate attack and insisted that by throwing some of the brigades beyond the Federal left their position would be broken up and a favorable field gained." Longstreet in *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 519. "Lee ought to have gained a decisive victory on the 29th of August. He arrived with Longstreet's wing on Jackson's right early in the afternoon. If he had put these troops into action promptly and pushed down the Warrenton pike, he might have overwhelmed the right of the Union line, separating it wholly from Porter's corps standing idle behind Dawkins Branch. . . . This is what Lee started to do, but he allowed himself to be dissuaded by Longstreet." Steele, *American Campaigns*, I, 258.

² "In contrast to this evident preparation of the enemy for battle, only Porter's 9,000 or 10,000 were ready for action of the 35,000 men composing the left wing of the Union Army. Banks's corps 10,000 was still at Bristoe. . . . Ricketts's division, 8,000, was near Bristoe under orders to move to the front, but his men were so worn out by constant marching night and day that they could not possibly be got to the field even for defensive action that day. King's division, 7,000, was just in rear of Porter, but was so fatigued as to be unfit for offensive action, and hardly able to march." Board of Officers, *Official Records*, 16, 520.

unmolested by Longstreet in their march to turn Jackson's position during these attacks. At Bethlehem Church, however, these officers learned that the road to Gainesville, where they had been ordered, was barred by Longstreet—his troops being directly in front of Porter. What were they to do under their orders? McDowell, gathering his corps to him, and turning it into the Sudley Springs road, marched for Pope's rear. What Porter, on thus being left alone by his superior should have done has been the subject of one of the most acrimonious controversies that ever disturbed the Federal army.¹ What he did do, after several requests for orders,² was to stand still in front of Longstreet, and in this way prevent the attack that Lee was so desirous of making.³ At 4:30 p.m. Pope sent Porter a direct order to attack, but it was received too late for action.⁴

When McDowell reached the field, Hatch in command of King's division, was directed by McDowell to move the division on the Gainesville road in pursuit of the Confederates, who, he informed Hatch, were in

¹ The two sides of the controversy may be summed in the verdicts of two special bodies of army officers. Porter was tried, while passions were still hot, in 1862 by court-martial for disobedience of orders. The finding of the court was that he was guilty and he was sentenced: "To be cashiered, and to be forever disqualified from holding any office of trust or profit under the government of the United States." (a) This sentence was approved by President Lincoln on January 21, 1863. (b) In 1878 President Hayes ordered a board of army officers to review the entire case and report its findings and recommendations. (c) This board, acting in cooler blood, recommended that the sentence be annulled as unjust, (d) and President Arthur, in 1882, granted him "full remission of the hereinbefore penalty." (e)

a *Official Records*, 16, 512.

f *Ibid.*

c *Ibid.*, 513.

d *Ibid.*, 534.

e *Ibid.*, 536.

² *Ibid.*, 527.

³ Of this action the reviewing board says: "It is not possible that any court-martial could have condemned such conduct if it had been correctly understood. . . . It saved the Union army from disaster on the 29th of August." *Ibid.*, 529.

⁴ In dismissing the Porter controversy, Ropes, after a critical examination, concludes: "In our judgment General Fitz John Porter tried as hard to do his duty on that 29th of August as any officer in the army." *Army under Pope*, 128.

retreat.¹ As Hatch moved forward "with an impetuosity akin to rashness,"² he came in contact with Hood's division that was advancing astride the pike for reconnoissance. The divisions clashed desperately in the fading sunlight. As Hood saw it: "Law's brigade of Alabamians, Mississippians, and Carolinians dashed forward with the Texans, Georgians, and Geary's legion upon their immediate right; each seemed to vie with the other in efforts to plunge the deeper into the ranks of the enemy."³ Law illustrates the resolute tenacity of the opponents when he says that one of the Federal guns captured by his brigade was gallantly served until his men "were so near it as to have their faces burned by its discharges."⁴ The Sixth North Carolina Regiment, with the other regiments of Law's brigade, advanced on the north of the pike, and, reinforced by the Twenty-third South Carolina Regiment, drove the Federals for a half a mile from where the attack began.⁵ General Hatch, who was conducting the Federal fighting, had, unlike General McDowell, no illusions about "a day which we could safely claim as ours,"⁶ but frankly reports: "Night had now come on, our loss had been severe, and the enemy occupying a position in the woods on our left which gave them a flank fire upon us, I was forced to give the order for a retreat."⁷

In a general battle the actions and fortunes of separate regiments are so merged into those of the brigade or division to which the regiment is attached that it is usually difficult or impossible to point out the achievements of a particular regiment. The part

¹ Hatch's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 367.

² McDowell's Report, *Ibid.*, 339.

³ Hood, *Advance and Retreat*, 34.

⁴ Law's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 623. This gun belonged to the First New Hampshire Light Artillery, Captain G. A. Gerrish.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ McDowell's Report, *Ibid.*, 339.

⁷ Hatch's Report, *Ibid.*, 367.

taken by the Sixth North Carolina in this sunset battle is, however, described by one of its members, who wrote from the field. He says: A gallant skirmish was kept up until nearly dark by Company A, Lieutenant J. Calder Turner, and Company I, Lieutenant W. B. Allen, the men firing until their muskets were so hot that they could scarcely handle them. About night-fall, our skirmishers being recalled, the enemy advanced to take possession of the heights we occupied. We rose up from behind the hill, gave them a deadly volley, charged them for over a mile, when we were compelled to halt as we had advanced beyond our supports, and our brigade consisted of only four regiments of not over 300 men each. We captured the battery that had worked on us all day. Our regiment took the colors of the 56th Pennsylvania.”¹

When night silenced the guns of the contestants, between six and eight thousand Federals,² according to Pope’s report, lay dead or wounded along the separate routes by which they had essayed to dispossess Jackson of his holdings. There is no accurate accounting of the Confederate casualties in the first day’s fighting. The Confederates had a number of general officers severely wounded. In addition to Generals Ewell and Taliaferro, who were disabled on the night of August 28, Generals Fields and Trimble and Colonel Forno, commanding Hays’s brigade, were stricken down. Strange to say, the Federals lost no general officer. Both armies had fought with American sturdiness. Ropes emphasizes the difference in the fighting aim of the two armies in this way: “The Federals fought to win *today*, and they attacked with

¹ *Fayetteville Observer*, September 15, 1862. The Sixth Regiment, if we may judge from the report of Lieutenant Colonel Hoffman of the 56th Pennsylvania, must have handled that regiment roughly. He says of the loss of his colors: “General, honor now dictates a very painful duty. Our flag is gone. . . . I feel the stain bearing heavy on us. General, may I beg your assistance to wipe out the stain?” *Official Records*, 16, 374.

² *Ibid.*, 40.

great daring and perseverance. The Confederates fought that they might win *tomorrow*, and they resisted with inflexible resolution and courage.”¹

As the North Carolinians in Jackson’s command reviewed by their camp-fires during the early evening the day’s test of respective strength, they and their comrades from other states felt an uncommon exhilaration of spirit. Single-handed they had smitten low every assault launched against their position. In the morning they had stood on the railroad; in the evening its ugly length still stretched at their feet. They commented on the fact that the Federal commander had shown no skill either in directing or supporting his attacks, while their leaders had shaped every issue of the battle with dexterity and met its shiftings with resourcefulness, and that during the whole excursion of Jackson he had outwitted his opponents. If this much could be accomplished alone, what room was there for forebodings as to the morrow when Lee’s clear brain was to direct an army at last united?² They, therefore, complacently filled their cartridge-boxes to overflowing, and even jested that on several occasions during the day Pope’s men had seen little of “the backs of his enemies.”

The North Carolina regiment—the Sixth, that had trailed behind Law through Throughfare Gap, and then over the dust-strewn roads to Groveton, was also full of soldierly content. As these men drew up at 12 o’clock m., alongside of Jackson’s troops to await their fate in battle, they felt that the reunion in the very presence of the enemy of the two wings of the army betokened future triumphs, for the daring of its conception and the skill of its execution constituted a

¹ Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, 108.

² “They had interrupted Pope’s communications, destroyed his supplies, baffled and defeated all his attempts to overthrow them. Now that the Confederate army was united, no doubt of victory crossed their minds.” Allan, 265.

maneuver after their own hearts. In addition, the triumph of the Sixth North Carolina Regiment in its afternoon battle on the very field where a year before it had won renown in its maiden battle, fixed in the minds of its members that they were now a veteran regiment and that no service that might be required of them as a ripened organization would cause any blanching of faces or smiting of knees. As the Sixth had gone into action in the afternoon, shells from Captain James Reilly's North Carolina battery were preceding its advance. The four rifled guns of this battery were established on a ridge at right angles to the Warrenton turnpike and about 300 yards from it. There with the Washington Artillery as a neighbor, the gunners of the Sixth had held their own in swiftness of fire and accuracy of aim with that crack field-gun organization. The battery hurled 655 rounds between 4:50 p.m. and dark.¹ They too felt that the morrow had no terrors for their army.

¹ Ramsay's Narrative, Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 572. "The guns grew so hot that the gunners could not touch them, and the left gun of the right section fired a charge without a primer. Although we were under a hot fire, the battery ceased firing, and the men raised the muzzles of their guns and emptied all their canteens in them to cool them off. In a few moments the guns were again in action and were well served until the last shot in the chest was fired."

CHAPTER XVIII

SECOND MANASSAS: THE SECOND DAY

When the strife died down on August 29, Jackson, in accordance with his usual custom of keeping his opponents guessing as to what he would do next, drew back most of Hill's division from the railroad to the near-by woods in his rear.¹ His other divisions were already largely in wooded territory. Longstreet, not wishing Hood's division to bivouac in its advanced position, directed Hood to withdraw to the Confederate alignment on the wooded Groveton ridge. These movements, which deceived the Federals into believing that Jackson was retreating,² fitted in admirably with General Lee's purposes; for on receiving reports of the Federal strength developed by Hood's reconnoissance, he determined to await defensive battle if it were offered; if not attacked, he expected to set his entire army in motion for Pope's right rear during the night.³ If Pope chose to take the losses that would necessarily follow an attack on a foe in admirable position, Lee, confident of his ability to stand his ground, would abide that issue. If, on the other hand, Pope elected to retire to the fortifications around Centreville, Lee, strengthened by the reinforcements he was expecting,⁴ would manœuvre his army so as to draw other Federal troops from Southern soil just as his successes on the Peninsula and so far on the Rappahannock had drawn McClellan from the Peninsula,

¹ Early's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 712.

² "Had it been a deliberate ruse, it would have been a masterpiece." Alexander, *Military Memoirs*, 210.

³ "Developments appearing unfavorable for a general engagement, General Lee had settled upon a move by Sudley Springs, to cross Bull Run during the night and try again to reach Pope's rear, this time with his army." Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 186.

⁴ The divisions of D. H. Hill, McLaws, and Walker, together with Hampton's cavalry brigade, were on the march to join him.

Burnside from North Carolina, and Stevens from South Carolina. Confederate troops from the relieved states could then join Lee for vigorous offensive. Indeed, as news filtered through to him of the Federal concentration around Centreville, General Lee seems to have concluded that, after his loss of time on the Rappahannock, he could accomplish more by maneuvering toward the north and fighting only when necessary than he could by seeking pitched battles.¹ He was, therefore, content to abide either issue on the morning of the thirtieth.

General Lee made no changes in his troops during the night. Although he knew that Jackson's men were worn from the battle of the day before, he trusted to the hardihood of these troops to maintain his left. Their only reinforcement consisted of artillery. On a ridge behind the Douglass house he posted eighteen guns under Colonel S. D. Lee. These guns pointed northeast, and hence had an enfilading fire on a good part of Jackson's front. Hood's three batteries, including Reilly's North Carolina guns, were, after a two-hours cannonade on the ridge near the Groveton house, posted along the Warrenton pike, and their service was to be most effective in a critical moment. Longstreet's lines remained almost at right angles with Jackson's, and extended from Jackson's right to the Manassas Railroad.

The North Carolina troops, who were to join in the tumult of this unforgettable day, were facing their foes in three organizations. Branch and Pender occupied their old ground with A. P. Hill. Latham's

¹ General Lee always laid bare his plans to President Davis. In a letter dated on the very morning of the second day's battle at Manassas—a letter published in the De Renne collection after most of the accounts of this campaign were written—he says: "My desire has been to avoid a general engagement, being the weaker force, and by maneuvering to relieve the portion of the country referred to. I think if not overpowered we shall be able to relieve other portions of the country, as it seems to be the purpose of the enemy to collect his strength here." *Confidential Dispatches*, 56.

battery was behind Hill's forces. The Twenty-first Regiment and the First Battalion, both of Trimble's brigade, were on detached duty as guards for Jackson's trains during the last two days of conflict. The Sixth Regiment was with Law on the north of the turn-pike. This brigade, with Hood's own brigade, was to become Longstreet's column of direction in his afternoon battle.¹

The Federals made more changes than Lee in their dispositions for the second day of battle. With the arrival of Porter's corps in the morning, Pope's entire army, except Banks's corps,² was now assembled on Manassas Plains. He then had to decide on one of three courses: first, to retire behind Bull Run, where he could replenish supplies and be joined by Franklin and Sumner for future battle;³ second, to await his reinforcements in his present position;⁴ third, to renew his attack. He chose to attack. This decision was "beyond question a direct departure from the part which had been assigned to General Pope," for he was not expected to assault the "combined" forces of Lee "until he had effected a junction with Sumner and Franklin."⁵ In giving his reasons for his choice he said: "I felt it to be my duty, notwithstanding the broken-down condition of the forces under my com-

¹ Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 188.

² "And for this battle, as for the one of the day before, he entirely neglected to summon Banks's corps. Why this was so we shall never probably know." *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, 93.

³ "Franklin and Sumner were hastening to join him with 20,000 veteran troops. . . . Had Pope retired across Bull Run on the night of the 29th or on the morning of the 30th, and postponed battle for a day or two, he could have fought with a well-rathered army and one stronger by 20,000 troops." Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*, 266.

⁴ General Sykes of Pope's army thus comments on the strength of his position: "In fighting an offensive battle, we left behind us a position (the old battleground) that offered reasonable hopes of success, and in the pursuit of a supposed retreating foe we encountered a well-posted army, flushed by victory, confident, calmly awaiting the attack he most desired." *Official Records*, 16, 483.

⁵ Ropes, I, 285. "He ought to have taken a strong defensive position that day and resisted Lee's attacks until he was reinforced by the corps of Franklin and Sumner." Steele, *American Campaigns*, 257.

mand, to hold my position. I had received no sort of information of any troops coming forward to reinforce me since the 24th, and did not expect on the morning of the 30th that any assistance would reach me from the direction of Washington,¹ but I determined to give battle to the enemy and delay as long as possible his further advance toward Washington.”² Perhaps, after wrangles and controversies had clouded the memory, General Pope may have persuaded himself that the only way at that time to hold his position was to assault “superior forces” on formidable ground. A study of his dispatches and orders, however, leads to the conclusion that, although these reasons may have been his January, 1863, recollections, they were not his August 30 motivation.³

Reports came to General Pope during the night that Jackson was retiring. His hopes apparently at once became the father of his actions. At 5 a.m. he sends to Halleck an exuberant telegram that “once more thrilled the North with a brief hour of joy.”⁴ He declares that the enemy was driven from the field; that every assault was made by his men; that he had made great captures; that the Confederates, according to his news, were retreating toward the mountains.⁵ This opinion prevailed among some members of his

¹ Yet at 2 o'clock, when it was not too late for him to countermand his orders to his troops arranging themselves for battle in the woods before Groveton, Halleck sent him this telegram: “Yours of 5 a.m. is received. All matters have been attended to. Thirty thousand men are marching to your aid. Franklin should be with you by now and Sumner tomorrow morning. All will be right soon, even if you should be forced to fall back. Let the army know that heavy reinforcements are coming.” *Official Records*, 18, 742.

² *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 486. “If General Pope supposed that the enemy’s forces were at noon “greatly superior” to his own and were hourly increasing in numbers, it was the height of imprudence to attack them, unless they were occupying some untenable position or making some capital blunder.” Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*, I, 287.

³ “To lead an inferior and exhausted army in a hopeless struggle against a well-posted adversary in order to gain time, was not the real part played by General Pope on that memorable day, however fully he may afterwards have persuaded himself that such was the case.” Allan, 266.

⁴ Gordon, *The Army of Virginia*, 348.

⁵ *Official Records*, 18, 741.

staff until the afternoon attack; for, when General Banks sent Captain Nordendorf over from Manassas in the early afternoon to inquire as to the result of the battle of August 29, he was directed by Lieutenant-Colonel D. H. Strother of Pope's staff to assure General Banks that the "battle was the most decided and brilliant victory of the war," and that "in the night Jackson retreated toward the mountains."¹ After a conference of commanders² Pope decided to "break the enemy's left."³ To do this he first ordered McDowell to place only sufficient men in the center and on the left to hold the Confederates and to mass his other troops for an attack on the Confederate left.⁴ McDowell asked for permission to make a personal examination of the ground before ordering in his troops. Riding with General Heintzelman to the Confederate left, he "found all the points held by the enemy the day before beyond Bull Run abandoned" and "saw no evidences of the enemy in force."⁵ "On returning to headquarters," continues McDowell, "and reporting these facts, we found that word had been sent in from the front that the enemy was moving back on the road to Gainesville. Similar word was given by General Patrick.⁶ On the supposition that the enemy was falling back, I received your orders to take command of the corps above named (McDowell's, Porter's, and Heintzelman's) and pursue the enemy."⁷

This order, in contrast to Pope's despondent picturing of his feelings at this hour⁸—12 o'clock—was buoyantly confident. "The following forces," it runs,

¹ *Official Records*, 18, 743.

² Heintzelman's Report, *Ibid.*, 413.

³ Sigel's Report, *Ibid.*, 267.

⁴ McDowell's Report, *Ibid.*, 339.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 340. This absence of Confederates was owing to Jackson's having withdrawn his troops to the woods, as already stated.

⁶ Patrick's morning position faced Hood's brigade, which, it will be remembered, was called back during the night to the Confederate alignment.

⁷ McDowell's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 340.

⁸ Pope's Report, *Ibid.*, 41.

"will be immediately thrown forward in pursuit of the enemy and press him vigorously during the whole day."¹ Pope seemed to those around him so confident of coming triumph as to be even jocund.² General McDowell, who was "assigned to the command of the pursuit,"³ was directed to take up the chase along the Warrenton pike with "Porter's corps, supported by King's division of McDowell's corps and supported also on their left by Sigel's corps and Reynolds's division."⁴ At the same time McDowell's other division under Ricketts and the corps of Heintzelman and Reno were ordered to attack the Confederate left along the road from Sudley Springs to Haymarket⁵—a road parallel to the Warrenton pike.

Shortly after the receipt of these orders, the Federals still seeing no evidence of Confederate soldiers except here and there the ugly muzzle of a cannon projecting from the ridges,⁶ made ready behind their forest screen to set the chase afoot. Hardly did the Federals stir before a process of disillusionment set in. When Reynolds's command, on taking up the supposed pursuit, reached the thick woods opposite Groveton, Reynolds, by a daring personal inspection in front of his light troops, discovered "a perfectly stationary" line of Confederate skirmishers masking, as he thought,

¹ *Official Records*, 18, 741. "He gladly imagined that Longstreet had fallen back to Thoroughfare Gap and that Jackson was following him." Wood and Edmonds, *The Civil War in the United States*, 113.

² Captain Noyes of General Doubleday's staff gives this picture of General Pope and his surroundings on the morning of the 30th. "Close by our position was the hillock selected by General Post as his post of observation, and thither our general proceeded after placing his brigade. In a few moments he sent me an order to come up also, and here I saw Generals Pope, McDowell, and Hooker, with a dozen other general officers and their staffs . . . and everybody seemed to be in the best of spirits, while the general-in-chief . . . walked from group to group, evidently overflowing with good humor. Well he might be proud and happy, for it was now believed that the enemy was in full retreat." *The Bivouac and Battlefield*, 135.

³ *Official Records*, 18, 741.

⁴ Pope in *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 486.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Sykes's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 482.

"a column formed for attack on his left flank."¹ Barely escaping death as he turned and rode furiously to report to McDowell this menace, he was the first to puncture the illusion. McDowell was jarred by this totally unexpected news; a Confederate "break through" south of the pike would play havoc with Pope's rear. He turned the direction of the frontal attack over to Porter,² and hurried with Reynolds to build up a defense where no such need had been anticipated. Without due thought of the gap such transfer would leave in the Federal line, McDowell transferred Reynolds's entire command to the ridge south of the pike near Bald Hill.³ McLean's Ohio brigade of Sigel's reserve corps on the north of the pike was next called by Pope to cross to the south of the road and take post on Bald Hill, near Reynolds's right.⁴ Stahel's brigade, also of Sigel's corps, was about one o'clock advanced with Schriver's battery to take the place vacated by McLean, and occupied ground on each side of the Dogan house.⁵ Thus Pope's forces on the left had to give up all thought of "being in at the death of a fleeing foe," and create hurriedly a defensive line.

The second puncture in the illusion as to Confederate retreat is described by General Heintzelman, who was in charge of the pursuit on the Federal right. It will be recalled that Heintzelman, with his own corps and the divisions of Ricketts and Reno, was assigned the duty of following on the Haymarket road the supposedly routed forces of Jackson. Between one and two o'clock he undertook to press after a foe who, as he had just assured his commander, was shrinking

¹ Reynolds's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 394.

² McDowell's Report, *Ibid.*, 482. McDowell to Porter through Schriver, *Ibid.*, 362.

³ *Ibid.*, 340.

⁴ Schenck's Report, *Ibid.*, 281. McLean's Report, *Ibid.*, 286.

⁵ Stahel's Report, *Ibid.*, 284.

from further conflict. He reports: "The first step in advance brought us in contact with the enemy's skirmishers. These were driven out of the woods, but our further advance was resisted by the rebel artillery, commanding the road. The enemy was evidently still in force."¹ Thus now the Federal right wing as well as the left dismissed all idea of a routed foe.

Before General Heintzelman found his way blocked, however, it would seem that Ricketts had walked into trouble enough to put the right flank on its guard. At sunrise Ricketts, under orders to report to General Kearny with two brigades, conducted Duryea's and Thoburn's brigades to the extreme Federal right, and relieved a portion of Kearny's division.² The two brigades, finding the way open, then "advanced by the front across a railroad cut, and to a short distance beyond, the whole line being still in the woods except the right, which came out into a clearing and corn-field."³ At this hour Early's brigade was holding the Confederate left, for, as noted, Hill's division had dropped back into its woods to spend the night.⁴ Early's skirmishers opened with effect, and, at Early's call, Gregg's men came trooping back to warn intruders off their railroad. McIntosh's battery rushed into position "upon an eminence about a third of a mile distant."⁵ The combination sent Ricketts's brigades to the rear without any serious struggle. General Duryea was among the wounded. As early as 9:30 a.m. in this movement General Ricketts reported to McDowell's headquarters that his two brigades "were under heavy batteries of the enemy," and asked for "at least six heavy Parrott guns and the rest of the

¹ Heintzelman's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 413.

² Ricketts's Report, *Ibid.*, 284.

³ *History of Duryea's Brigade*, 96.

⁴ "Hill's brigades, to whose relief I had gone, went to the rear to replenish their cartridge boxes, and did not return to relieve me after the close of the fight on the 29th." Early, *Autobiography*, 125.

⁵ *History of Duryea's Brigade*.

division.”¹ Knowing the situation, Ricketts was surprised to receive around noon an order to “forward his division in pursuit of the enemy.”² He gave the order knowing its futility, but at once reported personally to McDowell his confidence that the Confederates “had no intention of retiring.”³ The rough usage meted out to the first advancing brigade offered assurance of the correctness of the opinion, and Ricketts was ordered “to abandon pursuit and resume his first position.”⁴ Meantime the brigades of Tower and Hartsuff, which had been forwarded at his request to Ricketts, were detached with Hall’s and Leppien’s batteries “to aid in improvising the defense of the left.”⁵ With the exception of a brief excursion forward about 4 o’clock by Hooker’s division,⁶ an excursion checked apparently by Thomas’s Confederate brigade,⁷ Heintzelman’s combined command made no further aggressive movement during the day.⁸

Ricketts’s threats during the morning led to the return of Hill’s division to its ground of the preceding day. Hill placed Branch’s North Carolinians on the left flank of Gregg. Thomas and Archer, sustained by the North Carolinians under Pender, were assigned to Gregg’s right. Early crowded⁹ to the right to make contact with Lawton. Then came Trimble’s brigade. On Trimble’s right General Starke had charge of the four brigades of Jackson’s former division. His right

¹ Ricketts to Schriver, *Official Records*, 18, 754.

² *Ibid.*, 755.

³ *Ibid.*, 16, 384.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ McDowell’s Report, *Ibid.*, 340.

⁶ Heintzelman’s Report, *Ibid.*, 413.

⁷ Thomas’s Report, *Ibid.*, 703.

⁸ “Indeed, there is little room to doubt that with the exception of supporting a battery, the whole of Hooker’s division, until 7 p.m., when it marched to Centreville, passed much of its time one mile from the Federal struggle on the left, watching the combat from such elevations as fences and gun carriages afforded. . . . Nor were the services of Kearny’s division of this corps on this day found worthy of mention either by its gallant commander or by his brave subordinates.” Gordon, *Army of Virginia*, 376.

⁹ There was room in the first line for only three of Early’s regiments.

connected with Longstreet. To the rear of Jackson's lines the batteries of Braxton, Crenshaw, Davidson, McIntosh, Pegram, and Latham's North Carolinians, under Lieutenant J. R. Potts, were ready to open whenever a shot was obtainable.¹ The fighting qualities of these two miles of gaunt men were shortly to be tested almost to the point of fracture.

The third puncture of the Confederate retreat theory is described by General Warren of Porter's corps. This corps was scheduled by General Pope to follow Confederate fugitives along the north of the Warrenton pike. Reynolds, as above noted, was to advance with Porter, but keep to the south of the highway. Warren's brigade was the supporting brigade of Sykes's division of Porter's corps. When, however, Warren saw the entire Federal left flank uncovered by the blunder of removing Reynold's strong division to Bald Hill without the substitution of some other command to fill the important gap, he "assumed the responsibility of occupying the place," and made all the show of force that he could.² His elevation gave him probably the "best view of what followed that the battlefield presented."³ He thus describes the difference between what Pope expected and what Porter found: "As soon as General Butterfield's⁴ brigade advanced up the hill there was a great commotion among the rebel forces, and the whole side of the hill and edges of the woods swarmed with men before unseen. The effect was not unlike flushing a covey of quails. . . . Butterfield's advance beyond the brow of the hill was impossible."⁵

¹ Walker's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 674.

² *Ibid.*, 503. He comments as follows on Pope's error: "I knew the enemy was in the woods and on the high ridge from the point F all around toward our right, but high authority reported him retreating, and that this was only his rear guard."

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Commanding Morell's division of Porter's corps. *Ibid.*, 471.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 503.

So far as the hour can be determined in the face of conflicting testimony, the united assaults of Porter and of Hatch must have taken place about three o'clock in the afternoon.¹ Events after, say, eleven o'clock, ought to have disabused General Pope's mind of any belief that he had only to follow up a brilliant victory. Yet, in spite of the facts that on the right Ricketts at 9:30 had called for heavy guns and more infantry, and at 12 m. reported, "the enemy have batteries still in our front"; that Heintzelman shortly after noon had been stopped by artillery and infantry; that on the left Reynolds had run into a stationary foe ready to spring on his flank and had to be withdrawn from Porter's column of attack; that Sigel had by a cavalry reconnoissance, promptly reported to his chief, confirmed Reynolds's statement that the Confederates were massed on the Federal left flank;² that shortly after two Halleck's telegram had assured him that Franklin would be with him by night and that Sumner was only a few hours behind Franklin; that, therefore, on the morrow he could meet Lee, wherever found, with an addition of around 20,000 seasoned men—yet in spite of all this, Pope did not recall his orders for Porter to throw his men into the culminating charge

¹ The difficulty of determining the exact hour of any battle event is strikingly evident here. The charge of Porter and Hatch was the most spectacular occurrence of the two days, and took place at a comparatively quiet time. It was watched by generals and privates of both armies. Yet notice the divergence of hours assigned to it. On the Confederate side, Lee fixes it at 3 o'clock, Jackson and A. P. Hill at 2 o'clock, Longstreet around 3, Wilcox at 3:30, Hood and S. D. Lee at 4, Law and Featherston at 3. On the Federal side, Heintzelman at 2, Schurz at 3, McGroarty at 4, Andrews, Huson and McCoy at 3, Pope between 12 and 2.

² Sigel says in his report: "Whilst this was going on I received repeated reports that the enemy was shifting his troops from the Gainesville turnpike to his right. I therefore ordered the Fourth New York Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Nazer, to scout the country as far as they could go. . . . After the lapse of about an hour I received notice that the cavalry pickets had found the enemy, and that the latter was moving against our left. I sent the messenger that brought this to General Pope's headquarters. . . . Meanwhile General Porter's troops, who had not changed their position, advanced into the woods where we had lost 1,000 men the day before." *Official Records*, 18, 268.

of the campaign. Apparently, as Gordon saw it, "the atmosphere was full of madness that day."¹

When Porter arrived on the field about 9 a.m. his representations to Pope that the woods on Jackson's right were full of Confederate troops only incensed Pope further; for he believed that the statement was rather an excuse for Porter's alleged disobedience than a fact.² Neither Porter's statement nor the developments of the morning could deter Pope from his obstinate determination to plunge against an enemy whose presence was "unseen and unknown."³ His plan of attack, as stated by General Sykes, was for Porter's army corps to be the pivot of operations. "The troops on our right were to swing towards us, clear the enemy in front (if there), and then by a joint movement with Porter we were all to hurry him [the enemy] up in his retrograde movement."⁴ This plan for a concentrated thrust by which Heintzelman, Reno, and Ricketts on the right were to sweep the retiring Confederates into a net spread by Porter and Reynolds failed, for, as just seen, Heintzelman, who commanded all the forces on the right, was thrown in his tracks, and Reynolds and Warren had to be withdrawn. Now, therefore, no change in orders having been received, it remained for Porter and Hatch alone of all the Federal troops crowded on the plains, to attempt to make a breach in Jackson's indomitable line, with Longstreet crouched for a timely spring.

Under cover of the woods Porter's corps, with Hatch's division in seven lines on its right,⁵ made

¹ Gordon, *The Army of Virginia*, 365.

² "General Porter . . . saw General Pope and endeavored to disabuse his mind of the belief that the mass of Longstreet's command was not yet up. He recounted his own observation and that of his officers. But in General Pope's preoccupied mind, these facts, when stated by Porter, partook rather of the character of excuses for very culpable inactivity and disobedience of orders than of information of the enemy's position and strength." Ropes, *The Army under Pope*, 130.

³ Sykes's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 482.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Hatch's Report, *Ibid.*, 368.

ready for a bloody afternoon; for at this hour even the privates had begun to discredit "the drift of talk that the rebels were falling back,"¹ and were realizing, as Colonel Roberts, one of Porter's brigade commanders, reports "that they were going into the jaws of death."²

As Porter's men stepped from cover, and with deafening cheers³ pressed at top speed across the open ground that separated them from Jackson, a continuous burst of musketry, beginning with Taliaferro and rapidly taken up by Baylor, Johnston, and Stafford, "tore them to pieces."⁴ Hatch's left, advancing in front of Ewell, drew a similar close and deadly fire from Trimble, Lawton, and Early. Then Hatch's right, extended by Porter's directing Gibbon's brigade to that flank⁵ and by Hatch's ordering his supporting lines to oblique in that direction,⁶ was caught first under oblique and afterwards direct volleys from Archer and Thomas. The Confederate artillery, too, massed to advantage on the ridge across the plain and ably served, took terrible toll of the exposed attackers. Jackson's five batteries on his left dropped on them at times an enfilading and at other times a withering frontal discharge of canister.⁷ Colonel Crutchfield's 18 guns massed on Jackson's right almost joined the 18 guns of the reserve artillery, that Colonel Stephen D. Lee had assembled on the commanding eminence in rear of the Dogan house. The short-range pieces of these 36 guns were directed against the front and left flank of the Federal first lines, while the rifled pieces played continuously on all reserves that attempted to leave the woods in support of the attacking columns, and on

¹ Dawes, *Service with the Sixth Wisconsin*, 70.

² Roberts's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 473.

³ *Ibid.*, 472.

⁴ Sykes's Report, *Ibid.*, 482.

⁵ Gibbon's Report, *Ibid.*, 379.

⁶ Hatch's Report, *Ibid.*, 368.

⁷ Crutchfield's Report, *Ibid.*, 653. Walker's Report, *Ibid.*, 674.

the woods themselves in order to break up supports endeavoring to form.¹

The attempt by Porter's corps, a corps distinguished for its redoubtable service at Gaines's Mill and at Malvern Hill, to break through Jackson's right was courageously undertaken and sustained with persistence; it was met by that imperturbable coolness and tenacity that always marked Jackson's sturdy fighters. The attack opened against Taliaferro on the Confederate right, and gradually rolled to the Confederate left; for Hatch's men came into action more slowly than Porter's.² It will be convenient to follow the battle in the order of its development. Taliaferro's brigade broke with immovable composure every attempt against it. On Taliaferro's left the first line of the Stonewall brigade was shaken by the initial rush of the Federals, but Colonel Baylor led up his second line, and, although his life went in the effort, his men obeyed their commander's injunction to hold the railroad at all hazards. In front of Johnston and Stafford, who were stationed in a cut of the railroad, the Federals, line after line, charged at a run, and the contestants for about a half hour slew one another at close quarters.³ So unyielding were the Confederates that, when they ran out of ammunition, they seized the stones with which the ground was covered, and stayed their antagonists with these primitive weapons.⁴

¹ S. D. Lee's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 577. "The troops of General Porter's advance were assailed on both flanks by grape and canister from the enemy's batteries." Chapman's Report, *Ibid.*, 496.

² Robert's Report, *Ibid.*, 472. * Colonel Marshall's Report, *Ibid.*, 474.

³ General Bradley T. Johnston reports: "I saw a Federal flag hold its position for half an hour within ten yards of the flag of one of the regiments in the cut, and go down six or eight times, and, after the fight, 100 dead were lying twenty yards from the cut, some of them within two feet of it." *Ibid.*, 666.

⁴ General Porter says: "Many of the enemy, hard pressed, had not time to reload, and received us with stones, severely wounding many and killing some of our men." Statement, 68. Colonel Stafford reports: "It was at this point that the ammunition of the brigade gave out. The men procured some from the dead bodies of their comrades, but the supply was not sufficient . . . and the men fought with rocks and held their position." *Ibid.*, 669.

Thus Porter's men, who "had charged across the open field nearly to the timber beyond, hoping under cover of the wood to sweep around to the left and take the guns of the enemy,"¹ were, notwithstanding their supreme efforts,² staggered to a halt in front of the railroad. The musketry fire from Jackson's men was so withering and the cross-fire from Lee's and from Crutchfield's guns so merciless that Porter's men were compelled to halt in their charge and resist it.³ They looked back in vain for support to enable them to carry their contention forward. Their succeeding lines could not reach them, for the Confederate artillery had now secured exact range,⁴ and was sweeping the ground behind them so searchingly as to hurl back succeeding columns.⁵ At this critical time, as will presently appear, more Confederate guns joined in the work of destruction. There was nothing for Porter to do except to get his men out as best he could.

While Porter was pounding at Jackson's right, Hatch, in prolongation of Porter's front, was essaying to crush in the Confederate center and left. Hatch's central attack fell on Ewell's brigades under Lawton, Trimble,⁶ and Early. The onset of the Federals here

¹ Brigade Commander Roberts's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 472.

² The Confederate officers were generous in their reports toward the gallantry of Porter's men. Brigade Commander Stafford says of this attack on his lines: "They moved forward by brigades to the attack, massing a large body of troops at this point. . . . they made repeated charges upon us while in this position, but were compelled to retire in confusion." *Ibid.*, 669. Brigade Commander Johnston says: "Before the railroad cut the fight was most obstinate." *Ibid.*, 667.

³ Roberts's Report, *Ibid.*, 472. Major Grower of the Seventeenth New York reports: "We now reached a sort of plateau, a battery on the summit of the hill playing upon us, while another on the right opened with grape and canister, completely enfilading our position. . . . I was compelled to halt and order the men to lie down and commence firing." *Ibid.*, 478.

⁴ "The enemy's firing was splendid; their range perfect." Brigade Commander Muhleck, *Ibid.*, 307.

⁵ "Reinforcements were started to us but did not arrive." Marshall's Report, *Ibid.*, 473. "His reserves moved twice out of the woods to the support of the attacking column and twice were they repulsed by the artillery." S. D. Lee's Report, *Ibid.*, 578.

⁶ Trimble had only three regiments engaged. The Twenty-first North Carolina had been detailed as part of Jackson's train guard.

was made with gallantry, but it crumbled more quickly than Porter's. As the attack collapsed, some of Early's and Archer's regiments slipped the bridle, and bolted across the railroad to follow up their success.¹ Farther to the left the Federal pressure on A. P. Hill's brigades under Archer and Thomas was more prolonged. The right regiments of Hatch and Patrick and Gibbon's brigade of staunch Westerners zealously strove to batter their way through the thinned ranks of Archer and Thomas, but in the emergency Pender's North Carolinians, as on the day before, streamed up, and, uniting with Field's Virginians under Brockenbrough, the two brigades struck so hard that the open field was cleared,² Gibbon's Sixth Wisconsin being the last to retire.³ Pender reports that he then "marched across the railroad embankment," but, as the field in his front was empty, he found "nothing especial to do," and returned to his place.⁴

During the height of this determined onslaught, Jackson asked reinforcements from Longstreet's unengaged men.⁵ General Lee directed Longstreet to

¹ Reports of Archer and Early, *Official Records*, 16, 701, 713. Archer says, "My regiment obtained a fresh supply of ammunition from the cartridge boxes of dead Yankees."

² General A. P. Hill reports: "The attack on my part of the line was gallantly resisted by Archer and Thomas, Gregg still holding the extreme left. The onset was so fierce and in such force that at first some headway was made, but throwing in Pender and Brockenbrough, their advance was checked and eventually repulsed with great loss." *Ibid.*, 671.

³ Colonel Gates of Patrick's brigade gives an inside view of the battle at this hour: "The order was then given to advance, and the three lines moved slowly forward, receiving the enemy's musketry, grape and canister, which increased as we advanced. The first and second lines melted away, and I found myself in the first line under a murderous fire. . . . the right of my line advanced to within a few yards of the railroad embankment behind which the enemy were posted, when, a large proportion of officers and men being killed or wounded, the line fell back a few rods, closed up, and advanced with the same result, and so for the time the effort was repeated to reach the enemy behind his cover, but the fire was too heavy." *Ibid.*, 376.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 698.

⁵ General Jackson reports of the fighting at the time of this request: "In a few moments our entire line was engaged in a fierce and sanguinary struggle. As one line was repulsed another took its place and pressed forward as if determined by force of numbers and fury of assault to drive us from our position." *Ibid.*, 647.

send a division to Jackson. Longstreet received this order just as he had ridden to the front to see whether he could make a diversion.¹ From a ridge to which he had been invited by Hood and Evans he "came in sight of Porter's battle, piling up against Jackson's right, center, and left."² Longstreet at once realized that from this advantageous position on the very flank of the Federal attack he could help Jackson more quickly and more effectually by artillery than he could by infantry that was an hour's march from the place of need.³ He, therefore, ordered Major Frobels, Hood's divisional artillery chief, to move his three batteries forward on the Warrenton road. "Immediately after," reports Frobels, "I was ordered to change position to the right of the road and advance, which was done, Captain Reilly [North Carolina battery] taking position on the hill in front of the Groveton house, engaging the batteries immediately in front under a terrific fire, while Bachman's battery advanced still farther, passing through the woods to the right, and assisted by the howitzer section of Reilly's battery, under command of Lieutenant [Ezekiel] Myers, opened on the flank."⁴ Under the accurate practice of these guns in front of the Groveton house, added to the continuous play of S. D. Lee's and Crutchfield's pieces, which from their position behind the Groveton house were already plowing

¹ *Official Records*, 16, 565.

² *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 187.

³ "Porter's masses were in almost direct line from the point at which I stood, and in enfilade fire. It was evident that they could not stand fifteen minutes under the fire of batteries planted at that point, while a division marching back and across the field to aid Jackson could not reach him in an hour, more time probably than he could stand under the heavy weights then bearing down upon him." *Ibid.*

⁴ Frobels's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 607. Of the fire of these batteries General Wilcox reports: "The effect of every shot could be seen. A rapid fire of shot, shell, and spherical case, delivered with admirable precision, checked their advance."

"deep furrows through the Federal masses." ¹ the Federal "supporting lines were broken and fell back in confusion." ² Jackson's unrelenting musketry disposed of the front lines, and Porter and Hatch recognizing their failure, drew out their men under a destructive cannonade. ³ Sykes's regulars were moved into their rear, and covered their retreat with steady composure.

At this juncture Pope issued another costly order. It will be remembered that when Reynolds, on advancing on the Warrenton turnpike, discovered a stationary line of Confederates on his left, he was withdrawn from Porter's support, and ordered to assist on a ridge of Bald Hill in repelling any attempt to turn the Federal left. McLean's brigade of Sigel's corps was then posted on his right. The holding of this hill was vital to Federal success. Now suddenly, while the yells of advancing Confederates were ringing across the field, Reynolds, to the surprise of every officer in the neighborhood, ⁴ put his troops in motion to the right and rear. He thus states the orders under which he left so unexpected a breach in the line: "The commanding general observing the attack of Porter to have been repulsed, ordered me with my division across the field to the rear of Porter, to form a line

¹ Hood, *Advance and Retreat*, 36. *Ramsay's Narrative* gives these details of Reilly's Battery: "On Saturday, August 30, in the afternoon, the entire battery was ordered to a position on the right hand of the turnpike, and engaged the enemy. The battery kept up a steady and destructive fire. Expended 520 rounds of ammunition. Lieutenant Ramsay was struck on the right knee. Richard Crowell and Robert May were wounded." Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, I, 572.

² General Lee's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 557.

³ Of Jackson's guns Henderson says: "Jackson's artillery, which during the fight at close quarters had turned its fire on the supports, launched a storm of shell on the defeated Federals. Some batteries were ordered to change position so as to rake their lines. . . . At every step the losses of the Federals increased, and the shattered divisions, passing through two regiments of regulars, which had been sent forward to support them, sought shelter in the woods." Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 175. Of the fire from Longstreet's guns Featherston says: "The fire of our artillery upon the retreating foe was rapid and destructive." *Official Records*, 16, 603.

⁴ See Reports of Schenck, Sykes, McLean, *Ibid.*, 282, 286, 482.

behind which the troops might be rallied.”¹ In obedience to this ill-timed order,² Reynolds moved the brigades of Meade and Seymour to the congested pike, but his rear brigade under Colonel Robert Anderson was so sharply beset by the oncoming Confederates, that Anderson’s men had to face about and battle for life alongside McLean. The removal of Reynold’s division left no Federal troops on the south of the turnpike, where Longstreet was now ready to swing forward in power, except the brigades of Warren, McLean, and Anderson. On the north of the turnpike, and along the road from Stone house to Sudley Springs the following divisions were massed behind Porter’s and Hatch’s troops, now just being driven back: in their left rear, the divisions of Schenck³ and Schurz; in the central rear, the divisions of Reynolds, Reno, and Stevens; in the right rear, those of Hooker, Ricketts,⁴ and Kearny. These troops were now to meet Lee’s counter-action.

As soon as Porter and Hatch reeled back from their contest with Jackson, Lee ordered both wings of his army to push home the advantage.⁵ Longstreet,

¹ Reynolds’s Report, *Official Records*, 16, 394.

² “It was a fatal blunder. There were troops enough behind Porter, even of his own, who had not taken part in Butterfield’s assault, to arrest any panic among Butterfield’s men. There was the whole of Sykes’s splendid division of regulars. . . . There was the half, at least, of Sigel’s corps and there were Reno’s and Ricketts’s divisions coming up.” Gordon in *Army of Virginia*, 365.

³ McLean’s brigade of this division had been detached to Bald Hill.

⁴ Two of Ricketts’s brigades had also been detached to reinforce first, the Henry hill, and then Bald Hill.

⁵ “The field of Bull Run had seen many examples of the attack as executed by indifferent tacticians. At the first battle isolated brigades had advanced at wide intervals of time. At the second battle the Federals had assaulted by successive divisions. . . . When the Confederates came forward, it was in other fashion; and those who had the wit to understand were now to learn the difference between mediocrity and genius, between the half measures of the one and the resolution of the other. Lee’s order for the advance embraced his whole army. Every regiment, every battery, and every squadron was employed. No reserves save the artillery were retained on the ridge, but wave after wave of bayonets followed closely on the fighting-line. To drive the attack forward by a quick succession of reinforcements, to push it home by weight of numbers, to pile blow on blow, to keep the defender occupied along his whole front . . . such were the tactics of the Confederate leader.” Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 177.

divining the order, had already unleashed his waiting regiments, and they were off with yells that reached across to Jackson before Lee's command was received. Hood, with his own and Law's brigade astride the turnpike, had been designated "as the column of direction to push for the plateau at the Henry house, in order to cut off retreat at the crossings."¹ Wilcox with one brigade advanced on Hood's left.² To Hood's right the divisions of Kemper and D. R. Jones³ joined in the advance as swiftly as the broken and wooded country over which they moved permitted. Evans was in direct support of Hood, and R. H. Anderson behind Evans.

Hood's enthusiastic brigade, bounding forward with its left on the south side of the turnpike, first cut to pieces Warren's brigade of two regiments, which Warren heroically sacrificed⁴ to prevent the impetuous charge of the Confederates from landing broadside on Porter's retreating flank. Then, conjointly with the left of Kemper's division, Hood pushed Anderson's brigade here and there until it dropped out of the fighting. Although Hood's strength was now waning, after an advance of one and a half miles, he and his coadjutors next turned their rifles against McLean's Ohio brigade, which was excellently posted near the Chinn house on part of Bald Hill. The Ohioans were now the only Federals left on Bald Hill, but two of Ricketts's brigades under Tower and reinforcements from Sigel were hurriedly coming up.

¹ Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 188.

² His other two brigades joined in Jackson's advance. Longstreet comments: "Wilcox was called to support and cover Hood's left, but he lost sight of two of his brigades—Featherston's and Pryor's—and only gave the aid of his single brigade." *Ibid.*,

³ Drayton's brigade—the right brigade of the division—was, says Longstreet, "taken off by some unknown and unauthorized person to the support of cavalry." Its absence was severely felt, for its position would have given it an opportunity for a reverse attack.

⁴ Warren's two regiments numbered about 1,000 men. Of this number 431 were left dead or wounded in front of Hood. Warren's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 502-04.

McLean knew the necessity of holding this commanding ridge until the confusion in his rear, where the troops of Reynolds, Porter, and Heintzelman were stumbling over one another, could be adjusted.¹ He, therefore, met Hood with so fierce a fire from artillery and infantry that Hood's attenuated regiments were thrown back on Evans. The troops of Evans, too, after a sanguinary struggle, were halted by the growing numbers in their front, as the Federal reinforcements were then arriving. The divisions of Kemper and D. R. Jones were, however, now catching up with Hood, and adjusting themselves for a sustained stroke.

Meantime Hood's companion brigade under Law, which had been delayed to support one of Frobel's advancing rifle batteries,² now headed into the increasing roar. As Law advanced he encountered first Stahel's brigade posted on each side of the Dogan house and aided by an accurate fire from the batteries on the adjacent ridge. Law, with the sixth North Carolina, the Fourth Alabama, and the Eleventh Mississippi in line, repelled an advance of Stahel's regiments on the north of the house by "a well-directed and destructive fire from the Sixth North Carolina and the Fourth Alabama."³ The retreat of the infantry left him free to move on the batteries, but they withdrew on seeing their infantry supports repulsed. Both Law and Wilcox were now ordered by General Hood to take time to realign the division.⁴

A young officer of the Sixth North Carolina gives a personal sketch of his regiment's participation: "On the morning of the 30th they opened a most terrific fire of artillery on us, which was kept up all day by the rifles at long taw. We kept up a continual skirmishing, each company going forward one hour at

¹ Reynolds's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 394.

² Either Reilly's or Bachman's, as Frobel's third battery had no rifled guns.

³ Law's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 624.

⁴ Hood, *Advance and Retreat*, 36.

a time. . . . Their charge [Porter's] laid bare their left flank to us, and General Longstreet ordered up a rifled battery, our brigade supporting it, and the Yankees skedaddled. In a few minutes we advanced to the top of the next hill, and opened again. A battery replied, and we took an awful shelling, with but little loss. Then we formed line of battle, advanced toward a Yankee battery, which opened on us, and also two regiments, but we drove the regiments off in fine style. We then advanced until we slept on the battlefield of Manassas."¹

When Law ranged alongside Hood's brigade, the Confederates throughout the field were adjusting themselves for their final spring. Wilcox's own brigade was on its way to Hood's left. Anderson's division was now up and ready to relieve Hood and Evans in the center. Kemper was climbing the slopes of the Chinn house plateau on Hood's right, and D. R. Jones, who had two miles to march, was now coming in sight to the east and south of Bald Hill. Stuart's cavalry, consisting of Robertson's brigade, and Rosser's regiment and four attached batteries, was sweeping around with skillful resolution to the right of Jones. Jackson's men, also, their backs turned on their gory railroad, were tramping under their feet what for two days had been disputed territory, and were now surging toward Stone Bridge in exhilarated pursuit of their stubborn attackers. The artillery was darting from knoll to knoll as it kept abreast of the infantry, and its close range discharges fed unabatingly the fires of death.²

¹ *Fayetteville Observer*, September 15, 1862.

² "Groveton and Second Manassas were battles in which the role of the artillery was a superior one. . . . Never in the history of war have more superb or denser columns recoiled before the muzzles of an artillery." Wise, *Long Arm of Lee*, I, 276. "As far as the eye could reach the long gray lines of infantry, with the crimson of the colors gleaming like blood in the evening sun, swept with ordered ranks across the Groveton valley. Batteries galloped furiously to the front; far away to the right fluttered the guidons of Stuart's squadrons, and over all the massed artillery maintained a tremendous

The contest was now hinged on the possession of two commanding elevations—Bald Hill and Henry Hill. If the Confederates immediately grasped Bald Hill, a door to Pope's rear was opened to Longstreet; if, in addition, they secured the Henry house hill, the avenues of Federal retreat would be closed, for that historic eminence commanded the crossings of Bull Run. No wonder then that McLean, standing at bay alone on Bald Hill, after he blocked off Hood and Evans from immediate possession was anxiously dividing his attention between the marches of the forces in his front and those in his rear. Before him the Confederates were focusing for his demolition. In a few moments the long quavering yell that always announced one of their mettlesome charges would rise above the roar of battle. Behind him brigades from Sigel's corps and Tower with his own and Hartsuff's brigades of Ricketts's division were hurrying to sustain him. As he looked the crash came.

With a fiery rush Anderson and Kemper, to whom some regiments from Evans and Hood adhered, swept McLean from Bald Hill, while Stuart's cavalry and D. R. Jones's division, with the exception of Drayton's brigade and one regiment ¹ that joined Kemper, passed to the left of Bald Hill, and made straight for the Henry hill. In an effort to stem the Confederate onset on Bald Hill, Sigel threw in one regiment from Stahel and then the brigades of Milroy, ² Koltes, and Krzyzanowski. McDowell hurried Tower's two brigades from the Henry hill. Tower showed skill and pertinacity as

fire. The men drew fresh vigor from this powerful combination. The enthusiasm of the troops was as intense as the excitement." Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, I, 178.

¹ The Twentieth Georgia, *Official Records*, 16, 583. As illustrative of the reduction in the size and in the equipment of Confederate regiments at this stage of the campaign, Colonel Benning says: "The number carried into action was exclusive of officers, 335, and of these nearly one-third were barefooted, without a piece of leather to their feet." *Ibid.*, 584.

² Milroy led his men, according to Sigel, too far to the left and rear, and hence was not as helpful as was expected. *Ibid.*, 269.

did Koltes and Krzyzanowski, and the Federal artillery was in constant eruption, but the Confederates were not to be denied; they rolled the defenders down the declivities,¹ and in the gathering darkness set their own faces toward the Henry house.

While the Confederates were carrying Bald Hill, D. R. Jones's division, Stuart's cavalry, and Rosser's batteries² were heading straight for the vital point of the field—the Henry house plateau. Rosser went into battery whenever he could secure an enfilade fire as the infantry advanced. Robertson's cavalry brigade defeated Buford's cavalry on the Federal left, and followed the routed men across Bull Run. The threatening approach on this flank, as well as the central surge now setting in for the Henry hill, of course, stirred the energies of the Federal leaders. They were already defeated at all points, and unless they could save this plateau their army bade fair to be lost.³ Hence Pope and McDowell made haste to build up a defense there. Seizing the first well-ordered body in sight—Chapman's brigade of regulars, retiring from Porter's support—McDowell hurried it to the woods southeast of the house.⁴ Milroy, fortunately for his commander, was already well posted in a cut of the Sudley road to Chapman's right. Reynolds,

¹ General McDowell reports: "The attack on Bald hill had been too severe for the troops to hold it long under the hot fire the enemy maintained upon it." *Official Records*, 16, 342. During this conflict the Federal losses were very great. Generals Schenck and Tower were wounded and Brigade Commander Koltes and Colonel Fletcher Webster, son of Daniel Webster, were killed. Colonel Muhleck, who succeeded Koltes in command, says: "By this time immense forces of the enemy poured through the woods in splendid order and fighting desperately." *Ibid.*, 308.

² "Colonel Rosser, a fine artilleryman, as well as a bold cavalier, having the immediate direction of the batteries." Stuart's Report, *Ibid.*, 737.

³ "Had the hill been lost nothing, nothing, could have saved Pope's army. The Stone bridge, the main point of passage, was not more than a mile northward, within the range of artillery, and Jackson was already in possession of the Matthews hill, not 1,400 yards from the road by which the troops must pass in the retreat." Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, I, 181. "It was a post of the last importance." *Army under Pope*, 140.

⁴ *Official Records*, 16, 341, 497.

who after his deflection to Porter's rear had found himself "perfectly out of place" ¹ in that crowded area, was ordered to take the brigades of Meade and Seymour to sustain Chapman. Then Buchanan, with his own regulars and the remnants of Warren's brigade, made his way to the table land east of the house. ² Finally Pope, very late in the afternoon, placed Reno's brigade on the crest of the hill "in a magnificent position for defense." ³ Batteries were also placed within deadly range of the attackers.

Chapman reports that his arrival was most opportune, for "not a regiment or brigade of the enormous reserve held on that field was in effective position to repel the advance" of the Confederates. ⁴ Chapman with the aid of the batteries held his own against the unrelenting Confederate pressure on the right for three-quarters of an hour. He then withdrew to the summit of the Henry hill. The brigades of Meade and Seymour of Reynolds's division, that had descended to the Sudley road, with Milroy on their right, maintained themselves for, Meade says, ⁵ two hours, and then Buchanan took the places vacated by Reynolds and Chapman. In order that they might complete the rout of Pope's army before darkness paralyzed unity action, the Confederates were now vying with one another in efforts to shake loose the Federal hold on that elevated ground. Hence, as Buchanan took over the contest, he was violently assailed. His disciplined regulars withstood the shock for a time, "but at length," he reports, "I found the contest too unequal; my command was

¹ Reynolds's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 395.

² Buchanan's Report, *Ibid.*, 488.

³ Walcott, *History of the Twenty-first Massachusetts*, 148.

⁴ Chapman's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 497.

⁵ Meade reports: "The brigade in conjunction with the division . . . charged down the slope of the Henry house ridge toward the Sudley Springs road . . . and taking a position on this road, which was firmly maintained under heavy infantry fire until it was relieved by Buchanan's brigade of regulars." *Ibid.*, 398.

being cut to pieces . . . and I was forced to give the order to retire.”¹

Only Reno's brigade² in its “magnificent position for defense” and some well-located batteries now remained between the Confederates and the crucial plateau. Darkness, having already enveloped the woods, was now covering the plains.³ The Confederates, in more or less confusion from their long advance over tiresome country,⁴ and in possession of that creepy sensation and caution of motion that troops always feel when expecting their comrades converging in the darkness behind them to shoot into their backs, caught their breath for a last endeavor. Twice they surged insistently up the plateau, to which way of “ascent could be found only by groping through the darkening rainfall.” In spite, however, of their valorous essay⁵ they failed to dislodge Reno, whose men, ably seconded by artillery, clung tenaciously to their heights. The darkness of the night precluded another trial, which apparently must have succeeded, for Wilcox's brigade had now entered the fighting on the left, and Drayton's unused brigade had at last reached its position on the right.⁶ The Stone bridge and a line of retreat were saved to the Federals by Sykes's,

¹ Buchanan's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 488.

² Reno's other brigade, commanded by Nagle, had suffered so grievously on the 29th that it was not again put in action. *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, 151.

³ “Darkness coming on earlier because of thickening clouds hovering over us, and a gentle rain closely following, the plateau was shut off from view, and its ascent only found by groping through the darkening rainfall.” Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 190.

⁴ “The Confederate lines presented a broken front, here pushed forward, here drawn back; divisions, brigades, regiments had intermingled, and the thick woods intervening at frequent intervals, rendered combination impracticable.” Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 181.

⁵ “They attacked, however, with their customary energy and courage.” Ropes, *Army under Pope*, 140.

⁶ Longstreet comments: “But for the dropping off of two of Wilcox's brigades from close connection with the right wing and the deflection of Drayton's brigade . . . it is possible that my working column could have gained the plateau of the Henry house before it was dark.” Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 191.

Reynolds's and Reno's staunchness.¹ At 9 o'clock Reno followed Sykes across Bull Run in profound silence.²

Nor had the Confederate left wing been content with its defensive victory in mid-afternoon. Jackson was always quick to swoop down on a broken line. As soon as he saw that Porter and Hatch were beaten back, orders were speeded to his battle-worn men to seek further advantage. So accustomed were his commanders to his methods and so sympathetic were their own tempers that practically all of his available troops were afoot before the order was received.

Although not a part of Jackson's command, Wilcox's division, which as a support to S. D. Lee's guns connected the lines of Jackson and Longstreet, began the aggression on the right of Jackson's lines. Featherston's brigade, followed by Pryor's and then Wilcox's own, with one of Starke's brigades on the left,³ moved down the Groveton slope "to take in rear or intercept the retreat" of the Federals.⁴ Wilcox met no serious opposition in his rapid passage across the first open field and through the woods behind it. Confederate batteries were keeping abreast of the movement and lessening the load of the infantry by scattering such Federal groups as attempted to rally around some stouthearted officer. However, as Wilcox's men emerged from the woods and stopped in front of a second open field to readjust their lines, they became targets for batteries near the Dogan house, from batteries on the Sudley road, and from Sykes's three batteries that were firing as they retired. Across

¹ "In checking the offensive movement of Longstreet the gallant defenders of the Henry house had saved the Federal army from a terrible disaster." Comte de Paris, II, 299.

² "About 9 o'clock General Reno . . . told us that we were to abandon our position, and that our lives depended upon the secrecy of the movement." Walcott, *History of the Twenty-first Massachusetts*, 150.

³ Featherston's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 603.

⁴ Wilcox's Report, *Ibid.*, 599.

the field a line of infantry was formed on the edge of the woods. While Wilcox was preparing to fall on this line, he received an order from Longstreet to hurry to Hood's support. Taking his own brigade, but leaving Pryor and Featherston to coöperate with Jackson, Wilcox promptly set out to find Hood.¹

Hardly had Wilcox disappeared before the brigades of Archer, Pender and Thomas of A. P. Hill's division came obliquing from Jackson's left. Hill, knowing what Jackson's orders would be, had dispatched these three brigades to wreak what damage they could when Hatch's men were broken in front of Jackson. These brigades united with Featherston and Pryor in forming a first line composed from left to right of Featherston, Archer, Pender and Pryor, with Thomas in reserve.² The divisions of Starke and Lawton formed a second line. Branch's brigade of North Carolinians advanced on the extreme left of the front line, but outside of an artillery fire³ met no opposition.⁴ Gregg and Strong were held in place to meet a threatened Federal movement on the left. These dispositions being completed, "we all advanced together, taking the enemy, as it were, *en echelon*," reports Pender.⁵

General Jackson describes the manner in which these troops ploughed their way through the broken field: "Eagerly and fiercely did each brigade press forward, exhibiting in parts of the field scenes of close encounter and murderous strife not witnessed often in the turmoil of battle."⁶ The Federal resistance

¹ Longstreet expected Wilcox's entire division to join him, but Wilcox evidently thought that only his own brigade was called.

² Featherston's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 603.

³ Judging by the official reports, the Federal artillery, especially the batteries of regulars, fought with more persistence than the infantry.

⁴ A. P. Hill's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 671. Lane says: "We were not actively engaged next day, but held our position under a heavy artillery fire and very heavy skirmishing until late in the afternoon. We then followed up the enemy until about 10 p.m." *Ibid.*, 677.

⁵ Pender's Report, *Ibid.*, 698.

⁶ Jackson's Report, *Ibid.*, 647.

which was being offered, after Sykes was moved to the Henry hill, by Heintzelman, Stevens, Ricketts, and portions of Hatch's rallied men, was apparently less strenuous on the Confederate right than on their left; for Pryor, holding the right, reports that with the Federal "expulsion from the wood where he first sought shelter, the fighting with us ceased. Afterwards it was a mere chase."¹ Archer, on the other hand, speaking of the opposition offered to his own and Pender's men, says: "My troops never for a moment faltered in their gallant charge, although exposed to the fire of two other batteries, besides the constant fire of the one we were charging and of its infantry supports. The enemy stood to his guns and continued to fire on us until we were within 75 yards, when he abandoned three of his pieces, which fell into the hands of my brigade on the same spot where they had been served so bravely. General Pender overtook and captured the other three pieces."²

As a result of their first dash, the Confederates gained the woods that the Federals were holding. Pender says of the ground gained by his North Carolinians in conjunction with Archer: "We advanced steadily, driving the enemy from the field, through the woods, taking a part of his battery in the field and the other part in the woods. While advancing through the field, we were exposed to a very heavy enfilade fire from the right."³ The retreating Federals made their last stand at the Carter house, which they were

¹ Pryor's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 602.

² Archer's Report, *Ibid.*, 701.

³ Pender's Report, *Ibid.*, 698. Ricketts reports from the Federal side: "I moved Thompson's battery to the extreme right of the line to dislodge the enemy, but was outnumbered in guns, and withdrew it to unite with Matthew's battery on the right of Stevens's division, to aid in checking the enemy's advance, which was now pushed along the front. Their loss in men and horses entirely disabled these batteries, and in connection with the casualties among the commanding officers, compelled the division to retire toward night, making a desperate stand at Mrs. Carter's house, used for a hospital, which proved unavailing." *Ibid.*, 385.

using as a hospital. There the divisions of Ricketts and Stevens held the right of the line while Kearny's division occupied the lowland between the Matthew hill and the Henry house hill.¹

The Confederate assault, delivered after dark, fell on Ricketts and Stevens, about half a mile east of the Sudley road. General Pender tersely sums up the closing scene: "We continued our advance until after dark, when we came in contact with a body of the enemy. Each fired a volley. They ran, and we rested for the night."² The disintegration of the troops on his right rendered it necessary for Kearny to join in the general Federal retirement.³ The Confederates, therefore, remained in undisputed possession of this hill "not 1,400 yards from the road by which the Federals must pass in their retreat,"⁴ but it was then too late for further pursuit. Thus night saved Pope's right, as it did his left, from what, in the condition of the field at dark, seemed irretrievable disaster; for even if the first line under Hill had been fought off, the divisions of Starke and Lawton were close behind to carry on had light permitted. Colonel Allan, whose study of the field was most exhaustive and fair, concludes his narrative of the infantry combat with these words: "Another hour of daylight, and it is doubtful if any organized opposition would have remained to Jackson's progress; and the two

¹ "We fell back to the Weir house (I believe) used as a hospital, and there established a new line of battle. I sent General Kearny's division to the left to close a gap between my left and the main body of the army, keeping General Stevens's and Ricketts's troops to hold the right." Heintzelman's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 414.

² Pender's Report, *Ibid.*, 698. Heintzelman, in command of the Federal right, is equally terse. He reports: "Somewhat later the enemy attacked General Ricketts's troops, and they gave way." *Ibid.*, 414.

³ Kearny, as quoted by Parker, is fuller: "As for myself I was shamefully abandoned. My only salvation depended on holding a certain hill and house in the rear. In the darkness of twilight, the enemy came, fired a few trifling shots, and Stevens's people ran, we alongside never dreaming of it." De Peyster, *Philip Kearny*, 422.

⁴ Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 181.

wings of the Confederate forces, approaching the turn-pike and the Stone bridge from opposite quarters, must have overwhelmed large portions of the Federal army."¹ But again, as at First Manassas, at Seven Pines (first day), at Gaines's Mill, the Confederates seemed destined to lose the full fruits of victory by triumphing at too late an hour to follow harrowingly a stricken opponent. Hence without further pursuit the Federal army trudged dejectedly to Centreville.

There were no such scenes of bewildering confusion as marked the Federal rout on the same field during the previous summer. A year's discipline had in a measure taught individuality to submit itself to organized control, and a year's experience had demonstrated to thinking soldiers that a man who sticks to his ranks is usually safer than a man who straggles. At the same time it is true that after the failure of the three o'clock attack and after the Confederates carried Bald Hill, there was much disorganization and what Pope calls "skulking and straggling."² However, after it became clear that the Confederates were not pursuing and after it became evident that Franklin had arrived to cover the retreat, order gradually be-

¹ Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*, 302. "But fortunately for the Federal army, darkness came on, and the exhausted Confederates ceased from further assaults on their obstinate antagonists." *Army under Pope*, 140. "An hour more of daylight would have enabled the Confederates to win a tremendous victory." Wood and Edmonds, *History of the Civil War in the United States*, 115.

² General Franklin reports: "I arrived at the field this afternoon at 6 o'clock. Found the road was filled with fleeing men, artillery, and wagons, all leaving the field in a panic. It was a scene of terrible confusion, and I immediately formed line of battle across the road and attempted to stop and form the stragglers. It was impossible to succeed in this, the number becoming over 7,000 in less than one-half an hour. The number continued to increase until I left the position." *Official Records*, 16, 536. At 1:30 p.m. an order was received from McClellan, directing the other part of the Sixth corps to join General Pope at once. The troops accordingly moved through Centreville, and when about three miles beyond, many of Pope's men were met in wild retreat. The remaining part of Slocum's division being in advance was formed across the road in an effort to arrest the frightened, fleeing mass, the different parts of which were promiscuously struggling to get at the head of the retreat—a mass and press "as great as the First Bull Run retreat of July 21, 1861," said General Slocum. *Life of Major-General Slocum*, 41.

came restored, but the enormous straggling was not checked for over a week. Assistant Adjutant-General Irwin writes of his return to Washington on September 2: "We made our way through the innumerable herd of stragglers, mingled with an endless stream of wagons and ambulances, urged on by uncontrollable teamsters, which presently poured into Washington, overflowed it, took possession of its streets and public places, and held high orgy."¹

Captain Noyes, returning to the army from Centreville, thus describes what he saw: "And now the rush of men, singly and in detachments, mingled with sutler's wagons, artillery caissons, and supply wagons, began to look fearfully ominous, but even yet I would not, could not, descend from the heights of hope into the valley of despond . . . and now we began to meet ammunition trains, even batteries, and battalions of men marching back in something like order." *Bivouac and Battlefield*, 138.

¹ *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 541.

CHAPTER XIX

THE CLOSE OF POPE'S CAMPAIGN

At the close of the battle of August 30 the Confederate troops fell into exhausted sleep wherever the fighting ceased. They were as jaded from the marvelous rapidity of their campaign as soldiers could be,¹ but, in spite of empty stomachs, bruised feet, and swollen shoulders, they were sufficiently jubilant over Pope's defeat to disregard their suffering.² The Federals, equally exhausted, could not find immediate rest. Their orders required a concentration behind Franklin's corps at Centreville, about six miles from the Henry house. All through the night such commands as remained organized were dropping downheartedly³ into the old Confederate works around that point. Innumerable stragglers thronged all the paths and roads leading toward Washington.⁴

In spite of the fact that he was forced to retire and leave to Confederate captors 30 cannon, 20,000 small

¹ General Branch wrote of his North Carolinians from near Chantilly: "If we had not the actual experience it would not be credited that human nature could endure what we have endured. Fighting all day and marching all night—not for one day only, but for a whole week. The little sleep that we have had has been on the battlefield surrounded by the dead and wounded. . . . The only rations we have had for a week are fresh beef—our wagon trains can't keep up with us. My brigade has been in nearly every battle, sometimes in the lead, and always among the foremost." *Our Living and Our Dead*, I, 41.

² General Pope's unfortunate orders had awakened among the Southern soldiers a personal resentment against him as a commander—a resentment that they had never felt against McClellan.

³ "Disgusted and sick at heart we continued our slow march along the five miles of obstructed road to Centreville." Walcott, *History of the Twenty-first Massachusetts*, 151.

⁴ Major Hammerstein, described by McClellan as a cool-headed old soldier, reported that some of the corps were entirely broken up into stragglers. (*Official Records*, 18, 772.) Adjutant-General Kelton estimated that on September 1 he met 30,000 stragglers between Alexandria and Centreville. General Stough, in command at Alexandria, reported: "Thousands of stragglers, singly and in squads, are coming into this vicinity." *Ibid.*, 798.

arms,¹ 2,000 wounded men, and several thousand other prisoners, Pope at 9:45 sent to Halleck from Centreville what has been described as a "Popesque telegram." He stated his reasons for retiring as follows: "Under all the circumstances, both horses and men being without food,² and the enemy greatly outnumbering³ us, I thought it best to retire to this place at dark."⁴ He added: "The movement has been made in perfect order and without loss. Do not

¹ Lee's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 558. Ropes (*Army under Pope*, 190) is inclined to question this number of small arms because Longstreet reported only 12,000 and Jackson only 6,520—a total of 18,520. The discrepancy—1,480—probably arose from the fact that Stuart's cavalry reported directly to General Lee,^(a) and that D. H. Hill's division, just arriving from Richmond, finished the gleanings of the field after Jackson and Longstreet had set out for Chantilly. (See *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 192.)

^a Rosser of the cavalry, for example, reports that at Manassas he captured on the 31st 400 men and "a large lot of small arms." *Official Records*, 16, 751.

² If Captain D. L. Smith, then Deputy Commissary of the Army of Virginia, is right, any Federal lack of food on that day was due to mismanagement. He asserts that he had at Bristoe Station, only about five miles from Pope's headquarters, 300,000 rations and 500 idle wagons. He adds: "During the action I reported to General Pope personally . . . that with the transportation available, I could deliver within the camps of the troops before sunset of that day, from 30,000 to 50,000 rations, if the troops requested them, and I asked permission to do so, stating at the time my apprehension that a change of the position of the army might endanger the safety of the stores. The reply I received was: 'Return to your post; General Banks will take care of your stores.' This was before the action commenced on the second day of the fight. . . . There was no necessity for any troops being without rations, as I had even ample supplies for the entire army there, as fully three days rations for the whole army were burned, and all that was required was the necessary orders to supply them to the troops." Smith to Colonel Fred T. Locke, *History of Fifth Army Corps*, 249. These rations, together with 147 cars, 7 locomotives, and other material, were destroyed on the 31st by order of General Pope. *Official Records*, 16, 78. In reference to supplying Pope with ammunition, Banks, in charge of the trains, telegraphs General Halleck from Manassas Junction at 1:45 p.m. on the 30th: "I have many more wagons on the road now near this place, which can be moved directly to him if I knew where to send them. Please inform me." *Ibid.*, 742.

³ "These [the Federal] forces aggregated on the field of battle 167 regiments of infantry, 14 of cavalry, one regiment of heavy artillery, and 43 batteries. The Confederate forces opposed numbered 134½ regiments of infantry, 14½ of cavalry, and 61 batteries. Not all of these (the Confederates) were actively engaged; only 120 regiments of infantry reported losses." Heysinger, *Antietam*, 50. "He gives his entire strength on September 1 at 62,000 men. . . . Lee's numbers on that day could hardly have exceeded 40,000." Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*, 313.

⁴ *Official Records*, 16, 79. At about the same hour General Porter, less euphemistically, wrote to McClellan: "I advanced in pursuit of the enemy, and struck the center of his line under the direction of General Lee, and was whipped, as was the whole army, badly." *Ibid.*, 18, 768.

be uneasy. We shall hold our own here." At 10:45 on the next morning, after a survey of what Captain W. H. Powell, of the Fourth United States Regiment, calls the *disjecta membra* of a shattered army,"¹ and after some very depressing reports from commanding officers,² his optimism was less buoyant. True, he tells Halleck, "you may rely on our giving them as desperate a fight as I can force our men to stand up to,"³ but he undoubtedly iced Halleck's spine by mildly inquiring in the next sentence, "I should like to know whether you feel secure about Washington should this army be destroyed." Such a question was not expected. Franklin's corps, one of the best in the army, was now up; Sumner's corps, under capable commanders like Richardson, Sedgwick, and French, was up; Banks's corps, at last ordered away from the trains, was up—close to 30,000⁴ choice troops stood ready to stiffen weakened divisions like Hooker's, and

¹ "The morning was cold and rainy; everything bore a look of sadness in unison with our feelings. All about were the *disjecta membra* of a shattered army; here were stragglers plodding through mud, inquiring for their regiments, part of the men with guns and part without; wanderers driven in by the patrols; while every one you met had an unwashed, sleepy, downcast aspect, and looked as if he would like to hide his head somewhere from all the world." *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 489; but see Noyes, *Bivouac and Battlefield*, 141.

² General Hooker, always a staunch fighter, wrote: "It is my duty to report . . . that my division is in no condition to meet the enemy. This was communicated to me yesterday by my brigade commanders, and on inquiry I find their morale to be such as to warrant me in entertaining the most serious apprehension of their conduct in their present state. . . . They are in no condition to go in battle at this time." *Official Records*, 16, 437. "With the exception of Sumner, the commanders of the Army of the Potomac had continued persistently to inform me that their commands were and had been demoralized ever since they left Harrison's Landing." *Ibid.*, 116.

³ *Ibid.*, 80. General Walcott, then of the Twenty-first Massachusetts Regiment, comments rather bitingly: "The bold and braggart tone of his dispatches to Halleck, the commander-in-chief, ought to deceive nobody now. They were written in the hope that somehow or other he should escape further disgrace by the inaction of the Confederates, by his frightening General Halleck into ordering the army back to Washington, or by some other special providence; and then the world might be persuaded or at least his adherents might with some show of reason continue to claim that the enemy were badly whipped at the Second Manassas." *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, 141.

⁴ On August 29, General McClellan reported that Sumner's infantry force at Alexandria was about 14,000 men. (*Official Records*, 18, 710.) Sumner, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, says:

take a turn at Lee. In addition, the Federal army was occupying works of unusual strength. No wonder Halleck countered Pope's surprising question with the natural one: "With Franklin and Sumner, who must now be with you, can't you renew the attack?"¹ "The plan of the enemy," Pope answers, "will undoubtedly be to turn my flank. If he does so, he will have his hands full. My troops are in good heart."² By 8:50 on September 1 his belligerency is tempered, and his eyes are turning to the intrenchments around Washington as McClellan's, at the close of his Peninsula campaign, had turned toward the gunboats on the James. In a long communication to Halleck, he says: "I shall attack again tomorrow if I can; the next day certainly."³ He then raises a curtain for his commander to get a long-distance survey of his troubles: His cavalry is completely broken down; his infantry finds it difficult to keep the enemy's cavalry off the roads; many of the brigade and some of the division commanders of the Peninsula army are exhibiting unsoldierly and dangerous conduct, and their every word and act and intention is discouraging and calculated to break down the spirit of the men and produce disaster.⁴ In view of these things he concludes: "My advice to you—I give it with freedom, as I know you

"About 10,000 I presume." (II, (I), 367.) On August 29, Franklin's corps was stated to contain only between 10,000 and 11,000 ready for duty." (*Ibid.*, 722.) An official return for August 30 gives Banks 8,857 present for duty. (*Ibid.*, 780.)

¹ *Official Records*, 16, 79.

² *Ibid.*, 81.

³ *Ibid.*, 83.

⁴ *Ibid.* "You hardly have an idea," he continues, "of the demoralization among officers of high rank in the Potomac Army, arising in all instances from personal feeling in relation to changes of commander-in-chief and others. These men are mere tools or parasites, but their example is producing, and must necessarily produce, very disastrous results." "That Pope could write such stuff as this," remonstrates Ropes, "after he had had such troops as the divisions of Hooker, Kearny, and Reynolds under him for weeks, and had witnessed only a day or two before the gallant charge of Butterfield's division of Porter's corps and the stout defense of the Henry house hill by Sykes's division of the same corps, almost passes belief." *Story of the Civil War*, II, 309.

will not misunderstand it—is . . . that you draw back this army to the intrenchments in front of Washington, and set to work in that secure place to reorganize and rearrange it. You may avoid great disaster by doing so.”¹

Of course, after such advice from a commander in the field, there was nothing for Halleck to do but to order the Federal army into the forts around the capital, and seek a new commander. Pope was, however, not to enter the shelter of these forts without another encounter with the indefatigable Jackson, who unknown to Pope had been since Sunday marching for his right.

General Lee permitted his infantry to spend the Sabbath morning after the battle in rest and in caring for the wounded. Stuart, “with his cavalry in the saddle before daylight” on Sunday, soon reported to Lee that Pope’s army had been thrown into the old Confederate works at Centreville.² This place was too formidable to be assaulted.³ General Lee promptly instructed Jackson to cross Bull Run at Sudley Springs on Sunday afternoon, march across country to the Little River turnpike, and then bear down on that road toward Fairfax Court House.⁴ Longstreet was ordered to follow as soon as Jackson’s command was stretched out. This movement, if undisputed, would again flank Pope, and put the Confederate army between him and Washington. The roads were quagmires from continued rains, and Jackson’s men were too fagged to march with their accustomed swiftness. Night caught them shortly after they debouched into the Little River turnpike at Pleasant Valley, about four miles

¹ *Official Records*, 16, 83.

² *Ibid.*, 737.

³ “But formidable earthworks, against generals who dare manœuvre, are often a mere trap for the unwary.” Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 182.

⁴ Before starting, many of Jackson’s regiments were supplied with the excellent Federal rifles that had been gathered from the field. Oates, *War Between the Union and Confederacy*, 149.

northwest of Chantilly. Longstreet bivouacked at Sudley Springs. Stuart had been active in Jackson's front, picking up prisoners, and about dusk shelling the trains on the Fairfax road.¹ Jackson plodded toward Chantilly on the next morning, and in the afternoon approached Ox Hill in front of Germantown. Two miles further and Jackson would tap the Warrenton pike, which was now filled with the retreating troops and trains of the Union army, but, before he could compass those two miles, Pope, at last aware of the Confederate approach, threw his forces across from the Centreville pike to thwart the impending catastrophe.

The approach of Jackson, followed by Longstreet, so near his flank was apparently unknown to Pope until late in the forenoon of September 1.² The information according to General Hazard Stevens's son, at that time aide-de-camp to General Stevens, was communicated to Pope by two Federal cavalymen who, while privately foraging on the Little River turnpike, had ascertained the approach in force of the Confederates.³ Some intimations of another Confederate attempt to

¹ "Near this point Robertson's brigade captured one entire company of New York cavalry, and Lee's brigade an entire company of the old Second Dragoons (regulars), Captain Thomas Hight." Stuart's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 743. General Franklin, who, in accordance with McClellan's orders to guard Pope's communications with Alexandria, had on his arrival near Pope's army detached one of Slocum's brigades under Torbert to guard the roads near Fairfax, says: "Colonel Torbert reports that about 8 o'clock on the night of the 31st the enemy brought three pieces of artillery about 300 yards from his pickets, and fired on the trains then crowding the turnpike in his rear, causing great confusion. . . . Had Colonel Torbert's brigade not been present to defend this very vulnerable point, Stuart's cavalry would easily have been in rear of the army that night; the trains would in all probability have been utterly destroyed, and another great disaster would have occurred." *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 541.

² From Pope's second report it would appear that he obtained this information from a reconnoissance made by Sumner. This could, however, not have been his intention, for Sumner says this reconnoissance was made on August 31. Testimony before Committee on the Conduct of the War, I, 367.

³ "General Hazard Stevens, then Captain and Adjutant General of his father's division (First Division, Ninth Corps) informs me that two cavalymen came from General Pope soon after 1 p.m., with orders for the troops of the Ninth Corps (which was then under General Stevens's command, as General Reno, commander of the Second Division, was sick and off active

intervene between his army and Washington seem to have reached Pope in the early forenoon, but his orders to Sumner and Heintzelman to prepare for an attack in the "direction of Chantilly" *on the next morning*, September 2, betoken no knowledge that Jackson followed by Longstreet, was about to cut in two his retreating columns.¹ At 11 o'clock, however, he telegraphs Halleck: "The enemy is deploying his forces on the Little River pike, and preparing to advance by that road on Fairfax Court House. This movement turns Centreville and interposes between us and Washington, and will force me to attack his advance."² His announced intention of giving battle is followed in the next sentence by an expression of serious concern: "I have nothing like the force you undoubtedly suppose, and the fight will be necessarily desperate." Then as if the battle were already lost, he adds: "I hope you will make all preparations to make a vigorous defense of the intrenchments around Washington."³

By 12 o'clock Pope was fully convinced that his position at Centreville was endangered, and issued

duty) to march at once across the fields to the Little River turnpike, take a position across it, and hold in check the force said to be advancing by that road to Fairfax Court House. These men were under orders to accompany General Stevens as guides on the march, and did so." General Walcott in *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, 150.

¹ Sumner, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, says: "I arrived at Centreville the next morning (September 1), and reported to General Pope. . . . The general afterwards came to me, and determined that I should attack on the flank of the enemy the next morning with 25,000 men. . . . For some reason, however, which was unknown to me, instead of making the attack, I was ordered that night to retreat from Centreville. . . . I was exceedingly surprised when I received the order." II, (1), 367. General Heintzelman confirms this.

² *Official Records*, 16, 84. General Walcott thinks that in this telegram General Pope was "trying to frighten Halleck into ordering him to retreat without a fight by alluding to the smallness of his force, the desperate nature of the impending battle, and the necessity of looking out for the intrenchments around Washington." *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, 148.

³ "And yet at this very moment he had in the three corps of Sumner, Franklin, and Banks nearly 30,000 excellent troops, who were perfectly fresh and had not fired a shot in the recent battles—quite enough to have defeated Jackson on the Little River turnpike, separated as he was from Longstreet." *Ropes, Story of the Civil War*, II, 308.

orders, not for offensive battle as he had planned, but apparently for purely defensive tactics.¹ With the significant admonition, "Jackson is reported advancing on Fairfax, with 20,000 men; move quickly," Pope directs McDowell "to march rapidly back to Fairfax Court House . . . and immediately occupy Germantown with your whole force so as to cover the turnpike from this place to Alexandria."² He detaches Hooker from his division to take command at Germantown of all reinforcements advancing from toward Washington.³ He instructs Colonel Torbert, in command of two brigades near Fairfax Court House, "to hurry up Couch's division and all other troops coming from Washington to Germantown," enjoins him to hold his position to the last, and assures him that "the whole army is on the move to join you."⁴

To delay Jackson until his troops and trains passed the danger point, Pope ordered Reno's Ninth Corps under Stevens to march across the field to the Little River turnpike, take a position across it, and hold the advancing Confederates in check.⁵ Stevens's force consisted of his own division of three brigades and Reno's division of two brigades.⁶ "Heintzelman's corps was directed to take post on the road between

¹ A finer opportunity to atone for failure and recover prestige is rarely presented to a commander than was offered Pope in the early afternoon of this day. With 30,000 troops just added to those he had on the 30th and with Jackson far in advance of Longstreet, he could have fallen on Jackson with overwhelming numbers. Pope, however, as his telegrams to Halleck show, had lost faith in his officers and men.

² *Official Records*, 16, 84.

³ *Ibid.*, 85.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ There is no copy of Pope's orders to Stevens in the official records. The lack of Federal reports causes some uncertainties as to their operations. Stevens and Kearny, who directed the fighting, were both killed during the engagement. Reno, who was present, but off duty on account of sickness, made no report. Birney, who succeeded Kearny, filed a very brief report that covers only his part of the battle.

⁶ General Walcott says that only Ferrero's brigade of Reno's division was present. This is an error. Nagle's brigade was also engaged. Major Waite (*New Hampshire in the Rebellion*, 319) says of the Sixth New Hampshire, one of Nagle's regiments: "In this the Sixth was actively engaged and did good service." Captain Bosbyshell, of the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania,

Centreville and Fairfax, immediately in rear of Reno.”¹ While he was still about half of a mile from his objective, the Little River turnpike, Stevens saw a gray line of skirmishers between his troops and the pike. It was soon clear to Stevens, who was an officer of ability and experience, that the skirmishers were covering the advance of a Confederate force of sufficient strength to menace Pope’s line of retreat. If this force were not arrested in its march before it reached the Warrenton pike, it would there “cut in two the Union army while it was widely extended on the road.”² Stevens “came to the quick conclusion that a sharp charge on his part was better policy than to receive an attack or wait to allow his small force to be flanked in its position.”³ He therefore formed for assault, and with his own division on the west and Reno’s division on the east of the road from Ox Hill to the Warrenton pike, he pressed forward about 4:30 p.m. to interpose what check he could to Jackson’s progress.

Jackson, knowing that he was approaching a reinforced Federal army, had been moving slowly during the day and keeping his divisions well in hand. When he reached Ox Hill, about two miles from Germantown and four from Fairfax Court House, Stuart, who was in advance with his cavalry, reported that the wooded ridges toward Germantown and Fairfax were firmly held by infantry and artillery, and that it was plainly indicated that the Federals would here make a stand.⁴

another of Nagle’s regiments, says: “The brigade lost a number . . . but the Forty-eighth escaped with two men slightly wounded.” *History of Forty-eighth Pennsylvania*, 72.

¹ Pope’s Report, *Official Records*, 16, 45.

² Todd, *History of the Seventy-ninth New York Highlanders*, 215. “From the elevated ground on which he had just been moving, he had seen the wagons on the Centreville pike hurrying toward Fairfax Court House, and felt the greater need of showing a bold front.” General Walcott, *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, 153.

³ *Ibid.* “The attack upon the enemy on Monday by General Stevens with a handful of men . . . was not anticipated by General Pope, but made by General Stevens on his own judgment in an unexpected emergency.” *Ibid.*, 148.

⁴ Stuart’s Report, *Official Records*, 16, 744.

Jackson, with his men lining the roads,¹ waited awhile for Longstreet to draw nearer,² and then about four o'clock established his battle-lines, as follows: Starke's division, with its back at an acute angle with the Little River pike, was posted on the left, Ewell's under Lawton in the center, with its brigades astride the Ox Hill road, and A. P. Hill's on the right. The brigades of Branch and of Field under Brockenbrough, were directed forward to develop the Federal position and strength. Branch's North Carolinians, with Brockenbrough's Virginians on their left, pressed southward to the edge of a field near the Reid house. This house is between Ox Hill and the unfinished Manassas Gap Railroad coming from the former battlefield. There, standing behind a rail fence under bordering trees, these advance brigades, without a shot or a sound, waited until the assailing Federals came through a full-eared corn field to within seventy-five yards of their position. "Then," says Captain Walcott, of the Twenty-first Massachusetts Regiment, "from Branch's brigade of five North Carolina and Brockenbrough's of three Virginia regiments a terrific fire of musketry was opened from the fence."³ The Federals were staggered by the withering hail of bullets and paused in their onset. "Five color-bearers of the Highlanders (Seventy-ninth New York) had fallen in succession, and the colors again fell to the

¹ Cooke, in his *Life of Jackson*, thus describes the condition of Jackson's men: "The men of the Stonewall Brigade and their comrades were lying on the side of the road hungry and exhausted. They had not seen their wagons since they left the Rappahannock, and the rations secured at Manassas were long since exhausted. Green corn and unripe apples had for several days been their sustenance, and now they were in a country which did not afford even these. The hungry men saw on every side bleak fields and forests, with scarce a roof visible in the entire landscape, and thus famished and worn out, they were lying down and awaiting the order to advance and attack. There was no ill-humor visible; on the contrary jests and laughter greeted the least object calculated to excite them." 304.

² Stuart's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 744.

³ *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, 154.

ground.”¹ At this precarious moment General Stevens, disregarding protests, seized the fallen flag and appealed to his men to carry on. Rallying under the inspiring leadership, his wavering troops again surged for the fence. They reached it in a determined charge, in which their leader was slain; for, as Jackson reports, “so severe was the fire in front and flank of Branch’s brigade as to produce in it some disorder and falling back.”² However, when the Eighteenth North Carolina, under Lieutenant-Colonel T. J. Purdie, was withdrawn from the center and under a deadly fire covered the threatened flank, the brigade recovered its poise, and again kept its muskets busy. As Brockenbrough’s brigade, like Branch’s, staggered under the impetuous charge, Gregg and Thomas were timely at hand to sustain it. Pender, so often during this campaign used as a pinch-hitter, now came into action. Two of his North Carolina regiments—the Twenty-second under Major C. C. Cole and the Thirty-eighth under Captain John Ashford—moved through the woods to the support of Thomas, but were not actively engaged.³ The other two—the Sixteenth, Captain L. W. Stowe, and the Thirty-fourth, Colonel R. H. Riddick—went to the aid of Branch, who was some distance to the right. These two regiments, Pender reports, “suffered very severely from direct and flank fire.” Branch, Gregg, and Pender’s two regiments constituted the new right, and Thomas, intermingled with Brockenbrough, the center. The men of the new line stepped into a hot conflict, for Stevens’s troops were fighting steadily. Jackson’s men, however, had caught the habit of stern aggression. In the teeth of a cold, pitilessly driving rain that beat into their

¹ Todd, *History of the Seventy-ninth New York Highlanders*, 220.

² Lane’s Report, *Official Records*, 16, 677.

³ Pender’s Report, *Ibid.*, 698.

faces and wet their paper cartridges ruinously,¹ they fought almost by regiments, for, in their advance through the thick woods already darkened by the blinding storm, the brigades could not keep their liaison. Overcoming this difficulty by obstinate regimental combat, the Confederates, after about an hour's strife, drove Stevens's division back into the cornfield where the battle began.

When the men of Hill and Stevens were first contesting for the fence along the woods, Ferrero's brigade of Reno's own division, supported by Nagle's brigade, entered the battle on the east of the Ox Hill road. The Confederate front there was held by the brigades of Trimble and Hays, with Lawton and Early in second line. The Federals struck Hays's men just as an inexperienced brigade commander was trying to change brigade front almost at the moment of collision.² The brigade thus caught gave way in confusion. Trimble's sadly reduced brigade on its right, having its flank left unceremoniously in the air, became, says Captain Oates of the brigade, involved regiment by regiment in the retirement.³ The Twenty-first North Carolina Regiment was included in this retirement. Three of Early's regiments from the second line, however, grimly stepped into the confusion, and their volleys were so accurately delivered that the Federals were quickly thrust back—the Twenty-first Massachusetts Regiment

¹ "Just before sunset a terrific thunderstorm, a storm cold and pitiless as the rebels themselves—burst over the field; and amid the convulsions of the elemental warfare and the drenching rain, the blaze of battle rivaled the fierce lightning. It was a fearful hour. The rain was so furious that ammunition could scarcely be kept serviceable, and the thunder so loud that the roar of artillery was not heard at Centreville, three miles distant." De Peyster, *Philip Kearny*, 434.

² Hays was absent on account of wounds. General Early says: "Colonel Strong had attempted to change front when the enemy were advancing on him, and being entirely inexperienced in the management of a brigade, he had got it into such confusion that it was compelled to retire." *General Jubal A. Early*, 130.

³ *War Between the Union and the Confederacy*, 150.

receiving the heaviest battle loss in its career.¹ There was no other fighting on the Confederate left.

Just as Stevens's division was "retiring in some confusion"² from the counterstroke of Branch, Pender, Gregg, and Thomas on the Confederate right, and as Reno's men were staggering back from Early's deadly muskets on the left, Birney's strong Federal brigade of seven regiments, a part of Kearny's division, approached on Stevens's left flank. Birney threw forward his First Maine Regiment to stay Stevens's retreat until he could form his brigade. This regiment, "met by a most galling fire," "soon retired to a more advantageous position."³ As Birney led his other regiments forward to take over the fighting, he was quick to see that Stevens's retreat was leaving a dangerous gap on his right, and he appealed to Kearny to send Berry's brigade to fill it.⁴ When Kearny, who had just ridden up, received this report, he doubted its accuracy. He, however, on catching sight of the shattered Twenty-first Massachusetts just withdrawing from its encounter with Early,⁵ impatiently ordered it and other of Reno's troops⁶ to form on Kearny's right. When the new Federal line

¹ Walcott, *The Twenty-first Massachusetts*, 167. "In this short but savage battle, the regiment suffered the heaviest loss which it ever experienced in action, losing 140 men." "Then, while most of our poor fellows were standing with their guns at their shoulders, one of the deadliest volleys ever fired rolled upon us from our right and front. In the sudden anguish and despair of the moment, the whole regiment seemed to be lying bleeding on the ground." *Ibid.*, 163.

² Birney's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 418.

³ Whitman and True, *Maine in the War*, 97.

⁴ Birney's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 418.

⁵ "We tried to steal a few minutes to get the wet charges out of our guns, but the general in hot and angry impatience would brook no delay, and under his sneers, threats, and curses, we again moved forward." *History of the Twenty-first Massachusetts*, 164.

⁶ Apparently it was at this juncture, when Stevens's regiments were going to the rear, that Nagle's brigade was called into the battle; for Major Waite says of Nagle's Sixth New Hampshire men: "Advancing over a ridge to support other troops already engaged, they met the Fiftieth Pennsylvania (one of Stevens's regiments) just breaking and flying in confusion. . . . The two regiments united, and, protected by a rail fence on the edge of a corn field, repulsed the attack." *New Hampshire in the Rebellion*, 318.

tried to make headway, it sustained what Birney calls "a most murderous fire"¹ from Branch, Gregg, and Pender's two regiments, whose brigades, according to General Hill bore the brunt of the fight.² Thomas, meantime, with two of Pender's regiments attached, was silently moving to attack Birney's exposed right.³ Kearny, fretted by the hesitant movement of Reno's men, threatened to turn the guns of Randolph's battery on them.⁴ To demonstrate that there were no Confederates in front of them, he rode alone across the corn field squarely into the lines of Thomas's Georgians. Disregarding their shouts to surrender, he wheeled his horse to rush back, and was shot dead.⁵

As Kearny fell the Confederate left surged toward the right of his advancing line. In the darkness Northerners and Southerners were soon so intermingled that individual foeman were challenging one another to surrender—a challenge frequently answered by a close-range shot and occasionally by a bayonet jab. As a participant saw it: "All was now confusion, and it seemed as if the fight must go on till ended by death or surrender, with mortal enemies mingled together; but, strange to say, the fighting now closed almost entirely. It was so dark that no one could tell whether the man next to him was friend or foe, and nobody was willing to say who or what he was. Soon both parties, scarcely knowing how it happened, found themselves

¹ Birney's Report, *Official Records*, 16, 418.

² Hill's Report, *Ibid.*, 672.

³ General Walcott, *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, 157.

⁴ Todd, *History of the Seventy-ninth New York Highlanders*, 220; *Twenty-first Massachusetts*, 165.

⁵ As illustrative of the respect that soldiers feel for brave foes, Major R. W. York of the Sixth North Carolina says: "After the fighting was over, and the rain still falling, we sought shelter in the porch of an old-fashioned country store. There were only two benches on the porch, but these were cheerfully given up when the dead bodies of Generals Kearny and Stevens were brought by our boys from the field just in front of the old store. The bodies of the Federal Generals were laid in state on these two benches, and reverently, tenderly, with uncovered heads, many in the drenching rain, we silently watched the last sleep of our two gallant foemen." Cedar Fork Address.

drawing apart, and falling back to their original positions.”¹ “The firing,” writes Lieutenant O. A. Wiggins of the Thirty-seventh North Carolina, ceased as if by mutual consent.”² In front of Birney there were a few volleys after dark, but there too the firing died down to scattering shots as night advanced. “The battle of Chantilly,” comments General Walcott, “was now over, neither side having permanently gained a foot of ground.”³ Not only was this battle over, but Pope’s disastrous campaign was closed; for, late in the night, his troops were withdrawn to join the remainder of his army in its search for shelter in the forts around Washington.

This battle, although of comparatively brief duration and fought with the depleted ranks⁴ inevitable at the close of an unusually exhausting campaign and with the men’s nerves frayed raw by a week’s tumult, was a manful contest.⁵ “This engagement,” reports General Lane of Branch’s brigade, “is regarded by this brigade as one of our severest.”⁶ “The conflict raged with great fury, the enemy obstinately and desperately contested the ground,” was General Jackson’s observation.⁷

As the battle was fought with the foeman in unusually close proximity during the entire collision, the losses were large for the numbers engaged. They were, however, far fewer than they would have been but

¹ Walcott, *The Twenty-first Massachusetts*, 160.

² Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 657.

³ *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, 160.

⁴ “The hard service and heavy losses of this campaign,” writes Adjutant Graham Daves of the Twenty-second North Carolina of Pender’s brigade, “may be understood by the fact that at the time there were, out of twelve field officers of the brigade, but three left on duty, and some of the companies were commanded by corporals.” Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 169.

⁵ “We used every round of our ammunition, but General Branch ordered our position to be held at the point of the bayonet. We did so until dark.” *History of the Thirty-third North Carolina Troops*, 552.

⁶ *Official Records*, 16, 677.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 647.

for the rain's fouling so many cartridges and guns.¹ The Confederate losses were reported officially as 506.² The Union losses are not given separately for this battle. After a laborious search through state archives, regimental histories, and after much correspondence, General Walcott concludes that the Federal loss was about 1,000 men.³ The North Carolina loss, as officially reported, was as follows: Branch's brigade, 108;⁴ Pender's brigade, 58;⁵ Twenty-first North Carolina of Trimble's brigade, 4;⁶—a total of 170. The Federal losses for the entire Manassas campaign are reported as follows: Killed, 1,747; wounded, 8,452; missing, 4,263—a grand total of 14,462.⁷ The total Confederate loss as reported by the surgeon-general differs from the combined wing losses as reported by the two wing commanders, Jackson and Longstreet. Surgeon-general Guild records as follows: Killed, 1,090; wounded, 6,154—a total of 7,244.⁸ His wing losses are given by Longstreet⁹ as killed, 633; wounded, 4,016; missing, 46—a total of 4,725. Jackson¹⁰ gives the losses of his wing at 805 killed, 3,547 wounded, and 35 missing—a total of 4,387. These combined would, of course, make a total Confederate infantry and artillery loss of 1,468 killed, 7,563 wounded, 81 missing—a total of 9,112. A cavalry loss¹¹ of perhaps 200 must be added. This brings the total loss, according

¹ Lane reports of the fire of Branch's North Carolinians: "The enemy's direct advance was through a field of corn, in which he sustained great loss, notwithstanding most of our guns fired badly on account of the heavy rain." *Official Records*, 16, 677. Captain J. J. Norton thinks that two-thirds of the muskets in his regiment failed to fire. *Ibid.*, 692.

² *Ibid.*, 672, 813.

³ *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, 161.

⁴ *Official Records*, 16, 677.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 699.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 813.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 262.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 562.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 568.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 648.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 744-52.

to these officers, to 9,312. The North Carolina regimental losses as given by the surgeon-general were as follows:

First Battalion.....	18
Sixth Regiment.....	77
Seventh Regiment.....	44
Sixteenth Regiment.....	52
Eighteenth Regiment.....	12
Twenty-first Regiment.....	84
Twenty-second Regiment.....	63
Twenty-eighth Regiment.....	50
Thirty-third Regiment.....	8
Thirty-fourth Regiment.....	25
Thirty-seventh Regiment.....	81
Thirty-eighth Regiment.....	24
Chantilly or Ox Hill.....	170
	708

The indications are that the losses in both armies have been underestimated, for the regimental losses given by the surgeons-general in many cases are lower than those officially reported to the governors of different states. For instance, the surgeon-general reports the losses in the Twenty-first North Carolina as 84, but Acting Adjutant S. C. James sent to the governor of North Carolina an official report in which the names of 96 casualties are recorded.¹ The surgeon-general states the casualties of the Thirty-fourth North Carolina at 25 killed and wounded; Surgeon John F. Miller of that regiment sent to the state authorities an itemized list of 73 casualties.² Major C. C. Cole of the Twenty-second North Carolina sends by names an official list of 76 killed and wounded, as

¹ Raleigh *Standard*, October 1, 1862.

² *Ibid.*, September 24, 1862.

opposed to the surgeon-general's report of 63.¹ The total North Carolina casualties, on the basis of Lane's and Pender's reports were 726.² Three of North Carolina's most promising field officers laid down their lives in these battles. These were Colonel R. H. Riddick of the Thirty-fourth, an excellent and experienced soldier, Lieutenant-Colonel Eli H. Miller of the same regiment, who was rapidly growing into a most capable officer, and the gallant young Lieutenant-Colonel Saunders Fulton, whose death has already been mentioned.

Although the Federal troops engaged at Chantilly had fought with spirit and tenacity, General Pope had begun to distrust his army, and perhaps to feel that the army lacked confidence in his leadership.³ Notwithstanding the fact that his troops were in most excellent grouping for battle, he gave up his announced intention of attacking on September 2. Instead of an attack, he wrote General Halleck at 7:30 a.m.: "I

¹ Raleigh *Standard*, September 24, 1862.

² The North Carolinians who lost their lives in these battles were so far as our records show, as follows: in the Sixth Regiment, John Collins, J. P. Copeland, William Howell, A. King, T. J. Minnis, T. L. Ollis, John E. Ray, W. U. Roberts, Corporal C. Simpson; in the Seventh North Carolina, David Joiner, Martin Cruse, A. R. Riggsby, William Moore, A. Vandeberg; in the Eighteenth, Lieutenant Stewart, F. D. Moore; in the Twenty-first, Lieutenant-Colonel Saunders Fulton, Lieutenants D. P. Jackson, W. L. Owen, J. C. Hartman, Sanford Hill, J. A. Schultz, Privates J. D. Blackburn, A. S. Boyles, A. Z. Butner, W. H. Clemmons, Alexander Faucette, W. Fulk, John Hendrix, W. A. Petrie, E. W. Rierison, A. D. Shore, W. H. Williamson, L. D. Wright; in the Twenty-second Regiment, William Fields, Wilcher Hall, William Hays, J. S. Irvin, E. Riley, J. D. Spinks; in the Twenty-eighth Regiment, Joseph Drum, George Waller; in the Thirty-third, John Porter, G. Boon; in the Thirty-fourth, Colonel R. H. Riddick, Lieutenant-Colonel Eli H. Miller, Lieutenants H. D. Eaton, and Franklin Long, Sergeant R. W. Crowder, Privates J. B. Bedford, John M. Dennis, Calloway Dobbin, E. Halton, Jesse Phillips, W. L. Plaster, G. J. Swearzy, W. Whiteside; in the Thirty-seventh Regiment, Lieutenant Hayes Beatty, Lieutenant William Green, Privates B. P. Cussons, J. H. Fight, Thomas Hays, Davis Nelson, William Weaver. There are no nominal reports from the Sixteenth and the Thirty-eighth Regiments. Raleigh *Standard*, September 14 to October 8, 1862.

³ The Comte de Paris thinks that the Union army was unwilling to fight longer under Pope's command. He says: "But their numbers could no longer avail; for the bravest men in them had come to consider a new battle fought under his direction in the light of a useless butchery." *Civil War in America*, II, 303.

will give battle when I can, but you should come out and see the troops. They were badly demoralized when they joined me, both officers and men, and there is an intense idea among them that they must get behind the intrenchments. . . . The enemy is in very heavy force and must be stopped in some way. These forces under my command are not able to do so in the open field, and if again checked I fear the force will be useless afterwards. I would attack today but the troops are absolutely unable.”¹ “You will bring your forces as best you can within or near the line of fortifications,” was Halleck’s reply to this pathetic wail from his field commander.² In obedience to this order, the Union army, shocked in its morale,³ discontented with its commander,⁴ and wracked with jealousies,⁵ made its way to the Potomac forts in the disorganized condition in which a defeated army generally retires.⁶

¹ *Official Records*, 18, 796-97.

² *Ibid.*, 797.

³ General Meade writes to his family: “The morale of the army is very much impaired by recent events.” *Life and Letters*, I, 309. Major Gould, of the First Maine Regiment, declares: “We had been outgeneraled and driven behind the defenses of Washington; we were demoralized and discouraged. (I cannot say disheartened.) It was the darkest day and the darkest hour in our regimental history.” *History of the First, Tenth, Twenty-ninth Maine*, 217.

⁴ General Rufus R. Dawes, in *Service with the Sixth Wisconsin*, 75, says: “Open sneering at General Pope was heard on all sides.” “The troops of New England, the Middle States, and the West marched along side by side . . . [feeling] that they had been poorly led.” *First Massachusetts*, 279.

⁵ General Walcott of Reno’s Federal corps comments on the junction of his brigade with Franklin’s corps: “Never believing in General Pope, or considering ourselves a part of his army, and proud of having preserved our discipline in the midst of the permitted demoralizing rapine so general in the Army of Virginia, our hearts leaped with joy as we approached the long hoped for reinforcements from our Army of the Potomac. But to them we were only a part of Pope’s beaten army, and as they lined the road they greeted us with mocking laughter, taunts, and jeers on the advantages of the new road to Richmond; while many of them in plain English expressed their joy at the downfall of the braggart rival of the great soldier of the Peninsula.” *Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers*, II, 144. “Pope was now defeated, and there were those even in high position who seemed to glory in the fact.” Dawes, *Service with the Sixth Wisconsin*, 76.

⁶ A French officer, General de Trobriand, then colonel of the Fifty-fifth New York Zouaves, who was advancing in command of two regiments to unite with Pope’s reinforcements, gives a glimpse of the conditions at Fairfax Court House during the night of September 2. He says: “Toward eleven

The despondency in the field, however, did not exceed the depression in governmental circles¹ or among the people.² The President despaired of holding Washington,³ and the Cabinet was oppressed with gloom.⁴ Even before he knew the extent of the disaster, General Halleck had become so confounded over the situation that he, on August 31, laid aside his pride, and appealed to McClellan for counsel and direction.⁵ On the same day McClellan had written to his wife: "I do not regard Washington as safe. If I can quietly slip over there, I will send your silver off."⁶ The ordnance officers were directed to ship the arms and munitions in the Washington arsenal to New York for safety.⁷ The same order was given to the national treasurer as to his funds. Troops from Yorktown and Falmouth were

o'clock in the evening, we halted at the outskirts of the village of Fairfax. There everything was in terrible confusion. By the light of fires kindled all around . . . one could see a confused mass of wagons, ambulances, caissons, around which thousands of men invaded the houses, filled up the barns, broke down the fences, dug up the gardens, cooked their suppers, smoked or slept in the rain. These men belonged to different corps. They were neither sick nor wounded, but favored by the disorder inseparable from a defeat, they had left their regiments at Centreville to mingle with the train escorts, or had come away each by himself, hurried on by the fear of new combats." *Four Years with the Potomac Army*, 296.

¹ "Both Stanton and Halleck were, however, filled with apprehension beyond all others, as the army of stragglers and broken battalions . . . came rushing toward Washington." Gideon Welles, *Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward*, 194.

² The *New York Times* of September 5, 1862, expressed what seemed to be the verdict of the people in these words: "The summer campaign which was to have given us the capital has come to a disastrous end. Richmond is relieved and Washington is besieged. The magnificent army, organized and drilled with so much care by McClellan a year ago, repulsed first on the Potomac, has been again repulsed in its advance on Richmond from the North, and now seeks safety for itself behind the forts which line the Potomac. Disguise it as we may, the Union arms have been repeatedly, disgracefully, and decisively beaten. The whole campaign against Richmond has proved a failure."

³ "He (President Lincoln) then said that he regarded Washington as lost, and asked me if I would, under the circumstances, as a favor to him, resume command and do the best that could be done." *McClellan's Own Story*, 535.

⁴ Of the Cabinet meeting of September 2, Secretary Welles records in his diary: "There was a more disturbed and desponding feeling than I had ever witnessed in council; the President was greatly distressed." I, 105.

⁵ On August 31 General Halleck telegraphed General McClellan: "I beg you to assist me in this crisis with your ability and experience. I am utterly tired out." *Official Records*, 12, 103.

⁶ *McClellan's Own Story*, 532.

⁷ *Official Records*, 18, 807.

hurried to Washington.¹ A gunboat flotilla under Commodore Wilkes was formed on the Potomac.² The clerks and employees in the public buildings were ordered to report to General Wadsworth to be armed for the defense of Washington.³ "It was the moment," writes Morse, "for a master to take control, and the President met the occasion. There was only one thing to be done. . . . It was necessary to reinstate McClellan."⁴

This, to the great joy of the army,⁵ President Lincoln proceeded to do. Although the President believed that General McClellan was "deficient in the positive qualities which are necessary for an energetic commander,"⁶ he now relieved Pope and put McClellan in command of all the forces that were charged with the defense of the capital. This step was taken by Mr. Lincoln with a full knowledge of "the bitter opposition and remonstrance he was certain to encounter,"⁷ but with the conviction that since "McClellan had the army with him," the government was

¹ "The great danger to Washington renders it necessary that the remainder of General Keyes's corps be sent here as rapidly as possible," went the message to General Dix. "Hasten forward the troops as rapidly as possible," was the order to Burnside at Falmouth. *Official Records* 18, 798-99.

² "I have ordered Wilkes and a force of 14 gunboats . . . to come round into the Potomac, and have put W. [Wilkes] in command of the flotilla here." Welles, *Diary*, I, 93.

³ *Official Records*, 18, 807.

⁴ *Abraham Lincoln*, 80. Morse adds: "By this act the President gave extreme offense to the numerous and strenuous band with whom hatred of the Democratic general had become a sort of religion; and upon this occasion even Messrs. Nicolay and Hay seem more inclined to apologize for their idol than to defend him." *Ibid.*, 82.

⁵ "The announcement of McClellan's restoration came to us in the early evening of the 2d of September, 1862, just after reaching Hall's hill, weary from long marching and well-nigh disheartened by recent reverses. The men were scattered about in groups discussing the events of the ill-starred campaign. . . . Suddenly while these mournful consultations were in full blast, a mounted officer . . . reined up enough to shout, 'Little Mac is back here on the road, boys.' From extreme sadness we passed in a twinkling to a delirium of delight. A deliverer had come. A real rainbow of promise." George Kimball in *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 550.

⁶ Welles, *Diary*, I, 105.

⁷ Rhodes, *History of the United States*, IV, 135.

entitled in this crisis to use his popularity as well as his organizing and engineering skill.¹

That Pope's campaign was a failure all will agree;² whether the failure was due solely to General Pope's incompetency has been a subject of discussion ever since the campaign closed in angry contentions. Perhaps the severest of his critics have been officers of the United States army.³

Much of the panic in Washington would have been forestalled if the Federal authorities had been accurately informed as to the condition and real strength of General Lee's army. To expect his small army to storm the works around Washington, including as they did some forty-odd forts and their connecting curtains,

¹ The President's estimate of McClellan at this time is thus reproduced by Secretary Welles: "McClellan knows this whole ground; his specialty is to defend; he is a good engineer, all admit; there is no better organizer; he can be trusted to act on the defensive, but he is troubled with the 'slows,' and good for nothing for an onward movement." *Diary*, I, 105. McClellan was well aware that the War Department was not kindly disposed to him. On receiving on August 21 a telegram that Pope and Burnside were hard pressed and suggesting that he come to Washington as soon as possible, he writes, sarcastically: "Now that they are in trouble they seem to want the 'Quaker,' the 'procrastinator,' the 'coward,' and the 'traitor.'" *Own Story*, 470. To this opinion he adds on August 23: "Nothing but their fears will induce them to give me any command of importance." *Ibid.*, 471.

² "The failure of General Pope's operations had been so manifest and the lack of belief on the part of the troops in his ability as a commander of an army had become so universal, that there was really nothing to be done but to relieve him and to appoint McClellan in his room." Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*, 323.

³ For instance, General Meade wrote just after the battle: "The result is no more than might have been known by any one who looked upon things in their proper light. . . . In a few words we have been, as usual *out-manuevered* and out-numbered." *Life and Letters*, I, 306, 308. Major Steele, writing after a critical study of the campaign, says: "He never had a true conception of the situation from the time when he learned of Jackson's movement northward, until he reached the fortifications of Washington with his beaten army." *American Campaigns*, 237. General Francis A. Walker, expressing his judgment after a "cooling time" of twenty-four years, summarizes: "The campaign was destined to end in humiliation. The braggart who had begun his campaign with insolent reflections, in general orders, upon the Army of the Potomac and its commander . . . had been kicked, cuffed, hurtled about, knocked down, run over, and trodden upon as rarely happens in the history of war. His communications had been cut; his headquarters pillaged; a corps had marched into his rear, and had encamped at it ease upon the railroad by which he received his supplies; he had been beaten or foiled in every attempt he had made to 'bag' these defiant intruders; and in the end he was glad to find a refuge in the intrenchments of Washington, whence he had sallied forth six weeks before, breathing out threatenings and slaughter." *History of Second Army Corps*, 91.

mounting 500 heavy guns and 120 field pieces, and defended by 110,000 men,¹ seems ludicrous to a reader with his "hind-sights" adjusted. Lee's movements, however, had been so rapid and daring, his strategy so admirable, and his men had displayed such "courage, patience, and muscular legs,"² that their opponents magnified their power.³ It is true that since May the Federals had seen Lee cement by battle an army which with imperfect equipment and slender commissariat had, by dint of sheer fighting ability and implicit reliance on its leaders, relieved its capital of an investing army, forced its antagonists to withdraw troops from North Carolina and South Carolina, regained northwest Virginia by defeating Pope, and now seated itself almost within the environs of Washington. What might it not attempt next?⁴

It was, however, no part of General Lee's plan to shatter his small army by throwing it against an intrenched army. He, on September 3, reported to President Davis: "After the enemy had disappeared from the vicinity of Fairfax Court House, and taken the road to Alexandria and Washington, I did not think it would be advantageous to follow him farther. I had no intention of attacking him in his fortifications, and am not prepared to invest him. If I possessed the necessary munitions, I should be unable to supply provisions for the troops."⁵ Therefore, after allowing his jaded men a brief rest, he determined to tempt fortune by passing into Maryland.

¹ Colonel Richard B. Irwin, Assistant Adjutant General, United States Volunteers, in *Battles and Leaders*, I, (2), 541.

² Dodge, *Bird's-eye View of the Civil War*, 80.

³ "The most exaggerated stories prevailed regarding the losses of the campaign and the strength of the enemy." *The Army under Pope*.

⁴ Henderson says: "Within six months two great armies had been defeated; McClellan had been driven from the Peninsula and Pope from the Rappahannock. The villages of Virginia no longer swarmed with foreign bayonets. The hostile camps had vanished from her inland counties. Richmond was free from menace and in the valley of the Shenandoah the harvest was gathered without let or hindrance." *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 198.

⁵ *Official Records*, 28, 590.

CHAPTER XX

THE CONFEDERATES CROSS INTO MARYLAND

As soon as General Lee found that the Federal army was lodged behind defenses that were too strong for judicious assault by his small army, he was confronted by the question of how best to utilize his recent victories. He knew that his army "could not afford to be idle."¹ Since his position near Centreville did not offer a strategic base that answered his needs, there were only two courses open to him: one to retire further into Virginia and await Federal initiative; the other, to relieve Southern territory of harassment and distress by carrying the war into Maryland, and possibly into Pennsylvania,² for he was morally sure that there would be no invasion of Virginia while his army was north of the Potomac.

If he adopted the first course, he would forego the advantages of the offensive, and leave to his Federal adversary the selection of time and place for future combat. The time of attack, if left to the Federals, would, of course, be delayed until the more or less demoralized Union army could be strengthened and reorganized. Hence, Lee's present superiority would be lost. Moreover, the Federal commander, availing himself of his numbers and of his sea control, might select a speedily vulnerable place of attack. General Lee, therefore, wisely dismissed this alternative. The occupation of Maryland, on the other hand, would enable Lee to hold his desired aggressive, and possibly to force a decisive battle before the Federal army could

¹ Lee to Davis, *Official Records*, 28, 591.

² "Should the results of the expedition justify it, I propose to enter Pennsylvania unless you should deem it unadvisable upon political or other grounds." Lee to Davis, *Ibid.*, 592.

assimilate its new organizations and rehabilitate its former jealous components.

The movement, too, would satisfy the insistent desire of large groups of thoughtful Southern men who were possessed with what President Davis rather unsympathetically calls a "feverish anxiety to invade the North,"¹ because they were convinced that the South's only chance to succeed was to wage vigorous and persistent war in northern territory before the Federal government could utilize the far superior resources of that section. Moreover, Confederate entry into its rich territory would test the belief that Maryland, if freed from Northern coercion, would cast in its lot with the Confederates. General Lee had no hallucinations as to vast recruiting in Maryland,² yet he was satisfied that "the present seems the most propitious time since the commencement of the war for the Confederate army to enter Maryland. . . . If it is ever desired to give material aid to Maryland and afford her an opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject, this would seem the most favorable."³

In addition, General Lee naturally took into consideration the effect of such a movement on European statesmen, on his own people, and on the citizens of the North. If the Federal armies were in future to be handled as slowly and cautiously as they had been

¹ *Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist*, V, 346.

² In announcing to President Davis on September 10 the crossing of the Potomac by his army, he says: ". . . . Situated as Maryland is, I cannot anticipate any general uprising of the people in our behalf." *Official Records*, 28, 596. General Bradley T. Johnson, a Marylander himself, with whom General Lee talked freely about his Maryland plans, says: "I believe that I know that the Maryland campaign was not undertaken by General Lee under any delusive hope that his presence there would produce a revolution in Maryland, and such a rising as would give a large force of reinforcements to him." *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 12, 503.

³ Lee to Davis, *Official Records*, 19, 590. "Situated as she was, the pressure exercised unhesitatingly by the government of the United States upon her people prevented the advocates of secession from exhibiting their full strength." Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*, II, 327.

on the Peninsula or as blunderingly as they had been on the Rappahannock, then the way might be opened for his sturdy fighters to win a notable victory on Northern soil. In that event those European nations that were strainedly watching every turn in American affairs while they dallied with Southern overtures for a recognition of their independence, might be led to a favorable decision.¹ Nothing would more quickly justify such action on their part than would a triumphant Southern army campaigning in the heart of Northern territory.

General Lee earnestly desired to relieve his own people from the continuous strain of invasional warfare. If he without further achievement permitted the Federals to follow him back into Virginia, then the destruction of Southern commercial industries, the spoliation of its crops, the demolition of its infant munition plants, and the wreckage of its homes must continue. How long could the South hold its own against such losses? Moreover, as a sympathetic commander he knew how much better soldiers stand the hardships of war when their minds are not weighted down with solicitude about the welfare of their property and the safety of their families. There would be little harrying of Southern homes as long as his men were tramping the highways of Maryland or Pennsylvania.

General Lee was not without hope that "the erring sisters might be allowed to depart in peace" if the wastage of war had to be borne by the North. If Southern troops were camping on Northern farms it would be easier to persuade the owners that it was impossible,

¹ "A single victory on Northern soil, within easy reach of Washington, was far more likely to bring about the independence of the South, than even a succession of victories in Virginia." Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 201. "When the news of a second battle at Bull Run reached England, it seemed at first to Lord John Russell that the failure of the North was certain, and he asked Palmerston and his colleagues to consider whether they must not soon recognize the Confederacy, and whether mediation in the interest of peace and humanity might not perhaps follow." Lord Charnwood, *Abraham Lincoln*, 313.

as many already believed, to subjugate the entire South than it would be to convince them when Northern soldiers were quartered in Southern towns. "To make victory complete," thinks Henderson, "it is the sounder policy to carry the war into hostile territory. A nation endures with comparative equanimity defeat beyond its own borders. Pride and prestige may suffer, but a high-spirited people will seldom be brought to the point of making terms unless its army is annihilated in the heart of its own country . . . and the hideous sufferings of war are brought directly home to the mass of the population."¹ So assured was General Lee that "the present position of affairs places it in the power of the government of the Confederate States to propose with propriety to that of the United States the recognition of our [Southern] independence,"² that he departed from his usual custom of discussing only military matters, and suggested to President Davis that the time was ripe for the presentation of such a proposal.³

Finally, if the task before him appeared too great for his followers, he could retire from Maryland, possibly without serious loss to his army, but only after he had staved off for the season another Northern invasion, and thereby having given his people an opportunity to gather their crops without molestation.

No one, of course, was better apprised than General Lee that his army was ill-provided for offensive opera-

¹ Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 201.

² *Official Records*, 28, 60.

³ The remainder of this letter is so characteristic of General Lee that a few further lines should be quoted: "For more than a year both sections of the country have been devastated by hostilities which have brought sorrow and suffering upon thousands of homes, without advancing the objects which our enemies proposed to themselves in beginning the contest. Such a proposition, coming from us at this time, could in no way be regarded as suing for peace; but, being made when it is in our power to inflict injury upon our adversary, would show conclusively to the world that our sole object is the establishment of our independence and the attainment of an honorable peace." *Ibid.*, 600.

tions in alien territory.¹ His numbers were already small, and he knew that every day's advance would pile up absentees from exhaustion,² hunger, worn-out clothing, unrenewed shoes, and increasing sickness.³ His guns were inferior in range and metal to those of his opponents.⁴ His artillery ammunition was both scant and defective.⁵ Such munitions and meagre equipment as the government at Richmond could furnish at the time would have to be wagoned for great distances, and the escorts for these long routes would be no slight drain on the fighting lines. But for the material captured from the Federals, it is doubtful whether the expedition could have been undertaken.⁶

¹ "The army is not properly equipped for an invasion of an enemy's territory. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes, and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes. . . . What occasions me most concern is the fear of getting out of ammunition." Lee to Davis, *Official Records*, 28, 591.

² "Jackson's men had been marching and fighting from May 23d to September 1st. The two Hills' and Longstreet's from June 25th to the same date." *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 12, 507.

³ A diet largely confined to badly cooked beef, green corn, and green apples had led to a widespread outbreak of diarrhea among the troops. "We were hungry. For six days not a morsel of bread or meat had gone into our stomachs—and our menu consisted of apples and corn. We toasted, we burned, we stewed, we boiled, we roasted these two together and singly, until there was not a man whose form had not caved in, and who had not a bad attack of diarrhea." *Ibid.*, 10, 506.

⁴ Out of the 275 guns taken by the Confederate army into Maryland there were only 117 rifled pieces. Of three-inch rifled pieces, then the most serviceable gun in either army, the Confederates possessed only 47, and of heavy guns they had only four 20-pounder Parrotts. Of their remaining guns 34 were Napoleons and 127 short-range, smooth-bore pieces. Pendleton's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 835; *Long Arm of Lee*, 284.

⁵ General Alexander, of whom Wise says "without an ordnance officer of Alexander's ability it is difficult to see how the invasion of Maryland in 1862 would have been possible," comments as follows: "About one-half of the small-arms were still the old smooth-bore muskets of short range and our rifled cannon ammunition was always inferior in quality." *Military Memoirs*, 223. "Their projectiles and fuses were of very inferior order." *Long Arm of Lee*, 296. "Our guns were inferior and our ammunition was very defective. Longstreet, *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 667.

⁶ Henderson thus emphasises the dependence of the army on captures: "The captures made in the Valley, in the Peninsula, and in the Second Manassas campaign proved of inestimable value. Old muskets were exchanged for new, smooth-bore cannon for rifled guns, tattered blankets for good overcoats. 'Mr. Commissary Banks,' his successor Pope, and McClellan himself had furnished their enemies with the material of war, with tents

As an offset to these handicaps he had from his point of view two vantage-grounds. First, he believed that the Federal army was so broken and dejected from its two unfortunate campaigns that he might deliver a telling blow before it regained its sturdy morale.¹ He could not of course foresee, as President Lincoln foresaw, that the restoration of General McClellan to command would largely heal the bickerings among the officers and convince the privates that their lives and fortunes were in safe hands.² Second, General Lee knew the serenely confident fighting temper of his army. He felt then, what Dodge later expressed, that mere words could not do justice to the soldierly spirit³ which had been shown by his men in the two campaigns now closed. He was confident that while his adversaries were in a state of nervous anxiety inseparable from defeat, his own ragged and hungry followers would continue to meet almost any draft on their willingness, endurance, courage, and downright staying power. This condition of his army was all the more satisfactory because he had been informed that with the arrival of the troops now coming into his camps he could expect no further accessions, for the desperate Federal pressure by sea and land on other

medicines, ambulances, and ammunition waggons. Even the vehicles at Confederate headquarters bore on their tilts the initials U. S. A.; many of Lee's soldiers were partially clothed in Federal uniforms, and the bad quality of the boots supplied by the Northern contractors was a very general subject of complaint in the Southern ranks." *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 253.

¹ General McClellan has very nearly framed in words General Lee's thoughts. He says: "When I finally resumed command of the troops in and around Washington they were weary, disheartened, their organization impaired, their clothing, ammunition, and supplies in a pitiable condition." *Own Story*, 551.

² "The effect of this man's presence upon the Army of the Potomac was electrical, and too wonderful to make it worth while attempting to give reasons for it." *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 490. "It is evident, however, that the reinstatement of McClellan has inspired strength, vigor and hope in the army. Officers and soldiers appear to be united in his favor and willing to follow his lead." Welles, *Diary*, I, 129.

³ Dodge, *Bird's-eye View of the Civil War*, 80.

sections of the Confederacy forbade the detachment of other troops.¹

Hence, after securing the approbation of his government, General Lee set his army in motion for a territory which to his troops accustomed to war-worn Virginia seemed "fair as a garden of the Lord," but in which only hope led them to expect any recruits. His army had been reinforced by the divisions of D. H. Hill, Lafayette McLaws, and J. G. Walker, and by Hampton's cavalry brigade. The coming of these troops added twenty North Carolina regiments to the eleven and one-half that had gone through the Manassas campaign.² Walker's division was sent by rail as far as Gordonsville, but the divisions of Hill and McLaws marched all the way from Richmond,³ and

¹ Colonel Henderson does not overdraw the dangers in other sections of the Confederacy when he says: "It was not on the Virginia frontier alone that the South was hard pressed. The Valley of the Mississippi was beset by great armies; Alabama was threatened, and Western Tennessee was strongly occupied; it was already difficult to find a safe passage across the river for the supplies furnished by the prairies of Texas and Louisiana, and communication with Arkansas had become uncertain. If the Mississippi were lost, not only would three of the most fertile states, as prolific of hardy soldiers as of fat oxen, be cut off from the remainder, but the enemy, using the river as a base, would push his operations into the very heart of the Confederacy." *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 206.

² These were as follows:

In Anderson's brigade of D. H. Hill's division: Second Regiment, Colonel C. C. Tew; Fourth Regiment, Colonel Bryan Grimes; Fourteenth Regiment, Colonel R. T. Bennett; Thirtieth Regiment, Colonel F. M. Parker.
 In Garland's brigade of D. H. Hill's division: Fifth Regiment, Colonel D. K. MacRae; Twelfth Regiment, Captain S. Snow; Thirteenth Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Thos. Ruffin, Jr.; Twentieth Regiment, Colonel Alfred Iverson; Twentieth-third Regiment, Colonel D. H. Christie.
 In Ripley's brigade of D. H. Hill's division: First Regiment, Colonel H. A. Brown; Third Regiment, Colonel W. L. deRosset.
 In Ransom's brigade of Walker's division: Twenty-fourth Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Harris; Twenty-fifth Regiment, Colonel H. M. Rutledge; Thirty-fifth Regiment, Colonel M. W. Ransom; Forty-ninth Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel L. M. McAfee.
 In Walker's brigade, under Manning, of Walker's division: Twenty-seventh Regiment, Colonel J. R. Cooke; Forty-sixth Regiment, Colonel E. D. Hall; Forty-eighth Regiment, Colonel R. C. Hill.
 In Cobb's brigade of McLaws's division: Fifteenth Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel William MacRae.
 In Hampton's brigade of Stuart's division: First Regiment of Cavalry, Colonel L. S. Baker.

³ Captain Heysinger, after asserting that in the preparation of his book he had "studied, selected, arranged and annotated in writing" "every part, volume, and page," of the *Official Records of the War of the Rebellion* (Preface,

their numbers were seriously diminished by the severe and long march."¹ Moreover, most of these troops had, since shortly after the battle of Malvern Hill, been erecting fortifications around Richmond and Petersburg.² This toil under the July and August sun of a malarial climate had caused much sickness and many deaths.³ Notwithstanding the arrival of these divisions, Colonel Allan, one of the most frank and accurate of the Southern writers, thinks it probable that on account of marches, sickness, and battle the "numerical strength of the Confederate army on September 3 was not so great as it had been two weeks before at the opening of the campaign on the Rapidan."⁴

By the night of September 7 General Lee was able to telegraph President Davis that his army, with the possible exception of Walker's division,⁵ was across the

12), states three times that Hill's troops were transported by rail to Gordonsville. (See pp. 124, 125, 131 of his *Antietam*). Evidently, as many a footsore North Carolinian could testify, he had not read page 1021 of Volume 19, Part 1, where General Hill says: "The division had marched all the way from Richmond."

¹ *Army of Northern Virginia*, 324. General Hill says of this march: "The straggling has been enormous in consequence of heavy marches, deficient commissariat, want of shoes, and inefficient officers." *Official Records*, 27, 1021.

² Hill's Report, *Ibid.*, 1018. "Ransom's brigade served with the troops left behind to defend Richmond and Petersburg and to assist in the construction of fortifications around these cities." Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 600.

³ "After Malvern Hill the Regiment (Twenty-fifth North Carolina) went into camp for a time at Drewry's Bluff. It was here, in consequence of the exposure just gone through, that army sickness made its first telling effect on the regiment, the loss by death from sickness being eighty-one." *Ibid.*, 296.

⁴ *Army of Northern Virginia*, 324.

⁵ This division, composed, with the exception of two regiments, of troops from North Carolina, was ordered on September 9 to destroy the aqueduct of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal at the mouth of the Monocacy River. As Walker's men approached the aqueduct, the retiring Federal pickets fired into Ransom's advance regiments, and seriously wounded Captain G. T. Duffy of the Twenty-fourth Regiment. General Walker found that "owing to the insufficiency of tools and the extraordinary solidity and massiveness of the masonry, the work . . . was one of days instead of hours." (Walker's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 913.) While Walker was considering how to carry out his orders he was ordered to recross the Potomac, march for Loudoun Heights and join in Jackson's attack on Harpers Ferry.

Potomac.¹ Thence he concentrated his troops in and around Frederick.² His object in entering Maryland east of the Blue Ridge,³ instead of using these mountains as a screen for his operations, was, as he states, that "by threatening Washington and Baltimore to cause the enemy to withdraw from the south bank (of the Potomac), where his presence endangered our communications and the safety of those engaged in the removal of our wounded and the captured property from the late battlefields."⁴ As soon as these objects were accomplished, Lee, with the intent of drawing McClellan as far as possible from his base, purposed to cross into Western Maryland, and concentrate his army west of the South Mountain.⁵

While at Leesburg he ordered on September 5 that his line of communication with Richmond, which had been running through Gordonsville, Culpeper, and Warrenton, should be diverted to pass from Gordonsville or Culpeper through Luray and Front Royal to Winchester in the Valley.⁶ He later designated Winchester as his general depot, and directed that not only all trains but all recruits and convalescents on their way to his army should move by the new route.⁷ Moreover, in order that they might reach his army in Western Maryland without danger of capture from Federal cavalry, he ordered that all the sick, slightly wounded, and stragglers from Leesburg south should

¹ Major R. W. York of the Sixth North Carolina Regiment says: "As we reached the Maryland shore, wild huzzas rang out; the bands and drum corps gave us 'Maryland, my Maryland,' while the soldiers sang it, whistled it and hummed it until it was literally worn to a frazzle." *Brief Sketches of State Troops*, 172.

² The name of this town appears in the official reports as Fredericktown, Frederick City, and Frederick.

³ The Blue Ridge immediately north of Harpers Ferry is called locally South Mountain.

⁴ Lee's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 145.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 145, 603.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 593.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 601.

be concentrated at Winchester.¹ This order, which led to the accumulation in Winchester of a large body of stragglers² and war-worn men, included all those who had dropped out of Lee's own army in its march from Manassas, all from the ranks of Walker in his longer march from Gordonsville, and all from the divisions of D. H. Hill and McLaws in their toilsome trip from Richmond.

General Lee had naturally expected that, when his army appeared in the direction of Frederick, the Federal troops at Harpers Ferry and at Martinsburg³ would be withdrawn, as his movement would leave them in an indefensible pocket.⁴ In this he was disap-

¹ *Official Records*, 28, 603. Paragraph II, Special Order.

² While all unwounded men who fell behind on a march were technically known as stragglers, there were, of course, two classes of such men; the involuntary and the voluntary delinquents. General Lee, in writing to President Davis on September 7, suggested a military commission to deal with stragglers. After stating that the material of which his army was composed was the best in the world and that nothing can surpass the gallantry and intelligence of the main body, he thus describes the two classes of stragglers: "With some, the sick and feeble, it results from necessity, but with the greater number from design. The latter do not wish to be with their regiments, nor to share in their hardships and glories. They are the cowards of the army, desert their comrades in time of danger, and fill the houses of the charitable and hospitable in the march." (*Ibid.*, 597.) The march into Maryland, following the almost unprecedented hardships of the Manassas campaign, greatly increased the numbers of the first class. Of these men Judge W. A. Montgomery, of the Twelfth North Carolina Regiment, says: "The long and exhausting march through Virginia and until Boonsboro was reached, laid on the roadside many of the survivors of these battles. They fell out, not from cowardice, but because from hunger and thirst and heat and marching nature had been exhausted." Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 627. In describing the condition of his regiment, when it crossed the Potomac on September 8, Alexander Hunter says: "Our underclothes were foul and hanging in strips, our socks were worn out, half of the men were barefooted, many were lame and were sent to the rear; others of sterner stuff hobbled along and managed to keep up, while gangs from every company went off looking for food, and did not regain their commands for weeks after. Many became ill from exposure and starvation and were left on the road. The ambulances were full, and the whole route was marked with a sick, lame, limping lot, that straggled to the farmhouses that lined the way." *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 10, 507.

³ The force in Lee's rear at Harpers Ferry, including White's command, amounted to 12,737. *Official Records*, 27, 549.

⁴ Before leaving Washington General McClellan, at the request of Mr. Seward, stated to General Halleck that these troops could do no good there and ought to be united with his forces. Halleck, however, "received the statement with ill-concealed scorn." (*Own Story*, 550.) On September 11, McClellan, stating that the force at Harpers Ferry "could be of little use and is con-

pointed;¹ for through a military blunder of General Halleck—a blunder that inured to Federal advantage² these forces were left in their exposed positions. This unexpected departure from military rules requiring the relief of a hopeless position, complicated future movements. General Lee had now to decide whether he should ignore the menace of hostile forces squarely seated on his supply roads from the Valley and adhere to his original plan of a speedy concentration behind the South Mountains, or whether to stay his march long enough to capture the large garrison at Harpers Ferry before proceeding. If he left this force unmolested, there was of course the probability that with large reinforcements it would be a constant menace to his communications; if he stayed his march long enough to capture this stronghold, he would again have to divide his army in the immediate presence of a numerically superior army and again run the serious risk of having each division overwhelmed separately.

General Lee concluded that it “was necessary to dislodge the enemy before concentrating the army west of the mountains.”³ In giving his reasons for this bold decision,⁴—a decision not concurred in by either of his wing commanders, Longstreet or Jackson⁵—General

tinually exposed to be cut off by the enemy,” applied for it. (*Official Records*, 28, 254.) Halleck answered: “There is no way for Colonel Miles to join you at present.” (*Ibid.*, 44.) McClellan’s Report.

¹ “In this I was disappointed.” Lee to Davis, *Ibid.*, 605.

² “It was a lucky blunder, for Lee was forced on September 10 to divide his army, sending Jackson back into Virginia to capture Harpers Ferry while he proceeded with Longstreet to Hagerstown.” Rhodes, *History of the United States*, IV, 143.

³ Lee’s Report, *Official Records*, 27, 145.

⁴ Colonel Eben Swift of the United States General Staff says of Lee’s often apparently overbold maneuvers: “Lee practiced his own theory of the art of war. Although indebted to Napoleon, he treated each problem as a concrete case, which he solved according to circumstances, and he had his greatest success when he departed furthest from established rules.” Quoted in Bradford, *Lee the American*, 189.

⁵ Longstreet declined the proffered command of the Harpers Ferry expedition. He thought the loss of time required was too great; that the soldiers were already too tired to be called on for any extra exertion; that the

Lee says: "The advance of the Federal army was so slow at the time we left Fredericktown as to justify the belief that the reduction of Harpers Ferry would be accomplished and our troops concentrated before they would be called upon to meet it."¹ Therefore, Special Order No. 191, afterwards famous as the "lost dispatch," sent his army westward from Frederick on September 10 to undertake by rapid movements the capture of Harpers Ferry, and a subsequent concentration behind the South Mountains. General Jackson, in command of the operations against Harpers Ferry, was directed to march by Boonsboro Gap with his own command, recross the Potomac, and be in readiness by September 12 to assail the troops under General White at Martinsburg, and to pen in from that side any attempted escape of the garrison at Harpers Ferry. The nine North Carolina regiments under Branch and Pender and the Twenty-first North Caro-

Confederates were masters of the situation as long as they kept their army well in hand. (*From Manassas to Appomattox*, 549). Jackson feared that in undertaking a siege of Harpers Ferry the "system of movements would prove too complex for realizing that punctual and complete concentration which sound policy required," (Dabney, *Life of Jackson*, 549), and desired to fight McClellan first and consider Harpers Ferry afterwards, but "he accepted with alacrity the duty which his colleague had declined." Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 212.

¹ Lee's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 145. General Lee's division of his army and its separation by rivers and long distances in the face of McClellan's outnumbering forces is approved by such military critics as General Palfrey, Colonel Henderson, Wood and Edmonds. Others deem it too audacious, and cite his grave danger on the 15th and 16th, when but for the caution of Franklin and McClellan Lee's part of the army would likely have been crushed, as confirmation of their views. Major Steele, one of the later military critics, says: "It is hard to say whether Lee was right or wrong in detaching a large part of his army—more than half of it—for the capture of Harpers Ferry. . . . It was certainly contrary to a recognized principle of war, and it had a very serious effect on the campaign. . . . The truth of the whole matter is, however, that Lee was emboldened to take such a risk as he took by the slow and leisurely way in which McClellan's army was following him. And but for the untoward incident of the "lost order," Jackson would probably have captured Harpers Ferry and rejoined Lee with McLaws and Walker and A. P. Hill before McClellan gained the top of South Mountain." *American Campaigns*, 275, 276. General J. G. Walker states that General Lee, in explaining some movements on September 9, said to him: "He [McClellan] is an able general, but a very cautious one. . . . His army is in a very demoralized and chaotic condition, and will not be prepared for offensive operations—or he will not think so—for three or four weeks." *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 606.

lina, to which was attached the First Battalion, accompanied Jackson in his rapid march of over sixty miles. McLaws, with his own and R. H. Anderson's division, was instructed to turn south at Middletown, move parallel with Elk Ridge, and seize Maryland Heights. These heights, towering over the hamlet of Harpers Ferry but separated from the village by the Potomac River, form the southern end of Elk Ridge, and reach practically to the river's brink. McLaws was instructed to be in position by Friday the twelfth. The only North Carolina forces with this command were the Fifteenth North Carolina under Lieutenant-Colonel William MacRae,¹ and Manly's battery under Captain Basil C. Manly. Walker's division of two brigades—Ransom's of four North Carolina regiments and Walker's own with three from North Carolina—received orders to leave the Monocacy River, where it had been trying to break up the aqueduct, cross the Potomac into Virginia, and occupy Loudoun Heights, east of Harpers Ferry. While these heights were within cannon shot of the Federal works they were separated from them by the Shenandoah River. Walker's orders, too, enjoined his possession of the summits by Friday. The remainder of Lee's infantry, under Longstreet and D. H. Hill, was directed to Boonsboro. While on the march Longstreet was ordered on to Hagerstown to keep in check state troops which Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania was trying to mass around Chambersburg.² D. H. Hill's division,³ in charge of the reserve artillery and the army trains,

¹ The colonel of this Regiment, H. A. Dowd, was severely wounded at Malvern Hill.

² Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 206.

³ Of this division, containing two and one-half North Carolina brigades, and just from an exhausting march from Richmond, Federal Surgeon Steiner in his diary says: "General Hill's division, numbering about 8,000 men, marched through the streets on their route westward this morning. This division showed more of military discipline than any of its predecessors; the men marched in better order, had better music, and were fairly clothed and equipped."

formed the rear guard. Hill, who was to halt at Boonsboro, was instructed to support the cavalry at the gaps and to prevent the escape of fugitives up the valley from Harpers Ferry. Stuart's cavalry covered the infantry movements.

Under these orders the Confederate army moved out of Frederick for unprovisioned marches in a rollicking humor,¹ and with bands playing and men singing, "The girl I left behind me." The cool reception to his troops and the comparatively few recruits received² had corroborated General Lee's belief that unless Maryland could be held for some time by his government, the Confederate sympathizers in that state would hardly dare to cast in their lots with the Confederacy.³ No doubt, too, the tatterdemalion appearance of Lee's men and the manifest hardships that they were undergoing chilled the recruiting inclination of some whose sympathies leaned southward.⁴

¹ "The troops who were left after these campaigns were as hard and tough as ever have been, for the process of elimination had dropped out all the inferior material." *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 12, 507.

² The bill of fare offered recruits was not alluring unless they were men of the strongest conviction. Colonel B. T. Johnson of Jackson's command, inviting his fellow Marylanders to join Jackson, thus states the scant equipment needed: "Let each man provide himself with a stout pair of shoes, a good blanket, and a tin cup. Jackson's men have no baggage." Dr. Lewis H. Steiner, a medical inspector of the Union Sanitary Commission, comments in the diary which he kept during the Confederate occupation of Frederick: "If ever suicide were contemplated by any one, it must be by those civilians who proposed to attach themselves to Jackson's corps. His men have become inured to hardships by long training and are now on one of their most difficult undertakings."

³ "General Lee knew perfectly well that a people who had been under military rule for fifteen months, who had been subjected by every method known to military and relentless force, could not organize resistance or a revolution until confidence in themselves and their cause was restored by the presence of an abiding permanent power." *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 12, 504.

⁴ Their long separation from their baggage and their constant marches and battles had left Lee's army distressingly dirty and ragged. General J. R. Jones in his report says: "Never has the army been so dirty, ragged, and ill-provided for as on this march, and yet there was no marauding, no plundering. The rights of property and persons were strictly respected, eliciting the following comparison from the New York *World* of December 15: 'The ragged, half-starved rebels passed through Maryland without disorder or marauding, without injury to the country, showing their excellent discipline.

While General Lee was thus leaving Frederick for the west, General McClellan's army was drawing near that city from the east. On the day of Lee's departure, September 10, the Union army was approaching a line running from Ridgeville, about fifteen miles from Frederick, through Damascus, Clarksville, Barnesville, and Poolesville.¹ McClellan's advance, as Lee anticipated, was slow.² His natural caution was augmented at the beginning of this campaign by Halleck's constant fear of an attack on Washington, and perhaps by his own anomalous situation. When he took up a second time the burden of restoring an army routed at Manassas, he did so at the verbal request of President Lincoln. This personal appointment was confirmed on September 2 by an order from the War Department, but his authority was limited to "the command of the fortifications of Washington and of all the troops for the defense of the capital."³ His powers of reorganization, added to the growing war resources of the North, enabled him to have a formidable army ready by September 5 to follow Lee.⁴

The well-fed, well-clothed Union soldiers laid waste everything before them, plundering houses, hen-roosts, and hog-pens, showing an utter want of discipline." (*Official Records*, 27, 1007.) A Federal woman in Frederick who watched them pass, wrote: "Oh! they are so dirty! I don't think the Potomac River could wash them clean; and ragged! there is not a scarecrow in the fields that would not scorn to exchange clothes with them. . . . I saw some strikingly handsome faces though; or rather they would have been so if they could have had a good scrubbing." (*Four Years in the Ranks*.) While some scoffed, others felt with a high-minded Northern soldier, Captain G. F. Noyes, who writes: "The good farmer told me that most of the large body of rebels who had passed his house were half-clothed and dilapidated; but I knew how well these men fought, and his statement elicited, not my contempt, but rather my respect for men who under such difficulties and want of food and clothing have stood up bravely and persistently in a bad cause. These men must be sincere." *Bivouac and Battlefield*, 161.

¹ *Official Records*, 107, 810.

² President Lincoln is quoted by Secretary Welles as giving to his cabinet on September 12 his impression of McClellan's slowness: "He can't go ahead—he can't strike a blow. He got to Rockville, for instance, last Sunday night, and in four days he advanced to Middlebrook, ten miles, in pursuit of an invading enemy. This was rapid movement for him." *Diary*, I, 124.

³ *Official Records*, 18, 807.

⁴ The task of moulding a new army out of the old units was facilitated by the fact that many of the organizations had not been engaged in exceedingly arduous service or in battle since the Peninsula campaign. Sumner's corps of

This new army, henceforth to be known as the Army of the Potomac, was, of course, a consolidation of the Army of Virginia and of the Army of the Potomac, and not many changes were made among the high officers. Generals Sumner and Burnside became wing commanders. General Hooker relieved General McDowell and his command was designated as the First Corps. General Mansfield succeeded General Banks as commander of a corps known thereafter as the Twelfth. General Reno took over under Burnside the direction of the Ninth Corps. The corps of Generals Heintzelman, Porter and Sigel were assigned as part of the defenses of Washington. However, in answer to McClellan's call on September 11 for Porter, Sigel, and Heintzelman,¹ Porter's corps was on September 12 ordered to join him.²

Now that the Federal army was prepared to leave Washington, the question of a field commander arose. As General McClellan's command had been limited to the defenses of Washington, General Halleck at first held that McClellan had no authority to direct active operations. When he was before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, General McClellan dismissed a question as to orders under which he acted by saying: "I do not think that order, assigning the

37 regiments was already compacted. Franklin's corps of 27 regiments had not been called to disintegrating service. Since the battle of Cedar Creek on August 9, Banks's corps of 26 regiments had done nothing harder than guarding trains. Couch's division of 15 regiments was well ordered for the field. Two of Burnside's brigades—Fairchild's and Harland's—consisting of seven regiments, had not been recently engaged. Griffin's brigade of 6 regiments and 4 of Cox's Ohio regiments reported no losses under Pope. Thus 122 regiments had only to be ordered into place. Those organizations that had been tried to the uttermost on Manassas Plains had to be treated more tenderly, but they were mainly under competent officers who knew how to refit them, and many new regiments were at hand.

¹ *Official Records*, 28, 253, 271.

² Sykes's division of Porter's corps had already left Washington and was acting independently. Morell's division marched on the 12th, and joined McClellan on the 14th, when Porter again assumed command of Sykes. Humphrey's division of two brigades did not reach the army until September 18.

command of the defenses of Washington, was ever rescinded, or any other issued in its place. . . . I asked the question, two or three times, of General Halleck, whether I was to command the troops in the field, and he said it had not been determined. I think that was one of the things that grew into shape itself. When the time came, I went."¹

The advanced corps of the Federal army was welcomed into Frederick two days after the Confederates had started toward the mountains. Under urgent appeals from the citizens and the authorities of the State of Pennsylvania,² and from a cavalry report that the Confederates were withdrawing from Maryland,³ General McClellan quickened the pace of his army after the tenth,⁴ and came on faster than General Lee had expected. By the afternoon of September 12

¹ Proceedings, II, (1), 439. General Halleck, also testifying before the Committee, said: "The question was discussed by the President for two or three days as to who should take command of the troops that were to go to the field. The decision was made by himself, and announced to General McClellan in my presence. I did not know what the decision was until I heard it thus announced." (II, (1), 453.) Per contra, Secretary Welles notes in his Diary, under September 12: "In a long and free discussion on the condition of the army and military affairs by the President, Blair, Smith, and myself, the President repeated what he had before stated to me, that the selection of McClellan to command active operations was not made by him but by Halleck, and remarked that the latter was driven to it." (*Diary of Gideon Welles*, I, 124.)

² On September 11 Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania asked for "80,000 disciplined troops" and the militia of neighboring states. (Curtin to Lincoln, *Official Records*, 28, 268.) On September 10 a Citizens Committee of Philadelphia had asked the President to appoint a military governor for that state. (*Ibid.*, 251.) "At no time during the war were Confederate prospects so bright. Kirby Smith had defeated a Union force in Kentucky, had occupied Lexington, and was now threatening Louisville and Cincinnati. Bragg with a large army had eluded Buell, and was marching northward toward Louisville in the hope that Kentucky would give adhesion to the Confederacy. . . . The feeling in the North approached consternation. That Lee should threaten Washington and Baltimore, then Harrisburg and Philadelphia, while Bragg threatened Louisville and Cincinnati, was piling up a menace that shook the nerves of the coolest men. . . . The number of the Confederates was grossly exaggerated, but their mobility and their leaders were compensation so great that their power as an invading army was still rated none too high." Rhodes, IV, 142, 143.

³ McClellan to Lincoln, *Official Records*, 28, 233.

⁴ See telegrams of instruction to his commanders. "Up to the 10th the army had not marched so much as it had drifted, but from this point on our purpose seemed to grow more definite." *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 557.

his headquarters were at Urbana, and his entire army, with the exception of Franklin's corps,¹ which was moving for the relief of Harpers Ferry, and Couch's division, which was guarding the Potomac,² was concentrating around Frederick. At Urbana on that day, General McClellan states that he received "reliable information that the enemy's object was to move upon Harpers Ferry and the Cumberland Valley."³ The official correspondence shows that this statement was no exaggeration nor afterthought of the Federal commander.⁴ On the next day, Governor Curtin telegraphed to General McClellan

¹ Franklin was at Licksville. *Official Records*, 27, 379.

² Couch's corps was at Barnesville, *Ibid.*, 40.

³ McClellan's Report, 27.

⁴ It has generally been stated that McClellan received from the "lost dispatch," which fell into his hands between noon and three o'clock on the afternoon of September 13, his first information that Lee had divided his army. Henderson, for example says: "In exact accordance with the anticipations of Lee and Jackson, McClellan, up till noon on the 13th, had received no inkling whatever of the dangerous manœuvres which Stuart so effectively concealed." (II, 216.) This error has doubtlessly been perpetuated on account of two facts: First, the government's collection of documents relating to this campaign was apparently exhausted with the publication during 1887 of Volume XIX of the *War of the Rebellion Records*. Part I of this volume contained the reports of officers; Part II embodied the official correspondence of the period. So far as governmental publications were concerned these two volumes closed the record for ten years. Then, in 1897 the government printed two supplementary volumes—Serials 107, 108—that are rich in material on the Maryland campaign. These volumes, however, came too late to be available to such painstaking writers as Palfrey (1881), Davis (1881), Dodge (1883), Walker (1886), Allan (1892), Lee (1894), Longstreet (1895), Henderson (1900), and to the authors of *Battles and Leaders*, and to many of the writers in the *Southern Historical Society Papers*. Second, many writers who read the reports of battles with the utmost care do not scan so searchingly the volumes of correspondence supplementary to the battles. It must be borne in mind that General McClellan's opportunities to ascertain Confederate movements during the Maryland campaign were far superior to his facilities on the Peninsula. He was operating in territory largely Union in sentiment. The Federal cavalry under General Pleasonton's vigor had greatly improved. Large numbers of paroled Federal prisoners were passing back through his lines. Governor Curtin, with the military and civil officers of Pennsylvania, scoured the country north and west of Lee's army for accurate information. From these sources it appears that by midnight of September 12 General McClellan had the following information: first, as to Jackson's movement toward Harpers Ferry; and, second, as to Longstreet's arrival at Hagerstown; and, consequently, of a divided Confederate army. Jackson left Frederick at daylight on the 10th. At 3:30 p.m. on the same day Governor Curtin telegraphed General Halleck that at 9 a.m. a paroled prisoner had met Jackson in person at the head of a large force between Middletown and Boonsboro. (*Official Records*, 28, 247.) At 9 o'clock on the same night

even more precise information, for it revealed that Longstreet, instead of stopping at Boonsboro as at first directed, had proceeded to Hagerstown. Curtin stated: "Longstreet's division is said to have reached Hagerstown last night. Jackson crossed the Potomac at Williamsport to capture Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry."¹ Hence, even if no corroborating evidence had ever fallen into his hands, General McClellan

General White at Martinsburg forwarded to General Wool a report from Colonel Downey of the cavalry that the Confederates in force were at Boonsboro. (*Official Records*, 28, 249.) Jackson camped there on that night. On the 11th Colonel D. S. Miles, in command of the Federal forces at Harpers Ferry telegraphed General Halleck: "My eastern front is threatened. My pickets at Solomon's Gap shelled out. The ball will open tomorrow morning." (*Ibid.*, 107, 819.) On September 11 Captain Russell of the cavalry reported the Confederates at Williamsport, with a line 20 miles long (*Ibid.*, 820). At 8:45 p.m., on the 12th, McClellan telegraphed Pleasonton to verify a report from Captain Sanders that Jackson was marching on Harpers Ferry." (*Ibid.*, 824.) Before 11 p.m. on the 12th (*Ibid.*, 823), McClellan received a telegram from Governor Curtin that practically laid bare General Lee's intentions. He stated that a reliable gentleman had come from Hanover to say: "I left the rebel encampment at Liberty, Maryland, last night at 12 o'clock. I spent twenty-four hours among their men and officers, from whom I learned the following general program, after satisfying them that I was a citizen of Maryland and favorable to their cause: They intend to cross about 70,000 men, forming their reserve at Williamsport, and occupy the Virginia shore as a general depot for all supplies they can gather. Part of this reserve to attack and capture Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry. The main rebel army to occupy Maryland between Williamsport and Hagerstown, from which they will move on Cumberland Valley and other points in Pennsylvania." (*Ibid.*, 19, 277.) General Lee could hardly have stated his own plans more explicitly. Then second, as to Longstreet's command. At 7 p.m. on the 11th, McClellan's chief of staff notified Franklin: "It has been reported that the greater part of the enemy's forces at Frederick have moved to Hagerstown." (*Ibid.*, 107, 816.) At 11 a.m. on the 11th Governor Curtin reports that a body of rebel cavalry entered Hagerstown at 9 a.m. (*Ibid.*, 28, 267.) This was the hour at which Longstreet's cavalry took possession of the town. At 12:05 p.m. on the same date, he informs Burnside: "General White at Martinsburg reports to General Wool this morning that 15,000 rebel cavalry, artillery and infantry passed through Boonsborough last night in the direction of Hagerstown." (*Ibid.*, 107, 817.) At 8 p.m. on the same day General McClellan received this from Curtin: "Jackson is now in Hagerstown." (*Ibid.*, 28, 269.) At 10 p.m. McClellan tells Burnside: Our information is that the enemy has abandoned Frederick and is marching toward Hagerstown." (*Ibid.*, 107, 818.) At 10 a.m. on the 12th, he telegraphed Halleck: "I feel perfectly confident that the enemy has abandoned Frederick, moving in two directions, viz., on the Hagerstown and Harpers Ferry roads." (*Ibid.*, 28, 270.) On the 13th (hour unstated) he learned from Governor Curtin's telegram, cited above, that Longstreet was at Hagerstown and Jackson at Harpers Ferry.

¹ *Official Records*, 28, 287. Captain Heysinger comments: "The separation and divergence of these separated parts of Lee's army . . . constituted the entire key to the situation; and McClellan had this information and from it divined the whole campaign a day before Lee's lost order was heard of; but not before it was being executed in all its details." *Antietam*, 74.

knew, at least by the thirteenth, as assuredly as a field commander can usually expect to know, that the Confederate army was strung out from Hagerstown to Harpers Ferry, a distance of twenty-eight miles, with the wing commanders at each extremity and the Potomac River between them. However, on this same (to him) lucky thirteenth day of September, "confirmation strong as Holy Writ" was to be added to the information he had already acquired, for shortly after noon Private B. W. Mitchell of the Twenty-seventh Indiana Regiment picked up near Frederick a copy of General Lee's order, Number 191, already referred to as the lost dispatch. The telltale document was hurried by Mitchell's regimental commander, Colonel Musgrove, to General McClellan.¹

This unexpected stroke of fortune not only confirmed the intelligence already secured by McClellan as to the division of Lee's army, but it also gave him "the additional and scarcely less important information, where the rest of the army, trains, rear guard, cavalry, and all were to march and to halt, and where the detached commands were to join the main body."²

As this lost copy of General Lee's order was addressed to a North Carolina officer, General D. H. Hill, it becomes necessary to state that this important document was never received, and, therefore, never lost by General Hill. He went into Maryland under General Jackson's command. Military regulations required that he should receive his orders, not direct from army headquarters, but from General Jackson. When General Jackson was handed his copy of Lee's document, he, with his usual caution, did not trust a staff officer to make a copy for General Hill, but copied it with his own hands, and forwarded it by a tried subordinate to General Hill. With like care, this copy was received,

¹ General Musgrove's statement, *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 603.

² Palfrey, *Antietam and Fredericksburg*, 22.

studied, and preserved by that officer, and was among his papers at the time of his death. He would, of course, have preserved with equal care a copy from General Lee's headquarters, but he stated positively that he never saw any order from general headquarters, and knew nothing of such a paper until accounts of the finding of a lost order were published in Northern papers. His Adjutant General, Major J. W. Ratchford, a gallant soldier and a man of most exemplary habits and unimpeachable character, made affidavit soon after the occurrence that no such copy was ever received at General Hill's headquarters. It seems that some officer at General Lee's headquarters, forgetting that General Hill was attached to General Jackson, prepared the copy that was found by Mitchell, and started it to General Hill.¹ How this copy was lost or by whom will perhaps never be known, but it is clear that General Hill did not lose it.

It does seem that the unexampled good fortune of having the lost dispatch dropped into his lap to confirm his intelligence of a divided foe and to inform him of the exact position of every adversary division would have aroused McClellan into an activity akin to his opportunity. He knew that he was charged with

¹ General E. P. Alexander in his *Military Memoirs* says: "The incident occurred from our unsettled organization. D. H. Hill's division had been attached to Jackson's command upon its crossing the Potomac. No order should have issued from Lee's office for Hill. Jackson so understood it, and with his usual cautious habit, on the receipt of the order, with his own hand, made a copy for Hill, and sent it. This copy Hill received and carefully preserved, and produced after the war, when the matter was first inquired into. But Lee's office had also prepared an official copy for Hill, and this copy, serving as a wrapper to three cigars, was picked up by a private soldier of the Twelfth Corps in an abandoned camp at Frederick." 229. General Hill said of the matter: "I went into Maryland under Jackson's command. I was under his command when Lee's order was issued. It was proper that I should receive that order through Jackson, and not through Lee. I have now before me the order from Jackson. My Adjutant General made affidavit, twenty years ago, that no order was received at our office from General Lee. But an order from Lee's office, directed to me, was lost and fell into McClellan's hands. Did the courier lose it? Did Lee's own staff officers lose it? I do not know." *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 570.

being possessed by "the slows,"¹ and that he was holding his leadership only by passive assent. His military ability easily enabled him to comprehend his advantage, for at twelve o'clock on September 13 he wrote to President Lincoln: "I think Lee has made a gross mistake. . . . I have all the plans of the rebels and will catch them in their own trap if my men are equal to the emergency."² He himself, however, did not sweat from the activity necessary to entrap so versatile a commander as General Lee. While Lee, on the night of September 13, was writing to D. H. Hill to go in person to see how things were on the National road, leading from Frederick to Turner's, or Boonsboro Gap,³ and while Longstreet at Hagerstown was so troubled about the Confederate situation⁴ that he could not sleep,⁵ McClellan, whose soul, it seems, would have been ablaze only with zeal to speed his army against his exposed foe, took time to write a long letter to the Adjutant General on the military value of recruiting and equipping the regular artillery.⁶

¹ President Lincoln's characterization. (Welles, *Diary*, I, 118.) In asking Halleck on September 11 for more troops, McClellan refers to this knowledge, for he says that he is impelled to ask "at the risk of being thought slow and overcautious." *Official Records*, 28, 254.

² *Ibid.*, 281. If Musgrove is right about the hour at which McClellan received Lee's lost order, McClellan's statement as to having "all the plans of the enemy" was based on the information that he had received before Lee's order reached him, for Musgrove says that he received the paper from Mitchell after twelve o'clock.

³ *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 560.

⁴ Alexander thus states the situation as McClellan had it: "Lee and Longstreet with only 14 brigades were about Boonsboro. McLaws and Anderson with 10 brigades were between Harpers Ferry and Cramptons Gap, eight miles south of Turner's Gap. Jackson with 14 brigades was southwest of Harpers Ferry, and Walker with two brigades was southeast of it, and across the Shenandoah." *Military Memoirs*, 229.

⁵ *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 220.

⁶ *Official Records*, 28, 282. "Unfortunately the commander-in-chief failed to set his subordinate a good example in the way of showing activity. During the afternoon (13th) the sound of McLaw's guns engaged in the fight for Maryland Heights was distinctly heard at Frederick City. Yet, though the roads were good, the weather fine, and the South Mountain range only twelve miles distant, McClellan postponed all movement until the following morning." Wood and Edmonds, 123.

He states that he ordered a "rapid and vigorous forward movement,"¹ but his conception of celerity did not sufficiently reckon with the mobilizing power of Lee's stout-legged infantry.² Knowing as he did, that there were no Confederate forces between his army and the passes of South Mountain, McClellan allowed his advanced divisions to go into camp on the night of the thirteenth almost in sight of these urgent and obvious goals.³ Five miles added to the march of Franklin's advanced division at Jefferson would have brought it on the night of the thirteenth to the mouth of Crampton's Gap when that Gap, which was the real key⁴ to Federal success, was held only by two regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, and one battery.⁵ Six more miles of marching would have enabled Reno on the National road to have encamped on that night not at Middletown, but at the entrance to Boonsboro Gap, which was then defended by only two small brigades of infantry⁶ and Rosser's regiment of cavalry. If these positions at the gaps had been taken on that night, Franklin could have seized Crampton's Gap, with slight opposition, in the early hours of the next day, and could thus have carried out McClellan's thought "to cut off McLaws and R. H. Anderson on Maryland Heights and to relieve Harpers

¹ *Official Records*, 27, 12.

² Morse, in his *Life of Lincoln*, says of Lee's rapidity of motion at this time: "Lee with his usual energy seemed able to do with a thousand men more than any Northern general could do with thrice as many." 84.

³ That McClellan saw at that date the absolute necessity of controlling these gaps is evident from his first report. He says that he received at Frederick information that "made it clear that it was necessary to force the passage of the South Mountain range and gain possession of Boonsboro and Rohrsersville before any relief could be afforded to Harpers Ferry." McClellan's Report, 26.

⁴ "But just as Pope had lost his campaign by moving as he supposed directly on Jackson at Manassas Junction instead of upon Gainesville, where he could have been between Jackson and Lee, here McClellan lost his campaign by moving directly after Lee upon Turner's Gap." Alexander, *Military Memoirs*, 230.

⁵ *Official Records*, 27, 826.

⁶ Colquitt's and Garland's brigades of D. H. Hill's division.

Ferry.”¹ In like manner, if Reno’s men, in place of resting at Middletown, had passed forward under the light of a good moon to bivouac on the thirteenth at Boonsboro Gap, it could have seized the mountain pass² before D. H. Hill occupied it with his other three brigades on the next morning. Then McClellan’s concentrated army could have fallen on Hill and on Longstreet’s arriving men in the Antietam Valley with overwhelming numbers.³ Instead of this easily possible activity, he waited until the morning of the fourteenth for his “rapid and vigorous forward movement.”⁴

Lee, however, who, as already stated, was disturbed by the unavoidable delay at Harpers Ferry, began with his usual alertness in emergencies to shift his available troops so as to build up a defense for his imperiled army. He had not intended to defend the South Mountain passes, for he wished to receive McClellan’s attack farther from the Federal base.⁵ Now, however, what Longstreet and Jackson had apprehended when they advised their commander against dividing his army had come about. In spite

¹ Franklin in *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 592.

² “If McClellan’s main army had pressed forward it would have reached Turner’s Gap by daylight, and brushed away Stuart’s little force of cavalry, and D. H. Hill’s two brigades, and been in possession of the pass long before Longstreet’s command could have marched back from Hagerstown, and even before D. H. Hill could have brought back his advanced troops from Boonsboro. *American Campaigns*, I, 277.

³ “If he hurried his left column by Burkettsville, through Crampton’s Gap, it would come directly upon the rear of McLaws’s force on Maryland Heights. If he pressed his right by Middletown, through Turner’s Gap, he would interpose between Hill and Longstreet on the one hand, and all the troops beyond the Potomac on the other.” Palfrey, *Antietam and Fredericksburg*, 22.

⁴ “The case called for the utmost exertion and the utmost speed. . . . It was a case for straining every nerve. It cannot be said that he did not act with considerable energy, but he did not act with sufficient. The opportunity came within his reach, such an opportunity as hardly ever presented itself to a commander of the Army of the Potomac and he almost grasped it, but not quite.” *Ibid.*, 23. Franklin was ordered toward Crampton’s Gap at daybreak on the 14th; Reno (Cox) in Turner’s Gap at 6 a.m. on the 14th; Sykes at 6 a.m.; Hooker at daylight, and Sumner at 7 a.m. McClellan’s Report, 43.

⁵ Lee’s Report, *Official Records*, 27, 145.

of the fact that "nothing could have been neater or completer than the way in which his lieutenants carried out his orders,"¹ Harpers Ferry, against which Lee had directed twenty-six of his infantry brigades, had not fallen on September 13 as anticipated;² of Lee's remaining fourteen brigades, nine were at Hagerstown, 13 miles from the nearest point of danger; and here was the entire army of McClellan, who had "come on more rapidly than was convenient,"³ knocking at the doors of South Mountain. Of the situation at Boonsboro (Turner's Gap) General Lee says: "By penetrating the mountain at this point, he would reach the rear of McLaws and be enabled to relieve the garrisons at Harpers Ferry."⁴ Moreover he could turn at will on Hill and Longstreet, separated as they were by thirteen miles.⁵

To gain sufficient time to reassemble his divisions behind South Mountain was now Lee's only chance to extricate his army from its perilous situation, for he declined to assent to Longstreet's suggestion⁶ to retire on Sharpsburg and await McClellan's attack there. Orders went out for vigorous defense on the morning of the fourteenth. He assigned to D. H. Hill with his single division the task of delaying McClellan's main body by making as desperate a fight as he could at Boonsboro Gap until Longstreet could spur his men

¹ Palfrey's *Antietam*, 23.

² "Friday (the 13th), the day on which by the calculation of the commanding general, Harpers Ferry would fall, had passed." Stuart's Report, 27, 816.

³ Lee to Davis, *Official Records*, 27, 140.

⁴ Lee's Report, *Ibid.*, 146.

⁵ "The Federal general would be enabled to throw the weight of his whole force on that small portion of the Confederate army then with Lee, before Jackson, McLaws, and Walker could effect the capture of Harpers Ferry and go to its assistance." General Walker, *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 607.

⁶ "I suggested that instead of meeting McClellan there, we withdraw Hill and unite my forces and Hill's at Sharpsburg, at the same time explaining that Sharpsburg was a strong defensive position from which we could strike the flank or rear of any force that might be sent to the relief of Harpers Ferry. I endeavored to show him that by making a forced march to Hill my troops would be in an exhausted condition and could not make a proper battle." *Ibid.*, 665.

across the thirteen miles of hot and dusty roads from Hagerstown to support him. Munford was directed with his two cavalry regiments to defend Crampton's Gap, five miles south of Boonsboro Gap, until he could be reinforced by infantry, and McLaws¹ and Jackson² were ordered to expedite their operations and rejoin Lee at top speed. It will then be seen that unless McClellan's army could be delayed at the two menaced gaps until the twenty-six Confederate brigades assembled about Harpers Ferry could make their way back to Lee, McClellan's united onset would jeopard the Confederate army as it had not been jeopardized since Yorktown.

What were the prospects of an early return of the Confederate troops that were at Harpers Ferry? None at all for September 14, unless the siege were abandoned. To understand the situation there, it becomes necessary to follow Jackson's march from Frederick. The two objectives of the part of Lee's army that was under Jackson were Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry. Jackson alone was to move through Boonsboro and Williamsport on Martinsburg. As soon as he had dispersed the Federal force there under General Julius White,³ he was to approach Harpers Ferry⁴ from the west and south. Coincidentally McLaws with Anderson attached was to descend Pleasant Valley and seize from the north the overlooking Mary-

¹ *Official Records*, 28, 606.

² Allan, *Army of Northern Virginia*, 346.

³ This force consisted of the 65th Illinois, that on the 15th surrendered at Harpers Ferry, 817 men; the 125th New York that surrendered 922 men; Battery M, 2d Illinois, 100 men; and the 12th Illinois cavalry that with 1,500 cavalymen (*Official Records*, 27, 549) escaped from Harpers Ferry.

⁴ "The town of Harpers Ferry is situated in Virginia, at the junction of the Shenandoah River with the Potomac, and is on the left or western bank of the Shenandoah. It is quite capable of defense against an attack from the southwest, where Bolivar Heights run across, behind the town, from one river to the other. But the post is completely commanded by Loudoun Heights on the eastern bank of the Shenandoah, and by the still more lofty Maryland Heights on the opposite bank of the Potomac." Ropes, *Story of the Civil War*, 330.

land Heights, while Walker, approaching from the east, should erect batteries on Loudoun Heights.

Jackson, whose command had the longest route, left Frederick on September 10 for one of those rapid marches that could be borne only by men who had "become inured to hardships by long training."¹ Ten North Carolina regiments and one battalion shared in this wearing march. They were the five regiments of Branch, the five of Pender, the Twenty-first, and First Battalion of Trimble. After passing through Boonsboro and Williamsport he crossed the Potomac at Light's Ford. Then spreading out his columns, he "organized a kind of grand hunting-match through the lower valley of Virginia, driving all the Federal detachments before him and forcing them to crowd into the blind alley of Harpers Ferry."² General White, on reaching the Federal garrison from Martinsburg, was entitled by his rank to take over the command. He, however, waived his privilege in favor of the post-commandant, Colonel Dixon S. Miles, whose total defensive force, including White's and the cavalry that escaped, was over 14,000 men.³

To capture this body of men without loss of time and then to speed to Lee was now the task of the Confederate encircling columns. Jackson, following White, reached Halltown, about four miles from Harpers Ferry at 11 a.m. on the thirteenth. As his movements were to synchronize with those of Walker and of McLaws, couriers were started to those officers and signal stations established. The courier returning from Loudoun Heights brought word that Colonel John R. Cooke, in command of the Twenty-seventh North Carolina and the Thirtieth Virginia Regiments of Walker's division, had worked his way with the help

¹ Steiner, *Diary*, 18.

² Comte de Paris, II, 325.

³ As already noted, 12,737 Federals were surrendered, 44 were killed, 173 wounded, and at least 1,500 cavalry escaped. *Official Records*, 27, 549.

of knives and hatchets¹ up the densely wooded slopes to the summit of the Loudoun Heights, and that the artillery of the division would be ready to open early on the next day. Report, too, was brought that Maryland Heights, which, once let go, Harpers Ferry was doomed, had fallen to McLaws's men, and that McLaws's guns would be dragged up the mountain also on the next day. Thus each of these commands, owing to the rough mountainous country through which the men were breaking their way, was already twenty-four hours behind its prearranged schedule, and destined to further delays. Moreover, the delays kept the army constantly exposed to the disaster of having its divisions stricken individually.² The night of the thirteenth then was one of acute anxiety for General Lee. Unless Franklin could be halted for some hours at Crampton's Gap, he would be able to carry out McClellan's instructions "to cut off, destroy or capture McLaws's command and relieve Harpers Ferry,"³ and unless D. H. Hill's small division of about 5,000 men⁴ could hold at bay McClellan's First and Ninth corps, supported by such other corps as McClellan saw fit to advance from his consolidated army,⁵ Lee's left seemed doomed.

¹ Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 432.

² "Nevertheless, on the night of the 13th disaster threatened the Confederates. Harpers Ferry had not yet fallen and, in addition to the cavalry, D. H. Hill's division was alone available to defend the passes. Lee, however, still relying on McClellan's irresolution, determined to hold South Mountain, thus gaining time for the reduction of Harpers Ferry, and Longstreet was ordered back from Hagerstown, thirteen miles west of Boonsboro, to Hill's assistance." Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 218.

³ McClellan to Franklin, *Official Records*, 27, 45.

⁴ Hill's Report, *Ibid.*, 1022. This division at the latest return, July 20, numbered for duty 9,573 officers and men. This number was reduced by the transfer of Wise's brigade of five regiments to Longstreet (*Ibid.*, 18, 647), by sickness in the Peninsula during July and August, and by the losses incident to the march from Richmond to South Mountain. Wise's brigade numbered apparently 2,180.

⁵ "My left, from the time I left Washington, always rested on the Potomac, and my center was continually in position to reinforce the left or right as occasion might require." *Own Story*, 557.

Neither Walker nor McLaws had dallied in his endeavors to meet his commander's expectations. Walker's men, including seven regiments of North Carolinians, leaving the mouth of the Monocacy, shivered their way across the Potomac on the night of the tenth, rested, Walker thought necessarily on the eleventh,¹ and reached the foot of their appointed heights on the morning of the thirteenth. Seizing the roads in the neighborhood, Walker ran five rifled pieces² to the summit, and at one o'clock opened fire on the Federal batteries and troops. During this exchange of shots Major F. L. Wiatt of the Forty-eighth North Carolina Regiment was severely wounded.

McLaws had been equally active. After passing Middletown he turned south, crossed into Pleasant Valley by way of Burkittsville, and posted his brigades to guard the various roads and gaps leading into the valley. Then he pushed forward the brigades of Kershaw and Barksdale for an assault on Maryland Heights. These heights, so indispensable to the safety of beleaguered Harpers Ferry, were held by Colonel Thomas H. Ford with possibly 2,300 men.³ Kershaw and Barksdale, fighting their way through craggy terrain,⁴ pushed Ford out of their way on the thirteenth,⁵ established four guns on the heights during the

¹ "My men being much worn down by two days and nights marching almost without sleep or rest, we remained in camp during the 11th." *Official Records*, 27, 913.

² Walker's Report, *Ibid.*

³ Colonel Ford reports that his original force of 1,150 men was reinforced by a battalion of the 39th New York, one company of the 111th New York and the 126th New York Regiment. (*Ibid.*, 542.) Later, Colonel Downey and Colonel Sammon went to his aid. *Ibid.*, 543, 544.

⁴ The men had to pull themselves up precipitous inclines by the twigs and undergrowth that lined the mountain side, or hold themselves in position by the trees in front. . . . Men had to cling to bushes while they loaded and fired." *History of Kershaw's Brigade*, 148.

⁵ "And when on the morning of the 13th the rebels under McLaws advanced upon the heights from the east, a feeble, broken resistance was followed by the spiking of the guns; and rolling these down the hill, the Union forces were withdrawn to Harpers Ferry, leaving Maryland Heights to the rebels, and with it the mastery of the situation." *History of One Hundred and Twenty-fifth New York*, 29.

afternoon of the next day, and joined Walker in a bombardment of the Federal lines. When the opening roar of these guns on the heights announced that McLaws and Walker had completed their preparation, Jackson's infantry began a general advance on the Federal intrenchments on Bolivar Heights—a line that extended from the Potomac on the north to the Shenandoah on the south. A. P. Hill's division moved along the west bank of the Shenandoah; Ewell's division was on Hill's left, while Jackson's division went forward on the Shepherdstown road, parallel to the Potomac. Hill's advance included two operations. General Pender, in command of his own brigade of North Carolinians and the brigades of Archer and Brockenbrough, carried out his orders to seize and establish batteries on a commanding eminence on the Federal left. Branch's North Carolinians and Gregg's South Carolinians, so often comrades in battle, succeeded, too, during the night in complying with Jackson's directions to march along the river and to take advantage of the ravines cutting the precipitous banks of the river and establish themselves on the plain to the left and rear of the enemy's works.¹ During the same night Colonel Crutchfield managed to get ten guns across the Shenandoah River and they were so placed on the slopes of Loudoun Heights that their fire took the Federal works in reverse. Ewell's and Jones's divisions, likewise advanced into position, with the batteries on Schoolhouse Hill and on the Potomac. When Pender's men who were to lead in the assault in the morning, dropped to ground on the night of the fourteenth in an effort to catch some sleep in spite of a wintry sky, they were within 150 yards of the Federal works.²

¹ Jackson's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 954.

² A. P. Hill's Report, *Ibid.*, 980.

Although, outside of delays, the Confederate plans for the reduction of Harpers Ferry were working out with remarkable felicity, the night was not without impatient¹ solicitude for General Jackson. Throughout the day the reverberations of close battle along the South Mountain passes had been warning him that his forces were now nearly two days off their schedule. He realized that unless his fellow commanders had detained the Federal army at the passes, then McLaws would be cooped up between McClellan's advance and Harpers Ferry, and that Longstreet would be prevented from forming a junction with D. H. Hill, and that he himself would be cheated of his prey.² "That all this was not effected," remarks Dabney, "was due to the surprising promptitude with which Jackson reduced Harpers Ferry, and to the heroic tenacity of McLaws and D. H. Hill in holding the Pleasant Valley and Boonsboro Gap against him [McClellan] until the Confederate army could be concentrated."³ With, then, a clear knowledge that "McClellan was thundering in his rear,"⁴ Jackson enjoined a speedy *coup de grace* for the beleaguered garrison. At dawn on the fifteenth the encircling guns burst into play,⁵ but before Pender's expectant

¹ "Every one at headquarters knew how impatient General Jackson was at the unavoidable loss of time." Colonel Douglas, *Battles and Leaders*, II, 617.

² General Palfrey, of the Union army, says of the possibilities then open to McClellan: "To crush McLaws, relieve Harpers Ferry, turn every gun he could get on to Maryland Heights upon Jackson and Walker, and hurl forty or fifty thousand men on to D. H. Hill and Longstreet, while he interposed between them, seem things not only within the range of possibility, but of easy probability." *Antietam and Fredericksburg*, 41.

³ *Life of Jackson*, 557.

⁴ General Johnson in *Battles and Leaders*, II, 616. General Walker thinks that Jackson mistook the fighting on the mountain for "a cavalry affair between Stuart and Pleasanton." (*Ibid.*, 609), but the weight of evidence indicates that General Walker is in error.

⁵ "McLaws and Walker plunged their shot among the Federal masses from the heights; Poague and Carpenter scoured their right with a resistless fire; Lawton advanced to the attack with artillery and infantry in front; and the enfilading batteries of General Hill and Crutchfield swept their men from the ramparts by a storm of projectiles. After an hour of furious cannonading,

regiments could follow the artillery barrage, Colonel Miles ordered a surrender, and he himself was killed by distant gunners who had not caught sight of the white flag.¹

So skillfully had Jackson's artillery been used² that his losses in the three different commands were only 4 killed and 70 wounded. These figures do not include McLaws's loss of 35 killed and 178 wounded in the storming of Maryland Heights.³ The North Carolina losses were 2 killed and 24 wounded.⁴ The Federal casualties at Harpers Ferry were 44 killed and 173 wounded, and 12,737 surrendered.⁵ Along with the prisoners, the Federals surrendered 73 cannon,⁶ 13,000 small-arms, and large quantities of military stores.⁷ Most of the North Carolina regiments present at Harpers Ferry report that they there exchanged their muskets for rifles. Lieutenant B. H. Cathey of the Sixteenth North Carolina Regiment points out the contrast between Pender's men, who marched forward at once to receive the surrender, and the Federals who

all the Federal batteries were silenced. General Jackson had directed that at this signal, Hill should instantly advance and storm the place. His batteries were just moving, the gallant Pender again in front, supported by two advanced batteries, when amidst the surge of smoke, a white flag was seen waving." Dabney, *Life of Jackson*, 555.

¹ Of one of the batteries that fired several shots after the white flag was hoisted, Colonel Pendleton, supporting the battery, says: "It is but justice, however, to add that from the position we occupied the flag was imperceptible, nor were we aware of the surrender until a message was received from the major-general commanding directing a cessation of the fire." *Official Records*, 27, 1016.

² Commenting on this use of artillery, Wise says: "From a tactical standpoint, Jackson's movements were splendidly conceived and superbly executed. He employed his artillery, almost every effective piece being brought to bear on the enemy's position, in a way above criticism. True the opportunity presented for its use was a rare one, yet the fact remains that he grasped it and saved his infantry almost to a man." *Long Arm of Lee*, 291.

³ *Official Records*, 27, 860, 861.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 985, 1005.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 549.

⁶ Major H. B. McIlwaine, chief of the Federal Artillery, reports that only 47 guns were used in the field defense. *Ibid.*, 548.

⁷ Jackson's Report, *Ibid.*, 955.

met them. He says: "We found them drawn up on a line, with arms stacked. It was in fact quite a splendid reception but what a contrast! The enemy was spotlessly dressed in brand-new uniforms, shoes, and buttons, and gold and silver trappings, glistening in the morning sun, while we were almost naked; a great many of us without shoes, without even a faded emblem on our ragged coats to tell rank or official command."¹

¹ Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 760.

CHAPTER XXI

SOUTH MOUNTAIN AND CRAMPTON'S GAP

When General McClellan set out from Frederick to follow the Confederates toward the South Mountain, he, fortunately for General Lee, put his main force on the National road for Boonsboro (or Turner's) Gap instead of on the Crampton's Gap road, where Franklin was operating.¹ Hampton's brigade of Stuart's cavalry was charged with the duty of delaying the Federal advance wherever streams or narrowed gaps gave opportunity. At Catoclin Pass the First North Carolina Cavalry, under Colonel L. S. Baker, and the Jeff Davis Legion, with one section of Hart's battery, were attacked by squadrons from the Eighth Illinois and the Third Indiana Cavalry to which were attached two sections of Robertson's and Haines's batteries.² The Legion, with the North Carolinians dismounted as flankers, held the ridge from nine until one o'clock. Then warned by the approach of two brigades of infantry,³ the horseman withdrew to a ridge east of Middletown. On the outskirts of this village General Hampton posted the First North Carolina Regiment, while his other regiments were drawn up across the Catoclin Creek in rear of the town. The regiment was first shelled by Gibson's Federal battery, and then charged by Farnsworth's cavalry brigade. "The enemy's cavalry," writes a member of Hampton's brigade, "advanced down upon us with files of infantry sharpshooters on each side. They were met by a

¹ "A still more certain way for McClellan to have achieved this result would have been to push forward with his whole army on the afternoon and night of the 13th of September for Crampton's Gap. This would almost surely have brought his united corps between the separated parts of the Confederate army." Steele, *American Campaigns*, 728.

² General Pleasanton's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 209.

³ Stuart's Report, *Ibid.*, 816.

squadron of mounted and dismounted men under Captain T. P. Siler, a brave and daring officer of the North Carolina cavalry, who gallantly fought and repulsed the advance. The whole regiment was exposed to a murderous fire of the enemy's artillery from the mountain sides above. Colonel Baker, with the remaining squadrons, with great coolness and decision, successfully repelled the enemy's movements to intercept him at the creek, and safely withdrew the regiment across Catoctin Creek."¹ General Wade Hampton reports: "The First North Carolina Regiment, under Colonel Baker, was the rear guard of the brigade during the fight at Middletown, and both officers and men conducted themselves to my perfect satisfaction. They were exposed to a severe fire of artillery and musketry, which they bore without flinching, nor was there the slightest confusion in their ranks. They lost eight men and three missing. Captain T. P. Siler, a gallant officer, was among the wounded."²

After his withdrawal from Middletown, Stuart, detaching the Jeff Davis Legion for observation, and directing Rosser with the horse artillery to Fox's, or Braddock's Gap, a mile south of Boonsboro Gap, turned the remaining regiments of Hampton's Brigade, including the First North Carolina, south by way of Burkittsville to join Munford at Crampton's Gap, for Stuart, like the other Confederate leaders, thought that a man of McClellan's ability would at once see that his master stroke could be delivered only by rushing his united army through Crampton's Gap at the earliest possible moment.³ From Boonsboro Gap, where he spent the night, General Stuart reported by

¹ *Sketches of Hampton's Cavalry*, 85.

² Hampton's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 817.

³ As General Jackson was then in front of Harpers Ferry, and General McLaws with his division occupied Maryland Heights, to prevent the escape of the Federal garrison, it was believed that the enemy's efforts would be against McLaws, probably by the route of Crampton's Gap." Stuart's Report, *Ibid.* "Stuart, who had occupied Turner's Gap with

courier to General D. H. Hill, whose five brigades were west of the mountain, that he had been able to discover only two infantry brigades on the Frederick road,¹ and asked that a Confederate brigade be sent back to hold the gap. In immediate compliance with this request, General Hill sent, not one brigade, but two brigades—those of Colquitt and Garland—as his brigades were then very small, and General Stuart assisted Colonel Colquitt in posting his brigades. Stuart proceeded at an early hour on the morning of September 14 to Crampton's Gap, about five miles south of Boonsboro Gap. On reaching that important pass and "finding that the enemy had made no demonstration toward Crampton's Gap up to that time," he "directed Munford to hold this point until he could be reinforced with infantry,"² and sent Hampton's regiments down to the Potomac River to observe the main road from Frederick to Harpers Ferry. He himself, then, apparently easy in mind about any forthwith assault on the two gaps,³ joined McLaws at Maryland Heights.⁴ Evidently Pleasanton's Federal Cavalry was improving when it could mask an infantry movement against so acute an observer as General Stuart.⁵

Hampton's brigade of cavalry, moved to Crampton's Gap . . . to reinforce his cavalry there under Munford, thinking, as General Lee did, that should have been the object of McClellan's main attack, as it was on the direct route to Maryland Heights and Harpers Ferry." Lee, *Life of General Lee*, 204.

¹ Stuart's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 818.

² *Ibid.*

³ "When General Stuart rode up, he saw nothing seriously threatening, and ordered Hampton south to the river pass; thinking that there might be something more important at that point, he rode himself to Maryland Heights." Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 229.

⁴ General McLaws reports: "I was on Maryland Heights, directing and observing the fire of our guns, when I heard cannonading in the direction of Crampton's Gap, but I felt no particular concern about it, as there were three brigades of infantry in the vicinity, besides the cavalry of Colonel Munford, and General Stuart, who was with me on the heights and had just come in from above, told me that he did not believe that there was more than a brigade of the enemy." *Official Records*, 27, 854.

⁵ "We learned that the Yankee cavalry, which is getting bold, adventurous, mighty, and numerous in these latter days, had forced our cavalry on the

Thus on the night of the thirteenth General McClellan, with his advance under Reno at Middletown and with his army well in hand around Frederick, was ready to hammer hard with the two army corps of Reno and Hooker, supported by those of Sumner and Mansfield, for a passage on the next day through Boonsboro Gap to Lee's rear. As soon as the opening roar of McClellan's guns at Boonsboro Gap should be heard, Franklin, who was in front of Crampton's Gap, five miles south of McClellan's attacking point, with his own corps and Couch's division, was directed to carry this important gap, and then to join in the general plan "to cut the enemy in two and beat him in detail."¹

In compliance with his midnight orders² General D. H. Hill rode back to the top of South Mountain before daylight³ on the fourteenth to see what force was threatening Boonsboro Gap. His five brigades acting under prior orders, had been stretched out to guard the army trains and the artillery parked west of South Mountain, and also to control the roads from Harpers Ferry. Under the circumstances nothing but emergency would justify the calling away of these brigades from the important duty that placed them from two to six miles from the Gap.⁴ Two of them, however, as noted—Colquitt's and Gordon's—had at Stuart's call the day before been ordered back to

National road back a little faster than common." *Three Years in the Confederate Horse Artillery*, 118.

¹ *Official Records*, 27, 46.

² *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 560. General Lee gives these reasons for this order: "Learning that Harpers Ferry had not surrendered, and that the enemy was advancing more rapidly than was convenient from Frederick, I determined to return with Longstreet's command to the Blue Ridge to strengthen D. H. Hill's and Stuart's divisions engaged in holding the passes of the mountains, lest the enemy should fall upon McLaws's rear, drive him from the Maryland Heights, and thus relieve the garrison at Harpers Ferry." Lee's Report.

³ Captain George G. Grattan, *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 39, 36.

⁴ "General Hill's attention was given more to his instructions to prevent the escape of fugitives from Harpers Ferry than to trouble along his front, as the instructions covered more especially that duty, while information from the cavalry gave no indications of serious trouble from the front." Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 219.

the summit of the mountain to relieve the cavalry. Colquitt's Georgia brigade was established across the National road, on which McClellan's main force was advancing, and about half way down the eastern face of the mountain. Garland, having farther than Colquitt to move, was forced by night to bivouac on the western slope of the mountain, and did not reach the summit until about sunrise.¹

Following a careful examination of the rough and wooded ground² and some directions to Colquitt and Garland, General Hill made his way to the lookout post on one of his peaks to determine, if possible, in what force the Federals were approaching. After Stuart's report on the night before that his horsemen were being followed, so far as he could discover, only by cavalry and two brigades of infantry,³ no one was expecting so soon the appearance of General McClellan's entire battle force. General Hill was, therefore, amazed on reaching the lookout station to see almost as far as his eye could reach the oncoming masses of blue.⁴ Behind Reno's men, who were nearing the entrance to

¹ Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 219.

² As the Confederates had not expected to join battle at these gaps, but farther north, the engineers had made no reports on the topography of the mountain. When General Hill received orders to return to Boonsboro Gap, he sent General Ripley at midnight on the 13th to secure such information as Stuart had gathered. *Official Records*, 27, 817.

³ Stuart's Report, *Ibid.*, 816. "In his advance on the 13th the enemy had not exposed much of his force, and Stuart was still uncertain as to the character of the movement he had been opposing. . . . Naturally anxious not to overestimate the force he had encountered, Stuart reported to D. H. Hill and McLaws only what he had seen, and this was not enough to cause serious apprehension." *McClellan's Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry*, 117. Judge George G. Grattan, who at the time of the battle was aide to Colonel Colquitt, writes thus of the afternoon of the 13th: "Colonel Colquitt had a conference on the roadside with General Stuart, at which I, as his aide, was present and heard what General Stuart said in regard to the advance of the enemy. My distinct recollection is that General Stuart reported that there were no troops following him but cavalry and that Colonel Colquitt would have no difficulty in holding the pass with his brigade." *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 39, 34.

⁴ One of these Federal marchers, who stopped on the side of the descending ridges of the Catocin range to watch the movement, thus describes his impression: "The gathering of such a multitude is a swarm, its march a vast migration. It fills up every road leading in the same direction over a breadth

the Gap, the glint of rifle barrels could be seen throughout the beautiful Middletown Valley and far back on the roads leading down from the Catoctin ridges.¹ The sight of this host in front of his single division inspired in Hill, to the amazement of some of his officers,² "more satisfaction than discomfort"; "for though," as he explains, "I knew that my little force could be brushed away. . . . I felt that McClellan had made a mistake, and I hoped to be able to delay him until General Longstreet could come up and our trains could be extricated from their perilous position."³

To retard even for a time the advance of McClellan's vast army would require stark fighting on the part of Hill's small division, inasmuch as eleven North Carolina, six Alabama, and six Georgia infantry regiments, and one regiment of Virginia cavalry, would have to be pitted against whatever numbers General McClellan cared to throw against them. Still, although

of many miles. . . . Half a mile beyond us the column broke abruptly, filing off into line of battle, right and left, across the fields. From that point, backward and downward, across the valley and up the farther slope, it stretched with scarcely a gap, every curve and zigzag of the way defined more sharply by its somber presence." *Battles and Leaders*, II, 558.

¹ General Hill comments on the sight: "It was a grand and glorious sight and it was impossible to look at it without admiration. I had never seen so tremendous an army before, and did not see one like it afterwards. For though we confronted greater forces at Yorktown, Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, and about Richmond under Grant, these were only partly seen, at most a corps at a time. But here four corps were in full view, one of which was on the mountain and almost within rifle-range." *Ibid.*, 564. "Hill must have felt helpless with his five small brigades. . . . It was his duty to retard the march of this immense host, to give Lee time to get his trains at Boonsboro out of the way, to bring Longstreet back from Hagerstown to his support, and to give Jackson time for his work at Harpers Ferry." Lee, *Life of Lee*, 204.

² In a letter to General Hill, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Ruffin of the Thirteenth North Carolina Regiment records an interview with Hill during the battle: "You said that you were greatly gratified to find that McClellan's whole army was on your front. As I knew how small your force was, I could not understand how it could be a source of pleasure to you to find yourself assailed by twenty times your number. In a moment you made it plain to me by saying that you had feared at first that McClellan's attack on you was but a feint, and that with his main army he would cross the mountain at some of the lower gaps and would thus cut in between Jackson's corps and the forces under Lee." *Battles and Leaders*, II, 564.

³ *Ibid.*, 565.

no battle so far east had been contemplated, ¹ there was now no other choice; if the Federal host poured through that gap before the widely sundered Confederate divisions could reassemble, the doom of Lee's army seemed sealed. Fortunately General Hill knew that he could rely on the staunchness of his officers and men, for, as General Alexander says, "D. H. Hill never failed to get good fighting out of his veteran division."² So evident was it to the Confederates that General McClellan's best play was a drive in full force against the mountain passes nearest to Harpers Ferry that Hill had been unwilling to call back his other brigades from their important duty until it was clear that McClellan's movement at Boonsboro was not a mere feint. He now, however, ordered up Anderson, Ripley, and Rodes, and prepared to abide the unequal contest.³

Hill's reconnoissance had revealed that the Federal left was advancing on the old Sharpsburg, or Braddock road, a road parallel to the National road and passing through Fox's Gap, about a mile south of Boonsboro Gap.⁴ Leaving Colquitt in a position to guard the

¹ "Lee had not expected to be obliged to defend Turner's Gap, against McClellan. Hill's force had been left at Boonsboro, in charge of the reserve artillery and some of the trains, merely to guard against the escape of the garrison from Harpers Ferry in that direction." Bache, *Life of Meade*, 187.

² *Military Memoirs*, 231.

³ Allan thinks that inasmuch as Hill did not order all his brigades back to South Mountain at a very early hour on the 14th, he was slow to perceive the magnitude of the task before him. The criticism is based on a misconception of the importance of the duty on which those brigades, especially those of Ripley and Rodes, were then engaged. They were, as already pointed out, in charge of all the reserve artillery and most of the ammunition trains, and were the only guards of the roads above Crampton's Gap. Hill, expecting the Federals to throw their full weight against Crampton's Gap and Brownsville Gap, knew that if they broke through at these lower gaps then the withdrawal of his brigades would leave, not only the guns and the trains at the mercy of the Federals, but the withdrawal would cause in that event a hopeless separation of Lee's troops. Hence, as he says, he was reluctant to order up all his troops until he was sure that the Federals were before the gap in full force. *Army of Northern Virginia*, 352.

⁴ The National road, often called simply the turnpike, leading from Frederick to Hagerstown, crosses the South Mountain through a depression of about 400 feet below the crests on each side of the road. The depression

National road, Hill directed his only other brigade yet present, Garland's North Carolina brigade, to march south and contend for this passage. Garland deployed his five small North Carolina regiments across the Sharpsburg road. The Fifth Regiment under Colonel D. K. MacRae was on the right supported by the Twelfth under Captain S. Snow. The Twenty-third under Colonel D. H. Christie was advantageously posted behind one of the stone fences so common in that section, and was the centre of the brigade. The Twentieth under Colonel Alfred Iverson was on the left of the Twenty-third and there was a considerable interval between the two on account of the nature of the ground. The Thirteenth under Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Ruffin, Jr., was about 250 yards to the left of the Twentieth. These undesirable intervals between the regiments were not due to any carelessness on Garland's part in posting his men, but the number of roads and crests to be held were so numerous that he had to stretch out his regiments to meet the requirements of the field. Colonel Rosser's regiment of cavalry, the Fifth Virginia, serving dismounted, was on Garland's right flank. Bondurant's battery was also sent with the brigade, but the mountain was so steep that ascending troops were fairly safe from artillery fire in their front. These

through which the road winds through the mountain is known as Boonsboro or Turner's Gap. This road was McClellan's line of approach. Colquitt's brigade alone was posted across the road, about half way down the eastern slope. South of this main pass about one mile is another gap through the mountain, known as Fox's or Braddock's Gap, and through which the old Sharpsburg road runs. Garland was stationed on this road, and the battle south of the National turnpike was along this road, and over it Reno's corps attacked. North of the main turnpike about two miles was another gap known as Hamburg Pass. The road to this pass branches off from the National road at Bolivar, sweeps north by Mount Tabor Church. It is generally known as the old Hagerstown road. This was the route by which Hooker's corps attacked. It was defended at first only by Rodes's brigade. "These two gaps, Boonsboro and Fox, which are virtually one, are traversed by many roads. If McClellan's advance was to be checked till Jackson could take Harpers Ferry and join Lee, all these roads must be held by this handful of men to the last extremity. This necessitated the scattering of the regiments of the brigade." Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 219.

were all the Confederate troops present at Fox's Gap until the Second and Fourth North Carolina regiments of G. B. Anderson's brigade arrived a little before noon. As the infantry fighting began about 9 o'clock, Garland's men had been engaged three hours before Anderson's two regiments came up in support. Colonel D. K. MacRae, who after Garland's death succeeded to the command of the brigade, states in his official report that Garland's men numbered scarce 1,000.¹ If Rosser's cavalry regiment was equal in strength to the average Confederate cavalry regiment at that time, he had about 200 men. Thus the first combat of the day was waged by the Confederates with about 1,200 men.

Two of General J. D. Cox's Ohio brigades under Scammon and Crook led the attack against Garland and Rosser. General Cox states that their brigades numbered about 1,500 each,²—a total then of 3,000 infantry, against Garland's 1,000 North Carolina infantry. In addition Cox had three companies of cavalry³ and four batteries.⁴ This would make a total of at least 3,500 Federals to 1,250 Confederates. General Cox seems to think that he fought probably all of Fitz Lee's cavalry brigade and part of Hampton's brigade, and that he also battled against, or ought to have battled against all five of Hill's brigades, for he says that

¹ *Official Records*, 27, 1041. This statement by the commanding officer is borne out by other evidence. Judge W. A. Montgomery, in his *History of the Twelfth North Carolina Regiment*, says that his regiment, a part of it left on the Potomac, went into action, by the actual count of Lieutenant B. M. Collins, with only 92 men. (Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 627.) Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Ruffin, Jr., commanding the Thirteenth North Carolina, wrote to his father that his regiment "numbered only 212 men." (*The Papers of Thomas Ruffin*, III, 262.) Adjutant V. E. Turner of the Twenty-third North Carolina writes that his regiment had received few conscripts since the regiment was so severely reduced at Seven Pines and Malvern Hill. (Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 219.)

² *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 585. Cox's six regiments, therefore, averaged 500 each; Garland's five, 200 each.

³ These were Gilmore's and Harrison's companies of West Virginia cavalry, and Schambeck's Chicago Dragoons.

⁴ Two of his own—McMullin's and Simmonds's, and two of Pleasanton's regular United States batteries—Gibson's, and Battery E, under Lieutenant Benjamin. *Official Records*, 27, 43.

General Hill's "brigades were all on the mountain within easy support of each other."¹ He, therefore, concludes that "with less than half the numerical strength which was opposed to it, therefore, the Kanawha Division had carried the summit."²

In his estimates of his adversary's forces, however, Cox, like McClellan, greatly magnifies Confederate numbers. Stuart's official report makes it perfectly clear that Fitz Lee's cavalry brigade, with the exception of Rosser's regiment, off on a reconnoissance of the Federal right, did not reach Boonsboro until "late on the afternoon" of the fourteenth³—at least six or eight hours after Garland's battle. As we have already seen, Hampton's brigade, leaving the Davis Legion for patrol duty between Boonsboro and Crampton's Gap, had moved down to Knoxville on the Potomac during the early hours of the day,⁴ and, as we have also seen, D. H. Hill did not dare to endanger the trains and leave open the roads from Crampton's Gap and Harpers Ferry until necessity compelled the hazard. Hence, until nearly noon—three hours after Cox's opening assault—there were only two brigades on the mountain. Moreover, as Colquitt held the main road from Frederick, and hourly expected attack, he could not be moved to Garland's support. Cox, therefore, in the morning attack by which he won a lodgment on part of the summit, fought only Garland's North Carolinians and Rosser's regiment of Virginia cavalry. Then after Garland's right and centre had been crushed in, two of G. B. Anderson's regiments, the Second and Fourth

¹ *Battles and Leaders*, II, (2), 589.

² *Ibid.*

³ Stuart's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 819. Fitz Lee, who had been with his cavalry brigade in the rear of the Federal army at Frederick, arrived at Boonsboro during the night. . . . On the morning of the 15th, when the Federal army debouched from the mountains, the cavalry brigade was alone between the Federals and Lee at Sharpsburg." Lee, *Life of General Lee*, 205.

⁴ Hampton's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 824.

North Carolina, and fragments from Garland, failed in efforts to regain the lost Confederate ground. This, as will be clear from following the details, was all of the morning battle.

Scammon's Ohio brigade, supported as the struggle tightened by a regiment on each of its flanks from Crook's brigade,¹ and by the fire of its own and of Pleasanton's batteries,² struck first Garland's right regiments under MacRae and Snow about 9 o'clock. Under the Federal pressure the Twelfth, with only its 92 men, and the Fifth, made up after its savage losses at Williamsburg, Seven Pines, and Malvern Hill, largely of recent conscripts, gave way, but not before they, in conjunction with the Twenty-third North Carolina, had inflicted a severe loss on the Twenty-third Ohio and wounded its commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Hayes, afterwards President of the United States. A part of the broken Twelfth Regiment joined the Thirteenth under Lieutenant-Colonel Ruffin and remained in the fight.³ The Confederate right being broken, the Federals concentrated for a general charge against Garland's three remaining regiments.⁴ Preparatory to the charge, Lieutenant George L. Crome of McMullin's Ohio battery ran two guns in advance of the Twelfth Ohio Regiment, and at 11 o'clock⁵ opened a fire at short range on the Twentieth North Carolina, but Captain J. B. Atwell, with Company B (Cabarrus Black Boys) of the Twentieth Regiment, flanked the

¹ These were the Eleventh and Thirty-sixth Ohio. Cox's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 459.

² Pleasanton in his report says: "At the same time I placed Gibson's battery and the heavy batteries in position to the left covering the road on that side, and obtaining a direct fire on the enemy's position in the gap." *Ibid.*, 210.

³ Colonel Ruffin's Report, *Ibid.*, 1,047.

⁴ Colonel White of the Twelfth Ohio reports: "The Thirty-sixth Ohio had now joined us on the right, and the Twenty-third Ohio on the left, when a general charge was ordered." *Ibid.*, 465.

⁵ McMullin's Report, *Ibid.*, 464.

guns through the woods, killed Lieutenant Crome while he was himself serving one of his pieces, and disabled the section. The general charge was participated in by Scammon's three regiments, with the Thirty-sixth Ohio of Crook's brigade on their right,¹ and with the Eleventh Ohio guarding their left flank.² As these regiments advanced "two 10-pounder Parrotts of Simmonds's battery, under Lieutenant Glassie, were pushed forward to an open spot in the woods . . . and did good service throughout the rest of the action."³

The weight of the charge fell earliest on Colonel Christie's Twenty-third and Colonel Iverson's Twentieth North Carolina regiments. Then, as the Federal right worked its way along the Sharpsburg road, it enveloped Lieutenant-Colonel Ruffin's Thirteenth North Carolina. General Garland was with the Thirteenth Regiment at this time, and was killed early in the struggle. The death of the commander, whom his North Carolinians followed not only with reliance on his military skill, but with warm personal affection, was a shock to the brigade. The contest in front of the low stone fence, where the Twenty-third lay, was severe and protracted. Colonel MacRae says that the Twenty-third Regiment poured "a constant and destructive fire into the enemy as he attempted to pass from the woods into the ravines or to advance upon the Confederate position." "Most gallantly," he adds, "for an hour and a half did this regiment harass the enemy and retard his movements."⁴ The Twen-

¹ Colonel Crook, commanding the Second Brigade, reports: "I was then ordered by the general commanding to send the Thirty-sixth to the right of the First Brigade to help drive the enemy by a charge from the crest of the hills, which was done, the regiment making a gallant charge." *Official Records*, 27, 471.

² "I was informed the enemy were trying to flank us on the left. I at once detached the Eleventh Regiment in that direction." Crook's Report, *Ibid.*

³ General Cox's Report, *Ibid.*, 459.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1041. General Cox also testifies to the stubborn resistance of the Twenty-third, aided presently by the Twentieth. He says: "Although

tieth North Carolina Regiment, too, with the Twelfth and Thirteenth Ohio attacking its front and the Thirty-sixth Ohio overlapping its right flank, made a resolute defense. Captain L. T. Hicks of Company E says that Federals were within fifteen feet of his men before his regiment would yield to their numbers.¹ In the retreat of both the Twenty-third and the Twentieth bayonet wounds were actually given and received.² After a short retreat the remnants of these two regiments were formed on an adjacent height as a support to a section of artillery, which Rosser was putting into action.³ This position they occupied until night.

When these two regiments gave way the Ohioans swarmed around Garland's remaining regiment—Colonel Ruffin's Thirteenth North Carolina. Ruffin, dreading to lose all his men from the circling fire, was considering what to do when Captain Leonard H. Hunt of Company C suggested that the regiment be ordered to charge the Federals in front, and then withdraw in the confusion.⁴ As the Federal front recoiled before the yelling charge of the Carolinians, Ruffin faced about in the disarray, and fighting to his right and left, succeeded in bringing off his men.⁵ Falling back to the Sharpsburg road, Ruffin joined the two

Garland's line had been broken in the first charge, the rallying and fighting had been stubborn for more than an hour." *Battles and Leaders*, II, 587. Colonel White, of the Twelfth Ohio, says: "The ground was literally covered with the enemy's dead and wounded. The enemy escaped with his battery during the obstinate contest with the Carolina regiment." *Official Records*, 27, 465.

¹ Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 115. This statement is confirmed by General Cox, who says: "The rebels stood firmly, and kept up a murderous fire until the advancing line was in a few feet of them." *Official Records*, 27, 459.

² MacRae reports: "Men on both sides fell from bayonet wounds." *Ibid.*, 1042. Colonel Carr B. White of the Twelfth Ohio reports that his men killed several Confederates with their bayonets. *Ibid.*, 465.

³ MacRae's Report, *Ibid.*, 1042.

⁴ Ruffin to Judge Ruffin, in *The Papers of Thomas Ruffin*, III, 262.

⁵ Colonel Ruffin, in a letter to General Hill, thus describes his maneuver: "He [the adjutant] returned and reported that the rest of the brigade was gone and that the ground was occupied by the enemy. I then attempted to go to the left, hoping to come in contact with some portion of your command,

regiments of G. B. Anderson, which were just arriving under Colonel C. C. Tew.

The gradual disintegration of Garland's brigade opened to the Federals a clear sweep to Colquitt's rear, and to the National highway, for, until Anderson's regiments came up, General Hill did not have a single regiment with which to bar Cox's progress. A resourceful soldier, however, is never beaten until he has tried every expedient. To allow Cox to reach the Mountain House in Colquitt's rear, and thus to open a passage through Boonsboro Gap for McClellan's army would be fatal. In desperation Hill ran two guns down from the Mountain House, and, drawing up behind them a line of cooks, teamsters, couriers, and dismounted staff officers so as to give the appearance of infantry supports he opened a rapid fire. Rosser, too, who had drawn back his cavalry in good order, brought two of his horse artillery guns into play on a knoll near the road. The effectiveness of the artillery fire,¹ the bold front of the noncombatants, and a flank fire on his right regiments from Colquitt's skirmishers under Captain W. M. Arnold, together with a belief on Cox's part that the entire force of Hill and Longstreet were present,² now induced General Cox to hesitate about further efforts. When, therefore, two of G. B. Anderson's regiments came into action at the close of Colonel

but was again confronted by the enemy. I next tried to retreat to the rear but to my dismay found myself entirely surrounded. The enemy in front was pressing us and I saw but one way out, and that was to charge those in my front, repel them if possible, and then before they could recover, make a dash at those in my rear and cut my way out. This plan was successfully executed. I shall never forget the feeling of relief which I experienced when I first caught sight of you. You rode up to me, and shaking my hand, said that you had given us up for lost and did not see how it was possible for us to have escaped." *Battles and Leaders*, II, 564.

¹ Colonel Ewing of the Thirtieth Ohio, Scammon's right regiment, reports: "In five minutes he [the enemy] having charged his battery 600 yards to our right front, sent in on us a hail of grape, and we fell a few yards back under cover. We lay here supporting a battery, which was soon sent up, until 5 o'clock." *Official Records*, 27, 469.

² *Battles and Leaders*, II, 587.

Ruffin's efforts, and struck here and there¹ at the more or less separated regiments that had tried to envelop the Thirteenth North Carolina, Cox thought it was wise to contract his lines until the remainder of the Ninth Corps should arrive.² He, accordingly, drew back almost to his 9 o'clock position.³ There was no renewal of the battle until afternoon. Garland's brigade with Rosser's single cavalry regiment, although broken by the weight of numbers, had by persistently fighting from 9 o'clock until about noon, prevented the Confederate right from being turned.⁴

When G. B. Anderson's brigade reached the summit, two of his regiments, as just seen—the Second under Colonel C. C. Tew and the Fourth under Colonel Bryan Grimes—were directed to Fox's Gap to give such relief as they could to Garland's men until other forces should have time to come up. Anderson's other two regiments—the Fourteenth under Colonel R. T. Bennett and the Thirtieth under Colonel F. M. Parker—were at first directed to hold a commanding crest on Colquitt's left. On Rodes's arrival, however, his brigade was posted on this crest, and the two regi-

¹ Captain Matt Manly writes of the multi-angled combat of these two regiments: "The Second [North Carolina] was hotly engaged on South Mountain and fought in so many directions that no one knew which was front. General Hill informed some of the men who were getting excited on seeing the blue coats in their rear, that the front was where the enemy appeared, and that the muskets would carry as well in one direction as another. Hill's presence was always sufficient to give full assurance that we were in the right place, and that we had only to fight to win. There never was a better soldier, or a man better qualified to judge of the merits of one. The clash of battle was not a confusing din to him, but an exciting scene that awakened his spirit and his genius." Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 2, 166.

² *Battles and Leaders*, II, 587.

³ General Cox thus describes the charges on his right: "The 30th and 36th [Ohio] were, therefore, brought back to the crest on the hither side of the gap, where we still commanded the Sharpsburg road." (*Battles and Leaders*, II, 587.) Major Lyman J. Jackson, commanding the extreme Federal left regiment, the Eleventh Ohio, says: "We then fell back to the hill-side in the open fields, where we were out of reach of their guns, and remained here with the rest of the brigade until an advance was made against the enemy by the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island troops on our right." (*Official Records*, 27, 472.) The advance referred to by Major Jackson was the general advance in the afternoon.

⁴ MacRae's Report, *Ibid.*, 1042.

ments were ordered to Fox's Gap to rejoin their brigade. Ripley's brigade, which reached the Mountain House just ahead of Rodes, was also directed to join Anderson, as the Confederate right at that time was the active sector. Around three o'clock Drayton's small brigade of three regiments reported to Hill. This was the first of Longstreet's command to reach Boonsboro from Hagerstown. The men of this brigade—indeed none of Longstreet's arriving men—were in plight for instant battle. After a march of thirteen miles on a hot September day, these men had to clamber to the top of South Mountain and then, without a moment in which to catch breath or rest muscles quivering with fatigue, they were obliged to plunge into a fierce contest on ground so rough as to demand further severe toil. Colonel G. T. Anderson's Georgia brigade, also of Longstreet's forces, followed Drayton and was assigned to the Confederate right.

General Hill, wishing to secure his right before the heavy Federal masses in his front and left could fall on Colquitt on the National road and Rodes now marching to form on Colquitt's left, called Ripley, G. B. Anderson, and Drayton around him, and instructed them, with their own and G. T. Anderson's brigade, to move south "until they came in contact with Rosser, when they should change their flank, march into line of battle, and sweep the woods before them."¹ A battery was directed to play on the woods to facilitate their advance. Then committing the handling of these four brigades to General Ripley, who was the senior brigadier, General Hill spurred to the left to post Rodes and such of Longstreet's brigades as might report to him on their arrival, for until

¹ *Official Records*, 27, 1020. General G. T. Anderson reports: "I found General Hill at the Mountain House, and he conducted us in person to the right of our line, and after giving the necessary orders left for other parts of the field. General Ripley, the next senior officer, was then left in charge of the four brigades." *Ibid.*, 908.

Rodes's Alabama brigade came up behind Ripley, Hill had not a man to post on Colquitt's left in front of Hooker's First Federal Corps that was now deploying with intent to turn his left and crush his center.

While Hill was thus preparing a defense made up of a few brigades, McClellan was deploying a full corps in front of each gap. General Hooker's First Corps, deflected at Bolivar from the National road to the Tabor Church road, and consisting of at least 13,000 men, was working its way up the mountain to turn Hill's left at Boonsboro Gap. The remainder of Reno's Ninth Corps was pressing up behind Cox, who was in the position already described at Fox's Gap.

For continuity of narrative the movement on the Confederate right at Fox's Gap, where Ripley's four brigades were seeking position, will first be followed. Willcox's Federal division reached the foot of the mountain about two o'clock. Reno posted the eight regiments of Willcox on the right of Cox. The division extended from Cox's right to the old Sharpsburg road. Sturgis's division, arriving about an hour later, was moved up in second line to Willcox. The advance of these two divisions, had Ripley succeeded in complying with Hill's directions, would have met the brigades of Ripley, G. T. Anderson, and Drayton. Reno's remaining division under Rodman was divided. Fairchild's brigade of the division was directed to Cox's extreme left, for which point G. B. Anderson's Confederate brigade was marching. Rodman's other brigade under Harland was ordered to Willcox's right on the Sharpsburg road; but this brigade did not become seriously involved. Batteries were established wherever suitable positions could be found.

When the four Federal divisions moved forward to join battle between four and five o'clock,¹ their

¹ Apparently Willcox moved before Cox, for Ferrero of Willcox's division reports that he made the first advance at 3:30 p.m. (*Official Records*, 27, 448.)

Confederate opponents were not in the positions that General Hill intended them to occupy. Instead of following the rather obscure wagon trail on the summit of the mountain that led directly to Rosser's station, Ripley seems to have taken an even fainter trail that deflected his leading brigades too far down the western slope of the mountain.¹ When, therefore, Reno's divisions came abreast of what should have been an extended firing line of four Confederate brigades, only Drayton's three regiments, which had not reached the point of deflection, were there to receive them, and Drayton had to change direction and form after the attack began². As soon as the roar of Drayton's guns reached Ripley, he pushed his own and the Second and Fourth North Carolina regiments to which the fragments of the Thirteenth North Carolina were adhering "up through dense thickets and up very steep acclivities to outflank the enemy and come to General Drayton's support."³ Before, however, the Confederate brigades could retrace their lost distance and reinforce Drayton, his brigade of three regiments was crushed by the continued attack of Cox, Willcox, and Sturgis, but not before his men, upheld by batteries on the Mountain House road, had fought so obstinately as to hide the smallness of their numbers. Drayton's men were not broken until Welch's brigade, overlapping Drayton's left flank, secured an enfilading

Cox says that this advance was at 4 p.m. (*Official Records*, 27, 460.) Scammon and Ewing of Cox's division say 5 p.m. (*Ibid.*, 462, 469.)

¹ "It seems that General Ripley's brigade reached the field about this time, and was sent to Anderson's assistance, but by some mishap lost its way in the thick brush, and never rendered any service unless, perhaps, in its marching around from place to place, it was seen by the Federals from the mountain top and gave the impression that there was a large force in their front." (*Southern Historical Society Papers*, New Series I, 140.) General Hill says in *Battles and Leaders*: "In half an hour or more I received a note from Ripley that he was progressing finely; so he was, to the rear of the mountain on the west side." (II, 569.)

² *Official Records*, 27, 1032.

³ *Ibid.*

fire on their lines.¹ When Reno's troops tried to follow up their success against Drayton, they were halted by a fire from Rosser's horse artillery and the batteries already mentioned.²

Shortly after Drayton fell back, Law's and Wofford's brigades under General Hood of Longstreet's command hurried by G. T. Anderson's right, and took over the front that had been held by Drayton. The Sixth North Carolina Regiment, Major R. F. Webb, arriving with Law, brought up to twelve the number of North Carolina regiments now on the field. Just as darkness was falling these two brigades were thrown against a part of Cox's division and against Sturgis's division³ which had largely relieved Willcox.⁴ Hood reports that he drove the Federals and regained the ground lost by Drayton.⁵ Willcox, on the other hand, admits only a temporary confusion among Sturgis's troops when General Reno was killed, and asserts that the breaking men were rallied and, supported closely by

¹ Colonel F. W. Swift of the Seventeenth Michigan Regiment, in a report made since the war, says: "Far up the mountain the enemy with their batteries were awaiting our advance . . . our immediate front being held by Drayton's South Carolina brigade. We moved out from our sheltered position through an open field and upon the enemy's position, exposed to a storm of lead from the stone fence in front and from the enemy's batteries on the right of the gap. . . . With cheer after cheer sent up in defiant answers to the rebel yell, our men advanced to within easy musket shot, when they opened a murderous fire on the enemy, which was kept up for some time, the regiment steadily advancing, and its extreme right swinging around and getting an enfilading fire upon the rebels intrenched behind the two walls on the left of the road. Unable to stand the murderous fire, the rebels broke in dismay." *Michigan in the War*, 376.

² *Official Records*, 27, 1032. Longstreet says: "General Hill had posted his batteries on the summit north of the turnpike, which had a destructive cross-fire on Cox as he made his fight." *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 222.

³ Cox's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 460.

⁴ Willcox's Report, *Ibid.*, 429.

⁵ "I at once ordered the Texas brigade, Colonel W. T. Wofford commanding, and the Third Brigade, Colonel E. M. Law commanding, to move forward with bayonets fixed, which they did with their usual gallantry, driving the enemy and regaining all of our lost ground." (Hood's Report, *Ibid.*, 922.) He adds in his *Advance and Retreat*: "Night closed in with not only our dead and wounded, together with those of our adversary, in our possession, but with the mountain, on the right, within our possession." 41.

his own division, firmly held their ground.¹ If Willcox means, as it seems, that Sturgis held the ground on which his men were finally rallied, there is little difference between his and Hood's reports. This contest did not close until after nine o'clock. During this infantry clash Hood's chief of artillery, Major Frobel, reached the summit with his three batteries, and Hood states that "they performed excellent service."² Reilly's North Carolina battery, then consisting of four rifled pieces and two howitzers, went into battery with Frobel near the Mountain House, but held its fire under orders.³

Just prior to Hood's plunge into the battle, G. B. Anderson's men, who had been deflected westward and were struggling back through the mountain laurel to secure a position on Drayton's right, reached the firing line. Fairchild's Federal brigade, which was supporting Battery E, Fourth United States Artillery, was in their immediate front. Anderson arrayed his hard-breathing men⁴ for an attack on this battery. The Second, Fourth, and what was left of the Thirtieth, North Carolina regiments charged the battery and its supports,⁵ but were repulsed with considerable loss.

¹ *Official Records*, 27, 429. Perhaps a statement of Todd in his *History of the Seventy-ninth New York Highlanders* throws light on the divergence. After stating that at dark the Highlanders were moved forward beyond the other regiments, and formed on ground recently occupied by the enemy, (a) he says: "Just as this movement was completed, the enemy fired a volley or two at our line, which frightened the troops in our rear more than it injured us, for two or three of the regiments became demoralized and fell back down the hillside in some confusion." 234.

a That is, by Drayton, as his were the only troops that lost ground on the south side of the turnpike during the afternoon.

² Hood, *Advance and Retreat*, 40.

³ Ramsey's Diary, Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 573.

⁴ "It is difficult to conceive a more arduous march than this was." Ruffin's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 1046.

⁵ The two regiments of Anderson's brigade that were sent north but afterwards south of the turnpike never became seriously involved. Captain A. J. Griffith, commanding the Fourteenth after Colonel Bennett's wounding, says that, after much marching, the regiment was attached to Ripley's brigade, and shared the fate of that brigade in not getting into action. (*Ibid.*, 1050.) Of the other regiment, the Thirtieth, Major W. W. Sillers says that only its skirmishers were engaged. (*Ibid.*, 1051.)

When this battle at Fox's Gap closed, the Confederates, after what Colonel E. A. Osborne of the Fourth Regiments calls "one of the most trying and, in some respects, one of the most splendid days of the war,"¹ still held the ridge from the Mountain House to Wise's fields. How little the lines had swayed during the battle is shown by the fact that General Garland was killed in Wise's field just when the battle opened in the early morning, and that at dusk General Reno, the Federal Corps commander, met his death in the same field. Garland had been crushed in the morning and Drayton in the afternoon, but in spite of these reverses the Mountain House plateau, which was the key to the field and which General Cox says was his objective,² remained in Confederate hands.³

During the progress of the afternoon struggle at Fox's Gap, Hooker's First Union Corps was grappling desperately with Hill's center and left at the Boonsboro Gap. On nearing the gaps in the morning General McClellan, unaware, of course, that the Confederates were holding the National road with only Colquitt's brigade, scented another Thermopylae if he tried to burst through the narrow fastnesses of the gap along that road. He, therefore, determined, probably on a suggestion from Reno,⁴ that, while still demonstrating against Hill's center,⁵ he would throw Hooker's entire

¹ Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, I, 246.

² General Cox writes (*Battles and Leaders*, II, 588): "During all this time there was sharp fighting all along the front, the struggle being on the part of the Confederates to drive back our center and left, where we held the highest summits of the mountain, and on our part to push forward our right so as to gain the one elevation they still held on our side of the National road, at the Mountain house."

³ "The opposing lines were close together at nightfall. . . . Equally erroneous is the claim that any Confederates were driven except Drayton's small brigade. We held the crests of the mountain on the National road and on the old Sharpsburg road until Lee's order for withdrawal was given." *Ibid.*, 571. "The success of the Unionists on this side however," writes the Comte de Paris, "was not decisive, for they were not yet masters of the second ridge, at the front of which they were still fighting at the approach of night." *Civil War in America*, II, 322.

⁴ *McClellan's Own Story*, 580.

⁵ McClellan's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 51.

First Corps on the Confederate left. If this flank could be turned by an extensive circuit, and if Reno, who was then trying to break the Confederate right, could succeed and reach the National road from the south, then the Confederates would be huddled for destruction between the converging wings of the Federals.

In the execution of this plan Meade's division of three brigades was ordered to turn north at Bolivar and follow the Tabor Church or old Hagerstown road. This road runs north from Bolivar for about one and a half or two miles, turns almost due west near Frostown, and then leads in a southwesterly direction to the Mountain house. After Meade had followed this road to Frostown, he wheeled two of his brigades—Gallagher's and Magilton's—to the west, and began to ascend the mountain. His other brigade under Seymour continued north from Frostown for about a half mile, and then turned southwest so as to take the Confederate position in reverse while the other brigades battled with the front. Three brigades of Hatch's division formed on Meade's left. Gibbon's brigade the largest in the division,¹ was detached to move along the National road in a demonstration against the Confederate center, which was held, it will be recalled, by Colquitt. Ricketts's division constituted the reserve. Only one of Meade's batteries, Cooper's, was brought into action, for the ascending slope of the mountain was not favorable to artillery. At apparently 3:30 p.m. Meade began the action on the Federal right, and the entire corps then followed him into battle.² Hooker took into action, it seems, not fewer than 13,000 men.³

¹ Hatch's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 220.

² The usual divergences as to the hour of attack prevail, the time assigned ranging from 3:00 to 4:00 p.m., Cf. *Ibid.*, 249, 271, 1034, 1053; *Battles and Leaders*, II, 573; *Diary of the Twelfth Massachusetts*, 67.

³ McClellan reports Hooker's corps as numbering at Antietam 14,856. (*Ibid.*, 67.) Adding Hooker's losses on the 14th, namely, 923, this would

Rodes's Alabama brigade, stated by its commander to number 1,200 men, was the only force that Hill had left to undertake the seemingly forlorn task of delaying Meade's 4,000 and Hatch's 3,500 men. General Lee was hurrying Longstreet's march, but when Meade opened fire only Drayton and G. T. Anderson had arrived, and had been put in on the right to withstand Reno. Hill posted Rodes on two outstanding crests near the summit of the mountain. As these crests commanded the field they had to be held, but their occupation necessarily led to loss of contact between Rodes and Colquitt in the center. Hatch's division, advancing a little later than Meade's, was headed directly for this interval, and came forward at first without any opposition except from a rather long range artillery fire. Gibbon, whose troops had been formed in front of Colquitt since three o'clock,¹ was directed to await the success of the right and left Federal wings before pressing his contest.

give his paper strength at South Mountain as 15,779. If we deduct the one-fifth for which Federal writers contend, then Hooker's battle strength ought to have been 12,624. Hooker reports his Antietam strength as between 12,000 and 13,000. (*Ibid.*, 217.) If 12,500 be taken as a mean, and the loss above added, the corps numbered, according to Hooker, 13,423 at South Mountain. General Meade, who succeeded Hooker in command of the corps at Antietam, reported in a carefully prepared table that, after the sulkers, stragglers, exhausted, and slightly wounded had returned to their standards, the corps numbered 15,239 present for duty men on the morning of September 22. (*Ibid.*, 28, 349.) If the losses at South Mountain on the 14th and at Antietam on the 17th, namely 3,513, be added, the corps strength at South Mountain, according to Meade, should have been around 18,000, for seemingly no new regiments were added. Finally, the reports of the three division commanders are to be considered. Hatch reports that without Gibbon's brigade he took into action 3,500 men (*Ibid.*, 27, 220); Ricketts reports that he engaged 3,158 (*Ibid.*, 259); Meade that he lost 399 or ten per cent of the men taken in action (*Ibid.*, 268). This would give him 3,999. Gibbon's brigade, the largest of Hatch's division, could hardly have had fewer than 1,500. These figures, therefore, show an infantry force on the field of 12,157, to which two regiments of cavalry—the First Massachusetts and the Third Indiana—must be added (*Ibid.*, 210).

¹ Colonel Meredith's Report, *Ibid.*, 249.

Rodes would have been soon brushed aside by Meade's weight of numbers but for his advantageous position and the tenacity of his troops. His men, who were excellent shots,¹ screened themselves behind boulders, rocky ledges, fences, and crests, and never relaxed in their telling fire.² When dislodged from one position by the pressure of Seymour's brigade on the flank and of Magilton and Gallagher on their front, the plucky Alabamians took cover in a new place, and their rifles continued to blaze in the faces of Meade's persistent fighters. So pertinacious were Rodes's men in clinging to every new alignment that Meade sent to Hooker for reinforcements. Duryea's brigade of Ricketts's reserve division, which had "arrived at the east side of South Mountain, about a mile north of the turnpike, at 5 p.m.,"³ was ordered to climb alongside Meade's men and invigorate their contention. Although these troops reached the firing line late in the afternoon, Hooker reports that they rendered "substantial aid" and assisted "their comrades in crowning the summit with our arms."⁴

¹ *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 39, 41.

² The Pennsylvania Bucktails (Thirteenth Reserves), deployed as skirmishers and using breech-loading rifles, led Seymour's advance. The historian of this regiment writes: "Between three and four o'clock in the afternoon the columns were well under way, and the Bucktails, sighted by the Confederate batteries, placed high up on the mountain, received a storm of shell. Sharpshooters, protected by rocks and trees, also opened upon them and drove them to cover. All up the mountain side rocks and boulders abound, and here and there stone walls. . . . Quickly taking shelter behind trees and rocks, the Bucktails brought into play their accuracy of marksmanship. Having in their hands Sharp rifles, they were enabled to pick off many a Confederate, who, attempting to reload his inferior weapon, was compelled to partially expose his person." 204.

³ Ricketts's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 258.

⁴ Hooker's Report, *Ibid.*, 215. Meade, however, dismisses in these words Duryea's part in the battle: "Only one regiment had an opportunity to open fire before the enemy retired and darkness intervened." (*Ibid.*, 267.) This is not in consonance with Duryea's report nor with the fact that in addition to the 105th New York, to which Meade refers, the 107th Pennsylvania of Duryea was cited for gallantry on the 14th and the 17th. (*Ibid.*, 260.) Duryea reports: "On ascending the mountain we were met by General Meade, who urgently desired me to press forward as the Pennsylvania Reserves were

Shortly before Duryea's men were put in on Seymour's left,¹ Evans's Confederate brigade under Stevens, another of Longstreet's brigades, reported to Hill. Stevens was directed to join the sorely pressed Rodes. Hardly had he reached the first crest, which was held by Gayle's Twelfth Alabama Regiment, detached for that purpose, before he was assailed by Gallagher, Magilton, and Duryea, who with Seymour had been hammering to drive Rodes's other regiments toward the National pike.² Stevens's men endured the odds for about a half an hour.³ Then, with Rodes's regiments,⁴ they fell back toward the turnpike.

Meantime Hatch's three Federal brigades were ascending the mountain without even a company to oppose them.⁵ Longstreet, however, who had arrived in person and by virtue of his rank assumed command, was followed as far as the village of Boonsboro by three

engaged with a superior force. Notwithstanding the men had marched from 4 a.m. to this time, they gave a shout and gained the crest of the mountain. The 105th Regiment New York Volunteers immediately opened a galling fire supported by the 97th and 104th New York Volunteers and the 107th Pennsylvania Volunteers." *History Duryea's Brigade*, 164.

¹ Meade, *Official Records*, 27, 267.

² The commanding officer of the 107th Pennsylvania of Duryea's brigade reports: "Several times they [the enemy] rallied, and once in particular, having gained an admirable position behind a stone fence, they appeared determined to hold on to the last. Here it was they sustained their greatest loss. Colonel Gayle, Twelfth Alabama, fell dead, and the lieutenant-colonel of the Fifth South Carolina (R. S. Means, Seventeenth South Carolina) was wounded and taken prisoner. Their stand at this point delayed not the onward movement of the 107th a moment, but in a little while we were over the fence and among them, taking 68 prisoners, killing and wounding quite a number." *Ibid.*, 261.

³ *Ibid.*, 945, 949.

⁴ Longstreet says of Rodes's defense: "In view of the great force approaching to attack him, his fight seemed almost hopeless, but he handled his troops with skill and delayed the enemy, with the little help that finally came, till night, breaking from time to time as he was forced nearer our center at the turnpike." *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 224. Hill says: "It was pitiable to see the gallant but hopeless struggle of those Alabamians against such mighty odds." *Battles and Leaders*, II, 574. Rodes thus sums up the achievements of his brigade: "We did not drive the enemy back or whip him, but with 1,200 men we held his whole division at bay." *Official Records*, 27, 1036.

⁵ General Hill says of Hatch's approach: "The advance of Hatch's division in three lines, a brigade in each, was as grand and imposing as that of Meade's division. Hatch's general and field officers were on horseback, his colors were all flying, and the alignment of his men seemed to be perfectly preserved."

of his brigades. These were Kemper's, Pickett's under Garnett, and Jenkins's under Walker. If these brigades could have followed Longstreet directly to the fighting zone and secured position before Hatch was well up the mountain, their rifles would have gone far toward establishing the Confederate lines.¹ But when they arrived at Boonsboro a report had reached general headquarters that the Federals were forcing their way down the mountain by the old Sharpsburg road. "To meet this," says Longstreet, "General Lee ordered these brigades to the right and they marched a mile and more down a rugged way along the base of the mountain before the report was found to be erroneous, when the brigades were ordered to make their way back to the pike and to the top of the mountain in double time."²

Hatch was within a few hundred yards of Rodes's line of front³ when the troops of Garnett, Kemper and Jenkins, jaded and panting from their Hagerstown march, their fruitless diversion toward Fox's Gap, and their double-timing up the mountain, presented themselves to oppose him.⁴ Kemper and Garnett, the first to finish their climb, were directed to occupy the interval that separated Rodes and Evans from

¹ General Palfrey of the Union army writes: "It is altogether probable that D. H. Hill's assertion is true, that if Longstreet's troops, as they came on the ground, had reported to him, who had become familiar with the ground and knew all the vital points, the result might have been different. 'As it was they took wrong positions, and in their exhausted condition after a long march, they were broken and scattered'." *Antietam and Fredericksburg*, 38.

² *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 224.

³ "The regiment formed line within 50 yards of the enemy, and under a galling fire of musketry." Hunton's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 898.

⁴ "As they marched," writes Longstreet, who watched their coming, "the men dropped along the road as rapidly as if under severe skirmish. So manifest was it that nature was exhausted that no one urged them to get up and try to keep their ranks." (*From Manassas to Appomattox*, 225.) General Garnett reports: "It is due to the brigade to say that it went into the battle of Boonsboro under serious disadvantages. It had marched (a portion of the time rapidly) between 22 and 23 miles before it went into action, much oppressed by heat and dust; reached its position a short time before sunset under a disheartening fire of artillery, and was attacked by a much superior force as soon as it was formed in line of battle. That it bravely discharged its duty is fully attested by the number of casualties." *Official Records*, 27, 895.

Colquitt on the pike. "As the brigades were led to places along the line, the divisions of Hatch and Ricketts were advancing; the former, in range, caught the brigades under fire before their lines were formed."¹

Fagged as they were and numbering apparently fewer than a thousand men,² Garnett and Kemper vied with Rodes in proving their mettle against foes worthy of their best efforts. In their first position "behind a fence on the summit running north and south, fronted by a wood and backed by a corn field full of rocky ledges,"³ they fought the brigades of Patrick and Phelps to a standstill. Then Hatch, finding "the resistance of the enemy so much more determined than had been anticipated,"⁴ ordered Doubleday's brigade to relieve Phelps. As Doubleday's men took over the line of fence, he reports that the Confederates were only 30 or 40 paces in his front, and were pressing heavily in attempts to charge at every cessation of fire, and that the firing continued until in the darkness his men were aiming only at the flashes of the Confederate muskets.⁵ If Colonel Hoffman is right in his estimate of time,⁶ Doubleday's men fought over the line of

¹ *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 225.

² Kemper, Garnett, and Jenkins comprised three of the six brigades of D. R. Jones's division. General Jones states that his strength at Antietam was 2,430 (*Official Records*, 27, 886). Longstreet's regiments and brigades were fuller at Antietam than at Boonsboro, for the return of men exhausted by the marching of the 14th exceeded the casualties at Boonsboro. This figure for the division would give a brigade average of 405. Under this computation, Garnett's and Kemper's brigades together entered the fight with 810 men. Again, four out of five of Garnett's regimental commanders give their strength at the opening of the combat. The four averaged 96 men to the regiment. If the fifth be given this average, the brigade numbered 480, a little above the average of the division. The report of Colonel Corse, 17th Virginia Regiment, contains the only statement of regimental numbers in Kemper's brigade. He reports 9 officers and 46 men as present for action at Antietam. (*Ibid.*, 904.) No computation, of course, can be made from a single report except that with one regiment so small and all affected by the same hardships, Kemper's brigade could hardly have exceeded the brigade average.

³ Doubleday's Report, *Ibid.*, 222.

⁴ Hatch's Report, *Ibid.*, 220.

⁵ Doubleday's Report, *Ibid.*, 222.

⁶ Hoffman's Report, *Ibid.*, 235.

fence for an hour and a half without advance.¹ Then Doubleday was relieved by Ricketts's division.² Jenkins's Confederate brigade under Walker reached the field almost at the same time as Ricketts, and the new adversaries exchanged a few volleys in the darkness without much harm to either.

Rodes's battered regiments, after their terrible losses, were, as already seen, now giving ground. Their gradual retirement exposed the Confederates in the center not only to Ricketts's fire, but to pressure on the flank from Meade and Duryea. Hence these regiments drew back short distances toward the main turnpike,³ but, in spite of confusion in some regiments, a firing line remained intact. Retiring from their ground was a new experience to the Confederates in 1862, and their sullen resentment at the necessity of giving back even before such odds led them to turn

¹ Doubleday reports: "General Ricketts now came from the right and voluntarily relieved my men at the fence, who fell back some 10 paces and lay down on their arms." *Official Records*, 27, 222. Captain Noyes of General Doubleday's staff thus saw the fight of his brigade: "The air is now full of shrieking lead, and we hear just ahead of us the cheers and yells of the opposing troops, the never-ceasing rattle of musketry, and all the awful din of battle. Out of this carnival of noise and fire rushes the adjutant of the First Brigade exclaiming, 'Our brigade cannot sustain itself much longer, as we are nearly out of ammunition. For God's sake, to the front!' At the word the brigade is moved up even more rapidly. . . . Another minute and the edge of the wood is gained, and there at the fence which skirts it, is Hatch's brigade standing, falling, desperately fighting at this contested boundary. Beyond this fence is an open space of about a hundred feet in depth between the fence and a cornfield, and in this space a strong force of the enemy, partially protected by rocky ledges and inequalities of surface . . . is pressing heavily upon our position, charging gallantly two or three times, to be as gallantly repulsed before they reach the fence, and sweeping it meantime with sheets of fire. . . . At intervals a lull, a mere pattering of musketry, and then the rebel storm bursts forth afresh, and before it some of our men go down, or slowly fall back, wounded and bleeding, to the rear. . . . It is now so dark that our men can only aim at the flashing of the rebel muskets; . . . an advance into the unknown localities would be sheer madness, and so our men stand silently and grimly at the fence. . . . Our division is now relieved by the division of General Ricketts, which moves up and takes post at the fence." *Bivouac and Battlefield*, 172-76.

² Hooker reports: "Hatch being outnumbered, sorely pressed, and almost out of ammunition, Christian's brigade, Ricketts's division, was ordered forward to strengthen him." *Ibid.*, 215.

³ Reports of General Jones (*Official Records*, 27, 886); General Garnett (*Ibid.*, 895); Colonel Hinton (*Ibid.*, 898); Colonel Wallace (*Ibid.*, 947).

and fire wherever a flash revealed a foe. The Federals were too uncertain of their status to attempt any further advance over the dark, rugged slopes that were now concealing their adversaries. As the two battle lines lay on their arms for such rest as the chill night permitted, the men, as a staff officer observes, were "almost feet to feet."¹

This ended the fighting except in front of Colquitt, where the battle continued until 9:30. Colquitt's brigade had been held in position during the day to protect the Confederate center on the National pike. Two of his regiments² were most securely posted behind a stone fence on the northern side of the road. This fence extended from the pike to the abrupt terminus of the elevation which was first occupied by Rodes. His remaining regiments were stretched on the south of the pike in an effort to occupy the ground between the highway and the Confederate right. His skirmishers, consisting of a company from each regiment,³ under Captain W. M. Arnold, were concealed in a wood about 400 yards in front of the battle line, and had been several times useful in the attacks on the right.⁴ At three o'clock Colquitt⁵ had seen Gibbon deploy his large western brigade across the pike, and momentarily listened for the ring of his guns, but Gibbon was under orders to delay his onset until the Federal wings reported progress.⁶ Then he was expected to smash through the center and cut the Confederates off from their line of retreat, the National highway.

¹ Major J. W. Ratchford, General Hill's assistant adjutant general, writes: "When about 10 p.m., I, with staff officers from Longstreet's and Hood's commands, was sent to order the colonels to put their regiments in motion for Sharpsburg, the lines were so close that we had to crawl in some places on our hands and feet and give the orders in a whisper." *Ratchford's Narrative*, 39.

² The Twenty-third and the Twenty-eighth Georgia.

³ *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 39, 37.

⁴ *Battles and Leaders*, II, 566.

⁵ Meredith's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 249. Colquitt places the hour at four. *Ibid.*, 1053.

⁶ Burnside's Report, *Ibid.*, 417.

Between four and five o'clock Gibbon's men, accompanied by Stewart's section of Campbell's battery,¹ swung forward with two regiments on each side of the pike. As they approached, Arnold's skirmishers thinned their ranks until Stewart shelled Arnold back.² The battle then centered around the stone fence where the Twenty-third and Twenty-eighth Georgia were, in the soldier's vernacular, "fixed for fighting." Resolutely Gibbon's hardy woodsmen stormed against these unyielding Georgians. The Seventh Wisconsin Regiment threw themselves against the front of the fence.³ The Sixth Wisconsin crawled up the craggy side of the crest on which the Georgia left rested, and delivered enfilading volleys.⁴ The Nineteenth Indiana and the Second Wisconsin regiments wheeled to the right and added an oblique fire from south of the road.⁵ Splendidly protected, however, the Georgians cheered,⁶ and fought, and clung to their wall. After nine o'clock, when the Federal fire seemed to indicate a slackening will, many of the bold spirits in Colquitt's regiment advanced to the wall to deliver a farewell fire.⁷ When about 10 or 10:30 o'clock Lee's orders to retire on

¹ Later Campbell's other guns joined Stewart. Gibbon, *Official Records*, 27, 248.

² Meredith's Report, *Ibid.*, 250.

³ Callis's Report, *Ibid.*, 256.

⁴ Bragg's Report, *Ibid.*, 254.

⁵ Colonel Fairchild of the Second Wisconsin reports of this charge of fire: "Then I ordered the men to fire by the right-oblique on a line of the enemy on the Seventh Wisconsin. After a short time I ceased firing, and, the better to get at the enemy, changed direction with the right wing of my regiment. In that position good execution was done until their ammunition was all expended, when they were withdrawn to the line, and the left wing took their place. After the left wing had expended their ammunition and had been withdrawn, the Nineteenth took the same position by wings. All were then ordered to lie down. The fire from the enemy ceased and all was quiet." *Ibid.*, 252, 253.

⁶ General Hill writes: "About 9 p.m. the stone wall was reached, and several gallant efforts were made in vain to carry it. When each repulse was followed by the 'rebel' yells, the young men on my staff would cry out: 'Hurrah for Georgia! Georgia is having a free fight!'" *Battles and Leaders*, II, 576.

⁷ Colonel Bragg of the Sixth Wisconsin reports: "No sooner did the time of fire cease, than the enemy, supposing that we were checked, crept up close in the woods and commenced a rapid fire. I directed a volley in reply, and then, with three lusty cheers for Wisconsin, the men sat cheerfully down to await

Sharpsburg were delivered, Colquitt's two regiments were still pointing their rifles over the stone fence.¹ Moreover, so advantageously had they been placed that notwithstanding they inflicted on Gibbon a loss of 318 men,² they themselves lost only 99 of their number.³ The pertinacity of these troops enabled the Confederates to retain the main pass and the road through it.

Thus Hill's division of 5,000 men, aided by the gradual arrival between 3 and 7 p.m. of eight of Longstreet's wearied and depleted brigades,⁴ had by dint of manful fighting saved the Confederate army from portending disaster. Facing plainly visible odds,

another attack ; but the enemy was seen no more." *Official Records*, 27, 254. Captain Callis, commanding the Seventh Wisconsin, which was directing its attack directly to the front of the fence, reports: "He [the colonel of the Second Wisconsin] seeing our perilous condition, brought his regiment forward on our left, and commenced a fire that relieved us from further annoyance from the left, thus leaving us to contend against a direct fire from behind a stone wall in our front. The firing was kept up without ceasing until about 9 o'clock at night, when our ammunition became exhausted. . . . The enemy, coming to know our condition, commenced advancing on us in line, whereupon I ordered the regiment to rise up, fix bayonets, and charge. Our regiment had not advanced farther than twenty feet when we fired. This broke the enemy's line, and they retired in great confusion." *Ibid.*, 257. This retirement took them back to the wall.

¹ Colonel Colquitt reports: "Not an inch of ground was yielded." *Ibid.*, 1053.

² *Ibid.*, 184.

³ *Battles and Leaders*, II, 579.

⁴ Adjutant General Walter H. Taylor, who "for a long time supervised the preparation of the official returns of the Army of Northern Virginia" (Preface to *Four Years with General Lee*, 8), thus sums up the Confederate forces engaged: "The resistance made by General D. H. Hill at South Mountain deserves more than a passing notice. On the 14th of September, with the brigades of Rodes, Garland, Colquitt, Anderson, and Ripley, numbering in the aggregate less than five thousand men, for six or seven hours he successfully resisted the repeated assaults of two corps of the army under General McClellan (Burnside's and Hooker's) fully 30,000 strong. About 3 p.m. he was reinforced by the brigades of Drayton and Anderson numbering 1,900 men, and later in the day by the brigades of Evans, Pickett, Kemper, Jenkins, Hood, and Whiting; only four of these, however, numbering about 3,000 men, became seriously engaged, and they not until dusk. Thus it will be seen that a force of less than 10,000 men held McClellan in check for an entire day." *Ibid.*, 68. Longstreet estimates that 4,000 of his men were engaged. Of the brigades of Kemper, Garnett, and Walker he says: "The three that marched south of the turnpike, along a narrow mountain trail part of the way, through woodlands, and over boulders, returning then up the mountain, the last march at double-time, were thinned to skeletons of three or four hundred to the

odds¹ that would have daunted soldiers and commanders of doubtful mettle, Hill's men did not, as General Rodes emphasizes, drive the Federals. On the other hand, they were crowded back as their commander expected.² They did, however, do what in the morning they had set their wills to accomplish. They won for the ordnance officers time to get their ammunition trains and reserve guns out of danger;³ they, together with Munford's fighters at Crampton's Gap, held McClellan off Jackson until Harpers Ferry was captured;⁴ and, what was vastly more important,

brigade." (*From Manassas to Appomattox*, 226.) If his figure is right, then the Confederates numbered about 9,000. From a study of the official regimental and brigade reports, Hill thinks that the brigades of Kemper, Garnett, Walser, and Evans did not number on arrival over 1,880 men." *Battles and Leaders*, 574-77.

¹ General McClellan reports: "We went into action with about 30,000 men." (*Official Records*, 27, 53.) Although he says clearly that "we went into action" with 30,000, let the often-discussed one-fifth be deducted for special duty men, and we have 24,000 active participants. Again McClellan reports that at Antietam, three days later, Hooker's First Corps numbered 14,856, and Reno's Ninth Corps 13,819. (*Ibid.*, 67.) If to the 28,675 resulting, the South Mountain losses of the two corps, namely, 923 for the First and 889 for the Ninth (*Ibid.*, 186, 187) be added, we shall get back to McClellan's first number, 30,487. If we again deduct one-fifth, there results 24,390. In a complete army return of September 20th (*Ibid.*, 28, 336), the Ninth Corps is listed at 10,734. If to this figure we add the corps loss at South Mountain, 889, and the Antietam loss, 2,349 (*Ibid.*, 27, 187, 198), we should have 13,972 as its South Mountain strength. In the return of September 20, the special duty men, the sick, and those in arrest, were deducted, but even deducting one-fifth from this report, the Ninth's strength would then be 11,178. As seen in a previous note, Hooker's strength must have been at least 14,000. The addition of these should give the total Union battle strength at South Mountain as 25,178. The total Southern strength was, as seen, about 9,000. McClellan reported that he was opposed by 30,000 Confederates (*Ibid.*, 53). General Palfrey of the Union Army sweetly comments on this assertion: "For McClellan, a year after the event, to profess to believe that he drove Longstreet and Hill with 30,000 men from the heights of South Mountain with 30,000 of his own men, is one of those extraordinary, inconceivable, aggravating things that stirs up everything that is acrid in the nature of those who follow his career." 39.

² As previously quoted, General Hill said of his hopes: "For though I knew that my little force could be brushed away . . . I hoped to delay him until General Longstreet could come up." *Battles and Leaders*, II, 565.

³ "After a desperate fight, Hill, reinforced by four of Longstreet's brigades, succeeded in checking the advance of the enemy, until the reserve artillery and the ordnance trains at Boonsboro could move off to a position of safety." Wise, *Long Arm of Lee*, 292.

⁴ General Lee in his official report says: "The resistance that had been offered to the enemy at Boonsborough secured sufficient time to enable General Jackson to complete the reduction of Harpers Ferry." *Official Records*, 27, 147.

they prevented a fatal wedge from being driven in between Longstreet and Jackson,¹ and thereby enabled General Lee to concentrate his forces at Sharpsburg. Adjutant-General Seaton Gales thus comments on the results of the battle: "It may be safely said that in its consequences, in the accomplishment of predetermined objects, and in the skillful disposition of small numbers to oppose overwhelming odds, it is without a parallel during the war."²

While Hill and Longstreet were frustrating at Boonsboro General McClellan's design of "cutting the enemy in two and beating him in detail,"³ Colonel T. T. Munford of Stuart's cavalry, as ranking officer, was waging with General Franklin a hot fight for the possession of Crampton's Gap. Munford's force consisted only of three regiments of Mahone's brigade of infantry under Colonel Allen Parham,⁴ the Second and Twelfth Virginia cavalry,⁵ Chew's three-gun battery of horse artillery,⁶ and a section of naval howitzers that were of too short range to be effective.⁷ With

¹ "But the relief of Harpers Ferry would have been as nothing compared to the greater advantage such prompt action would have brought McClellan—the advantage of having his entire army over the mountain, and upon interior lines, between the separated parts of Lee's army, ready to unite and cut off the troops with Lee and Longstreet from their line of retreat, and maybe to capture or destroy them." Steele, *American Campaigns*, I, 278. "Thus ended McClellan's grand effort to cut Lee's army in two. When we remember the disparity in the forces engaged, and the issue involved in this battle, no one ought to withhold from General D. H. Hill, and the brave men who fought with him that day, the praise due them for holding McClellan's army at bay, from early morning until 3:30 in the afternoon, when the first of Longstreet's men arrived to assist." *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 39, 43.

² *Our Living and Our Dead*, III, 327.

³ McClellan to Franklin, September 13, *Official Records*, 107, 826.

⁴ These were the Sixth, Twelfth, and Sixteenth Virginia. The other regiments of this brigade were on detached duty. *War Talks of Confederate Veterans*, 25, and letter of T. B. Ruffin in *Norfolk Ledger*. 41.

⁵ Munford's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 825. The other regiments of this brigade were detached—the Sixth to gather arms at Centreville; the Tenth to accompany General Jackson; the Seventeenth Battalion to the Valley.

⁶ "The armament of the battery from first to last consisted of three pieces: a Blakely imported British rifled piece, which fired a percussion shell; a smooth bore 12-pounder howitzer; and a 3-inch iron rifle." Wise, *Long Arm of Lee*, 163. Franklin credits this battery with six guns.

⁷ Munford's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 827.

his small body of infantry sheltered behind a stone fence at the base of the mountain, a cavalry regiment dismounted on each flank of his infantry, and Chew's guns in battery near the summit, Munford nerved himself for an unequal contest with Franklin's corps.¹

It will be recalled that, while General McClellan was marching with his principal army to storm Boonsboro Gap, he had detached Franklin with the Sixth Corps,² supported by Couch's division, to break through South Mountain at one of the southern gaps leading to Rohrersville in Pleasant Valley. A passage into Pleasant Valley would put Franklin's forces directly in rear of McLaws, who was then working his way to Maryland Heights. Franklin's instructions then read: "Having gained the pass, your duty will be first to cut off, destroy, or capture McLaws's command and relieve Colonel Miles" at Harpers Ferry.³ Then, his orders continue: "You will return by Rohrersville on the direct road to Boonsborough if the main column has not succeeded in its attack. If it has succeeded, take the road by Rohrersville to Sharpsburg and Williamsport, in order either to cut

¹ Munford's total force seems to have been about 1,050. It was made up as follows: Mahone, four regiments, estimated at 700; (a) Second Virginia Cavalry, 200 (McDonald's Laurel Brigade, 90); Twelfth Virginia Cavalry, 150 (*Official Records*, 27, 90)—total, 1,050. Then the Tenth Georgia of Semmes's brigade, numbering 173 (*Ibid.*, 861) joined him on the mountain side. This force of 1,223 men, sustained by the batteries, held Franklin off from 3 o'clock until about 6:30. As these men were swept back, Cobb arrived with 1,341 men (*Ibid.*). This makes a total of 2,564, without Chew's battery. Cobb estimated that 2,200 Confederates were engaged (*Ibid.*, 870).

² Both Stuart and Munford report (*Ibid.*, 818, 826) that the Sixth and Twelfth Virginia combined numbered only 300 men. The estimate above allows 200 men for each of Mahone's other two regiments.

³ On September 20 Franklin's Corps, exclusive of Couch's command, and also exclusive of special duty, sick, and in arrest, was officially reported at 11,862 (*Ibid.*, 28, 336). If to this number his losses at Crampton's Gap, 553 (*Ibid.*, 27, 183) and at Antietam, 439 (*Ibid.*, 196), his present for duty strength at South Mountain should have been 12,834. If, in spite of the deductions in the September 20 report, an additional 20 per cent be deducted, he should have had available for battle 10,268 men. In *Battles and Leaders* (II, 595) Franklin says that "on the basis of the last returns" his strength was 12,300 men. If the 20 per cent is again deducted, this would leave him, on the 14th, with 9,840 men.

⁴ McClellan to Franklin, *Official Records*, 27, 45.

off the retreat of Hill and Longstreet toward the Potomac or prevent the re-passage of Jackson.”¹ In order that he might be sure “to catch the rebels in their own trap if his men were equal to the emergency,”² McClellan appealed to Franklin in these words: “I ask of you at this important moment all your intellect and the utmost activity that a general can exercise.”³

Franklin, understanding thoroughly how his commander's success or failure was at stake, essayed, about three o'clock⁴ in the afternoon of September 14, his first objective: namely, the storming of Crampton's Gap. He threw Slocum's division of three brigades against Munford's meager front, while coincidentally Smith's division moved on Munford's right flank.⁵ He supported these attacks by a steady fire from Woolcott's, Ayers's, and Cowan's batteries.⁶ Munford's men, joined as the battle progressed by the Tenth Georgia Regiment of Semmes's brigade, numbering 173 men,⁷ held firm for about an hour and a half at the stone fence,⁸ and what Slocum calls “a severe engagement” occurred.⁹ Federal numbers,

¹ McClellan to Franklin, *Official Records*, 27, 46.

² McClellan to Lincoln, *Ibid.*, 28, 281.

³ *Ibid.*, 27, 46.

⁴ Slocum's Report, *Ibid.*, 380.

⁵ Hancock's brigade of Smith's division was in reserve, and not actively engaged. The burden of the Federal fighting was borne by Slocum's division, supported on the left by Brook's brigade of Smith's division. Franklin thought that the appearance of Smith's forces on the Confederate right and rear produced a panic among the enemy.” Committee on the Conduct of the War, II, (1), 626.

⁶ Reports of Franklin, Slocum, and Ayers, *Official Records*, 27, 375, 380, 403.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 861.

⁸ General Newton's Report. Colonel Coke of the 96th Pennsylvania Regiment reports: “As we emerged from the corn, the enemy met us with a murderous fire. We were within twenty paces of the road. . . . It was here we met our great loss.” *Ibid.*, 394.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 380. General Franklin reports: “Colonel Bartlett became engaged along his entire line. He maintained his ground steadily under a severe fire for some time at a manifest disadvantage, until reinforced by two regiments of General Newton's brigade upon his right, and the brigade of Colonel Torbert and the two remaining regiments of Newton on his left.” *Ibid.*, 375. Colonel Munford says: “Colonel Parham's loss must have been heavy, as they were a long time engaged and the firing was as heavy as I ever heard.” *Ibid.*, 827.

however, soon told, but it took three hours ¹ of obstinate combat to drive Munford to the summit of the mountain. His men would have been more quickly dislodged but for the accurate and damaging fire of Chew's guns in his rear, and of three of Macon's and one of Manly's North Carolina pieces firing from the Burkittsville Gap, about a mile to the south. ²

As Munford's retiring men neared the summit of the mountain, Howell Cobb's Confederate brigade, containing the Fifteenth North Carolina Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel William MacRae, came hurrying up. This brigade had spent the night before at Sandy Hook, near Harpers Ferry. When General McLaws, who after Stuart's report had "felt no particular concern" ³ about an immediate assault in his rear, heard of an advance of the Federals, he ordered Cobb to return to Brownsville, take command at the Gap, and hold it at all hazards. After a march of three hours, ⁴ Cobb reached Brownsville, where he received messages "from Munford, at Crampton's Gap, about two miles distant, recommending the removal of the brigade to that point, as the enemy was pressing him with overwhelming numbers." ⁵ On pushing up to the summit Cobb found that the Federals were flanking Munford on both left and right. He sent

¹ McClellan's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 46; Munford's Report, *Ibid.*, 826.

² General Semmes, whose brigade was stationed at the Burkittsville-Brownsville Gap, reports: "A section of Captain Manly's battery and three pieces of the Reserve Artillery under command of Captain Macon, which had been ordered to Burkittsville Gap by myself, did good service in breaking the enemy's lines, checking his advance, and inflicting loss on him." *Ibid.*, 873. Captain Manly reports: "When within about a half mile of Burkittsville, I opened fire on them from my rifled guns, and after some eight or ten rounds succeeded in bringing them to a halt. Shortly afterwards they withdrew, and attacked with heavy reinforcements at the lower pass. I kept up a sharp fire on them from my battery all day, with every appearance of doing them considerable harm." *Ibid.*, 876.

³ McLaws's Report, *Ibid.*, 854.

⁴ The historian of the Fifteenth North Carolina says of this march: "The men were almost exhausted from constant marching over rough roads, nearly shoeless, and without rations, except green beef without salt and some corn." Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 739.

⁵ Cobb's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 870.

two of his regiments to each flank. The two regiments ordered to the left took up the fight steadily, and for a time helped to delay the Federal advance.¹ Munford reports that the two regiments assigned by Cobb to his right "behaved badly,"² and instead of relieving his attenuated regiments, joined in their retirement. Their withdrawal necessitated the falling back of Cobb's two left regiments. One of these, the Fifteenth North Carolina under Lieutenant-Colonel William MacRae, had found, on the extreme left, a snug fighting berth in rear of one of the abounding stone fences, and was plying its rifles cheerfully. Then, says the regimental historian, "being engaged with the enemy in front, and confident of the strength of our position, the first knowledge that we had of the situation on our right was a terrible volley of musketry from the rear and right flank, which at first was thought to be from a mistake of our own troops, but soon such thoughts were dispelled by seeing the Federal flag in our rear."³ The regiment extricated itself in the twilight with a loss of eleven killed and forty-eight wounded. The sudden envelopment of the right companies also entailed the capture of 124 men.⁴

The staunch resoluteness of Munford's men in forcing Franklin to fight until dark for the gap was of incalculable benefit to the Confederates, for had Franklin won a passage in time to fall on McLaws's brigades as they were then scattered⁵ in Pleasant Valley, he

¹ "The enemy made another stand at the crest of the mountain, but was speedily dispersed." Slocum, *Official Records*, 27, 380. Lieutenant-Colonel Seaver of the Sixteenth New York says: "As we gained the crest of the first hill, I observed a line of battle formed on a road which led round the brow of the hill, and ordered the men to cover themselves and fire as rapidly as possible. This was done with good effect. Our fire, increasing as the men came up, soon broke the rebel lines." *Ibid.*, 391.

² Munford's Report, *Ibid.*, 827.

³ Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 740.

⁴ *Official Records*, 27, 861.

⁵ McLaws in his report explains how he was situated. "It was," he says, "necessary to guard three positions; first, to present a front against the

had every chance to rout them,¹ and also to relieve Harpers Ferry. As it was, McLaws, on the next morning was gravely imperiled. With South Mountain east of him and Elk Ridge west of him he was bottled up between the garrison at Harpers Ferry on the south and Franklin's corps on the north.² To add to his peril Franklin had been joined at 10 p.m. on the night before by Couch's division of about 7,000 men.³

In this emergency McLaws acted with prompt decision. Four of his brigades—those of Pryor and Wright at Weverton and those of Armistead and Featherston on the road from Harpers Ferry—he could not withdraw from their important service, but, leaving only a regiment with his artillery on Maryland Heights, he formed the brigades of Wilcox, Kershaw, and Barksdale, supported by what he calls “the remnants of the brigades of Cobb, Mahone, and Semmes”⁴ across Pleasant Valley. Then, about a mile below Crampton, he awaited battle. Franklin's orders, issued at 1 a.m. on the fifteenth were: “Endeavor to open communications with Colonel Miles at Harpers Ferry, attacking and destroying such of the enemy as you may find in Pleasant Valley.”⁵ With his numbers this seemed easily possible. He began at daylight dis-

enemy advancing down the valley; second, to prevent them from escaping from Harpers Ferry and acting in conjunction with their troops in front; third, to prevent an entrance at Warrenton Gap.

¹ “If,” reports Colonel Buck of the Second New Jersey, “our men had been fresh at this point, we could easily have taken the artillery and part of the baggage train, but the men were so fatigued, and darkness coming on, the enemy made good their escape.” *Official Records*, 27, 385.

² McLaws says that, as he was cut off from Longstreet on the north; as he could not, as matters stood, take refuge under the bluffs of the Potomac; as he could not cross the mountains except in a scattered and disorganized condition; as he could not attempt Weverton Pass, there was nothing for him to do but stand and fight. *Ibid.*, 857.

³ The official return of September 20 gives Couch 7,219 men. He was not engaged seriously in any of the battles; hence had no significant losses. *Ibid.*, 28, 336.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 27, 855.

⁵ McClellan's Report, *Ibid.*, 47.

positions to comply with his orders, but by 11 a.m. he had concluded that "it would be suicidal to attack,"¹ and telegraphed McClellan that he would await orders.² His decision, no doubt, was partly influenced by the tumultuous shouts³ with which the Confederates at 10 a.m. welcomed the news that Harpers Ferry had surrendered. Franklin's decision not to attack was, thinks General Alexander, "a gross blunder. It lost an early opportunity to defeat six of Lee's brigades."⁴

As soon as a road to the rear was opened by Miles's surrender, Jackson ordered McLaws's hungry and tired men⁵ to follow him to Sharpsburg "with all possible dispatch," for during the morning Jackson had learned that Lee had withdrawn from Boonsboro at 2 a.m. on the fifteenth and was concentrating at Sharpsburg. Before starting on this stumbling all-night march, Jackson's men received rations from the captures at Harpers Ferry, but the troops of McLaws and Walker pushed by the Federal stores there with little chance to replenish exhausted knapsacks. This march, coming as it did on top of the sixty-two mile tramp from Frederick and two nights of man-

¹ Franklin's statement in *Battles and Leaders*, II, 596.

² This telegram declares: "The enemy is in large force in my front, in two lines of battle stretching across the valley, and a large column of artillery and infantry on the right of the valley, looking toward Harpers Ferry. They outnumber me two to one." *Official Records*, 27, 47. "General Franklin watched the large force in front of him to so much and so little purpose that they sent their trains back across the river, and gradually withdrew themselves. . . . The scheme of interposing the Federal army between the wings of Lee's army was rapidly coming to naught." *Palfrey*, 45.

³ Von Borcke, *Memoirs of the Confederate War*, I, 220.

⁴ *Military Memoirs*, 234. General Alexander comments: "One can but wonder if McClellan had communicated to Franklin a copy of Lee's order No. 191, for, with the knowledge of the situation given by that order, it seems impossible that the latter could have remained idle so near a divided enemy for two whole days, as he now did on the 15th and 16th, receiving meanwhile no orders from McClellan." (*Ibid.*, 234.) One can but wonder that a careful student like Alexander overlooked McClellan's letter of the 13th to Franklin (*Official Records*, 27, 45), in which he states the contents of Lee's order to Franklin.

⁵ McLaws reports: "The entire command was very much fatigued. . . . A large number had no provisions, and a great portion had not time or opportunity to cook what they had." *Ibid.*, 857.

euvering for strategic position at Harpers Ferry, brought Jackson's men to the new battlefield on the next day in a thoroughly exhausted condition. The men of McLaws and of Walker, who were following at Jackson's heels, arrived, too, with faces blanched by fatigue. All had suffered severely from the dropping by the wayside of men who could no longer stand the strain.¹

At the close of the fighting at Boonsboro Gap, Generals Longstreet and Hill rode to General Lee's headquarters for report and conference.² After receiving their reports General Lee directed that the forces should be withdrawn to Keedysville,³ but subsequently designated Sharpsburg, a village about seven miles from the Boonsboro Gap, as the point of assembly. There on the ridges running parallel to Antietam Creek, a sluggish, obscure creek destined now to leap into sudden fame, Lee daringly elected to receive McClellan's thrust,⁴ and to endeavor to hold fast until his hard-marching followers could

¹ "The majority were badly shod. Many were not shod at all. They were all ill-fed, and men ill-fed are on the high road to hospital. There were stragglers, then, from every company in the command." Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 235.

² General Longstreet describes this conference: "General Lee inquired of the prospects for continuing the fight. I called on General Hill to demonstrate the situation, positions, and forces. He explained that the enemy was in great force, with commanding positions on both flanks, which would give crossfire for his batteries, in good range on our front, making the cramped position at the Mountain House untenable. His explanation was too forcible to admit of further deliberation. General Lee ordered withdrawal to Keedysville." *From Manassas to Appomattox*, 226.

³ General Lee's first thought had been to retire to Virginia. At 8 p.m. before the fighting closed, he wrote to McLaws as follows: "The day has gone against us, and this army will go by Sharpsburg and cross the river. It is necessary for you to abandon your position tonight. Send forward officers to explore the way, ascertain the best crossings of the Potomac, and, if you can find any between you and Shepherdstown, leave Shepherdstown Ford for this command." *Official Records*, 108, 619.

⁴ "Lee's daring was never more amply illustrated than when he made up his mind to fight on the Antietam. McClellan's great army was streaming through the South Mountain. At Rohrerstown six miles east of the Confederate bivouacs, where he had halted as soon as the cannonade at Harpers Ferry ceased, Franklin was still posted with 20,000 men. From their battlefield at Turner's Gap, ten miles from Sharpsburg, came the 70,000 which composed the right and center: and on the banks of the Antietam but 15,000 Southerners were in position. Jackson had to get rid of his prisoners, to march

gather around him in fuller force. His situation was less precarious on the morning of the fifteenth than it had been on the day before, for Longstreet and Hill were now united, and news from Jackson convinced Lee that Harpers Ferry would capitulate during the morning, and hence Franklin would no longer be a menace to McLaws. Nevertheless his condition was critical in the extreme. There was no hope that any of his other subordinates with hands tied at Harpers Ferry could reach him before the next day. If McClellan saw fit to attack then, Lee, with only the fourteen brigades of Longstreet and D. H. Hill, would have to bear up in an open country against the four corps of Hooker, Sumner, Reno, Mansfield, and Porter's division—to say nothing of Franklin. Braving whatever the odds might be, General Lee drew up his fourteen brigades along the line of the Hagerstown turnpike, east of Sharpsburg, and resolved to abide what proved to be the bloodiest one-day battle ever fought in America.

seventeen miles, and to ford the Potomac before he could reach the ground. Walker was twenty miles distant beyond the Shenandoah, and McLaws over five and twenty. Would they be up before McClellan attacked? Lee, relying on McClellan's caution and Jackson's energy, answered the question in the affirmative." Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 232.

CHAPTER XXII

THE CLOSE OF THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN

When at dawn on the fifteenth the Federal skirmishers reported to General McClellan that with the exception of the dead and the severely wounded, there were no Confederates in or around Boonsboro Gap, the opportunity for which he had longed seemed beckoning. He soon knew from Franklin's report that McLaws and Anderson were still in Pleasant Valley. He also knew that, as Harpers Ferry had not fallen, Jackson and Walker were yet held there. None of these forces could by any possibility reach Lee before the next day. A march of only about eight miles, through an open country and over fair roads, would enable McClellan, with the thirty-five brigades of Hooker, Sumner, Reno, Mansfield, and Sykes, to fall on Lee, who had only Longstreet's nine and D. H. Hill's five brigades, for an easy victory.¹ Surely the occasion was ripe for McClellan to repeat to himself what he had written to Franklin: "I ask of you at this important moment the utmost activity that a general can exercise."²

McClellan, however, proceeded toward his antagonist on the Antietam "as though time were of no especial value to him." While Jackson's, McLaws's, and Walker's men were marching their hearts out to range themselves alongside their imperiled chief, the Federal commander did not succeed in getting a single organization across the Antietam until the afternoon of the

¹ If no enumeration be made of Franklin's corps, of Porter's divided corps, nor of Pleasanton's cavalry, General McClellan, according to his own report, had present with him in the First, the Second, the Ninth, and the Twelfth Corps, 57,614. *Official Records*, 27, 67. Even if one-fifth be deducted, he had present for battle in these four corps 46,091. Sykes's division and the cavalry would certainly run his numbers up, at the lowest, to 52,000 or 53,000. General Lee's entire force, including his cavalry, could not on the same date have exceeded 12,800.

² *Ibid.*, 46.

sixteenth.¹ About 3 p.m. on this same afternoon Hooker's single corps began to take the upper crossings of the Antietam, near Pry's mill. At almost the same hour Jackson's and Ewell's divisions, after a severe night march from Harpers Ferry, had dropped in position to defend the Confederate left in front of Hooker. Before Hooker's advance, General Hunt, Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, had established batteries of 20-pounder Parrotts, interspersed with lighter field guns, all along the ridge east of the Antietam, a ridge that overlooked the entire field and was of sufficient elevation to enable the cannoneers to drop shells with accuracy in the east and in the west woods and in enfilade on the confused Confederate left.²

¹ Nicolay and Hay, who, however, can usually see no good in General McClellan, comment in this case fairly: "It seems almost incredible, as we write it, and it will appear inexplicable to such readers as may come after us, that McClellan made no movement during the afternoon of Monday the 15th, did nothing during the entire day of the 16th but to advance a portion of his right wing across Antietam Creek, and this while the ragged legions of Lee were streaming in from across the Potomac to take up their positions for the impending conflict. Every minute which he thus let slip was paid for in the blood of Union soldiers the next day. Never had McClellan's habit of procrastination served him so ill a turn as during the whole day of the 16th. Lee's error of dividing his army would have been fatal to him if even on the morning of the 16th McClellan had advanced on him in force." *Abraham Lincoln*, VI, 138. General Palfrey joins in this view. He says: "Here again was a great opportunity with a long day before him, a force that outnumbered his opponent as five to two, and probably as six to two, and the knowledge that the large detachments his opponent had made could not join him for twenty-four hours, and might not join him for forty-eight or more, it was time for rapid action. . . . If he had used the priceless hours of the 15th of September, and the still precious though less precious hours of the 16th as he might have, his name would have stood high in the roll of great commanders, but he let these hours go by, and, as will presently be told in detail, it took him forty-eight hours to get ready to deliver his main attack, and then he had to deal not only with Lee and Longstreet and Hood and D. H. Hill, but with all of them with Stonewall Jackson added, with two of his divisions, and McLaws and Walker." *Antietam and Fredericksburg*, 47. General McClellan gives these unsatisfactory reasons for not joining battle on the 16th: "It was afternoon before I could move the troops to their positions for attack, being compelled to spend the morning in reconnoitering the new position taken up by the enemy, examining the ground, finding fords, clearing the approaches, and hurrying up the ammunition and supply trains." *Own Story*, 590. "Possibly a greater man might have risked all and attacked; but General McClellan's character was notably cautious, and if he failed in achieving great victories, he in this campaign avoided defeat." Fletcher, *History of the American Civil War*, 169.

² Lee's position "possessed the grave disadvantage of being paralleled by the ridge east of the Antietam, along which McClellan had ample space to deploy his 275 pieces of artillery. The superiority of his ordnance in weight

General McClellan's plan for the savage conflict now about to drench the fields of Maryland with the blood of close to 23,000 young Americans was "to attack the enemy's left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's, and, if necessary, by Franklin's, and as soon as matters looked favorable there, to move the corps of Burnside against the enemy's extreme right, upon the ridge running to the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and, having carried their position, to press along the crest toward our right, and, whenever either of these flank movements should be successful, to advance our center with all the forces then disposable."¹ As a second step in this plan, Mansfield's Twelfth Corps was ordered to cross behind Hooker during the night, and Sumner to hold his second corps in readiness to cross at dawn on the seventeenth, but he received no orders to advance until 7:20.

As Hooker ascended the slopes of the Antietam just before sunset on the sixteenth² his advance under Meade walked into the territory of Law and Wofford of Hood's division, which was posted on the Confederate left, near the Dunker Church. There was straight-way a flare-up. Hood's batteries, including Reilly's North Carolina battery, had been exchanging shots all day with the batteries across the creek,³ but the

and range far overbalanced the Confederate advantage in elevation. The range from ridge to ridge in no place exceeded 2,000 yards, but at many points approached that limit. The Federal guns were, therefore, able to deliver upon the hostile batteries a damaging fire to which little effective reply could be made. Not only was McClellan able to engage the Confederate 10-pounder rifles and 6-pounder guns with his 20-pounder Parrots, but a greater discrepancy had to be contended with by the latter, for their projectiles and fuses were of very inferior quality, whereas those of the Federals were of the best." Wise, *Long Arm of Lee*, 295, 296.

¹ McClellan's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 55.

² Before he knew his chief's plans, Hooker had been disturbed that his small corps, now numbering, as he says, between 12,000 and 13,000, had been ordered across the river to attack the whole rebel army, and had said to McClellan that unless he was reinforced or an attack made on the left, "the rebels will eat me up." *Ibid.*, 217.

³ "On Tuesday, 16th, the battle began, and about 10 a.m. the four rifled guns engaged the enemy, and kept up a steady, well-directed fire until the last shot was fired. The battery retired then and went rapidly to the rear to fill ammunition chests. Expended in this action four hundred and eighty-

infantry, which had performed rearguard service on the fifteenth from South Mountain to Sharpsburg,¹ had not been called to conflict up to this hour. "The fight," says Polley, "was opened by the artillery on our right, between us and Law's brigade, which was composed of the Fourth Alabama, Sixth North Carolina, Second Mississippi, and Eleventh Mississippi. They were as gallant soldiers, either collectively or individually, as ever fought a battle. . . . The action continued for some time after dark,"² and both sides claimed a victory.

The forty-eight hours required by General McClellan "to carry the Army of the Potomac seven miles and get them into a fight"³ were priceless to General Lee. On reaching Sharpsburg during the early hours of the fifteenth, the Confederate commander established the fourteen brigades of Longstreet and of D. H. Hill with their faces to Antietam Creek and their backs to the Potomac. Longstreet's line, following the Hagerstown pike and almost due north and south, extended from near Snavelly's ford on the Antietam Creek to the Boonsboro road on the north. Evans's brigade, astride of the road, constituted Longstreet's left. D. H. Hill's division was east of the Hagerstown road. Two of his brigades were in front of the sunken road leading into the main pike just north of the cemetery, and made ever memorable by their sacrifices as "Bloody Lane." G. B. Anderson's brigade of four North Carolina regiments⁴ joined Evans. Then, in

four rounds of ammunition. Robert Allman, John Bingle, William Parks, and Abram Hodge were wounded." Ramsay's Narrative, Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 574.

¹ "Many times during the day our regiment was formed into line across the road as the army fell back toward Sharpsburg. The enemy came in sight several times but did not attack." Captain Neill W. Ray, Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 307.

² *Hoods Texas Brigade*, 130.

³ Walker, *Thirty-second Army Corps*, 98.

⁴ The Second, Colonel C. C. Tew, Captain G. M. Roberts; the Fourth, Colonel Bryan Grimes, Captains W. T. Marsh and D. F. Latham; the Fourteenth, Colonel R. F. Bennett, Lieutenant-Colonel W. A. Johnston; the Thirtieth, Colonel F. M. Parker, Major W. W. Sillers.

order of their names, came the five North Carolina regiments of Garland's brigade,¹ now under Colonel D. K. MacRae, Colquitt's brigade, and Ripley's with two North Carolina² and two Georgia regiments. Rodes was in reserve. Hood's two brigades, one of which, Law's, contained the Sixth North Carolina Regiment, under Major R. F. Webb, held the extreme Confederate left. Hood was drawn up east of the Hagerstown pike, just in front of the Dunker Chapel³ at the southern edge of the west woods. With the exception of the cavalry, these fourteen brigades were Lee's sole battle reliance until afternoon on the next day. A part of Stuart's cavalry was on the right, and a part under Stuart in person on the left near the Potomac River. The First North Carolina Cavalry, Colonel L. S. Baker, was with Stuart. Longstreet paced the Washington artillery south of the Boonsboro road, and massed four of S. D. Lee's batteries behind Hood's center near the Dunker Church.⁴ D. H. Hill, who was especially fond of the artillery arm and always sought to be assigned as many batteries as possible, was rich in guns at Sharpsburg. In addition to his four divisional batteries under Major Pierson,⁵ he had under his command the reserve batteries of Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Cutts and of Major H. P. Jones.⁶ These

¹ The Fifth, Captain T. M. Garrett; the Twelfth, Captain S. Snow; the Thirtieth, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Ruffin, Jr.; Captain J. H. Hyman; the Twentieth, Colonel Alfred Iverson; the Twenty-third, Colonel D. H. Christie.

² The First, Colonel H. A. Brown; the Third, Colonel W. L. DeRosset.

³ The name of this church appears frequently in the official reports as "Dunkard Church." The members of the religious denomination from which it derived its name were originally known as Tunkers.

⁴ S. D. Lee's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 845. One of Lee's batteries was detached for service with Toombs, *Ibid.*, 889.

⁵ These were Bondurant with 4 guns; Carter with 5, Hardaway with 3, and Jones with 4 (*Ibid.*, 845)—a total of 16.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 27, 809, note. Cutts's battalion consisted of the batteries of Blackshear, Lane, Patterson, and Ross, each of 6 guns (*Ibid.*, 155, 809). In addition, Cutts had found Lloyd's North Carolina battery(a) without orders at South Mountain, and still had its remaining 3 guns in tow (*Ibid.*, 155; *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 10, 430). Jones was in charge of Page's

forty-eight guns¹ were massed along a line from the Roulette house to the Piper house. All the Confederate guns were outmatched in weight and caliber by the Federal 20-pounders across the Antietam.

When these fourteen brigades were stretched out to make as imposing a show as possible, Lee could only wait and hope that McClellan would be dilatory in his attack, for the Confederate commander knew that he could expect no further troops until late on the morrow. As the anxious hours dragged by without attack, Lee breathed more easily. Messengers were spurring in to say that all his absent troops, except A. P. Hill's, were stumbling toward Sharpsburg as fast as human nature would permit. Through their toiling ranks this message had gone, "Lee is standing with his back to the Potomac waiting for us." His wearied followers drove their overtaxed bodies forward during the night by almost superhuman effort to meet their chief's expectations. Could they do it? Not if McClellan pitched his battle on the morning of the sixteenth. He did not, and Lee was saved, for about noon word went jubilantly along the thin Confederate lines, "Jackson's up! Walker's up!" Jackson had eight small brigades; Walker two, but Walker's regiments were fairly well filled. His North Carolina brigade under General Robert Ransom averaged four hundred men to the regiment.² This was one of the few divisions in the army that had not been recently engaged. After these footsore soldiers had rested for a

6-gun battery, Fry's 5-gun battery, and Wimbish's 4-gun battery (*Official Records*, 27, 809, 836). Turner's battery of this battalion was left at Leesburg for refitting (*Ibid.*, 809).

^a Upon recommendations of Generals Pendleton and Robert Ransom, this battery was disbanded by the October 4 order. The officers were relieved and the men divided between Manly's and Reilly's North Carolina Batteries, *Ibid.*, 28, 674; 27, 921.

¹ Wise, makes this number 54 guns, but he omits Jones's battery that lost 26 men in the battle. *Long Arm of Lee*, 298.

² Ransom's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 919.

few hours, Lee assigned Jackson to his extreme left, and Walker to his right.

This assignment of Jackson's command placed it in position to receive Hooker's attack on the next morning, for Hood's men, who had been long without food, were, after their combat with Hooker,¹ withdrawn to cook. Lawton's brigade under Colonel Douglass and Trimble's brigade under Colonel James A. Walker took the place vacated by Hood. Trimble's brigade connected on the right with Ripley's brigade of D. H. Hill's division. Hay's brigade was in support of Lawton. Early's brigade was directed to report to Stuart for the protection of his batteries. Jackson's former division, now commanded by General J. R. Jones, was formed on Lawton's left with its right resting on the Hagerstown turnpike. Grigsby and Jones occupied the front line, with Starke and Taliaferro in support.

Only one regiment and one battalion of North Carolina infantry came with Jackson.² Seven North Carolina regiments had, however, marched through the night with Walker.³ In the early hours of the morning, North Carolina was represented by twenty regiments and one battalion of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and the batteries of Reilly and Lloyd. During the conflict ten other North Carolina regiments⁴ and Manly's battery, after the severest sort of march,

¹ Hood says of the condition of his division, which included the Sixth North Carolina Regiment: "The extreme suffering of my troops for want of food induced me to ride back to General Lee, and request him to send two or more brigades to our relief, at least for the night, in order that the soldiers might have a chance to cook their meager rations." *Advance and Retreat*, 42.

² The Twenty-first North Carolina, Captain F. P. Miller, and the First Battalion, Major R. W. Wharton, both of Trimble's brigade.

³ The Twenty-fourth, Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Harris, the Twenty-fifth, Colonel H. M. Rutledge, the Thirty-fifth, Colonel M. W. Ransom, and the Forty-ninth, Lieutenant-Colonel Lee M. McAfee, of General Robert Ransom's brigade, and the Twenty-seventh, Colonel J. R. Cooke, the Forty-sixth, Colonel E. D. Hall, and the Forty-eighth, Colonel R. C. Hill, of Manning's brigade.

⁴ These were the five regiments of Branch's brigade, namely, the Seventh,

went into the desperate strife worn as they were. Thus on this field, a field that will always illustrate the high courage and unflinching fortitude of the men of the two warring sections, there were present to represent the State thirty regiments and one battalion of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and the batteries of Lloyd, Manly, and Reilly.¹

With the sixteen brigades of McLaws, Anderson, and A. P. Hill still panting their way over the dusty roads from Harpers Ferry to Sharpsburg, General Lee stood serenely² with twenty-four brigades to accept battle from General McClellan's forty-four brigades.³ Not only was Lee's army thus outnumbered, but from continuous campaigning the men were jaded almost beyond endurance.⁴ Only innate determination and loyalty to leaders and to cause kept these men on their feet. Nothing about these gaunt, hungry, ill-clothed, face-drawn men was in good order except their muskets and their hearts.

Captain J. G. Knox, the Eighteenth, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas J. Purdie, the Twenty-eighth, Colonel J. H. Lane, the Thirty-third, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert F. Hoke; and the four regiments of Pender's brigade, namely, the Sixteenth, Lieutenant-Colonel W. A. Stowe, the Twenty-second, Major C. C. Cole, the Thirty-fourth, Colonel W. L. J. Lowrance, the Thirty-eighth, Lieutenant-Colonel R. F. Armfield; and one regiment in Cobb's brigade, namely, the Fifteenth under Lieutenant-Colonel William MacRae.

¹ Latham's battery, one of A. P. Hill's divisional batteries, was left at Leesburg to recruit. *Official Records*, 27, 984.

² General Walker, in describing an interview with Lee on the 16th, says: "Anxious enough, no doubt, he was; but there was nothing in his look or manner to indicate it. On the contrary he was calm, dignified, and even cheerful. If he had had a well-equipped army of one hundred thousand veterans at his back, he could not have appeared more composed and confident." *Battles and Leaders*, II, 674.

³ These were Hooker 10, Sumner 9, Porter 6, Burnside 8, Mansfield 5, Franklin 6. Franklin's first division did not arrive until 10 a.m. *Official Records*, 27, 376.

⁴ What Polley says of Hood's men, among whom the members of the Sixth North Carolina Regiment were numbered, was true of the entire army, with only the variation in miles: "Since leaving Richmond, about one month previous, we had marched over two hundred miles, and had participated in engagements at Freeman's Ford, Thoroughfare Gap, Second Manassas, and South Mountain. . . . For the past several days we had subsisted chiefly on apples and green corn. Many of us were barefooted and ragged, and all of us were footsore, weary, and hungry, but full of patriotic ardor and inspired faith in our cause." *Hood's Texas Brigade*. Thompson of the

Military and historical critics have been amazed at General Lee's audacity in accepting battle at Sharpsburg.¹ They point out that it is against the canons of military science for a commander to battle with a broad river on his rear;² that history recounts few examples where a commander fighting on the disproportion in which Lee fought ever won a signal victory;³ that unless Lee could win a decisive victory he was needlessly sacrificing men whom the limited man-power of his section could not replace;⁴ that a drawn battle, entailing a great loss of life, would offer the Confederates no compensating advantage.⁵ General Lee would, under the ordinary usages of war, have readily conceded the soundness of each one of the foregoing propositions. Indeed, his first military re-

Ninth New York said of the dead Confederates he saw at Boonsboro: "All around lay the Confederate dead . . . with fallow hatchet faces, and clad in 'butternut'—a color running all the way from a deep coffee brown up to the whitish brown of ordinary dust. As I looked down on the poor pinched faces worn with marching and scant fare, all enmity died out." *Battles and Leaders*, II, 558.

¹ "The decision to stand and fight at Sharpsburg . . . is beyond controversy one of the boldest and most hazardous decisions in his whole military career. It is in truth so bold and so hazardous that one is bewildered that he should even have thought seriously of making it." *Story of the Civil War*, II, 349. General Alexander writes: "The more that one studies the situation the more amazed he must be at the audacity which deliberately sought a pitched battle in the open field, without a yard of earthworks, against a better equipped army of double his force, and with a river close behind him, to be crossed by a single ford." *Military Memoirs*, 242.

² "Strategically Lee's position in this battle was as bad as it could be. Two miles behind him was an impassable canal and river, and his only line of retreat led away from his right flank to a difficult ford three miles away." Steele, *American Campaigns*, 278.

³ Henderson says: "The records of warfare contain no instance, where two armies were much of the same quality, of the smaller army bringing the campaign to a decisive issue by defensive tactics. . . . No; except on peculiarly favorable ground or when defending an intrenched camp, an army matched with one of equal efficiency, and numerically superior, can never hope for decisive success." *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 228.

⁴ "At the best, supposing McClellan deferred his attack until Jackson's half of the army rejoined Lee, the Confederate army could reasonably expect to do no more than hold their own in a defensive battle and, after repulsing the enemy, to retire into Virginia. But in that case they gained nothing by standing to fight, and were certain to incur heavy losses, which they could ill afford." Wood and Edwards, *Civil War in America*, 125.

⁵ "It was heartrending to see how Lee's army had been slashed by the day's fighting." *Battles and Leaders*, II, 670.

action after the loss of the South Mountain was to order his army to recross the Potomac.¹ When, however, he had time to consider not only the military, but also the political and international situation, he felt impelled to rescind his order and to accept the hazard of battle. The reasons that had led him to tempt fortune in Maryland would not admit of abandoning the campaign with no greater fruitage than the capture of Harpers Ferry. His conception that a decisive Southern victory on Northern soil would bring about European recognition and perhaps terminate the war, had not left him.² To a man of his earnestness and pugnacious temperament hazard would weigh little against so dazzling a stake. Moreover, there were several considerations that doubtless made the step seem less perilous to him than to his critics. In spite of the good Federal fighting at South Mountain, Lee believed that frequent defeats had left the Union army an uncertain war machine. He had an abiding faith in the ability of his commanders and the prowess of his men.³ He had won before in the face of odds

¹ *Official Records*, 108, 619.

² "In short, the position of the Confederates toward Europe rendered it advisable for them to seize an opportunity to strike a blow which should resound on the other side of the Atlantic. The reader has not forgotten that at this period the French government . . . had openly extended its sympathies to the enemies of the American Union, and that under the name, sometimes of recognition, sometimes of intervention, it had already been several times anxious to intervene in their favor. The wisdom of the English government which refused to participate in these measures, had prevented France from pursuing so fatal a policy. But the numerous friends of the Confederates did not despair of dragging England into this course and thus securing them the support of these two great European powers. In order to accomplish this, they only asked of their clients some success which could be adroitly turned to advantage; a victory achieved beyond the Potomac would have enabled them to maintain that the North, beaten on her own soil, would never be able to conquer those vast states which had rebelled against her laws." Comte de Paris, II, 308. "This much, one may gather from the *Life of Lord John Russell*, any great victory of the South would probably have accomplished: the Confederacy would have been recognized, as Jefferson Davis longed for it to be, by European powers." Lord Charnwood, *Abraham Lincoln*, 305.

³ Lee's confidence in his commanders was shared by some of his opponents on that fateful day. General Palfrey of the Union army writes: "When we

in men and equipment. Why not again? There was a chance that some blunder of his antagonist would enable him to deliver a decisive counterstroke.¹ Finally, he was mindful that the South's only chance to win lay in an early decision, and rightly held that "in a war in which one of the combatants was so much the weaker in numbers and in material resources, great risks must be run on the chance of gaining great successes." Actuated by these views, Lee instructed his men, described by Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania as "ragged and filthy, but full of fight,"² to make their final preparations for battle.

pass from the men to the commanders, there is more to be said. Lee had Longstreet and D. H. Hill and Hood and Stuart with him, while Jackson and A. P. Hill and McLaws and Walker were hastening to join him. McClellan had for corps commanders Hooker and Sumner, and Porter and Franklin, and Burnside and Mansfield, while his division commanders were Cox, Couch, Doubleday, French, Greene, Hatch, Meade, Morell, Richardson, Ricketts, Rodman, Sedgewick, Slocum, W. F. Smith, Sturgis, Willcox, and Williams. If a student of military history, familiar with the characters who figured in the War of Secession, but happening to be ignorant of the story of the battle of the Antietam, should be told that the men we have named held the high commands there, he would say that with anything like an equality of forces, the Confederates must have won, for their leaders were men who made great names in the war, while the Federal leaders were, with few exceptions, men who never became conspicuous." *Antietam and Fredericksburg*, 52.

¹ "It seems, however, that Lee hoped to do something more than merely fight and win a defensive battle. He believed that if McClellan gave Jackson time to get up, it would be in his power, after repulsing the Federal attack, to deliver such a counterstroke as would hurl McClellan's army back in rout towards the South Mountains, and, by annihilating the only army the Federals had in the East, put an end to the war." Wood and Edwards, 125.

² *Official Records*, 28, 248. "Hardly a soldier had a whole pair of shoes. Many were absolutely barefooted, and refused to go to the rear. The ambulances were full of the footsore and sick. Not a man among all the troops had had a change of underclothing since the army left Gordonsville, and the consequence was that they were dirty, tattered, and full of vermin." *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 10, 509. Sanitary regulations, no matter how strict, seem unable to exterminate the greatest nuisance of a soldier's camp, namely, the body-louse. In the World War "cooties," as the soldiers called them, were ever-present pests. The following description from one of their victims shows how the Confederate soldiers suffered from these industrious comrades: "These insects, which in camp parlance were called graybacks, first made their appearance in the winter of 1861. At first the soldiers were mortified and almost felt disgraced at discovering one of these insects on his person; their crawling made his flesh creep and energetic efforts were made to hide the secret and eliminate the cause. . . . The salamander grayback had more lives than a cat, and propagated faster than a roe-herring. Once lodged in the seams of your clothing, they remained until time mouldered the garments. You might scald, scour, scrub, purify, leave them in seething liquid, or bury the raiment in the ground, but it was wasted

General McClellan's plan of throwing the three corps of Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner¹—a force variously estimated from 30,000 to 43,795—against the Confederate left was well conceived but sluggishly executed. Following the first corps during the night, Mansfield's corps went into bivouac within easy supporting distance of Hooker. Sumner, however, received no orders to cross the Antietam until 7:20

labor, for the insect seemed to enjoy the process and increased and multiplied under it. Every evening in Maryland, when the army bivouacked for the night, hundreds of soldiers could be seen, sitting on the roads or field, half denuded, with their clothing in their laps, busily cracking between the two thumb-nails these creeping nuisances—a hundred full-fledged fathers of families was not considered an unusual haul." *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 10, 510.

¹ There are four ways to reckon Hooker's numbers: First, McClellan (*Official Records*, 27) gives them as 14,856. If the one-fifth that Federal writers insist on be deducted, this will leave Hooker, according to his own chief, 11,885. Second, Hooker himself, while marching to battle, declares that he has from 12,000 to 13,000 (*Ibid.*, 217). Third the September 30 report (*Ibid.*, 28, 336) gives him present for duty, and excluding his sick, special duty men, 12,237. If his losses at Antietam, 2,590, be added, this would fix his number at 14,827. Fourth, his subordinate commanders state their numbers for South Mountain or for Sharpsburg. Meade reports his strength at South Mountain as 3,999 (*Ibid.*, 268). For the same battles Hatch, excluding Gibbon's brigade, which he says was the largest in the division, reports his as 3,500 (*Ibid.*, 220). Then, if we give Gibbon (as the largest brigade) 200 more men than the average brigade of his division, say 1,365, these two divisions numbered at South Mountain, 8,864 men. Their loss in that battle was 888. Therefore, their strength at Sharpsburg should have been 7,976. Ricketts gives his Sharpsburg numbers as 3,158 (*Ibid.*, 259). Therefore, Hooker's total, according to his commanders, should have been 11,134. As it is now impossible to tell which of these reckonings is correct, suppose we accept the average of the four, namely, 12,575. In spite of the fact that Hatch, commanding Doubleday's division, and Meade give their numbers at South Mountain, Palfrey seems not to have seen them. In estimating for Sharpsburg he quotes only Ricketts and Phelps and on this slight basis concludes that Hooker's infantry fell below 9,000." In this calculation he is followed by Allan, and he in turn by Ropes. In like manner, there are four methods of computing Mansfield's strength. First, McClellan (*Ibid.*, 67) reports it at 10,126. If the contested 20 per cent be allowed, this will put the corps at 8,101. Second, the September 30 report (*Ibid.*, 336), after excluding details, sick, arrests, gives as present for duty 8,383. Add the losses at Antietam, namely 1,746, and the corps numbered, just what McClellan reported, 10,129. Third, General Williams, who succeeded General Mansfield in command of the corps, states (*Ibid.*, 27, 477) that he lost 1,744, and that this was one-fourth of the corps. This would make 6,976 men in the battle. Fourth, the division and brigade commanders report as taking the following numbers into battle: Greene (*Ibid.*, 504), with 11 regiments, 2,504; Gordon (*Ibid.*, 498), with 5 regiments, 2,210; This leaves only Crawford's brigade of 6 regiments unreported. It seems fair to put this brigade, with its one more regiment, 300 ahead of its companion brigade, Gordon's, and give it 2,510. This would give the corps 7,224. The average of these four reckonings is 8,107. This certainly ought to be nearly correct. Mc-

a.m., and did not reach the firing line until Hooker was defeated and Mansfield most roughly handled.¹

At dawn Hooker, apparently not waiting to assure himself that either Mansfield or Sumner was in support, threw his men impetuously against Jackson. Doubleday's division on Hooker's right swept down the Hagerstown road against Jackson's own division, now under J. R. Jones, while Meade in the center and Ricketts on the left came in collision with Ewell's division under Lawton and the left brigades of D. H. Hill's division.² Hooker's infantry "with the high ground nearly three-fourths of a mile in advance"³ as an objective, fought its way forward with great determination. The Federal footmen were sustained by the field batteries of the corps and by the heavy guns across the Antietam, which, says Jackson, "opened a severe and damaging fire."⁴ Jackson's experienced campaigners, accustomed to fighting odds clung to their positions with steadfast resolution. As the swaying lines gave or took ground in fiercest contention,

Clellan reports Sumner's corps as numbering 18,813. The 20 per cent reduction would reduce this number to 15,051. The September 20 report, after the deductions for sick, details, imprisoned, states the number present for duty at 13,604. Add the Antietam losses, and the corps should have numbered in the battle 18,742—just about McClellan's figures. The average of these two computations would, of course, give the Second Corps 16,896. The total number of these three corps, according to these averages, would be 37,578, which is 6,217 fewer than the figures given by the commander-in-chief, and 2,422 fewer than stated by Sumner. Committee on Conduct of War, II, (1), 366.

¹ Walker, *Second Army Corps*, 100.

² It is very difficult to estimate accurately the number of Confederates that fought Hooker's division. Jackson's strength, without A. P. Hill, is officially reported. General J. R. Jones, commanding Jackson's own division, reports that his men numbered 1,600. (*Official Records*, 27, 1008.) General Early, who took over the command of Ewell's division after Lawton was wounded, states the strength of Ewell's brigades as follows: Lawton's, 1,115; Trimble's, 700; Hays's 550 (*Ibid.*, 968); Early's 1,000 (*Jubal A. Early*, 149). Early's brigade was, however, not used against Hooker. This would give Jackson, without A. P. Hill, a total of 5,000 men. Hood states that his two divisions numbered 2,000 (*Advance and Retreat*, 43). So far, if we accept the reports of the Confederate commanders, there is accurate data. However, uncertainty prevails as to the number with which D. H. Hill's brigades went to Jackson's aid.

³ Hooker's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 218.

⁴ Jackson's Report, *Ibid.*, 956.

the carnage was sickening. "It was never my fortune," reports Hooker, "to witness a more bloody, dismal battlefield."¹ He lost 2,590 men in about two hours of fighting. General Jackson thus describes his own losses: "At this early hour, General Starke was killed. Colonel Douglass, commanding Lawton's brigade, was also killed. General Lawton, commanding division, and Colonel Walker, commanding brigade, were severely wounded. More than half the brigades of Lawton and Hays were either killed or wounded, and more than a third of Trimble's, and all the regimental commanders in these brigades, except two, were killed or wounded."² At a still early hour Hooker's corps was decisively repulsed,³ its commander wounded, and Mansfield's Twelfth Corps assumed the burden of the battle.

In this first stage of the battle only three regiments and one battalion of North Carolinians were engaged. These were the Twenty-first and the First Battalion of Trimble's brigade and the First and Third regiments of Ripley's brigade. Trimble's brigade, under Colonel James A. Walker, offered such steadfast resistance to Hooker that it lost 228 men out of 700 taken in action.⁴ The losses of the North Carolina troops in this unit were not so great as were those of the other three regiments, because in the early part of the battle Colonel

¹ Hooker's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 218.

² Jackson's Report, *Ibid.*, 956.

³ Doubleday reports: "My own command had been fighting since daylight, and being out of ammunition were obliged to fall back. Patrick's brigade covered our retreat. . . . It was soon followed by Gibbon's and Phelps's brigades, exhausted as they were by long continued fighting." (*Ibid.*, 225.) Meade reports: "I directed the various divisions to be withdrawn as soon as they were relieved, and to be assembled and reorganized on the ridge in our rear." (*Ibid.*, 270.) Hooker's remaining division, that of Ricketts, attacked against the angle where Lawton's right joined D. H. Hill's left. His three brigades suffered frightfully—Hartsuff losing 599 men, Duryea 327, and Christian 254 (*Ibid.*, 190). Hough, in his *History of Duryea's Brigade*, 87, says of that brigade: "For a time they drove the enemy before them, but heavy reinforcements were brought up, and they were in turn compelled to fall back, leaving long lines of dead across the fields. . . . The heroic brigade, when it was finally relieved, retired from the field with only fifteen or twenty men with their four colors."

⁴ General J. A. Walker's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 978.

Walker threw them and the Twenty-first Georgia behind a stout post-and-rail fence.¹ General Early reports that these two regiments and the Twelfth Georgia broke the Federal line by their concentrated fire.² At sight of the sagging Federal first line, they joined the other regiments in an eager advance, but their weight was not sufficient to carry them far in face of the combined artillery and infantry fire that met them, and they were forced back to their original position. The commanding officer of the Twenty-first, Captain Frederick P. Miller of Forsyth County, was killed in the charge.

It will be recalled that Ripley's brigade, containing the First and Third North Carolina regiments, was holding D. H. Hill's front line immediately on Trimble's right.³ When Hooker's pressure on Jackson became violent, General Hill ordered Ripley to engage alongside of Trimble. According to the narratives of Captain Thruston of the Third North Carolina Regiment, and of Colonel H. A. Brown of the First Regiment, Ripley's brigade advanced to the burning Mumma house, where sixteen men and officers of the Third North Carolina were stricken down by the explosion of one shell,⁴ at a very early hour. After an hour's heavy shelling had been endured there, the brigade was wheeled to the left and advanced to join

¹ General J. A. Walker's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 977.

² Early's Report, *Ibid.*, 968.

³ In reference to the time at which Hill's brigade entered the strife, Colonel Allan (*Army of Northern Virginia*, 388) writes: "It is difficult to locate the time and place of the first entrance of these brigades into action." Later, writers have removed some of these uncertainties. Ripley, for example wrote that his brigade went into action at 8 a.m. Colquitt, however, whose brigade was on Ripley's right, reported that he joined battle at 7 o'clock, and that Ripley's brigade was then engaged. (*Official Records*, 27, 1053.) Captain, afterwards Colonel, S. D. Thruston, a cool and intelligent officer, who succeeded Colonel DeRosset in command of the Third North Carolina, states in a carefully prepared narrative, that Ripley's brigade was in action prior to Hood's attack at 6 a.m. and that when Jackson was reinforced by Hood, Colquitt, and MacRae, Ripley's men were still north of the pike and contending for every inch of it. (Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 186.) This is confirmed by the narratives of Colonel H. A. Bown and Colonel W. L. DeRosset.

⁴ Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 225.

Trimble's right, for Trimble's men were fighting almost northward. After a stationary engagement for a time, Ripley's regiment joined, at 7:30, in Jackson's rush forward through the great corn field in front of the Dunker Chapel, whereby Hooker was repulsed and Colquitt shared in the retirement that followed Mansfield's arrival with the Twelfth Corps. It seems from the regimental histories that Ripley was pitted against one of Ricketts's brigades in the Hooker contest¹ and against Crawford and Greene's forces in the Mansfield struggle.² Captain Thruston gives this account of Ripley's engagement: "Jackson's troops were in the woods around and west of the Dunkard Church. . . . As we came up, he advanced and drove the enemy back across the corn field and into a piece of woods east and north of the church; here the enemy, being reinforced by Mansfield's Corps . . . returned to the assault, and the fight became desperate for an hour. So tenaciously did these brave troops cling to the earth that, when reinforced by Hood and two brigades of D. H. Hill, they were still north of the pike and contending for every inch of ground between it and the corn field in front. At the moment when their ammunition was absolutely exhausted, and all had been used from the boxes and pockets of their

¹ "About the time of Meade's advance Ricketts became hotly engaged on the left of Meade and with the division of Hill, which had come up on Jackson's right." General Gates in *Ulster Guard*, 320. "Ricketts of his command met a similar fate on the left, but held position on the edge of the east woods, confronted by Lawton and part of D. H. Hill's division." *History of the 125th Pennsylvania Regiment*.

² Major Gould, in his *History of the Tenth Maine* of Crawford's command, says: "Jackson put in his reserves and called upon D. H. Hill to come over and help him, and Hill, having nothing else to do, did so, as we Tenth Mainers know to our cost." "It can be safely stated that we fought either Colquitt or Ripley." *Ibid.*, p. 252. In spite of very great losses, the coolness of this retreat is illustrated by Colonel H. A. Brown of the First North Carolina Regiment. He writes: "The manner of this retreat was slow and in order and under General Hill's personal supervision. Observing an abandoned caisson, he, Hill, ordered the soldiers to remove it from the field, remarking, 'We will not leave the enemy so much as a wheel.' The retreat was continued to the Dunkard Church, where after being supplied with ammunition, our lines were reformed." Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 142.

wounded and dead comrades, the reinforcements of Hill and Hood, above referred to, came up and stayed the tide for a time. . . . Of the twenty-seven officers who went into action on that memorable morning, all save three were disabled and seven killed.”¹ Ripley’s brigade lost 636 men; the First North Carolina 160, and the Third 253.²

When General Hooker found that his corps was being worsted, he ordered General Mansfield to hasten his Twelfth Corps to the rescue.³ Although the attacks of the First and Twelfth corps somewhat overlapped, the advent of Mansfield may, for the sake of clearness, be called the second stage of the battle. Mansfield’s right, under Williams, rested on the Hagerstown pike and his left, under Greene, extended southward to the Mumma house in D. H. Hill’s front.⁴ As the veteran Mansfield personally led forward his men in close array, the Confederates anxiously looked about for their reserves. With the exception of Early’s brigade, which had been guarding Stuart’s batteries, every one of Jackson’s regiments and Ripley’s brigade had taken part in the ghastly encounter. Hood’s two worn brigades under Law and Wofford were the only reserves in sight. G. T. Anderson’s single brigade and General J. G. Walker’s two brigades were on the way to the left, but still unavailable.

In answer to Lawton’s call, Hood’s men rushed into the raging, crashing contention, where, as General

¹ Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 188. Captain Thruston thus eulogizes the men of his regiment: “Thus was fought, and success uly, the battle of the Third North Carolina Infantry at Sharpsburg; and if it had been retired from service and had not fired another gun, the endurance, fearlessness, tenacity, and valor of that day would have been a crown of glory suitable to adorn the bravest of the brave.”

² *Official Records*, 27, 813. The losses at Sharpsburg for this brigade can be given, as it had no losses to speak of at South Mountain.

³ Mansfield’s successor, General A. S. Williams, reports: “Before reaching the position of General Hooker’s corps, information was brought that his reserves were all engaged, and that he was hard pressed by the enemy. The columns were hastened up, and deployed with all the rapidity that circumstances would permit.” *Ibid.*, 475.

⁴ Report of General Williams, *Ibid.*

Palfrey says, the two lines had almost torn each other to pieces.¹ General Hill, seeing the critical condition of Jackson's combat, ventured to strip still further his front line, and sent Colquitt's and Garland's North Carolina brigade, now commanded by Colonel D. K. MacRae, to join Ripley and prolong Hood's right.² The going of these two brigades, so sorely were the Confederates pressed for troops, left Hill with only the North Carolina brigade of G. B. Anderson and the Alabama brigade of Rodes to hold Lee's center. Just as Mansfield's men were nearing the firing zone, Hood and Hill's men dashed against Meade and Ricketts. The charge succeeded in driving back the Federals so steadily that, as soon as Mansfield approached, Meade, who had succeeded to the command of the First Corps on account of a wound to Hooker, withdrew his corps³ for organization to the front of the north woods, and behind a thirty-gun battery that the Federals established there.

Williams's two brigades under Crawford and Gordon drove successively and fiercely at Hood and the remnants of Ripley's brigade, while Greene's two brigades, working their way southward and westward, pressed steadfastly against D. H. Hill. Henderson thus views the contest: "The struggle was long and bloody. The men stood like duelists, firing and receiving the fire at fifty or a hundred paces. Crawford lost 1,000 men without gaining a foot of ground; but Gordon turned the scale, and Hood's brigades were gradually forced back through the corn field to the

¹ *Antietam and Fredericksburg*, 76.

² Captain Thruston's narrative gives this example of the spirit of Ripley's men: "As Colquitt's brigade dashed in splendidly on our right, the joyful yell, 'Come on boys! We've no ammunition, but will go with you,' was heard over the din of battle." Clark, ed., *op. cit.*, 1, 188.

³ General McClellan reports of the condition of the First Corps on its withdrawal: "One division of Sumner's and all of Hooker's corps on the right had, after fighting most valiantly for several hours, been overpowered by numbers and driven back in great disorder, and much scattered, so that they were for the time somewhat demoralized." *Official Records*, 27, 66.

Dunkard Church. A great gap had now opened in Jackson's line. Jones's division, its flanks uncovered by Hood's retreat, found itself compelled to seek a new position. D. H. Hill's brigades, in the same plight, gave ground toward Sharpsburg; and Greene, following in pursuit, actually crossed the turnpike, and penetrated the west wood, but neither Hooker nor Mansfield was able to support him, and unassisted he could make no progress."¹ This contest in the blood-dyed corn field and adjacent woods shattered the ranks of both contenders. On the Confederate side Hood's and Hill's losses were grievous. So thick lay his stricken that Hood was in constant fear lest his horse step on a dead or wounded comrade. Colquitt's brigade of Hill's division lost one-half of its men, and all but one of its field officers.² Ripley's brigade saw 536 of its men drop their muskets from wounds and death.³ The Third North Carolina of this brigade lost 253 of its men. On the Federal side Mansfield's corps had 1,746 men cut down in about one and a half hours.

[Here ends Dr. Hill's manuscript.]

¹ *Stonewall Jackson*, II, 248.

² Colquitt's Report, *Official Records*, 27, 1054.

³ *Ibid.*, 813. As Ripley had practically no losses at South Mountain, the casualties enumerated in the records occurred at Antietam.

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
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